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Terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that encompasses elements of 
politics, economics, social, and ideology, driving people to commit violent acts and 
become involved in such activity. As of today, the existence and latent threat of Islamist 
terrorism still inflict global society with formidable challenges, and one way to overcome 
such challenges is by leveraging our knowledge on the multi-dimensional, determining 
factors/elements that lead people to commit terrorist attacks and other radical-related 
activities.  
In other words, as our struggle against terrorism is a global endeavour that may 
last a generation or more, leveraging our knowledge on such multi-dimensional, 
determining factors/elements will increase our understanding of the underlying causes 
and patterns that continue to inspire jihadist terrorism. However, it is wrong to equate 
the religion of Islam with terrorism. Perhaps most importantly, the Islamic tradition is all-
encompassing, combining religious and secular life and law. This surely complicates 
attempts to understand the Islamist ideology and counter-measures to it solely through 
the lens of traditional Western political science. Therefore, a distinction must be made 
between the religion of Islam and a set of often-conflicting political ideologies known as 
Islamism, where many forms of them are non-radical, reformists or gradualists. That is 
why, Islamist extremists who advocate acts of terrorism may be properly termed Islamist 
terrorists, who seek to cloth their acts in the trappings of the Islamic religion. In this 
case, they use their own religious-based arguments to justify their violent acts. 
This Ph.D. thesis examines the multi-dimensional factors that lead to the 
existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia by focusing on the 
individuals who committed series of deadly terrorist attacks from 2002 – 2009 and some 
other radical-related activities in Indonesia until 2017. Such factors encompass at least 
the economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social 
network, state repression (“stick”), and government incentive (“carrot”), all which are the 
key variables in determining the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism. 
Through a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis using qualitative and quantitative 
research methodologies (including the social network analysis), this Ph.D. thesis will 
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specifically examine what factors drove people with the association to Jemaah Islamiya 
(JI) and radical-Islamist movements to commit and become involved in terrorist attacks? 
and why and how might such factors/elements influence these people to commit 
terrorist attacks in the future? The combined qualitative, quantitative, and social network 
analysis in this Ph.D. thesis has proven and confirmed the main hypothesis, where the 
existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia are indeed caused by the 
intertwining interaction of these multi-dimensional factors instead of being otherwise.  
The ideological-related variables followed by the social network-related ones are 
proven as the two most significant factors in the pattern of Islamist terrorism in 
Indonesia. In other words, the set of economic, social, and political grievances will not 
cause Islamist terrorism in Indonesia to occur if there are no intervening variables: the 
social network and radical ideology being involved in the equation. Subsequently, the 
other two moderating variables also play its own role, namely the state repression and 
the government incentive. According to various examinations of multivariate statistical 
analysis in this Ph.D. thesis, these two variables on their own will not cause the Islamist 
terrorism to occur in Indonesia, but when combined with the existence of social network 
and radical ideology, these two variables are proven as the moderating variables to 
exacerbate the occurrence of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia.  
In conclusion, by looking at this current pattern, it could be predicted that 
Indonesia herself is still likely to become both the producer and battlefield of global-
Islamist terrorism in near future. Therefore, the Indonesian national counterterrorism 
policy and strategy need to be updated and well integrated with the Indonesian national 
policy and grand strategy to better address the existence and latent threat of Islamist 
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SELECT DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARIES, AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ABRI: Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (In English: Indonesian Armed Forces). 
 
Abu Sayyaf: A Jihadist terror group based in and around Jolo and Basilan islands in 
the southwestern part of the Philippines. It is in this area that Moro groups (e.g., the 
Moro National Liberation Front) have been engaged in the insurgency seeking for an 
independent province in the Philippines. Abu Sayyaf is considered violent and has been 
designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, United Arab Emirates, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
 
A.H:  “After hijra.” The Islamic calendar starts in the year that Muhammad made the hijra 
from Mecca to Medina. 
 
Al-Jaz’ara:  An Islamist trend that is limited to Algeria and inspired by the thoughts of a 
French-educated Algerian intellectual, Malek Bennabi. The ideology of al-Jaz’ara is 
characterized by its nationalist-Islamist agenda and its rejection of any forms of non-
Algerian Islamist interpretations of Islam and/or influences in Algeria.2 
 
Al-Qaeda: A militant Sunni Islamist multi-national organization founded in 1988 by 
Osama bin Laden and several other Arab volunteers who fought against the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The meaning of al-Qaeda in English is the “base”, 
the “foundation” or the “fundament” and alternatively spelled al-Qaida, al-Qæda and 
sometimes al-Qa'ida. Al-Qaeda operates as a network made up of Islamist extremists, 
mainly the Salafi jihadist ones. Likewise, Al-Qaeda has also been designated as a 
terrorist group by the United Nations Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the European Union, the United States, Russia, India, and 
various other countries including Indonesia. 
 
                                                   
2 For more, see (Ashour 2009), 10. 
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Antiterrorism: Defensive counterterrorism. 
 
AQAM: Al-Qaeda and its associated movements. 
 
AQAP:  Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula. 
 
AQIM:  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 
 
Archipelago:  Another popular call for Republic of Indonesia. 
 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika:  The national motto of Republic of Indonesia. It means the unity 
in diversity. 
 
BIN: Badan Intelejen Negara (In English: State Intelligence Agency). 
 
BNPT: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Teror Republik Indonesia. (In English: 
Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency). 
 
Boko Haram: An Islamist extremist group based in northeastern Nigeria that has also 
been active in Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon. Whilst the group had alleged links 
to al-Qaeda, in March 2015 it announced its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL). Boko Haram was ranked as the world's deadliest terror group by the 
Global Terrorism Index in 2015. 
 
Caliph:  An Arabic word that means “leader.” The term caliph specifically refers to the 
successors of Muhammad who served as the political and spiritual heads of Islam. 
 
Caliphate:  The “office or dominion” of the caliph. The last caliphate was based in 
Turkey until its fall in 1924. 
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Counterterrorism: Deterrent, offensive, and defensive measures, both active and 
passive, which are designed to deter, diminish the effects of, or defeat terrorism.  
 
DI: Darul Islam. 
 
DI/TII: Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia. 
 
Densus 88: Detasemen Khusus Anti Teror 88 Polri (In English: Indonesian National 
Police Anti Terror Detachment 88).3 
 
Deradicalization: A process of relative change within Islamist movements, one in which 
a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to 
achieve political goals, whilst also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, 
political, and economic changes within a pluralist context.4  
 
Extreme/Extremism in Islam: Essentially extremism is any political theories that favor 
uncompromising policies or actions. For this Ph.D. thesis project, extremism in Islam 
refers to the selective and extreme interpretation of Islamic texts that are used for 
advancing certain (radical) political agenda. 
 
Hadith:  The record of Muhammad’s words and actions. This material was committed to 
memory for several generations and then collected and recorded by Muslim scholars. 
The most reliable/valid collections were the ones put together by al-Bukhari (A.H. 194 – 
256) and Muslim (A.h. 202 – 261). 
 
Five Pillars of Radical Islamist Philosophy:  The guiding principles of radical Muslims 
as determined by a content analysis of key writings by Islamist radicals (particularly 
Sayyid Qutb, Abdul Salam Faraj, Dr. Salah Sariah, and Al-Jihad leaders who wrote 
                                                   
3 The Indonesian National Police uses the terminology “antiterrorism” instead of “counterterrorism” 
although the meaning of Indonesian government definition of “overcoming terrorism” is more leaning 
towards “counterterrorism” instead of “antiterrorism.”  
 
4 For more, see (Ashour 2009), 5. 
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Constitution of Al-Jihad). These pillars are to obey no law but Islamic law, infidels are all 
around, Islam must rule, jihad is the only way to win, and faith is the reason. 
 
Ijma’ah:  Other than Quran and Hadith as the main sources of Islamic law, there is 
ijma’ah that means “a group in agreement.” It refers to the practice in Islamic law 
whereby new law is established for situations not specifically covered in the Quran or 
sunnah. 
 
Ikhwanism:  The term that literally means “Brother-y.” This term is used to describe a 
Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated group or individual. Correspondingly, the term also refers 
to a set of ideological and behavioural characteristics that were established between the 
early 1970s and the late 1980s. These characteristics include the non-violence 
movements against national regimes, the acceptance of electoral democracy, and the 
relative pragmatism. Ikhwanism transcends the organizational ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt or any of its autonomous branches in Jordan, Syria, Libya, Iraq, 
Palestine, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, Kuwait, and other countries. Since the 1990s 
Ikhwanism become popular within several Muslim-majority countries, including 
Indonesia.5 
 
Insurgency:  An insurgency at very least can be defined as an armed political effort with 
a specific aim to overthrow a constituted ruling authority or the political status-quo. 
Correspondingly, an insurgent is someone who violently rebels against a “recognized” 
ruling authority or the political status-quo.  
 
ISIS: A Salafi Jihadist unrecognized state and militant group that follows a 
fundamentalist, Wahhabi doctrine of Sunni Islam. This group has been designated as a 
terrorist organization by the United Nations and many individual countries including 
Indonesia. ISIS is also known widely as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
                                                   
5 For more, see Ibid., 7. 
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Jabhat al-Nusra: A Sunni Islamist terrorist organization that has been fighting against 
Syrian Government forces in the Syrian Civil War, with the specific aim to establish an 
Islamist state in Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra was the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda until 2016, 
and it also operates in Lebanon. It is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by 
the United Nations Security Council and many other countries including Indonesia. 
 
JI:  Jemaah Islamiya a.k.a. Jemaa Islamiyah; Jema’a Islamiyah; Jemaa Islamiyya; 
Jema’a Islamiyya; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Jema’a Islamiyyah; Jemaah Islamiah; Jemaah 
Islamiyah; Jema’ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema’ah Islamiyyah is a terrorist 
group seeking for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate spanning over Indonesia, 
Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines.  
 
Jihad:  A noun whose meaning is the act of striving, applying oneself, struggling, 
persevering. Grammatically, an individual involved in jihad can also sometimes be 
called a mujahid (Arabic: مجاهد), the plural of which is mujahideen (مجاهدين). However, 
mujahidin and jihadists are still two very different terms. The word jihad appears 
frequently in the Quran, often in the idiomatic expression of striving in the way of God 
(al-jihad fi sabil Allah). There is no single clear-cut consensus among Muslims and 
scholars pertaining to the definition and meaning of jihad. However, it is also generally 
believed that jihad has two meanings: an inner and spiritual struggle (the greater jihad) 
and an outer physical struggle against the enemies of Islam (the lesser jihad) that can 
take either a violent or non-violent (peaceful) manifestation. 
 
Jihadism:  A radical ideology within Islamism that stresses the use of violence as a 
legitimate, and in some versions the legitimate method of political and social change. 
Jihadists mostly use selective and literal Salafi interpretations of Islamic sources, hence 
the term “Salafi Jihadist.”6 
 
                                                   
6 For more, see Ibid., 8 – 9. 
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Lemhannas R.I.:  Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia (In English:  The 
National Resilience Institute of Republic of Indonesia). 
 
LDK: Lembaga Da’wah Kampus. (In English: Campus Islamic Da’wah Fellowship). 
 
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front. 
 
MMI: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (In English: The Mujahidin Council of Indonesia) 
 
MMIB: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (In English: The Mujahidin Council of Western 
Indonesia). 
 
MMIT: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (In English: The Mujahidin Council of Eastern 
Indonesia). 
 
Moderation:  A process of relative change within Islamist movements that is mainly 
concerned with the attitudes of these movements towards democracy. Moderation can 
take place on two levels: on the ideological level, the key transformation is the 
acceptance of democratic principles, most importantly the legitimacy of pluralism and 
the peaceful alternation of power. On the behavioural level, the key transformation is 
participation in electoral politics (if allowed). Different levels of moderation can occur 
within both non-violent radical and moderate Islamist movements unevenly and across 
issues areas.7 
 
Muhammadiyah: A major Islamist non-governmental organization in Indonesia. The 
organization was founded in 1912 by Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan in the city of Yogyakarta 
as a reformist socio-religious movement, advocating ijtihad (the individual interpretation 
of Quran and Sunnah) as opposed to taqlid (the acceptance of traditional interpretations 
by the ulama). Since its establishment, Muhammadiyah has adopted a reformist 
platform by mixing religious and secular education, primarily as a way to promote the 
                                                   
7 For more, see Ibid., 6 – 7.  
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upward mobility of Muslims towards a modern community and to purify Indonesian 
Islam of local syncretism via a quasi-Wahhabi movement. Muhammadiyah has been 
well known for its educational system, as it continues to support the local culture and to 
promote religious tolerance in Indonesia. Some of its higher educational institutions are 
attended mostly by non-Muslims, especially in East Nusa Tenggara and Papua 
provinces. The group also runs a large chain of charity hospitals, and operated 128 
universities as of the late 1990s. According to various sources, as of 2008 
Muhammadiyah was deemed the second largest Islamist organization in Indonesia with 
the approximate 29 million of members. 
 
NU (Nahdlatul Ulama): A traditionalist Sunni Islam movement in Indonesia following 
the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence. NU was established on January 31, 1926 in 
Surabaya as a response to the rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Islamist 
modernism in Indonesia. Some sources indicate that NU is the largest independent 
Islamist organization in the world with 40 million of membership in 2003. NU also serves 
its function as a charitable body providing funding for schools, as well as hospitals and 
many other organizing communities to help alleviating the poverty. In addition to its 
adherence to the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence, NU follows the ideology of Ahl as-
Sunna Wa al-Jama'ah, which takes the middle sect between the extreme aqli 
(rationalist) and the extreme naqli (scripturalist). NU believes that the source of ideas is 
not only the Quran and the Sunnah, but also the ability of the human mind to couple 
with empirical realities. NU has been described by the international media and the 
Western world as a progressive, liberal, and pluralistic Islamist movement.  
 
NII: Negara Islam Indonesia (In English: The Islamist State of Indonesia). 
 
NKRI: Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (In English: The Unitary State of Republic 
of Indonesia). 
 
Pancasila:  The national and state ideology of Republic of Indonesia. 
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PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Note: An Islamist party in Indonesia). 
 
PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Note: An Islamist party in Indonesia). 
 
PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Note: An Islamist party in Indonesia). 
 
Polri:  Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (In English: Indonesian National Police). 
 
Quran:  The words of Allah (the Arabic word of God) according to the Islamic theology 
that was revelead to Muhammad in seventh century Arabia. The Quran is 114 chapters 
long. 
 
Radical/Radicalism:  Essentially radicalism is the advocacy of extreme forms of change 
to achieve political means or refers to beliefs that constitute a considerable departure 
from traditional and established beliefs. For the purpose of this Ph.D. thesis project, it 
refers to the most fundamental roots of certain phenomena, including the Islamist belief 
system (e.g., the ideology) that are not shared in/by the most social streams, and 
implemented through non-gradual, radical, extreme, or revolutionary ways.8 Radicalism 
is also about the opinions and behaviour of people who favor extreme changes 
especially in the government (e.g., radical political ideas and behaviour). Radicalism 
becomes problematic when its manifestation conflicts with social norms and violates the 
positive law enacted in the society. 
 
Radicalization: A process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological 
and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles 
(including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and 
                                                   
8 The term belief system is usually used to refer to something that is broader than what is meant by the 
term ideology. A belief system is usually defined as a set of principles and ideas shared by a group of 
people, and which tend to influence their actions. Meanwhile, an ideology is defined as the set of ideas 
that underlie the belief system itself. Therefore, an ideology is less broad than a belief system. Although it 
can be difficult to differentiate between the two, it is usually acceptable to say that ideologies are less 
broad than belief systems. 
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political pluralism) and possibly to the utilization of violence, or to an increase in the 
levels of violence, to achieve political goals.9 
 
Radical-Islamist groups:  Groups that aim for revolutionary social, political, and 
economic changes and refuse to work within the established state institutions. Radical-
Islamist movements can use violent and/or non-violent methods to achieve their goals. 
Radical-Islamists could also be called revolutionaries, jihadists, extremists or 
exclusivists. In order to reach the stage of being radical, they have gone through a 
process of relative change in which such groups undergo ideological and/or behavioural 
transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful 
alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and 
possibly to the utilization of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, in order 
to achieve political goals.10 
 
Salafism:  This is a derivative of the word salaf (predecessors or ancestors). Salafism is 
also a school of thought in Sunni Islam attributing its beliefs to the first three generations 
of Muslims: the sahaba (companions of Muhammad) and the two succeeding 
generations (the seventh and eighth century). Literally, the term Salafi means a follower 
of the salaf and Salafism believes that pure Islam was practiced by these three 
generations. “Innovations” in religious matters are unacceptable to Salafists. Vaguely 
and broadly defined, those “innovations” could range from modern ideas like democracy 
to different understandings of Islam like mystical-Islam (Sufism) or Shi’ite Islam. The 
words “Salafism, Salafi, and Salafist” are used interchangeably in this Ph.D. thesis.11 
 
Shari’a Law: The body of divine law in Islam that governs the religious and secular life 
of Muslims. Some Muslims argue that the Shari’a is the only legitimate basis for law. 
The Shari’a is also called the Islamic law. 
                                                   
9 For more, see Ibid., 5. 
 
10 For more, see Ibid., 4 – 5.   
 
11 For more, see Ibid., 7 – 8.  
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SO-LIC: Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflicts 
 
Sufism: Islamic sect that was most popular during the time of ibn Taymiyyah. It focuses 
on the inner, personal life of Muslims and rejects jihad as a physical battle in favour of 
jihad as a battle within oneself to follow the teachings of Islam. It was Rabi’a al-adawiya 
(death in A.H. 801), a Muslim woman who proposed that Muslims should focus on the 
love of Allah, not the fear of Allah. This was a major philosophical step for Sufism. 
 
Sunnah:  The words and actions of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam. The record of 
these words and actions are called hadith. 
 
Taymiyyah, Ibn (1263 – 1328): A conservative Islamic scholar who is often quoted by 
radicals. He called for Muslims to fight jihad against the Mongols who had conquered 
the Islamic caliphate. 
 
Terrorism: As a form of political violence, terrorism can be interpreted as a violent act 
taking place outside the normal bounds of civil law and conventional military conduct. 
Terrorism is often linked to an insurgency or guerrilla warfare but is not necessarily a 
tactic or technique required of an insurgency or guerrilla campaign. Conceptually and 
practically, insurgency and guerrilla warfare can also overlap. However, the guerrilla 
warfare is one mean/method by which the insurgency is conducted. In other words, an 
insurgency is usually a bigger phenomenon than guerrilla warfare in terms of tactics, 
operations or strategy. Although these forms of conflict may often have similar goals, 
differences exist among insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. Therefore, the 
common denominator of terrorism is the use of violence towards civilians to send the 
message to achieve political goals. In other words, at the very least, terrorism can be 
defined as a criminal violent/armed tactic used to send messages and to achieve 
political goals via targeting civilians. 
 
Takfirism:  An ideology that in some respects overlaps with jihadism and Salafism. 
Etymologically it derives from the word takfir (excommunication), and it is also the act of 
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accusing a Muslim of abandoning Islam and becoming an infidel or an apostate 
(murrtadd). Therefore, it has the basic assumption that the whole Muslim community (a 
village, a city, a country or the global Muslim community) is infidels/apostates, unless 
proven otherwise.12 
 
Togut or Taghut: In general, this is an Islamic concept that refers to any voluntary 
allegiances other than to Allah and His commands. However, in another perspective 
taghut is more complex than that. As an Islamist/jihadist literature, taghut is understood 
as anything/anyone being worshipped or anything/anyone that rules but non-Shari’a 
conforming laws. 
 
TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia (In English: Indonesian National Military) 
 
TNI-AD:  Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat (In English: Indonesian Army) 
 
TNI-AL:  Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut (In English: Indonesian Navy) 
 
TNI-AU:  Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Udara (In English: Indonesian Air Force) 
 
U.K.: The United Kingdom 
 
U.S.: The United States 
 
UUD 1945: Undang Undang Dasar 1945 (the constitution of Republic of Indonesia) 
 





                                                   
12 For more, see Ibid., 9 – 10. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The Outline of Thesis 
 
1.1.1 The Outline of Statement of Aims and Objectiv es 
 
Terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that encompasses elements of 
politics, economics, social, and ideology, driving people to commit violent acts and 
become involved in such activity. As of today, the existence and latent threat of Islamist 
terrorism still inflict global society with formidable challenges, and one way to overcome 
such challenges is by leveraging our knowledge on the multi-dimensional, determining 
factors/elements that lead people to commit terrorist attacks and other radical-related 
activities. In other words, as our struggle against terrorism is a global endeavour that 
may last a generation or more, leveraging our knowledge on such multi-dimensional 
aspects, determining factors/elements will increase our understanding of the underlying 
causes that continue to inspire jihadist terrorism. Correspondingly, according to Hamed 
El-Said, it is fundamental for us to address the underlying problem of violent religious 
extremism/terrorism to better formulate and implement more effective counter-
radicalization efforts.13 
However, it is wrong to equate the religion of Islam with terrorism. Perhaps most 
importantly, the Islamic tradition is all-encompassing, combining religious and secular 
life and law.14 According to John Kelsay (2009), Islam can be described from a Salafi 
perspective (a deep understanding of prophet Mohammed's intent, purpose, and politics 
aside), whilst at the same time, Islam can also be studied theologically or politically. 
This surely complicates attempts to understand the Islamist ideology and counter-
measures to it solely through the lens of traditional Western political science.15  
Therefore, a distinction must be made between the religion of Islam and a set of 
often-conflicting political ideologies known as Islamism, where many forms of them are 
                                                   
13 For more, see (El-Said n.d.). 
  
14 For more, see (Sauter and Carafano 2012), 291 – 292. 
 
15 Ibid., 292.  
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non-radical, reformists or gradualists. That is why, Islamist extremists who advocate 
acts of terrorism may be properly termed Islamist terrorists, who seek to cloth their acts 
in the trappings of the Islamic religion.16 In this case, they use their own religious-based 
arguments to justify their violent acts. According to Ashour (2009), radical-Islamist 
groups aim for revolutionary social, political, and economic changes and refuse to work 
within the established state institutions. Radical-Islamist movements can use violent 
and/or non-violent methods to achieve their goals. Radical-Islamists could also be 
called revolutionaries, jihadists, extremists or exclusivists.17 In order to reach the stage 
of being radical, they have gone through a process of relative change in which such 
groups undergo ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection 
of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy 
of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilization of violence, or to an 
increase in the levels of violence, in order to achieve political goals. 
Correspondingly, one way to understand why people commit terrorist attacks or 
are involved in such activity is by exploring these factors/elements and the interplay 
among them including to how they correlate with and affect each other. Specifically, 
such multi-dimensional factors/elements and their interplay encompass at least 
economic grievances, social grievances, and political grievances, radical ideology, 
social network, state repression, and government incentive, all which are the key 








                                                   
16 Ibid., 291. 
 
17 For more discussion on definitions and typology, see (Ashour 2009), 4 – 11.  
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H0: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is not 
caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political 
grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government 
incentive. 
 
Ha: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is 
caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political 
grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government 
incentive. 
 
Therefore, by referring to Omar Ashour’s definition in his book, The 
Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (2009), the 
working definition of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia throughout this academic research 
is a form of political violence that is partly manifested in the form of terrorism as a 
criminal armed tactic that rejects democracy and pluralism whilst aiming to make non-
gradual, sudden, deep socio-politico-economic changes. In other words, what it means 
by the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia (as the dependent variable in this Ph.D. thesis) is 
the ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and 
the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). 
The Islamist terrorism in Indonesia can also be defined as one form of armed 
Islamism and a part of larger radical-Islamist movements that is legitimating the violent 
action by selective and extreme interpretation of Islamic texts. However, it does not 
suggest that the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is a part of only one movement. The 
different objective, organizational structures, leadership, scopes, and scales of various 
Islamist terrorist groups in Indonesia, reflect the reality that Islamist terrorism in 
Indonesia is not a monolithic entity.  
Consistent with Ashour’s definition of radical-Islamist movements that can use 
violent and/or non-violent methods to achieve their goals, Islamist terrorism in Indonesia 
also engages in violent and non-violent ways (e.g., the hatred speech/da’wah inciting or 
glorifying terrorism). The injustice terrorists seek to address may be social or economic, 
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but it is nonetheless blamed on a political authority.18 Throughout this academic 
research, the word extremism/extremist, radicalism/radical, violence/violent, and 
jihadism/jihadist will be used interchangeably to describe the Islamist terrorism in 
Indonesia along with its associated movements, networks, groups, and individuals.19
                                                   
18 For further examining that the main element of terrorism is indeed the politics as opposed to other 
dimensions, see (Long 1990), 4 and 5. 
 
19 The terms mean different things in the literature. So, their meanings depend on the social context. 
Extremists can be violent and non-violent. Political Violence can be terrorism or a different type (coups, 
insurgencies, etc). Radicalism can be non-jihadist (Marxist, liberal, ethno-nationalist, and non-jihadi 
Islamists). So, we must careful when using these terms, and instead using the qualifier when we are in 
doubt to give us the precise meaning of such words, thus making them in line with certain social 
phenomena we are trying to understand and explain.   
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Figure 1.1 An Overlapping Visualization of Radicalism, Extremism, Jihadism, and Terrorism.20 
 
 
Source: Self-made.  
  
                                                   
20 See (A. P. Schmid, Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin? 2014) 
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Essentially, radicalism is the advocacy of extreme forms of change 
to achieve political means or refers to beliefs that constitute a 
considerable departure from traditional and established beliefs. For 
this Ph.D. thesis project, it refers to the most fundamental roots of 
certain phenomena, including the ideology (and belief) system that 
is not shared in/by the most social streams, and implemented 
through non-gradual, radical, extreme, or revolutionary ways. In 
other words, radicalism is also about the opinions and behaviour of 
people who favor extreme changes especially in government (e.g., 
radical political ideas and behaviour). Radicalism becomes 
problematic when its manifestation conflicts with most social norms 






Essentially, extremism is any political theories that favor 
uncompromising policies or actions. For this Ph.D. thesis project, 
extremism in Islam refers to the selective and extreme 
interpretation of Islamic texts that are used for advancing certain 









Referring to the religious duty of Muslim believer to maintain and 
spread the religion of Islam. In Arabic, the word jihād is a noun 
whose meaning is the act of “striving, applying oneself, struggling, 
persevering.” Grammatically, an individual involved in jihad can 
also sometimes be called a mujahid (Arabic: مجاهد), the plural of 
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which is mujahideen (مجاهدين). However, mujahidin and jihadists are 
still two very different terms, and indeed their interpretation of jihad 
are not necessarily same. The word jihad appears frequently in the 
Quran, often in the idiomatic expression of “striving in the way of 
God (al-jihad fi sabil Allah).” The striving in the way of God can also 
be interpreted as the act to serve the God’s purposes on this earth.  
There is no a clear-cut consensus among Muslims and scholars 
pertaining to the definition and meaning of jihad. However, it is also 
generally believed that jihad has two meanings: an inner and 
spiritual struggle (the greater jihad) and an outer physical struggle 
against the enemies of Islam (the lesser jihad) that can take either 
a violent or non-violent (peaceful) manifestation. Jihad is also often 
translated as the Holy War although this term is still controversial 
and debatable. According to Professor Benard Lewis, most 
classical theologians, jurists, and specialists in the Hadith 
understood and defined the obligation of jihad in the war and 
military sense. Meanwhile, according to Javed Ahmad Ghamidi 
there is a consensus among Islamic scholars to define the concept 
of jihad as something that always includes the armed struggle 




The common denominator of terrorism is the use of violence 
towards civilians to send the message to achieve political goals. In 
other words, at the very least we can define terrorism as a criminal 
violent/armed tactic used to send messages and to achieve political 
goals via targeting civilians. 
Source: Self-made, articulated from various sources.21
                                                   
21 For more, see (Ashour 2009) 4 – 11.  
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Figure 1.2  A View of Islamism by Referring to Major Trends in Islamism (Ashour 2009) and an Indonesian View (Wahid, ed. 2011) 
 
End-State Maintaining the 
democratic and pluralistic 
Indonesia that is based 
on Pancasila. 
Establishing the Islamic 
Shari’a law in Indonesia as a 
milestone before the 
establishment of the (Salafi) 
Islamist state of Indonesia. 
First establishing the 
Islamic Shari’a law in 
Indonesia as a milestone 
before the establishment 
of the (Salafi) Islamist 
state of Indonesia. 
Directly establishing the 
Salafi Islamist State of 




Scope of Engagement Envisioning the 
Indonesian version of 
Islam as a role-model at 
the local, national, and 
global level. 
 
Engaging gradually from local 
to provincial and national 
level. The efforts are 
supported internationally. 
Engaging radically from 
local to provincial and 




Engaging radically from 
local to provincial and 




Ways Gradual. Gradual. Mixed (the Combination of 





The current state of 
civilization and existing 
political establishment. 
The current state of 
civilization and existing 
political establishment. 
Although publicly denying 
violent means, sometimes 
using violent means, but 
mostly using non-violent 
means (e.g., the hatred 
speech/da’wah inciting or 
glorifying terrorism). 
Violence (e.g., terrorism) is 
permitted. Also engaged 
with non-violent means 
(e.g., the hatred 
speech/da’wah inciting or 
glorifying terrorism). 
 
View Accepting democracy and 
pluralism. 
Partially and pragmatically 
accepting democracy and 
pluralism. 
Not accepting democracy 
and pluralism. 
Not accepting democracy 
and pluralism. 
Ideology Pancasila-based 
Islamism. Tend to be 
pluralistic and inclusive. 
Transnational-Islamist 
movements that partially 
accepting Pancasila-based 
Islamism (e.g., Ikhwanism). 
Transnational-Islamist 




Salafism, Jihadism, and 
Takfirism). 
 
Main Bases in 
Indonesia 
Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah 
Mixed (e.g., the Indonesian 
Muslim Brotherhood/Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera). 
Although Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia is not a Salafist, 
it fully rejects democracy 
and thus falls under this 
category.  
JI and its other related 
affiliations. 
Country of Origin Indonesia. Indonesia for the Indonesian 
Muslim Brotherhood/Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera and Egypt 
for Ikhwanism. 
Palestine. Saudi Arabia (Najd 
Province) for Salafism and 
Egypt for Jihadism and 
Takfirism. 
               Towards Moderation                                                       Towards Extremism 
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As the greatest test of any theories is not its conceptual precision or volume of 
data and cases but its ability to provide plausible explanations of social processes, this 
Ph.D. thesis presents a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis that attempts to analyze 
why operatives committed series of deadly terrorist attacks from 2002 – 2009 and some 
other radical-related activities in Indonesia until 2017. Since 2002 until the fourth quarter 
(Q4) of 2016, there were at least around 1,100 Islamist individuals in Indonesia who had 
been convicted in the radicalism and terrorism case, whilst around 4,000 – 5,000 
individuals had been detected as radicals but not being convicted (Karnavian, 2016).22 
Through a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis using qualitative and quantitative 
research methodologies, this Ph.D. thesis will specifically examine what factors drove 
people with the association to Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and radical-Islamist movements to 
commit and become involved in terrorist attacks? and why and how might such 
factors/elements influence these people to commit terrorist attacks in the future?  
The focus of this research is the Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the al-Qaeda-affiliated 
group that has been evolving, recruiting, and operating in Southeast Asia (including 
Indonesia) from early 1992 until today; as well as various other related radical-Islamist 
groups. The sample taken for this Ph.D. thesis is drawn from the JI-related former 
prisoners and activists who are now working actively with the government in 
deradicalization process and from key state/security officials as well as from experts in 
this field. In addition to that, any studied individuals who are now still serving in the 
prison are examined only through public documentation-archival evidence including 
legal court cases and published media documents where there are no interviews with 
prisoners. Having systematically examined such factors, this Ph.D. thesis aims to 
provide an original scholarly contribution to the fields related to terrorism studies, 
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, special operations and low-intensity conflicts (SO-
LIC), and wider national security and public policy issues.   
                                                   
22 For more elaborate information on this matter, see (Police General Tito Karnavian 2016). 
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1.1.2 The Outline of Distinct Contribution to the K nowledge of the 
Subject 
 
The entire analysis help develops both a foundation for future 
academic research and a series of recommendations for policymakers across 
all levels of government in assuring the security of human life, society, and 
civilization at both national and international levels.  
First, it will significantly contribute to the scholarly work of this field that 
falls under the category of social science and international studies. 
Specifically, this academic research project will help contribute to terrorism 
studies, as the subfield of terrorism studies has not yet, and may never, 
become a “hard” science, but will always remain somewhere in between 
(Sinai 2007). As this Ph.D. thesis is to identifying patterns, which is not 
necessarily the unbreakable rules as in the “natural sciences,” it aims to 
contribute to the social science academic research efforts in this area of study 
that will upgrade our capabilities to better understand and respond with the 
most effective countermeasures against the magnitude of the terrorist 
challenge facing us.  
Second, it will significantly contribute to the international and national 
security policy of which current strategic intelligence challenges impose us to 
reorient its focus to cover multiple new, specific targets including but not 
limited to rogue states, non-state group threats, the proliferation of mass 
destruction, international crime and narcotics, as well as terrorism (Imler 
2004). This study will specifically contribute to the safety and security policies 
particularly in the development of counterstrategies (e.g., counterterrorism) of 
the Republic of Indonesia. The struggle against terrorism is actually more 
complex than simply a struggle within the Islamic world between secularism 
and old traditions that may last a generation or more, so that a struggle 
against terrorism will no longer be engaged with only a single national element 
of power, but instead be overcome by superior knowledge involving the 
combination of strong academic research and the entire spectrum of national 
elements of power (Harris 2004). 
A special section will also be dedicated within this Ph.D. thesis to 
address the issues of counterterrorism policies, strategies and operations in 
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Indonesia. Therefore, by knowing more textured characteristics of Islamist 
terrorism in Indonesia through this academic research project, we will know 
the specific facts and findings that are strategically useful not only to the 
subfield of terrorism studies, but also to make the prediction/forecast about 
the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia and in the 
region. As Silke argues, constructing government policy without evidence is 
like building on the sand and if the result does not fail and collapse it is only 
because of luck and good fortune (Silke 2007). 
Having said that, this Ph.D. thesis stands out as the research project 
which stress its originality by its engagement in the depth of the study, in 
terms of interviewing JI former operatives, examining other related but not 
fully analyzed documents, and interviewing select counterterrorist operatives 
who have first-hand experiences in dealing with such phenomenon by using 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis in rigorous ways.  
 
1.1.3 The Outline of Thesis Structure 
 
This Ph.D. thesis covers up to around 90,000 words that are 
systematically organized into six main chapters reflecting a series of primarily 
sequential research activities, albeit with periods of simultaneous processes. 
Chapter 1 (the introduction) is the engine for this Ph.D. thesis, and therefore is 
dedicated to addressing the seven sub-elements: the outline of thesis 
(consists of the statement of aims and objectives; the distinct contribution to 
the knowledge of subject; and the structure of thesis); the phenomenon of 
terrorism; the defining of terrorism; the causes of terrorism as the focus of this 
Ph.D. thesis; the research context; research goals; and thesis structure.  
Chapter 2 (the literature review and research framework) will focus on 
the relevant literature/chief topics to demonstrate how this Ph.D. thesis fills the 
gap in the literature, and critically review the relevant existing research. 
Correspondingly, by based on the extensive relevant literature review in this 
field, the last part of chapter 2 addresses two more elements: research 
propositions and hypotheses: the theory building; as well as research 
framework and design: variables and methodology. 
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Subsequently, chapter 3 will focus on the descriptive analysis of JI and 
wider radical-Islamist history in Indonesia on which I base my analysis in 
chapters 4 and 5. Whilst the purpose of chapter 3 is to specifically describe JI, 
chapter 4 is where I analyze the causes behind the violent ideology and/or 
behaviour of JI and other related Islamist radicals in Indonesia. Chapter 3 is 
laid out according to the inter-linked development timeline of JI origins, 
historical development, and likely form in the future. Whilst the organization of 
this chapter is arranged accordingly in that way, it still reflects the determining 
variables of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that are examined in this Ph.D. 
thesis: economic grievances; social grievances; political grievances; radical 
ideology; social network; state repression; and government incentive.  In this 
chapter we can see that these variables have become the inherent 
characteristic of JI and Islamist terrorism in Indonesia from time to time. 
Subsequently, as all data collected in this Ph.D. thesis is displayed and 
analyzed in chapter 4, the direction of the entire research process in this 
Ph.D. thesis refers to the rigorous qualitative and quantitative research 
methods that are deemed suitable to best answer the research problems and 
questions in this Ph.D. thesis. As chapter 4.1 is specially dedicated for the 
qualitative research analysis (the discovering patterns analysis, the content 
analysis, and the discourse analysis); chapter 4.2 is for the quantitative ones 
(the multivariate statistical analysis mainly by using the chi-square test, the 
logistic regression, and the proportional test). Additionally, the discussion of 
social network analysis on the JI-related individuals are also made available in 
chapter 4.3. To complete the analysis package, chapter 4.4. is then specially 
dedicated to discussing the analysis warranty which consists of the general 
assessment of analysis and inputs/suggestions for the future research. 
As we complete the analysis part, chapter 5, which is the synthesis of 
various analysis is specially dedicated to interpreting, comparing, reconciling, 
verifying, and discussing the findings at length by integrating three main 
components that have been well covered throughout chapter 2 to chapter 4: 
the literature review; the history and evolution of JI; and the analysis. 
Subsequently, chapter 6 is focused on discussing two main components: the 
thesis conclusion and policy relevance/recommendation, where some 
discussions on what can be done to enhance security policy in a 
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changing/evolving threat environment (e.g., some prescriptions on future 
counterterrorism policies) are made available.  
 
1.2    The Phenomenon of Terrorism 
 
As a starting point, we can approach terrorism from the etymology. 
Within the word terrorism lies the word terror. The word terrorism was first 
used in 1795, within a same period when a revolutionary government began 
to coin the word terrorism by instituting systematic state terror against its 
population in the 1790s, precisely reflecting the specific sense of “government 
intimidation” during the Reign of Terror in France that the Jacobins imposed 
from March 1793 – July 1794. Later, the general sense of the systematic use 
of terror as a policy was first recorded in English in 1798. At one time, a word 
for defining certain kind of mass-destruction was dynamitism (1883), and 
during World War I the word frightfulness (translated from the German word 
schrecklichkeit) was used in the Great Britain for reflecting a deliberate policy 
of terrorizing enemy non-combatants.23 
The word terror comes from the Latin “terrere,” which means “frighten” 
or “tremble.” When coupled with the French suffix “isme” (referencing “to 
practice”), it becomes akin to “practicing the trembling” or to “causing the 
frightening.” In English, the words trembling, and frightening are synonymous 
with the words fear, panic, and anxiety all of which we naturally call as 
terror.24 Terrorism can be caused by multi-dimensional factors encompassing 
elements of politics, economics, social, and ideology, driving people to commit 
violent acts and become involved in such activity. Meanwhile, as a 
phenomenon, terrorism itself is more of an armed tactic with political or 
ideological motives. In this way, terrorism is understood as combining more 
elements of violence and politics as opposed to profit, financial, and 
economic-oriented motivation as we often find in the organized criminality. As 
a global phenomenon, it is indeed easy to recognize the manifestation of 
                                                   
23 For more discussion on this etymological and historical investigation of word terrorism, see 
(Terrorism n.d.).  
 
24 For more discussion on this etymological investigation of word terrorism, see also (Matusitz 
2012). 
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terrorism, but it is rather difficult to be clearly defined. Precisely crafting a 
commonly accepted definition of terrorism has been proven difficult, and 
consequently, it leads to various definitions of terrorism both in the academic 
and policy world (Garrison 2004, Maskaliunaite 2002). 
Although the United States may have declared a new war against 
“terrorism,” it turns out that no one including the U.S. government itself is all 
that sure just what “terrorism” is, meaning that indeed each U.S. government 
agency has its own definition of terrorism.25 In fact, the U.S. Department of 
State itself acknowledged that no one definition of terrorism has gained 
universal acceptance.26 On the other hand, scholars all over the world also 
tend to describe terrorism according to their socio-economic and political 
conditions. Those influenced by social and economic problems tend to view 
and to conceptualize terrorism as a conflict in society between the haves and 
the have-nots, whilst those who view the use of terror as a tactic to gain a 
political mileage tend to view and to conceptualize terrorism as a political 
phenomenon. The word terrorism is apparently interpreted to suit and to 
reflect different interests (Prabha 2008). 
All that said, the core problem of why the academic and policy 
community has never settled on a commonly accepted definition of terrorism 
is because scholars, policy experts, or government agencies may believe that 
there are cases where extreme actions are justified. But since academic and 
policy stakeholders, on the other hand, may also believe that terrorism is 
wrong, consequently, they could not agree on a common definition of 
terrorism. The explanation of why terrorism is almost wrong is detailed by Igor 
Primoratz in chapter 6 of his 2013 book, Terrorism: A Philosophical 
Investigation.27  
                                                   
25 Even inside the U.S. government itself such as Department of Defense, FBI, Department of 
State, and Federal Emergency Management Agency, they have various definitions of 
terrorism. 
 
26 The U.S. government in its various official documents acknowledges the non-universality of 
terrorism definition. See (U.S. Department of State 2003). 
 
27 This argument is supported by Professor Richard K. Betts.  
Richard K. Betts, Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, 
argues that many people believe there are cases where extreme actions are justified. 
However, these people also believe the terrorism is always wrong. See (How Do You Define 
Terrorism? 2001). 
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For example, when both the U.S. Army Air Force and British Royal Air 
Force bombed civilian targets in German and Japanese cities in World War II, 
few in the history of mankind would have called this narrative an act of 
terrorism. Those who planned the air operations and oversaw these strategic 
military campaigns never publicly described these tactics as “terror bombing”, 
but that was how they often referred to these tactics in their own internal 
communications (Lackey 2004).28 The U.S. and the British decision to bomb 
civilian targets with the same result of killing innocent civilians in that particular 
time was indeed widely viewed and justified by the fact that the U.S and the 
British had previously been drawn into a war with aggressor nations. This 
loophole of defining a social phenomenon is where, according to Richard K. 
Betts, everybody can find an exception to any abstract definitions. In other 
words, when terror is applied to actors and acts in the real world of today, its 
meaning and intent can point in many directions. Part of this dilemma is due to 
the use of terror as tactics by various actors at all layers of socio-political 
interaction.29  
In addition to that, several critics in the academic and policy world have 
also argued that the word terrorism is often simply applied to pejoratively 
define and to label whatever violent groups the U.S. opposes, pointing to the 
often-cited statement that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter.” According to Boaz Ganor, this statement has become not only a 
cliché, but also one of the most difficult obstacles in coping with terrorism. The 
matter of definition and conceptualization is usually a purely theoretical 
issue—a mechanism for scholars to work out the appropriate set of 
parameters for the research they intend to undertake.30  
                                                                                                                                                  
 
28 For more discussion on this matter, see (Primoratz, Terrorism 2015). 
 
29 This is indeed another proof that terrorism is a socially constructed concept. For more 
discussion on this matter, see (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 
2007), 1-1. 
 
30 In this matter, Boaz Ganor acknowledges that the purely theoretical definition of terrorism 
shall be differentiated with the practical meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism that indeed 
is socially constructed. For more, see (Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist 
Another Man's Freedom Fighter? n.d.). 
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If there is no universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism, at least we 
may refer to the most universally accepted definition of it. One of the most 
widely acceptable definitions is the one offered by Yonah Alexander (1976) 
who defined terrorism as the use of violence against random civilian targets to 
intimidate or to create a generalized pervasive fear for achieving political 
goals. That said, in a nutshell, it can be synthesized that terrorism is the threat 
and use of both psychological and physical force in violation of international 
law, by state and sub-state agencies for strategic and political goals.31 
However, out of many, at least 109 different definitions of terrorism in 
the academic and policy world, we can find that at least the key elements to 
terrorism are obvious: violence; civilians and non-combatant targets; the 
intention of spreading fear; and political aims that can be mixed with 
ideological and religious ones.32 Correspondingly, based on these elements 
we can conclude that the common denominator of terrorism is the use of 
violence towards civilians to send the message in order to achieve political 
goals. In other words, at the very least we can define terrorism as a criminal 
violent/armed tactic used to send messages and to achieve political goals via 
targeting civilians.33 This common denominator reflects the (tactical) utility of 
terror. Although there are differences between terrorists and waves of terror, 
the utility of terror as a tool of change used throughout history is not different 
(Garrison 2004).  
As an old tactic, terrorism has been used by governments to suppress 
revolution as well as by revolutionaries who have sought to achieve power 
over a government. It has been employed by single-issue groups seeking to 
address a specific evil in the society and by revolutionary governments trying 
                                                   
31 For more, see (Best and Nocella 2004), 370. 
 
32 Ideology and religion in this matter could become symbols that terrorism could be driven by 
a force of beyond merely the material world. For more, see (Matusitz 2012). See also the 
Table 2 where Alex Schmid (1988) made a summary of the twenty-two main elements 
appearing in 109 scholarly definitions. 
 
Civilian and non-combatants are two different categories. However, someone can be armed 
or part of an armed forces, but he/she is still a non-combatant. The examples of non-
combatants are the armed force’s medical team, as well as any other reserve and regular 
soldiers who are not on duty. 
 
33 Omar Ashour, Ph.D. (professor and thesis supervisor) in a discussion with the author, April 
12, 2016. 
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to maintain power. In the end, terrorists whether in possession of 
governmental power or in-want-of-governmental power, uses terror to achieve 
a political, social or religious goal. Modern terrorism is at least two hundred 
years old and it has not aged a day (Garrison 2004). 
Correspondingly, in 2012, Audrey Cronin defined terrorism as an 
unpredicted, altruistic form of political violence that is carried out by non-state 
actors, although possible to receive state’s support of means, at international 
and domestic levels where innocents, civilians, or non-combatants become 
random and intentional victims to instilll fear and maximize the psychological 
effects of the attack to the audience. Terrorism is carried out by terrorists that 
do not abide by domestic and international laws or norms, and even if we refer 
to conventional just war theory, terrorism is not justifiable.34  
There are however five points to be critically commented on Cronin’s 
definition. First, altruistic means that people committing terrorism, in their 
bounded rationality may think that they do it for the benefits of other people 
outside themselves. Second, since terrorism is a tactic, the state also can use 
terrorism as a tactic. For this particular point, there are generally two schools 
                                                   
34 This elaborate examination of defining terrorism is compilled from the lectures of Professor 
Audrey Kurth Cronin in 2012. For more, see (A. K. Cronin, Defining Terrorism and Its Grey 
Area with Other Forms of Political Violence 2012) 
 
However, Cronin’s arguments on the just war theory of contemporary Islamist terrorism 
should be complemented by a deep historical understanding of the just war theory in Islam. 
The just war theory in Islam is naturally embedded in the Shari’a (the Islamic tradition of 
jurisprudence and reasoning) and ethical norms that covers three main aspects: the proper 
authority to wage war; the responsibility to wage war; and the proper targets in war.   
 
The just war theory in Islam has been well developed since the seventh century as reflected 
by various interpretations in the different schools of thought: Shafi'i; Hanifi; Hanbali (mostly 
the works of Imam Ahmad Hanbal that was interpreted by ibn Taymiyyah); some of Maliki 
ideas; and very little Shi'ite input. The development of these schools of thought and concept 
of jihad were indeed influenced by their contextual circumstances.  
 
According to John Kelsay in his book, Arguing the Just War in Islam (2009), jihad that is 
based on the Shari’a is the Islamic analogue of the Western “just” war. Kelsay traces the 
arguments of thinkers over the centuries who have debated the legitimacy of war through 
appeals to the Shari'a logic. Therefore, we cannot fully understand the range of phenomena in 
the Islamist violence without comprehending the internal reasoning and discourse that Kelsay 
examines in his synthesis work. According to many reviews, Arguing the Just War in Islam 
provides a systematic account of how Islam's central texts interpret jihad, guiding us through 
the historical precedents and Qur'anic sources upon which today's claims to the doctrinal truth 
and legitimate authority are made. This is an important reference for us to make sense the 
global armed Islamist movements in the today’s context. By illuminating the broad spectrum 
of Islam's moral considerations of the just war, John Kelsay helps to enlighten Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike to make sense the possible war and peace in the future. 
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of thought where one of them, such as Bruce Hoffman’s, views terrorism as 
something that is only carried out by non-state actors and if it is used by state 
actors it is called repression, whilst another school of thought can view 
terrorism as something that can be equally carried out by both state and non-
state actors (Garrison 2004). 
Third, there is also a debate in both academic and policy literature until 
today about what it means by civilian versus non-combatant (Jackson 2008, 
Watkin 2003). Fourth, attacking random and intentional victims is not 
necessarily the case where this point is also still highly contested in the 
scholarly and policy debate until today. Fifth, terrorism is not only aimed to 
cause the psychological impact to the audience but also to merely exert 
political pressure for a cause. In other words, most terrorism acts are also 
about pressuring a stronger enemy (state or non-state actors), and less about 
influencing the public.35 To confirm this point it is also widely believed that 
terrorists decide to attack civilians in order to coerce their governments into 
granting concessions (Crenshaw 1998, DeNardo 1985, McCormick 2003).  
 
1.3 The Defining of Terrorism 
 
 Terrorism is a social phenomenon; thus, its definitions would 
consequently vary depending upon the construction of social context by which 
certain phenomena could be defined as terrorism or otherwise. That said, we 
could say that there is neither an academic nor an accurate legal consensus 
regarding the definition of the term “terrorism.” Even various legal systems 
and governmental institutions use different definitions. Moreover, 
governments have been reluctant to formulate an agreed upon, legally binding 
definition. These difficulties arise from the fact that the term is politically and 
emotionally charged (Hoffman 2006).  
 According to Bruce Hoffman (1998, 2006), terrorism is theatre. 
Terrorism is identical to a theatrical play that can be viewed as a deliberate 
presentation to a large audience to gain attention, spotlight a message, and 
seek a response favorable to the actor. Anxiety can increase as random or 
                                                   
35 Omar Ashour, Ph.D. (professor and thesis supervisor) in a discussion with the author, April 
12, 2016. 
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deliberate acts of terror often target civilians as victims. Like a play, the 
objective of the experience is to affect the feelings and attitudes of the 
audience.  Actions deemed as terrorist activity could include but are not 
limited to political demonstration, criminal conduct, and possible links to 
paramilitary operations or low-intensity conflict.   
 Hoffman (2006) believes that it is possible to identify some key 
characteristics of terrorism. He proposes that by distinguishing terrorists from 
other types of criminals, and terrorism from other forms of crime, we come to 
appreciate that terrorism is ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent – 
or, equally important, threatens violence; designed to have far-reaching 
psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted 
by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell 
structure whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia; and 
perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.  
 Responding to the Hoffman’s view, according to Richard Jackson 
(2007), in large part the silence on state terrorism in the discourse is due to 
the frequent practice by terrorism scholars of defining terrorism exclusively as 
a form of non-state violence, thereby excluding states a priori from being able 
to employ terrorism at all. In fact, in the past, we could see that there were 
instances where terrorism by the state actor was prevalent. Such terrorism by 
the state actor consists of two types: “terror from above” and “state-sponsored 
terror.”  
 “Terror from above” is where states (through their government) resort 
to violence to influence, control, and repress segments of their population, or 
rely on coercive aspects of state institutions. National governments can 
become involved in terrorism or utilize terror to accomplish the objectives of 
governments or individual rulers. Changes to legal codes can permit or 
encourage torture, killing, or property destruction in the pursuit of government 
policy. The examples of the twentieth century’s state terror were Joseph 
Stalin’s purges of the 1930s that terrorized the entire Soviet population, Nazi 
Germany during the 1930s – 1940s that aimed at the deliberate destruction of 
state’s enemies and intimidation of nations and regional states, and several 
programs in South and Central American regimes during 1970s that terrorized 
their populations with death squads.  
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 On the other hand, “state-sponsored terror” can also involve the state 
activity to sponsor terror taking place beyond their borders, where some 
governments provide supplies, training, and other forms of support to non-
state terrorist organizations.  During the Cold War era, state-sponsored 
terrorism was prevalently used by one state against another in a Cold War-
type struggle.  
 After the Cold War, as mentioned above, such scholars as Bruce 
Hoffman, for example, argue that terrorism involves violence that is rather 
perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity (Hoffman 1998, 2006). 
This is in keeping with the U.S. Department of State’s highly influential 
definition of terrorism, a definition employed by a significant proportion of 
terrorism scholars today, which conceives of terrorism as premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant targets by 
sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience (Martin, 2003). In other words, terrorism is often equated with non-
state actors or groups that are not responsible to a sovereign state, whilst in 
fact, internal security forces can use terror to aid in representing dissent, and 
intelligence or military organizations can perform acts of terror designed to 
further a state’s policy or diplomatic efforts abroad. 
 
Figure 1.3 A New Typology of Terrorism 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Schmid (1984) and taken from (J. M. Post, Political Psychologies of 
Terrorism 2017) 
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Thus, having examined the meaning of terrorism up to this point, and in 
our effort to synthesize the comparative views of non-state perpetrated 
terrorism and of state-sponsored terrorism, at the very least we can define the 
first as the use of violence by non-state actors against civilians in order to 
achieve a political goal; and the latter as the use of violence (e.g., genocide, 
war crimes, and torture) against civilians by a state as an instrument of 
domestic security and foreign policy. The reconciliation of both points of view 
is in line with the definition suggested by Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman 
(1988). By focusing on targets and objectives, they defined terrorism as an 
anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by clandestine 
individual groups or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons. 
Therefore, in contrast to an assassination, the direct targets of violence in 
terrorism are not the main (ultimate) targets.  
Based on this dilemma of clearly constructing a definition of terrorism 
that is universally accepted, Alex Schmid (2011) suggests that there are ten 
elements to be considered, which together provide a fair and good enough 
description of what, in the common academic view, can be said to constitute 
“terrorism.” These elements include the dual character of the term “terrorism,” 
the threefold context, the perpetrator as a source or agent of violence, 
political, the violent act, the threat-based communication, the differentiation 
between direct civilian victims and the ultimate target audience, the 
terror/fear/dread, the intent, and the campaign.36 This is however in line with 
what is basically argued by Richard K. Betts, that the core problem of why 
academic and policy community has never settled on a commonly accepted 
definition of terrorism is because scholars, policy experts, or government 
agencies may believe that there are cases where extreme actions are 
justified.  But since academic and policy stakeholders, on the other hand, may 
also believe that terrorism is always wrong, consequently, they could not 
agree on a common definition of terrorism. In other words, when terror is 
applied to actors and acts in the real world of today, meaning and intent can 
                                                   
36 For more elaborate discussion on these ten elements, see (A. P. Schmid, The Definition of 
Terrorism 2011), 76 – 83.  
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point in many directions. Part of this dilemma is due to the use of terror as 
tactics by various actors at all layers of socio-political interaction.37 
That is why Alex Schmid (2011) in his attempt to sort out a clear 
definition of terrorism, he interviewed 91 respondents by asking four 
fundamental questions related to the one’s definitions of terrorism: whose 
definition of terrorism do you utilize?; what is your comment/criticism on the 
1988 academic consensus definition of terrorism?; what is your 
comment/criticism on the U.N. draft definition of terrorism?; and what is your 
comment/criticism on the U.S. Department of State’s definition of terrorism? 
Moreover, Boaz Ganor even has fifteen reasons of why terrorism is difficult to 
be clearly defined.38 Based on this set of parameters to define terrorism, 
Schmid discusses the problems related to the definitions of terrorism 
forwarded by the U.S. Department of State, the draft definition of the United 
Nations, and the academic consensus definition developed in the 1980s.39 
                                                   
37 For more discussion on this matter, see (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) G2 2007), 1-1.  
 
38 For more elaborate discussion on these four fundamental questions, see (A. P. Schmid, 
The Definition of Terrorism 2011), 43 – 44.  
 
39 Terrorism according to the U.N. draft definition:  
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this (the present) Convention if that 
person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: (a) Death or serious bodily injury 
to any person; or (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public 
use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or 
to the environment; or (c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in 
paragraph 1 (b) of this [the present] article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss; 
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any acts. 
See also: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNODC/GEN/N05/460/57/PDF/ N0546057.pdf?  
 
Terrorism according to the U.S. Department of State in 2006:  
Terrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated violence that is perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (usually intended to 
influence an audience). 
 
Terrorism according to the academic consensus in 1984:  
Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as an 
instrumental target of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class 
characteristics, which form the basis for their selection for victimization. Through previous use 
of violence or the credible threat of violence, other members of that group or class are put in a 
state of chronic fear (terror). This group or class, whose members’ sense of security is 
purposefully undermined, is the target of terror. The victimization of the target of violence is 
considered extra-normal by most observers from the witnessing audience based on its 
atrocity, the time (e.g., peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization, or the disregard 
for rules of combat accepted in the conventional warfare.  
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Consequently, due to major divergences at the international level on 
the question of the legitimacy of the use of violence for political purposes such 
as in terrorism, either by states or by self-determination and revolutionary 
groups, this has not yet been possible to formulate a comprehensive definition 
of terrorism. In this sense, M. Cherif Bassiouni (1988) argues that to define 
“terrorism” in a way that is both all-inclusive and unambiguous is very difficult, 
if not impossible. One of the principal difficulties lies in the fundamental values 
at stake in the acceptance or rejection of terror-inspiring violence as means of 
accomplishing a given goal. The obvious and well-known range of views on 
these issues is what makes an internationally accepted specific definition of 
what is loosely called “terrorism,” a largely impossible undertaking. That is 
why, according to Bassiouni the search for an internationally agreed upon 
definition may well be a futile and unnecessary effort.40  
                                                                                                                                                  
The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this 
audience might in turn form the main object of manipulation. The purpose of this indirect 
method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror to produce disorientation and/or 
compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (e.g., a government), or targets of 
attention (e.g., public opinion) to changes of attitudes or behaviour favouring the short or long-
term interests of the users of this method of combat.  
 
For more, see (Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism : A Research Guide to Concepts, 
Theories, Data Bases, and Literature 1984), 111. 
 
In the second (1988) round, on the basis of some 50 responses to a questionnaire soliciting 
comments on the first version, the following text emerged: Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring 
method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state 
actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the 
direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence 
are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat- and 
violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) 
victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s), turning it into a 
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.  
 
For more, see (Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Concepts, 
Theories, Data Bases and Literature 1988). 
 
Terrorism according to the Indonesian government:  
Every activity (performed by individuals), which intentionally threatens or uses the violent 
means to generate a terrorizing and fearful condition on the general society; or to cause the 
damage and loss on the human life, on strategic, key and critical infrastructures, to the 
environment, and at the wider public and international facilities. For more, see Undang 
Undang Tindak Pidana Terorisme Nomor 15/2003 (In English: The Terrorism Criminal Act 
Number15/2003). 
 
40 For more discussion on this matter, see (Bassiouni 1988). 
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However, out of many, at least 109 different definitions of terrorism in 
the academic and policy world, we can find that at least the key elements to 
terrorism are obvious: violence; civilians and non-combatant targets; the 
intention of spreading fear; and political aims that can be mixed with 
ideological and religious ones.41 Correspondingly, based on these elements 
we can conclude that the common denominator of terrorism is the use of 
violence towards civilians to send the message in order to achieve political 
goals. In other words, at the very least we can define terrorism as a criminal 
violent/armed tactic used to send messages and to achieve political goals via 
targeting civilians.42 This common denominator reflects the (tactical) utility of 
terror. Although there are differences between terrorists and waves of terror, 




















                                                   
41 For these 109 definitions that were investigated by Alex P. Schmid et al, see the breakdown 
in the following table 2.1. 
42 Omar Ashour, Ph.D. (professor and thesis supervisor) in a discussion with the author, April 
12, 2016. 
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Table 1.2 Twenty-Two Main Elements Used in the 109 Definitions of 
Terrorism 
No Elements Freq 
(%) 
1 Violence, force. 83.5 
2 Political. 65 
3 Fear, terror emphasized. 51 
4 Threat. 47 
5 (Psych) effects and (anticipated) reactions. 41.5 
6 Victim-target differentiation. 37.5 
7 Purposive, plan, systematic, organized action. 32 
8 Method of combat, strategy, tactic. 30.5 
9 Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without 
humanitarian constraints. 
30 
10 Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance. 28 
11 Publicity aspect. 21.5 
12 Arbitrariness, impersonal, random character, indiscrimination. 21 
13 Civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims. 17.5 
14 Intimidation. 17 
15 Innocence of victims emphasized. 15.5 
16 Group, movement, organization as the perpetrator. 14 
17 Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others. 13.5 
18 Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of 
occurrence of violence. 
9 
19 Clandestine, covert nature. 9 
20 Repetitiveness, serial or campaign character of violence. 7 
21 Criminal. 6 
22 Demands made on third parties. 4 
 
Source: (Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism : A Research Guide to Concepts, 
Theories, Data Bases, and Literature 1984), 76 – 77. 
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1.4 The Causes of Terrorism as the Focus of this Ph .D. thesis 
 
As of today, the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism still 
inflict global society with formidable challenges, and one way to overcome 
such challenges is by leveraging our knowledge on multi-dimensional aspects, 
determining factors/elements that lead people to commit terrorist attacks 
(Silke 2001, 2003). Correspondingly, one way to understand why people 
commit terrorist attacks or get involved in such activity is by exploring these 
factors/elements and the interplay among them including but not limited to 
how they correlate with and affect each other.  
Specifically, these multi-dimensional factors/elements and their 
interplay encompass at least economic grievances, social grievances, political 
grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and 
government incentive, all of which are the key variables in determining the 
existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism. Since Islamist terrorism 
continues to generate new cells, operate, and span globally with various level 
of severity, understanding the relationship between economic grievances, 
social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state 
repression, government incentive, and Islamist terrorism has never been more 
important. However, as resources mobilization and logistical capacities are 
also critical, they are already becoming an integral part of all these examined 
variables. 
As the greatest test of any theories is not its conceptual precision or 
volume of data and cases but its ability to provide plausible explanations of 
social processes, this Ph.D. thesis presents a systematic, multi-dimensional 
analysis that attempts to analyze why operatives committed series of deadly 
terrorist attacks from 2002 – 2009 and some other radical-related activities in 
Indonesia until 2017. Such attacks will continue to instill in Indonesian and 
global society a feeling of being threatened by a militant strain of radical-
Islamist fundamentalism. Radical-Islamist fundamentalism in Indonesia, a 
home to a vast Muslim community and the World largest Muslim populated 
country, is likely to continue to be vociferous, disturbing the pluralistic and 
democratic polity, and creating violence and terror to achieve its ends. 
Although expected to remain a small minority, the radicals may cause much 
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trouble to the dominant majority, as they are motivated by fanatical 
perceptions, believing absolutely in the truth of their actions, demonizing their 
enemies, and enjoying some degree of operational capacity (Eliraz 2004).  
Through a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis using qualitative and 
quantitative research methodologies, this Ph.D. thesis will specifically 
examine what factors drove people with the association to JI and Islamist 
radicalism to commit and become involved in terrorist attacks? Why and how 
might such factors/elements influence these people to commit terrorist attacks 
in the future? The focus of this research is the Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the al-
Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group that has been evolving, recruiting, and 
operating in Southeast Asia (including Indonesia) from early 1992 until today; 
as well as various other related radical-Islamist groups. However, the unit of 
analysis of this Ph.D. thesis are the individuals related to these groups and 
not the groups themselves. 
The focus of this research coupled by the direct access to the studied 
individuals, the key state/security officials and experts in the field, and the 
government documents will significantly add to the originality and scholarly 
contribution of this research.43 The JI is important because it shares a 
relatively similar profile with other transnational-Islamist terrorist organizations 
in terms of its radical ideology, economic/social/political grievances, social 
network, their response towards state repression and government incentive, 
as well as their targets of terror.  
Having systematically examined such factors, the thesis aims to 
provide an original scholarly contribution to the fields related to terrorism 
studies, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, special operations and low- 
intensity conflicts (SO-LIC), and wider national security and public policy 
issues. Moreover, this Ph.D. thesis offers the first ever in-depth 
documentation of the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism by using 
both qualitative and quantitative research methods in exploring the dynamic, 
multi-dimensional causes of emerging Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. The 
                                                   
43 The leading expert in the field who becomes one of my important sources throughout this 
academic research is Sydney Jones. Sydney Jones, the Director of Institute for Policy 
Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) is considered an internationally leading scholar on Jemaah 
Islamiya. She currently resides in Indonesia. 
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entire analysis helps develop both a foundation for future research and a 
series of recommendations for policymakers across all levels of government in 
assuring the security of human life, society, and civilization at both national 
and international level.  
 
1.5 The Research Context 
 
Recent Islamist terrorism is a part of a religious wave that uses a 
variety of sacred texts or revelations for legitimacy that started since 1979 in 
the Iranian revolution (Rapoport 2004). In addition to the 1979 revolution, this 
wave was also inspired by the success of driving the Red Army out of Muslim 
land, Afghanistan.44 This era is characterized by not abiding by one’s state 
law, bounded rationality that is not understandable by secular views, and 
having religious symbolic meaning in their commitment towards terrorism 
activities (e.g., scripture-based, involving religious figures as their leader, 
martyrdom driven by religion, sectarian violence, and determination to change 
the structure).  
This era still relatively reflects the terrorists’ perception of society as 
something that needs to be fixed and/or changed. According to Garrison 
(2004), terrorists, regardless of issue or cause, hold at least one of three basic 
concepts about society: society is sick and cannot be cured by half measures 
of reform; the state is itself violence and can be countered and overcome only 
by violence, and the truth of the terrorist cause justifies any actions that 
support it. Whilst some terrorists recognize no moral law they have their own 
“higher’ morality.” Al-Qaeda and its associated movements fit with this wave 
since it aims to kill as many people as possible, has a religious figure as their 
leader, “hijacks” Quranic scripts, exploits religiously symbolic concepts of 
martyrdom, has presence in the global landscape, involved in legal and illegal 
                                                   
44 Abdullah Azzam, who was the creator of the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) or pre al-Qaeda, 
and served as bin Laden’s former mentor and boss wrote a book titled In Defense of Muslim 
Lands. In this sense, what he said as an Islamic scholar was often deemed as a real fatwa. In 
his book, he argues that because Kemal Ataturk dissolved the Caliphate and there is no 
Caliph who can declare war, jihad is now fard’ayn, meaning holy war is now the individual 
obligation of every good Muslim. Abdullah Azzam has a Ph.D. in Islamic Jurisprudence from 
the prestigious al-Azhar University in Cairo. 
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activities, and has overarching, strategic aims of restoring the world under the 
Islamic caliphate.  
 The typical religious wave of terrorism can also be found in the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). As an ethno-nationalist left-wing organization, the role 
of sectarianism within IRA was not major despite its major impact in the wider 
conflict. However, like their “religious” terrorist counterparts of al-Qaeda and 
JI, these IRA men, who were at first reviled for their participation in the Rising, 
were later starting to be reinvented and rehabilitated as “misguided” but brave 
and selfless. Their reinvention and rehabilitation were complete when this was 
combined with religious images of martyrdom and with their popular 
beatification since they died out like saints of their sense of moral rectitude 
(Githens-Mazer 2006). 
 In terms of religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based 
arguments, whilst Jonathan Fine (2015) argues that there are differences 
between secular and religious political violence, on ideological, strategic, and 
tactical levels; Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) complements Fine’s argument by 
suggesting that there is a unique connection between religion and terrorism. 
His argument relies on two premises. The first premise is driven by his 
conviction that religion itself is not the inherent cause of violence or terrorism 
since violence might occur with or without religious context. However, religion 
provides mores and symbols which make horrific bloodshed easier to 
vindicate. Bruce Hoffman (2006) argues that Jews and Christians, as well as 
Muslims, have much to answer for as fomenters of religious terror. Hoffman 
reminds us of the enormities perpetrated by Rabbi Meir Kahane, Dr. Baruch 
Goldstein, and Yigal Amir as well as the threat in America posed by William 
Pierce-inspired Christian supremacist movements. Ayatollah Khomeini, Imam 
Sheikh Ahmad Ibrahim Yassin of Hamas, and Osama bin Laden have their 
counterparts in the Jewish and Christian worlds (Hoffman 2006). 
 Nevertheless, Hoffman acknowledges that the Islamist fanatics have a 
much greater opportunity for mayhem because of the alienated hordes in the 
Middle East who see no hope at all in the status quo. The opportunity created 
by despair and rage, not the intrinsic elements of the religion itself, gives Islam 
the edge over Christianity and Judaism as a force for terror. This is 
corresponding to what Mohammed Hafez (2003) argues by using the 
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frustration-aggression models that were based on Ted Robert Gurr’s seminal 
work, Why Men Rebel? (1970). According to Hafez, the primary source of 
Islamist insurgencies lies in the repressive political environments within which 
the clear majority of Muslims find themselves.  
 Hafez’s combination of sophisticated theoretical approach, ideological 
frames, and resources mobilization to explain his detailed case studies in his 
book, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World 
highlights when and how institutional exclusion and indiscriminate repression 
contribute to the large-scale rebellion. The basic question on Hafez’s work is 
not, therefore, why Muslims revolt, but instead why states in these countries 
have the authoritarian character they do. He develops a case for analysis in 
terms of political context, particularly regarding the ability or failure of the state 
to provide the opening channels to Islamist movements for participation in the 
political process and the manner, in which it represses dissent. Moreover, 
according to Hafez, the espousal of anti-system worldviews by Islamists is a 
result less of an inherent ideological inclination, but more of political exclusion 
and repression. 
 Correspondingly, according to Hoffman, if the Old Testament and the 
Christendom Era are guides, Jews and Christians have also shown little 
aptitude for pacifism, except when they hold the upper hand. The first 
premise, however, leads to an important point that only religion that provides a 
moral justification to commit violence in the name of a cosmic war between 
good and evil. In each own way, every group committing such violence 
believes that their God is on their side and through them, the judgment is 
ready to be executed.45  
 This premise also leads to the belief system (including the ideological 
conviction) that the war has already been going on, so that the perpetrators 
just need to continue on engaging in such war, and use that belief system 
(including the ideological conviction) as their justification of self-defence.46 
                                                   
45 However, estate and ideology (e.g., Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, and various forms of 
ethno-nationalism/supra-nationalism) that have existed in the human history also generate a 
similar effect. 
46 The term belief system is usually used to refer to something that is broader than what is 
meant by the term ideology. A belief system is usually defined as a set of principles and ideas 
shared by a group of people, and which tend to influence their actions. Meanwhile, an 
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The involvement in such a way also gives the new illusion of power to the 
marginalized individuals who tend to be involved in such movements. It 
provides them with status, meaning, and identity in the world that no longer 
recognizes them. This act is called the performance violence. This 
performance violence is also deemed a ritual whilst sending a message to the 
audience. Victims are targeted not because they attack the perpetrators, but 
they are merely perceived and portrayed as symbols, tools, animals, or 
corrupt beings. That is why, moral disengagements are often used by religious 
terrorists to justify their attacks since the victims are not necessarily guilty 
against these perpetrators (Bandura 1990).  
 The second premise of Juergensmeyer is driven by his conviction that 
the cure for religion-inspired violence may ultimately lie in the renewed 
appreciation for religion itself and in the acknowledgement of religion in public 
life. Such an approach aims to generate a new kind of mind-set for individuals 
as the agents who apply their own ideological (and belief) system in their life. 
Through this premise he argues that the solution is not the secularization but 
the renewed/revived understanding of religion. The proponents of this 
arguments believe that human is the independent agent that has freedom in 
choosing what they think, believe, and act. In other words, humans should be 
independent in deciding what becomes their worldview and courses of action. 
Through a revived understanding of religion, they will not likely commit what 
Juergensmeyer calls religious violence, so that it supports the major premise 
that the cure to religious violence and terrorism is the revived and better 
appreciation of religion itself. 
 That said, by comparing and synthesizing general conclusions driven 
from both rigorous qualitative and quantitative research methods, this Ph.D. 
thesis aims to provide valuable original knowledge that is related to the multi-
dimensional textures and new patterns of Islamist radicalism, particularly in 
Indonesia. The thorough academic research process in this Ph.D. thesis is to 
leverage our scholarly based knowledge on the existence and latent threat of 
                                                                                                                                                  
ideology is defined as the set of ideas that underlie the belief system itself. Therefore, an 
ideology is less broad than a belief system. Although it can be difficult to differentiate between 
the two, it is usually acceptable to say that ideologies are less broad than belief systems. 
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Islamist terrorism, so that we will be in a better position to formulate more 
contextual, better-shaped counterstrategies in dealing with this phenomenon. 
Our knowledge of terrorism most certainly is deficient, but the field shows no 
clear ability to improve this situation. After thirty years of study, we simply 
should know more about terrorism than we currently do (Silke 2001, 2003). 
 
1.6 The Research Goals 
 
Through a systematic and comprehensive multivariable analysis, the 
thesis aims to present the underpinnings of the existence and latent threat of 
Islamist terrorism by simplifying the complex relationships between economic 
grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social 
network, state repression, government incentive, and Islamist terrorism. The 
thesis rigorously aims to provide the first ever in-depth documentation of the 
existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism by using both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. There is an immediate need in scholarly and 
policy arenas to have current specific research that integrates both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches in exploring the dynamic causes of emerging 
Islamist terrorism in Indonesia and in the region. Moreover, it seeks to achieve 
two, primary objectives.  
First, it will significantly contribute to the scholarly work of this field that 
falls under the category of social science and international studies. 
Specifically, this academic research project will help contribute to the subfield 
of terrorism studies, as the subfield of terrorism studies has not yet, and may 
never, become a “hard” science, but will always remain somewhere in 
between (Sinai 2007). This Ph.D. thesis aims to contribute to the social 
science academic research efforts in this area of study that will upgrade our 
capabilities to better understand and respond with the most effective 
countermeasures against the magnitude of the terrorist challenge facing us. 
 Second, it will significantly contribute to the international and national 
security policy of which current strategic intelligence challenges impose us to 
reorient its focus to cover multiple new, specific targets including but not 
limited to rogue states, non-state group threats, the proliferation of mass 
destruction, international crime and narcotics, as well as terrorism (Imler 
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2004). This study will specifically contribute to the safety and security policies 
particularly in the development of counterstrategies (e.g., counterterrorism) of 
the Republic of Indonesia. The struggle against terrorism is actually more 
complex than simply a struggle within the Islamic world between secularism 
and old traditions that may last a generation or more, so that a struggle 
against terrorism will no longer be engaged with only a single national element 
of power, but instead be overcome by superior knowledge involving the 
combination of strong academic research and the entire spectrum of national 
elements of power (Harris 2004).  
Therefore, by knowing more characteristics of Islamist terrorism in 
Indonesia through this academic research project, we will know the specific 
facts and findings that are strategically useful not only to the subfield of 
terrorism studies, but also to make the prediction/forecast about the existence 
and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia and in the region. As Silke 
argues, constructing government policy without evidence is like building on 
sand and if the result does not fail and collapse it is only because of luck and 
good fortune (Silke 2003). 
 
1.7 The Thesis Structure 
 
In line with the previous outline part (1.1.3) that lays out the overview of 
this thesis structure, the development of this Ph.D. thesis is indeed 
undertaken through a series of primarily sequential research activities, albeit 
with periods of simultaneous processes. The literature review and research 
framework (chapter 2) will focus on the relevant literature/chief topics to 
demonstrate how this Ph.D. thesis fills the gap in the literature, and critically 
review the relevant existing research. Correspondingly, by based on the 
extensive relevant literature review in this field, the last part of chapter 2 
addresses two more elements: research propositions and hypotheses: the 
theory building; as well as research framework and design: variables and 
methodology. 
Subsequently, chapter 3 will focus on the descriptive analysis of JI and 
wider radical-Islamist history in Indonesia on which I base my analysis in 
chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 3 is laid out according to the inter-linked 
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development timeline of JI origins, historical development, and likely form in 
the future. Whilst the organization of this chapter is arranged accordingly in 
that way, it still reflects the determining variables of Islamist terrorism in 
Indonesia that are examined in this Ph.D. thesis: economic grievances; social 
grievances; political grievances; radical ideology; social network; state 
repression; and government incentive.  In this chapter we can see that these 
variables have inherently characterized the phenomena of JI from time to 
time. 
Subsequently, chapter 4 is where I analyze the causes behind JI’s 
violent ideology and/or behaviour. The direction of entire research process in 
this Ph.D. thesis refers to the rigorous qualitative and quantitative research 
methods that are deemed suitable to best answer the research problems and 
questions in this Ph.D. thesis. All data collected in this Ph.D. thesis is 
exploited/analyzed respectively in chapter 4. Whilst chapter 4a is especially 
dedicated for the qualitative research method, chapter 4b is for the 
quantitative one. That said, chapters 4.1 and 4.2 are especially dedicated 
places to exploit, display, and analyze the collected data through respectively 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. Whilst all data simulation using 
qualitative analysis (the discovering patterns analysis, the content analysis, 
and the discourse analysis) and quantitative analysis (the multivariate 
statistical analysis mainly by using the chi-square test, the logistic regression, 
and the proportional test) are situated in chapter 4; the discussion of social 
network analysis on the JI-related individuals are also made available on 
chapter 4.3. To complete the analysis package, chapter 4.4. is then especially 
dedicated to discussing the analysis warranty which consists of the general 
assessment of analysis and inputs/suggestions for the future research. 
As we complete the analysis part, chapter 5, which is the synthesis of 
various analysis is specially dedicated to interpreting, comparing, reconciling, 
verifying, and discussing the findings at length by integrating three main 
components that have been well covered throughout chapter 2 to chapter 4: 
the literature review; the history and evolution of JI; and the analysis. 
Subsequently, chapter 6 is focused on discussing two main components: the 
thesis conclusion and policy relevance/recommendation, where some 
discussions on what can be done to enhance security policy in a 
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changing/evolving threat environment (e.g., some prescriptions on future 
counterterrorism policies) are made available.  
 
The Summary  
 
Terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that encompasses 
elements of politics, economics, social, and ideology, driving people to commit 
violent acts and become involved in such activity. Although it is difficult to 
clearly find a universally agreed upon definition of terrorism; in a nutshell, 
according to Yonah Alexander, terrorism is the threat and use of both 
psychological and physical force in violation of international law, by state and 
sub-state agencies for strategic and political goals. In other words, at the very 
least we can define terrorism as a criminal violent/armed tactic used to send 
messages and to achieve political goals via targeting civilians. This common 
denominator reflects the (tactical) utility of terror. Although there are 
differences between terrorists and waves of terror, the utility of terror as a tool 
of change used throughout history is not different (Garrison 2004).  
Terrorism is carried out by terrorists that do not abide by domestic and 
international laws or norms, and even if we refer to conventional just war 
theory, terrorism is not either justifiable (Cronin 2012).49 As of today, the 
existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism still inflict global society with 
formidable challenges, and one way to overcome such challenges is by 
leveraging our knowledge on multi-dimensional aspects, determining 
factors/elements that lead people to commit terrorist attacks (Silke 2001, 
2003). One way to understand why people commit terrorist attacks or being 
involved in such activity is to explore these factors/elements and the interplay 
among them including but not limited to how they correlate with and affect 
each other. Specifically, these multi-dimensional factors/elements and their 
interplay encompass at least economic grievances, social grievances, political 
grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and 
                                                   
49 See the previous footnote in this chapter 1 about this issue, which is based on John 
Kelsay’s 2009 book, Arguing the Just War in Islam. For more, see (Kelsay 2009). 
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government incentive, all of which are the key variables in determining the 
existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism.  
As the greatest test of any theories is not its conceptual precision or 
volume of data and cases but its ability to provide plausible explanations of 
social processes, this Ph.D. thesis presents a systematic, multi-dimensional 
analysis that attempts to analyze why operatives committed a series of deadly 
terrorist attacks from 2002 – 2009 and some other radical-related activities in 
Indonesia until 2017. Through a systematic, multi-dimensional analysis, this 
Ph.D. thesis will specifically examine what factors drove people with the 
association to JI and Islamist radicalism to commit and become involved in 
terrorist attacks, and why and how might such factors/elements influence 
these people to commit terrorist attacks in the future. The focus of this 
research is the Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group 
that has been evolving, recruiting, and operating in Southeast Asia (including 
Indonesia) from early 1992 until today; as well as various other related radical-
Islamist groups. Having systematically examined such factors and by 
comparing and synthesizing general conclusions driven from both rigorous 
qualitative and quantitative research methods that are based on the standard 
criteria of modern research in terrorism studies, this Ph.D. thesis aims to 
provide valuable original knowledge that is related to terrorism studies and 
national security policy, particularly about multi-dimensional textures and new 
patterns of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia.  
The thorough academic research process in this Ph.D. thesis is to 
leverage our scholarly based knowledge on the existence and latent threat of 
Islamist terrorism, so that we will be in a better position to formulate more 
contextual, better-shaped counterstrategies in dealing with this phenomenon. 
In other words, the entire analysis helps develop both a foundation for future 
research and a series of recommendations for policymakers across all levels 
of government in assuring the security of human life, society, and civilization 
at both national and international level.  
The following chapter (the literature review) extensively covers the 
chief topics in this particular field that includes two sub-parts. The first part 
covers the discussion of terrorism: on defining terrorism; terrorism and other 
forms of political violence; and the angles of looking at terrorism. The second 
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part covers the body of theoretical framework used in this academic research: 
the social movements theory; towards the internationalization theory of 
Islamist terrorism; terrorism in three religious traditions; the social movements 
theory as applied in the case of Islamist terrorism; and the theoretical 
framework to examine the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. The reviews of this 
relevant academic literature in chapter 2 provides the basis for the 
development of theoretical frameworks, research questions, and entire 
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CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH FRAME WORK 
 
As chapter 1 preliminarily discusses the ontology of terrorism whose 
nature makes clearly defining terrorism with a universally agreed upon 
definition difficult (if not impossible), chapter 2 examines the common 
denominator of terrorism, its connections with other forms of political violence, 
the angles of looking at terrorism, and how the body of theoretical framework 
is developed to explain the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia.  
The literature review of chapter 2 is precisely to serve as a solid 
literature basis to comprehend the pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. 
First, the literature review of this chapter aims to explain the phenomenon of 
terror/terrorism including terror/terrorism by the state and non-state actors. 
Second, the literature review of this chapter aims to explain the independent 
variables causing terrorism that are tested in the hypothesis of this Ph.D. 
thesis. The independent variables of economic grievances, social grievances, 
political grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and 
government incentive are all deeply examined in this literature review, and 
thus providing the subsequent chapters (chapter 3 – chapter 6) with a solid 
literature basis to prove that the causes of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia are 
indeed the intertwining interactions of these variables, instead of being 
otherwise. Third, in line with the focus of Ph.D. thesis, the literature review of 
this chapter also examines the phenomenon of Salafi jihadism in Indonesia 
from the perspective of how these independent variables have the impact 
upon the creation/occurrence of Salafi jihadism-based terrorism in Indonesia.  
The literature review of chapter 2 fills the gap in the existing literature 
and complements the previous works in the field (e.g., works of Sydney 
Jones, Zachary Abuza, David Gordon and Samuel Lindo, as well as 
Wiphusana Klaimanee and Mariusz Nogaj) by the sense of its 
comprehensiveness in constructing the phenomenon of Salafi jihad terrorism 
in Indonesia that is elaborated in chapter 3 and rigorously tested by the 








2.1.1 Terrorism (Terrorist) and Other Forms of Poli tical Violence: 
Insurgency (Insurgent); Guerrilla Warfare (Guerrill a); 
Assassination (Assassin); and Crime (Criminal) 
 
Terrorism as a Form of Political Violence 
In one definition, politics is the struggle in any groups for power that will 
give one or more persons the ability to make decisions for the larger group. 
This group may range from a small organization to the entire world. Politics 
occurs wherever there are people and organizations. Political scientists 
concentrate on the struggle for leadership and power in a political community 
such as political party, elected office, city, region, or country. It is therefore 
hard to separate the idea of politics from the idea of power, which is the ability 
to influence others or impose one’s will on them (O’Neil 2015). Since politics is 
about the competition for public power, and power is the ability to extend 
one’s will, we can conclude that politics is identical with power relationships 
among individuals, societies, groups, and states. 
On the other hand, the word violence has the essential meaning of the 
use of physical force or power to harm someone and to damage property by 
great destructive force or energy.61 Correspondingly, politics can manifest in 
the form of political violence, which itself has a broad meaning. By one 
definition, political violence is a type of violence taking place outside of state 
control that is politically motivated and driven. Some scholars view political 
violence as part of contentious politics or collective political struggle such as 
revolutions, civil war, riots and strikes, as well as peaceful protest movements 
(Tilly 2003, Zimmermann 2012). Political violence can be caused by 
institutional factors such as state, economic, or social systems; by ideational 
factors such as the effect of political and religious ideas; and by individual 
factors such as rational or psychological reasons (O’Neil 2015).  
                                                   
61 Based on its general definition, violence has these two inherent properties: a physical force 
and a destructive capacity. For more, see (Definition of Violence n.d.). 
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Another definition of political violence emphasizes it as a violence 
perpetrated by either individuals or state’s governments to achieve certain 
political aims, since the perpetrators believe that the political system –from the 
stage #1 to the stage #3 on table 2.2 below, affecting their life and interests is 
incapable of responding to their demands. Consequently, this condition leads 
them to believe that violence is not only justified, but also both necessary and 
sufficient factors to achieve their political and religious aims (Fine 2015, Gupta 
2008, Juergensmeyer 2003).  
On the other side of the same coin, as previously discussed on how a 
state through its government performs “terror from above,” state governments 
committing political violence believe that using violence to intimidate their 
population is both necessary and sufficient factors to force them into 
acquiescence (Burt 2007, Killingsworth et al. 2015, Leebaw 2011). However, 
according to Sauter and Carafano (2012), the repression of populations by 
their own governments is usually not included in the modern definition of 
terrorism, especially by Western governments. In addition to that, state 
governments can also employ political violence to defend the nation and to 
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Table 2.1 The Spectrum and Gradual Manifestations of Political Action 
 
Stage #1: The State of Peace 
  
The State Actor 
 
The Non-Regime/Non-State Actor  
 





Rule of Law (the routine rule 
legitimated by tradition; customs; 
constitutional procedure; and 
compromise politics of give-and-
take). 
 
Constitutional Opposition Politics (the 
formation of opposition presses and parties; 
rallies; electoral contests; and litigation/use 
of courts for political struggle). 
 





Oppression (the manipulation of 
competitive electoral process; 
censorship; surveillance; 
harassment; discrimination; 
infiltration of opposition; and 
misuse of emergency legislation). 
 
Extra Parliamentary Action (the non-violent 
actions such as social protest for political 
persuasion of rulers and masses; 
demonstrations to show strength of public 
supports; strikes; boycotts; non-cooperative 
civil disobedience; and other forms of 
pressure politics short of violence). 
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Stage #4:  
 
The Political Violence  
(Violent Politics) 
 
Violent repression for control of 
state power that includes state 
terrorism (the torture, death 
squads, disappearances, and 
concentration camps); 
counterinsurgency; assassination; 
massacres; and political justice 
(the mass arrest, banning, and 
deportation). 
 
Use of violence for challenging state power 
that correspondingly mirrors what state actor 
does. It includes terrorism (the de-
individuated political murder); insurgency; 
assassination (the individuated political 
murder); indiscriminate massacres; and 
material destruction (e.g., the sabotage and 
arson). 
 
Stage #5: The Civil War 
 
Source: Self-made.62  
 
                                                   
62 Adapted. See (Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature 1988), 58 – 59. 
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All that said, there are in fact various manifestations that could be 
categorized as political violence perpetrated by non-state and state actors. 
Such manifestations include but not limited to terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla 
warfare, assassination, and (extra-ordinary) crime. Scholars, however, 
generally suggest that an ordinary criminal violence should not be categorized 
as a political violence (O’Neil 2015).63  
Correspondingly, terrorism as a form of political violence according to 
Cronin (2012) can be defined as an unpredicted, altruistic form of political 
violence that is carried out by non-state actors (although it is still possible to 
receive state’s support of means) at international and domestic levels where 
innocents, civilians, or non-combatants become random and intentional 
victims in order to instill fear and to maximize the psychological effects of the 
attack on the audience. Terrorism is carried out by terrorists that do not abide 
by domestic and international laws or norms, and if we refer to conventional 
just war theory, terrorism is not justifiable.64  
For example, although religious radical terrorism can use national 
liberation and liberation theology as the justification (jus ad bellum/the 
principle of just cause/right intention), from the jus in bello perspective (the law 
of waging war) the Islamist terrorism is less well developed, since they have 
no weapons restriction and tend to attack anybody.65 In conclusion, they may 
emphasize the principle of jus ad bellum but totally ignore the principle of jus 
in bello that comprises primarily of discrimination, proportionality, and 
necessity. Terrorism (terrorist) is in the gray area with other forms of political 
violence such as insurgency (insurgent), guerrilla warfare (guerrilla), 
assassination (assassin), and crime (criminal), since although they are four 
different kinds of political violence they also share some similar characteristics 




                                                   
63 See also (Dumouchel n.d.) 
 
64 Audrey Cronin’s view of terrorism as a political violence is more leaning towards Bruce 
Hoffman’s that views terrorism as a political violence perpetrated by non-state actors. 
 
65 See the footnote in chapter 1.1 regarding the discussion on this issue. 
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Terrorism (Terrorist), Insurgency (Insurgent), and Guerrilla Warfare (Guerrilla) 
As a political violence, terrorism can be interpreted as a violent act 
taking place outside the normal bounds of civil law and conventional military 
conduct. Terrorism is often linked to an insurgency or guerrilla warfare but is 
not necessarily a tactic or technique required of an insurgency or guerrilla 
campaign. Conceptually and practically, insurgency and guerrilla warfare can 
also overlap. However, the irregular warfare is one mean/method by which the 
insurgency is conducted. Insurgency is usually a bigger phenomenon than 
guerrilla warfare in terms of tactics, operations or strategy.  Although these 
forms of conflict may often have similar goals, differences exist among 
insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism.66  
Insurgency is also difficult to be clearly defined as in our efforts to 
define a single, commonly agreed upon definition of terrorism. Insurgency is 
also a social phenomenon and therefore a product of the society from which it 
derives.67 It is clear that there is no universally agreed set of definitions for the 
study and practice of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and we did not set 
one in the Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (2012). 
Defining concepts is indeed a substantial act to any academic endeavors but 
also an act where the academic is at complete liberty. Therefore, as an 
ultimate consequence, we must accept the fact that this leaves open the 
possibility of concluding that these fundamental questions of clearly defining 
insurgency with a single, commonly accepted definition only lead to a 
potentially obsolete debate. Along similar lines, David Kilcullen argues in 
chapter 11 of Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
(2012) that the focus on faulty counterinsurgency concepts leads us 
completely astray.”68  
However, an insurgency at very least can be defined as an armed 
political effort with a specific aim to overthrow a constituted ruling authority or 
the political status-quo. Correspondingly, an insurgent is someone who 
violently rebels against a “recognized” ruling authority or the political status-
                                                   
66 For more, see (Crenshaw and Pimlott, Theories of Insurgency and Terrorism: Introduction 
1997). 
 
67 For more, see (Duyvesteyn and Rich 2012). 
 
68 For more, see (Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency: The State of a Controversial Art 2012). 
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quo. The Joint Publication 1-02-NATO defines insurgency as an organized 
movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government using 
subversion and armed conflict. Meanwhile, the Joint Publication 1-02-NATO 
defines guerilla warfare as military and paramilitary operations conducted in 
the enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous 
forces.69  
Corresponding to these both definitions of insurgency and irregular 
warfare, the Joint Publication 1-02-NATO also defines a terrorist as an 
individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.70 
This definition still reflects the substance of a terrorist whose target often 
include civilians and to weaken the resolve of what terrorists deem as “the 
enemy.” Both insurgency and guerilla warfare can use terrorism as a means 
to shape an environment.71 Adapting to counter superior military forces or 
technological capabilities, an insurgent or guerilla can create conditions that 
persuade or coerce a target audience to directly and indirectly support an 
insurgent or guerilla agenda.72 
According to Cronin (2012) insurgency at least can be defined as an 
organized resistance movement that has elements of subversion, sabotage, 
and armed conflict with the purpose of overthrowing the existing social order, 
in order to reallocate political power so that the follow-through events might 
occur: the overthrowing of existing government; the establishment of 
autonomous territory; the driving out of (foreign) forces from territory; the 
reallocation of political power; and the extraction of (political) resources that 
are unattainable by less violent means.  
In other words, as an organized resistance movement, an insurgency is 
usually an armed political movement/armed rebellion with a specific aim and 
                                                   
69 For more, see (Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, As 




71 For more, see (Army, Petraeus and Amos, Army Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency 
2006), 1-3.  
 
 
72 For more, see (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 2007), 1-5.  
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sustained by a significant level of support. This term of insurgency tells us 
something about its organizational dimension as opposed to the tactical 
dimension as we find in the phenomenon of terrorism. Therefore, this key 
difference/characteristic of insurgency set it apart from both terrorism and 
guerrilla warfare as they are both tactics and methods available to pursue the 
goals of the political movement. For example, by looking at the Mao Tse-
Tung’s insurgency from the angle of an organizational dimension we can see 
that Mao’s insurgency organizationally and progressively used various, 
systematic tactics to achieve its political aim.73 
 As terrorism is a tactic and is only one tool used by organizations that 
wage asymmetrical warfare against a superior foe, there is nothing inherent in 
either insurgency or guerrilla warfare that they must require the use of terror. 
Whilst some of the more successful insurgencies and guerrilla campaigns 
employed terrorism and terror tactics, and some developed into conflicts 
where terror tactics and terrorism became predominant; there have been 
others that effectively renounced the use of terrorism. The deliberate choice to 
use terrorism should calculate its effectiveness in three objectives that serve 
the overall aim of insurgency: how the use of terrorism can impact the further 
resistance; how the use of terrorism can destroy the government efficiency; 
and how the use of terrorism can impact the mobilizing of support.74  
This deliberate calculation of whether to use terrorism in the insurgency 
is logical since to survive and to be successful, insurgencies require the active 
or tacit support of some portion of the population involved. On the other hand, 
a terror group does not require and rarely has the active support of a large 
percentage of the population, since normally terrorism does not contend for 
actual control of territory.75 All that said, the population support is indeed the 
centre of gravity for insurgency since the goal of an insurgency is to challenge 
                                                   
73 For more, see (Tse-Tung 2007). See also (Fredman, Guerrilla Warfare 2013), 183 – 187. 
 
Chairman Mao’s insurgency tactics are also known by five lines of effort reflecting the 
employment of mass-base, united front, military wing, political warfare, and international 
support. 
 
74 For more, see (Reich 1998), 16 – 20.  
 
75 Ibid., 17. 
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the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory, or to force 
political concessions in sharing political power.  
That is why, the key element in insurgent strategy is the effective 
control of influence over a relevant population. A supportive population 
provides security, intelligence, logistical support, and a recruiting base for 
each side in an insurgency and counter-insurgency struggle. If the insurgency 
gains control over an increasing percentage of the population, the government 
will correspondingly lose effective control over a larger percentage of the 
population. Without a focus on the relevant population, insurgent objectives 
are nil.76  
Whilst insurgents may describe themselves as insurgents or guerrillas, 
terrorists will not usually refer to themselves as terrorists. They may describe 
themselves using military or political terminology such as freedom fighters, 
soldiers, or activists. Terrorism relies on public impact, and is therefore 
conscious of the advantage of avoiding the negative connotations of the term 
terrorist in identifying themselves.77 Terrorists do not usually attempt to 
challenge government forces directly, but act to create perceptions of an 
ineffectiveness or illegitimate government. Meanwhile, an insurgent or 
guerrilla force may clash with a government combat force to demonstrate that 
they can effectively challenge the military effectiveness of the government or 
to acquire military weapons and equipment. Terrorists use methods that 
attempt to neutralize the strengths of conventional forces. Bombings and 
mortar attacks on civilian targets where military or security spend off-duty 
time, ambushes of convoys, and assassinations of government individuals are 
common tactics.78  
However, depending upon the situation, insurgency and guerrilla 
warfare may also actively target non-combatants. Some insurgencies and 
guerrilla campaigns consider police and security personnel, in addition to 
military forces, as targets in an expanded definition of combatants. Examples 
                                                   
76 For more discussion on the significance of population within the context of insurgency, see  
(Merari, Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency 1993). 
 
77 For more discussion on this matter, see (Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 1998), 29 – 33.  
 
78 For more discussion on this matter, see (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) G2 2007), 1-7 – 1-8.  
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exist of insurgents or guerrillas deliberately placing civilians on a target list.  A 
Vietcong directive in 1965 detailed the types of people who must be 
“repressed,” and stated, “The targets of repression are counterrevolutionary 
elements who seek to impede the revolution and work actively for the enemy 
and for the destruction of the revolution… Elements who actively fight against 
the revolution in reactionary parties such as the Vietnamese Nationalist Party, 
Party for a Greater Viet Nam, Personality and Labour Party, and key 
reactionaries in organizations and associations founded by the reactionary 
parties and the U.S. imperialists and the puppet government.”79 Insurgents 
may also use more than one form of violence to obtain their objectives with a 
combination of terrorism and insurgent or guerrilla warfare as common.80 
In other words, the use of terrorism in insurgency must be very 
calculative since the miscalculated, improper use of terrorism in the 
insurgency can be counter-productive. In addition to that, although it is not 
always required, external support, recognition or approval from other countries 
or political entities can also be useful to insurgents.81 If we refer to the general 
principles of guerrilla warfare by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, we can see how he 
distinguished the use of terrorism and sabotage as a tactic. It is necessary to 
clearly distinguish between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective 
method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and 
indiscriminate in its results.82  
Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s conviction about the advantage of sabotage 
might be influenced by Thomas Edward Lawrence who is widely known as 
Lawrence of Arabia. From his memoir of the insurgent campaign, The Seven 
Pillars of Wisdom, we can see that the insurgent campaign against the 
Ottoman rule that had begun in 1916 with operations against the key supply 
                                                   
79 For more discussion on this matter, see (Merari, Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency 
1993), 216.  
 
80 See (O'Neill 1990), 26.  
 
81 The use of terrorism within the context of insurgency cannot be separated from the impacts 
that a method of terrorism causes within that insurgency movement and the objectives of 
insurgency movement itself. For more, see (Differences between Terrorism and Insurgency 
n.d.) 
 
82 For more, see (E. ". Guevara 2012). See also, (C. Guevara n.d.). 
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line on the long railroad between Medina and Damascus eventually turned 
into a full-scale Arab revolt and became a major distraction for the Turks.83 
This causal relationship between the failure of the Ottoman rule to secure the 
key supply line and a full-scale Arab revolt is also confirmed by the fact that 
insurgency is often founded on pragmatism and exploitation of the lack of 
delivery of coveted social goods by the central state (Kilcullen 2011). 
William Reno (2012) distinguishes two ideal types of insurgency: a 
hierarchical Maoist variant and a network type of insurgency. For the 
individual logic of these two types of insurgency, they largely derive from the 
context in which they are formed and carried out. In a hierarchical Maoist 
variant, conducted in many post-colonial states, the insurgents aim at building 
up a shadow government in preparation for an eventual takeover of power. On 
the other hand, in the network variant that is displayed in a patronage 
predatory state, the access to resources and economic opportunity is used as 
a means of population control. Challengers in the Maoist variant need to have 
developed some measure of social autonomy for an ideologically infused 
struggle. Whilst in the network-centric insurgency, the challengers almost 
exclusively come from the ruling circles themselves.84 
Therefore, up to this point we can clearly see that the dominant political 
form of insurgency current in contemporary analysis, on the other hand, is one 
usually seeking to create a shadow government which will ultimately replace 
the pre-existing government of a state through a phased process of resistance 
(e.g., defined by strategic defence, stalemate, and eventual strategic offence). 
This important feature of many of insurgencies concerns the prevalence of a 
shadow government, not only in the cases of India, Hezbollah and Hamas, but 
also Iraq and Afghanistan. This could be interpreted as a sign of the strategic 
nature of insurgency, rather than the tactical. This organizational feature 
makes insurgency stand out from other expressions of political violence, such 
as terrorism.85  
                                                   
83 For more discussion on Lawrence of Arabia’s experience in this matter, see (Freedman 
2013), 181. 
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Meanwhile, terrorism, due to its secretive nature does not invest in 
building up structures capable of taking over political power and responsibility. 
Tools of the trade used in insurgency range from targeted killings (e.g., 
assassinations and executions), hit-and-run tactics, sabotage on critical 
infrastructures, booby traps and IEDs, propaganda, political education and 
mobilization at the heart of people’s war, psychological warfare, and 
terrorism.86 According to Lawrence of Arabia, as a form of irregular warfare 
“insurgency is more intellectual than a bayonet charge.”87   
Since the defined end state of an insurgency is indeed the replacement 
of the government of a nation-state by a different governmental structure, the 
nature of the state ultimately remains the same with only its political 
leadership and structure changing. At its bottom line, the basis of an 
insurgency itself is thus political in nature and exists within the paradigm of the 
Westphalian state system established in 1648 and continues to define the 
modern world order.88 Therefore, insurgency is usually considered illegal at 
the domestic level, but sometimes it is considered legal at the international 
level (Cronin 2012). The Libyan armed revolution turned Civil War against 
Mu’ammar Qaddafi is an example of an insurgency, as much as some 
scholars and policy experts may tend to interpret al-Qaeda and its association 
movements as a global insurgency with the intent to overthrow the current 
world order. 
Subsequently, as we have examined the characteristics of terrorism, 
insurgency, and guerrilla; at least now we can view guerrilla from three 
angles: as a person; as an entity; and as a guerrilla warfare. The word 
guerrilla itself in Spanish means “little war,” a term originating in the resistance 
to Napoleon’s occupation of Spain in the nineteenth-century combat, in which 
small, unconventional insurgent units challenged colonial governments 
backed by traditional military forces. In following decades, as an overt military 
arm of insurgency, guerrilla armies in different conflicts around the world often 
                                                   
86 For more, see (Fredman, Guerrilla Warfare 2013), 178 – 192. 
 
87 Ibid., 182. 
 
88 For more discussion on this insurgency matter, see (Duyvesteyn and Rich 2012), 45. 
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portrayed themselves as legitimate military units fighting an enemy’s army in 
order to establish a new political entity. In some cases, they may have 
qualified as such, under norms eventually incorporated into the Geneva 
Conventions, by carrying their weapons openly, wearing uniforms, maintaining 
a clear command structure, and following the law of war, along with other 
practices.89 
As a person, a guerrilla can be defined as a small group of combatants 
and a member of resistance fighters that use military tactics to fight a larger, 
often less-mobile traditional military. Guerrilla does not belong to a regular 
army and fighting in a war as an independent unit carrying out harassment 
and sabotage including against regular army and government targets.90 In 
other words, at the very least, a guerrilla is someone who usually applies 
“irregular tactics” to attack an army.  
Correspondingly, as an entity, guerrilla can also be defined as an overt 
military arm of insurgency, whilst as a tactic (method) of an insurgency, 
guerrilla can also be defined as an overt military arm of insurgency that 
operates with the irregular warfare style and sometimes exists along with 
auxiliary and its underground counterparts that come out of the population 
supporting them.91 In this manner guerrilla is often referred as guerrilla 
warfare, or in one interpretation it is the response of an enraged society to 
what is deemed as an “illegitimate” military force (Freedman 2013).  
Guerrilla warfare was therefore defensive, fought on home territory with 
the advantages of in-depth popular support and local knowledge (in-depth, not 
in-face). It was geared to a strategy of exhaustion, gaining time in the hope 
that the enemy would tire or that something else would turn up. Though a 
strategically defensive concept, the tactics of guerrilla warfare had to be 
                                                   
89 For more discussion on this matter, see (Sauter and Carafano 2012), 264.  
 
90 As a comparison, see also (Definition of Guerrilla n.d.). 
 
91 The common denominator that defines something as a guerrilla warfare is where a small 
group of combatants that do not belong to the regular army uses military tactics such as 
ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility in order to fight a 
larger and less-mobile traditional military. Guerilla Warfare is a form of irregular warfare. At 
the very least, something can be defined as irregular warfare is where one or more 
combatants involved in such conflict are irregular military rather than the regular forces that 
belong to the state’s government. See the table 2.3 below for more elaborated characteristics 
of guerilla warfare. 
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offensive, aiming to catch the enemy unawares. Lawrence of Arabia observed 
that the victory in guerrilla warfare depended on the use of “speed, 
concealment, accuracy of fire.”92 Guerrilla warfare would most likely be 
effective when conducted from rough and inaccessible terrain in a country’s 
interior.  
However, Clausewitz did not see irregular militias as being of much 
value in the absence of regular forces. That is why, the history of Red Army 
had begun with “volunteers, rebels, primitive, inexperienced guerrilla” and 
turned them into “proper, trained, disciplined regiments and divisions.” 
According to Vladimir Lenin, guerrilla warfare as a part of insurgency could 
only be a subordinate form of struggle, not the main method, and would 
benefit from proper party discipline to keep it under control.93 
As with terrorism, in practice guerrilla can use it as one of their 
methods of action, where guerrillas generally operate in the military middle 
size, sometime with commando style with the intentional target is state 
apparatus and politicians. A guerrilla force may have something to gain from a 
clash with a government combat force, such as proving that they can 
effectively challenge the military effectiveness of the government.94 If we refer 
to the common denominator of terrorism as a violence targeted against 
civilians, the key contrast between terrorism and guerrilla warfare lies in the 
fact that at the very least, guerrilla warfare (as part of insurgency) is the 
employment of violence targeted against the state or “recognized” 
government. As a component of insurgency, guerrilla warfare was therefore 
viewed as a lesser strategy, a defensive expedient but not a source of 
victory.95 There is no legitimate basis of guerrillas at the domestic level, but if 
being conducted by certain rules it may have international legality (Cronin 
2012). 
                                                   
92 For more discussion on this matter, see (Fredman, Guerrilla Warfare 2013), 182.  
 
93 Ibid., 179 – 180.  
 
94 On the other hand, a terrorist group relatively has nothing to gain from such a clash. This is 
not to say that they do not target military or security forces, but that they will likely not engage 
in anything resembling a “fair fight,” or even a “fight” at all. The 1983 terrorist attack against 
the U.S. Marines barrack in Beirut, Lebanon is the example of this “unfair fight.” 
 
95 For more discussion on this matter, see (Fredman, Guerrilla Warfare 2013), 180.  
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Figure 2.1 The Venn Diagram Reflecting the Overlap of Terrorist, Insurgent, 
and Guerrilla. 
 
Source: Excerpt from (ProCon.org n.d.) 
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Table 2.2 The Characteristics of Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, and Conventional Warfare as Modes of Violent Struggle  
(according to Ariel Merari). 
 
Characteristics Conventional Warfare Guerilla Warfare Terrorism 
Unit size in battle. Large (armies, corps, division). Medium (platoons, companies, 
battalions). 
Small (usually fewer than 10 
personnel). 
Weapons. Full range of military hardware 
(air force, armor, artillery, etc). 
Mostly infantry-type light weapons but 
sometimes artillery pieces as well. 
Guerrilla warfare can rely significantly on 
IED’s for ambushes. 
Hand guns, hand grenades, 
assault rifles and specialized 
weapons, e.g., car bombs, 
barometric pressure bombs. 
Terrorists can rely 
significantly on IED’s for 
urban bombings. 
Tactics. Usually joint operations 
involving several military 
branches. 
Commando-type tactics. Note: 
Insurgents have been increasingly 







                                                   
96 Omar Ashour, Ph.D. (professor and thesis supervisor) in a discussion with the author, April 12, 2016. 
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Targets. Mostly military units, industrial 
and transportation infrastructure. 
Mostly military, police, and 
administration staff, as well as political 
opponents. 
State symbols, political 
opponents, and the public at 
large. 
Intended impact. Physical destruction. Mainly physical attrition of the enemy. Psychological coercion. 
Control of 
territory. 
Yes. Yes. No. 
Uniform. Wear uniform. Often wear uniform. Do not wear uniform. 
Recognition of 
war zones. 
War limited to the recognized 
geographical zones. 
War limited to the country in strife. No recognized war zones. 
Operations carried out 
worldwide.  
Note: However sometime 
terrorism is limited to 
geographical location. Please 
see the table 2.5 below. 
International 
legality. 
Yes, if conducted by rules. Yes, if conducted by rules. No. 
Domestic legality. Yes. No. No. 
 
Source: Self-made.97 
                                                   
97 Adapted. See (Garrison 2004).  
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Terrorism (Terrorist), Crime (Criminal) and Assassination (Assassin) 
Crime at the very least can be defined as an illegal act that is against the law and 
can be punished by the government, whilst criminals are the actors who are engaged in 
the crime without altruistic purpose by which they aim at gaining a specific end for their 
own personal gain. Therefore, unlike in terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare that 
aim at changing social structure, there is no symbolic violence in the crime as they do 
not aim at destroying the state and are not interested in public opinion. In other words, 
criminals do not aim at changing social structure, to challenging state’s authority, or in 
gaining popularity. Criminals even need and operate by taking advantage of state’s 
structures and authority. To some degree, criminals need the state’s infrastructure to 
stay alive. At the very least the main difference between criminal and terrorist or 
insurgent or conventional military is in its aims. Whilst the aim of criminal tends to be 
economic, the aim of terrorist or insurgent or conventional military tends to be socio-
politico.  
Meanwhile, according to John Collins (2001) assassination is generally defined 
as the premeditated, deliberate or intentional murder, usually of prominent individuals, 
by using a sudden or secret attack, for political, ideological, cultural, or religious 
reasons. Although assassination might have political nature, the political nature of 
assassination is not only the single reason. Other reasons may include economic, 
religious, ideological, psychological, or military motivations. The assassination of John 
Lennon is an example of psychological-driven assassination, and the assassination may 
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Figure 2.2 Another Way of Looking at the Common Features of Terrorism, Insurgency, 
Guerrilla Warfare, Assassination, and Crime as Forms of Political Violence. 
 
 
Source: Self-made.98  
 
 
2.1.3 The Angles of Looking at Terrorism 
Putting into other words, terrorism can also be viewed from three different 
angles: terrorism as a logic of action; terrorism as a product of social or psychological 
forces; and terrorism as a method of action. 
Terrorism as a logic of action refers to the use of violence by terrorists that within 
their bounded rationality they think that they deliberately plan, target, strike, or attack 
civilians, innocents, or non-combatants to achieve certain political demands. Martha 
Crenshaw (1998) argues that the terrorist behaviour is a product of strategic choice 
based on logical calculation and collective rationality (rather than merely on 
psychological reasons) among many other optional courses of action, and open to 
bargaining and negotiation if it serves their clearly defined cause and purpose (although 
terrorists are often unclear about their ultimate goals).  
                                                   
98 Adapted. See (A. K. Cronin, Defining Terrorism and Its Grey Area with Other Forms of Political Violence 
2012). 
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Nevertheless, there is a controversy in this definition. Although terrorism is 
logically planned and executed (at least five logical components exist in the logical 
calculation of terrorism: the cause itself is the end-state; agenda-setting is inherent in 
terrorism; the attacks are carefully planned and carried out to satisfy the symbolic 
meaning; group rationality; and cost-benefit analysis), miscalculation and uncertainty 
are still inherently unavoidable. For example, although terrorists logically aim to change 
a country’s political system, terrorists, in fact, will find it extremely difficult to transform or 
annihilate a country’s political system (Abrahms 2006). That said, terrorism is not 
actually always “logical and rational” as Crenshaw argues, but it could also be defined 
as a product of social and psychological forces.99 
Terrorism as a product of social or psychological forces, on the other hand, 
rather place emphasis on psychological factors to explain terrorism (Post 1998, 2007). 
According to him, the end-state of terrorism is violence. There is no cause being 
reflected as the end-state like in the Crenshaw’s argument. The behaviour is influenced 
by individual traits such as childhood, upbringing, as well as other psychological and 
social factors affecting the related individual. They also tend to be action-oriented and 
act within their own bounded-rationality. They feel marginalized and feel that the act of 
terrorism they commit will give them the meaning. This approach consequently places 
emphasis on affecting the lifestyle of the related individual as one mechanism to prevent 
such acts. 
Terrorism as the method of action refers to an armed political campaign which 
usually is used in the insurgency that exploits the mobilization of people to establish 
counter-state capabilities and activities for the purpose of challenging the state for 
certain political power (Marks 2006).100 The example for this category is an insurgency 
using terrorism as one of its methods of action. The Indonesian experience in dealing 
                                                   
99 In critical response to study of Robert Pape about logic of suicide terrorism, Max Abrahms (2006) 
produced an alternative study testing terrorism’s effectiveness as an instrument of coercion. See also 
(Abrahms, The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited 2012). 
 
100 This argument is derived from the compilation of Professor Thomas A. Marks’ lectures in 2006. For 
more, see (Marks 2006). 
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with the Aceh Separatist Movement (GAM), the Papua Separatist Movement (OPM), 
and the East Timor Separatist Movement (GPK) falls under this category.101 
In one perspective, looking at terrorism as the method of action used in the 
insurgency is identical to view terrorism at a minimum as a supplement of insurgency or 
conventional warfare to keep the enemy off balance and distracted, principally by 
conducting strikes against vulnerable targets at the enemy’s rear. The Afghan Taliban 
employs terrorism in this manner, as does the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. On 
the other hand, another perspective also views that the use of terrorism in the 
insurgency as the first step in an armed struggle. According to Stewart (2014), like 
Marxist, Maoist, and Focoist militant groups, al-Qaeda also followed this progressive 
strategy. It used terrorism to shape public opinion and to raise popular support for its 
cause, expecting to enhance its strength to a point where it could wage insurgency and 
then conventional warfare to establish an emirate and eventually a global caliphate. 
Once a group becomes more militarily capable, the group’s leaders will often switch 
strategies, progressing from terrorist attacks to an insurgency.102 Whether the Islamist 
terrorism in Indonesia follows this strategy trend remains to be seen. This academic 
research is trying to find the answer for this puzzle.  
The framework of viewing terrorism as the method of action employed in the 
insurgency can also be used to examine in which category the Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) should be placed. Is it a terrorist organization or a militant insurgency?  
As one tactical tool used by organizations that wage asymmetrical warfare 
against a superior foe, terrorism is often used to conduct armed conflict against a 
militarily stronger enemy when the organization launching the armed struggle is not yet 
at a stage where insurgent or conventional warfare is viable. If we refer to this particular 
definition of how terrorism as a tactic is used by the perpetrators whilst waiting for them 
to be ready to engage at the later stage of conflict (e.g., insurgency or conventional 
warfare), the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant should not be viewed merely as a 
terrorist group, but rather as a militant group using terrorism as one of its diverse 
                                                   
101 East Timor Separatist Movement (GPK) was applied until the East Timor’s separation from Indonesia 
in 1999. 
 
102 For more discussion on this matter, see (Stewart 2014).  
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military tools. According to Hafez (2007), the Salafi jihadists in Iraq indeed implement 
what is called “the system collapse strategy” which is the complete dismantlement of 
public order, governing political and economic institutions, and state security forces. 
In addition to conducting terrorist attacks in its area of operations, the group in 
fact has displayed the ability to fight and to launch a protracted, complex insurgency 
campaigns across an expansive geography, has engaged in conventional military 
battles against the Syrian and Iraqi militaries, and has demonstrated the capacity to 
govern areas of territory, administer social services, and collect taxes. Given these 
developing characteristics, categorizing the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant solely 
as a terrorist organization underestimates the group’s capabilities (Stewart 2014).103 
This argument is nevertheless also in line with the view of Gareth Stansfield (2014) who 
argues about the expansion of ISIS and the miscalculation of the West on the growing 
















                                                   
103 Ibid. 
 
104 For more discussion on this matter, see (Stansfield 2014). 
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Table 2.3 A Way to Comparatively View Self-Organized Terrorism (Non-State Actor 
Terrorism) and Conventional Military 
Dimension Conventional Military Self-Organized Terrorism 
Organization Hierarchical, formal. Flat, informal, networked. 
Leadership Concentrated, with an 
institutional authority. 
Primarily symbolic, with role 
in fundraising. 
Loyalty A state and a polity. A tradition. 
Coalition Partners Formal, perhaps shifting. Informal, but likely enduring 
from conflict to conflict. 
Command and Control Centralized, and with clear 
power relationships. 
Decentralized, and with no 
one fully in charge. 
Role of Intelligence 
Gathering and Analysis 
Powerful, and primarily 
defensive. 
Weak, and primarily 
defensive. 
Denial and Deception Useful, but of secondary 
importance. 
Well developed, critical to 
mission. 
Doctrinal Development Derived from formal study, 
historical experience, 
simulation, and gaming. 
Evolutionary, trial and error. 
Other Security Obligations Numerous, including 
regional security, 
peacekeeping, and formal 
alliances. 
None. 
Weapons Arsenal Built through formal 
acquisitions. Takes years, 
even decades. Resources 
are abundant. 
Adaptable, evolves quickly 
via natural selection. 
Resources are constrained. 




organizations, crime, and 
narcotics. 
Source: (Harris 2004), 345.  
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Table 2.4 The Comparative Example of Contemporary Non-State Terrorist Groups 
Al-Qaeda ISIS  Abu Sayyaf Jabhat al-
Nusra 




1988 by Osama 
Bin Laden. 
Being declared 
in April 2013. 
as the caliphate 
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105 For more, see (Ioannou 2015). 
 
106 For the estimation of these 30% foreign fighters, see (Rosenberg 2016).  
 
For its geographical coverage, see (Mapping Militant Organizations: Jabhat Fathah al-Sham (Formerly 
Jabhat al-Nusra) 2017).  
 
In 2013 al-Nusra was active in 11 of Syria’s 13 governorates, including parts of Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir el 
Zour, Daraa, and Idlib.  
 
By June 2015, the group had pushed the Syrian army out of the Idlib governorate after coordinating 
attacks against the Assad Regime with the Jaysh al-Fatah umbrella organization.  In early August 2015, 
al-Nusra announced that it would withdraw from the frontline against the Islamic State in northern Syria 
due to increasing Turkish and U.S. involvement in the region. Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-
Nusra) has also targeted Hezbollah in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon, which is near the border with Syria.  
 
In February 25, 2017, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham fighters carried out a suicide attack in the city of Homs. The 
attack killed General Hassan Daabul, a senior military intelligence advisor who was close to Syrian 
President Bashar Assad, and critically wounded Ibrahim Darwish, the head of the State Security Branch 
(40 killed, 50+ wounded). 
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All that said, as we proceed to conduct the academic research on terrorism, 
according to Cronin (2004), we should view terrorism from four levels of analysis: 
individual; group; state; and global level. However, to better examine the phenomenon 
in depth, Cronin argues that we need to delve into one of the major levels of analysis 
(e.g., individual) whilst still acknowledging other levels of analysis (e.g., group, state, 
and global level). The using of four level of analysis is extremely important to 
comprehend the phenomenon of terrorism as well as to formulate the right 
counterterrorism policy, strategy, and operations.  
For example, the focus on the individual level of analysis will be relevant to the 
following aspects of counterterrorism measures: psychological aspects; profiling of 
potential and real terrorists; and the removal of key leaders. Second, the focus on the 
group level of analysis will be relevant to the following aspects of counterterrorism 
                                                   
107 Adapted and translated. For more, see (Majalah Tempo 2016). See also (Home Office 2016). 
According to this British government report, 66 international terrorist organizations are proscribed under 
the Terrorism Act 2000, and 14 organisations in Northern Ireland were proscribed under previous 
legislation.    
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measures: social network; organizational structure; ideological (and belief) system; and 
wider dynamics of terrorist groups. Third, the focus on the state level of analysis will be 
relevant to the following aspects of counterterrorism measures: focus on fixing domestic 
problems that leads into the thriving of Islamist terrorism at national level and engaging 
sponsoring states behind the groups at international level. Fourth, the focus on the 
international level of analysis will be relevant to the following aspects of 
counterterrorism measures: focus on the state behind terrorist’s movements; 
international regimes; the issue of globalization; and the challenge of clash of 
civilizations. For this academic research project, I will home in on the individual level 
and then incorporate the other levels of analysis to place the case study of JI (and its 
related Islamist radical groups) into a broader international context. 
 





In addition to integrating various related social factors with the study of 
individuals, the social movements theory can be used as the basis to examine, 
comprehend, and explain the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism. One basic premise 
according to the social movements theory is that many terrorist organizations originate 
out of splinters, who break off from social movements and then decide to choose 
violence to catalyze a movement and achieve their goals, including but not limited to 
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As in the first part of chapter 2 we have examined the definition of terrorism from 
various perspectives, this second part of chapter 2 is to explain the development of 
theoretical framework used in this Ph.D. thesis. This part is organized into 5 sections: 
 
1. The social movements theory 
2. Towards the internationalization theory of Islamist terrorism 
3. Terrorism in three religious traditions 
4. The social movement theory as applied in the case of Islamist terrorism 
5. The theoretical framework to examine the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia 
 
2.2.1 The Social Movements Theory 
Etymologically, the word social movement consists of two independent words: 
social and movement. The word social means something that is related to activities or to 
people or to society in general. Meanwhile, the word movement indicates the act of 
process of moving from one position to another. The word movement can also be 
defined as a series of organized activities working towards an objective, or an organized 
effort to promote or to attain an end. Within the word movement there are elements of 
action, activity, tendency, and trend, all of which can be associated with the activity of 
moving and transmitting with vibrant/dynamic quality.108  
Given the fact that social movements serve their role in the history of humankind 
as the societal force that generates dynamics in the society and to make the society still 
alive, social movements can indeed be perceived as the integral part of social 
progression itself. That said, many social movements (e.g., the modern peace 
movements such as Gandhi’s Ahimsa and many other forms of democratic movement 
that acknowledges people’s participation within the context of citizen movement) are 
rather peaceful and progressive, thus not necessarily violent. In many cases of 
democratic society, social movements are indeed shaping modern democratic political 
life.  
                                                   
108 For more, see (Definition of Movement n.d.). 
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Correspondingly, social movements have helped democratization in 
authoritharian regimes, and contributed to more participatory approaches in 
representative democracies (Della Porta and Diani 2006).109 The “Occupy Wall Street” 
and related “Occupy” movements in the U.S. are the recent example of peaceful social 
movements. Trigerred by an internet-based blog post in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis, the movements immediately became a media sensation and later spread 
out relatively quickly to other regional hubs.110 Therefore, within the purpose of 
developing a theoretical framework for this Ph.D. thesis, the social movements theory is 
merely adapted to develop the understanding of Islamist terrorism phenomenon, 
particulary in the case of Republic of Indonesia. 
As explained by Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani (2006), three scholars: 
Mayer Zald (1996); Anthony Oberschall (1973; 1980); and Charles Tilly (1978) defined 
social movements as rational, purposeful, and organized actions. Collective action as 
the essential element of any social movements derives from a calculation of the costs 
and benefits, influenced by the presence of resources – particularly by organization and 
by the strategic interactions necessary for the development of a social movement. In a 
historical situation in which feelings of unease, differences of opinion, conflicts of 
interest, and opposing ideologies are always present, the emergence of collective action 
cannot be explained simply as having been caused by these elements.  
It is not enough to discover the existence of tensions and structural conflicts: we 
also must study the conditions which enable discontent to be transformed into 
mobilizations. The capacity for mobilization depends on the material resources (work, 
money, concrete benefits, services) and/or nonmaterial resources (authority, moral 
engagement, faith, friendship) available to the group. These resources are distributed 
across multiple objectives according to a rational calculation of costs and benefits. 
Beyond the existence of tensions, mobilization derives from the way in which social 
movements can organize discontent, reduce the costs of action, utilize and create 
solidarity networks, share incentives among members, and achieve external consensus. 
                                                   
109 For more on the relationship between social movements and democratic theory, see (Della Porta and 
Diani 2006), 239 - 249. 
 
110 For more discussion on the relationship between social movements and new communication 
technologies, see (Burcher 2017). 
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The type and nature of the resources available explain the tactical choices made by 
movements and the consequences of collective action on the social and political system 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; Edwards and McCarthy 2004).111 
Cultural Anthropologist David F. Aberle identified four kinds of social movements: 
alternative; redemptive; reformative; and revolutionary by based on “who is the 
movement attempting to change,” and “how much change is being advocated.” 
Alternative social movements are at individual level and advocate for minor changes; 
redemptive social movements are at the individual level and advocate for radical 
changes. Reformative social movements occur at a broader group of societal level and 
advocate for minor changes; revolutionary social movements occur at a broader group 
or societal level and advocate for radical changes. Other ways to categorize social 
movements include scope (reform or radical), type of change (innovative or 
conservative), targets (group-focused or individual-focused), methods (violent or non-
violent), and range (local or global).112 
That said, in other words, a social movement at the very least can be defined as 
a large, often informal grouping of individuals or organizations that collectively focus and 
act on specific socio-politico issues. Such specific socio-politico issues can include but 
not limited to the carrying out, the resisting, and the undoing of a socio-politico change. 
Systematically there are four requirements for a social movement to emerge and four 
required social conditions for it to succeed (Stark 2006). 
The first requirement is the existence of grievances, which need to be addressed, 
whilst at the same time, those opposing such movement and preferring the status quo 
will prevent the movement and eventually will lead to the clash of wills between the two 
sides.113 This is in line with the thought of Western philosopher of war, Carl von 
                                                   
111 For more on the collective action as the essential element of any social movements, see (Della Porta 
and Diani 2006), 14 – 15. For how resources and social movement mobilization are causaly connected, 
see also (McCarthy and Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory 1977) and 
(Edwards and McCarthy 2004). 
 
112 For more discussion on social change and social movements and types of social movements 
according to David F. Aberle, see (Lumen Learning n.d.). 
 
113 A theory that sophisticatedly examines the very importance of political grievances on Muslims turning 
into violence is well explained by Mohammed Hafez (2003). Hafez’s “political participation” approach to 
social movements accurately analyzes how three manifesting forms of political alienation: political 
exclusion; anti-system framing; and repression can drive peaceful political opposition into violent political 
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Clausewitz. According to him, war is a violent clash between opposing wills, each 
seeking to prevail over the others. According to Stark (2006), such grievances could 
emerge out of suppressed economic, social, and political conditions. The second 
requirement is the existence of individuals with shared belief, determination, and 
courage to sustain the movement and to achieve its goal. The third requirement is the 
existence of precipitating events that reflect people’s limit of tolerance and endurance 
against certain unfavourable conditions. The fourth requirement is the existence of 
social network which enables the involved individuals and groups to recruit and to 
educate people for such movement.  
Correspondingly, there are four conditions that determine the success of a social 
movement. The first condition is the capacity of a social movement to exploit, mobilize, 
and extract any necessary resources (financial and human resources) to sustain the 
movement. Such resources include the risk-taking individuals with commitment and 
motivation to succeed in that movement. There are three variables for this first condition 
to emerge: the skill/know how; the experience to plan, to manage and to carry out the 
movement under strong leadership; and the financial and economic resources (Stark 
2006).  
Subsequently, the second condition is the capacity and resilience of a social 
movement to withstand and to overcome any potential external oppositions, as a social 
movement, usually will generate responses or counter-movements by the status-quo 
(e.g., the government authority) that opposes the movement. That said, the third 
condition which is the capacity to gain politico-economic supports from significantly 
influential external allies, and the fourth condition which is the existence of separate 
organizations that share the same values and goals, are also critically required. 
Although these separate organizations may compete for same available resources, their 
collective existence cannot be more important for a social movement to be successful. 
However, since social movements cannot meet all expectations of people 
involved, these disenchanted people (splinters) will break off and will continue their 
activities to achieve their unmet goals. When splinters further their action in regular 
                                                                                                                                                                    
opposition including in the form of terrorism. For more, see (Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and 
Resistance in the Islamic World 2003). 
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violent activities and operate independently in loose networks, such violent activities 
begin to break away from the broader social movements. Like Stark’s model suggests, 
the violent activity can be irregularly and regularly used to express political 
discouragements and dissents.  
According to Crenshaw (1998) and Della Porta and Diani (2006), the violent 
model through a legal structure (e.g., the Islamic Defender Front in Indonesia/Front 
Pembela Islam/FPI that often demonstrates against U.S. embassy and other Western 
entities in Indonesia, and often clash with the national police) is directed against the 
system (not people) as a response against the security forces at the tactical level, whilst 
the violent model through an illegal structure (e.g., JI) is directed against civilians and 
wider society. According to Crenshaw, Della Porta, and Diani, this violent model is 
strongly driven and motivated by the radicalization of ideology. 
Subsequently, such illegal structures or organizations (e.g., JI) become the target 
of government authorities. Therefore, to survive, they must become covert and 
clandestine. Once they become covert and clandestine, they are separated from society 
and are joined within ties, bonds, and solidarity among people who share the same 
values and purposes. Under this condition, they reinforce each other to take certain 
collective actions and at the same time they begin to attack innocent people. At this 
stage, their activity can be categorized as terrorism. This corresponds to what Taylor 
and Horgan (2001) postulate that most involvement in terrorism results from gradual 
exposure and socialization towards extreme behaviour.114 
 
On Resource Mobilization 
As is discussed in the previous part, since it is conclusive that the mobilization of 
resources is a significant conditional element in any social movements, it deserves a 
special attention of both theoretical and practical analysis in this Ph.D. thesis. We 
cannot comprehensively acknowledge the texture of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia if we 
have not examined the causal dynamics between a social movement that become its 
starting point, resource mobilization, and the existence and latent threat of Islamist 
terrorism itself.  
                                                   
114 For more discussion on this matter, see (Taylor and Horgan 2001), 37 – 71.  
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In a way, defining resources as anything that facilitates mobilization robs the 
concept of its analytic bite, so that it is better to define resources (including political 
opportunities) narrowly to determine their relative contribution to the emergence and 
fate of social movements (McAdam 1996). In other words, resources could be said as 
the function of multiple factors and processes that contribute directly or indirectly to the 
emergence, survivability, and success of social movements in the longer run.  
In general, there are two main theories in the mobilization of resources.115 First. If 
institutionalized political systems shape the prospects of collective action and the forms 
of movements, their influence is not independent of various kinds of so-called “the 
mobilizing structures” through which groups seek to organize. In other words, “the 
mobilizing structures” are informal and formal collective vehicles through which 
individuals and groups will mobilize power and other necessary resources and engage 
in the collective action. As being formulated by its initial proponents, John McCarthy and 
Mayer N. Zald (1973, 1977), resource mobilization sought to break with grievance-
based conceptions of social movements and to focus instead on mobilization process 
and the formal organizational manifestations of these processes. For McCarthy and 
Zald, although social movements were perhaps not synonymous with formal 
organizations, they are nonetheless known by and became a force for social change, 
primarily through the social movement organizations (SMOs) they spawned. In some 
ways, theirs were less a theory about the emergence or development of social 
movements than it was an attempt to describe and to map out a new form of 
professional social movement that they saw as increasingly dominant in contemporary 
America (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).  
Second, on the other hand, Charles Tilly and his other colleagues (1975, 1978) 
stress the importance of resource mobilization as an organizational dynamic of 
collective action and view it as a political process model. Unlike the proponents of the 
first theory, they do not equate the resource mobilization of a social movement with the 
formal organization, but specifically lays the theoretical foundation for this second 
approach by documenting the critical role of various grassroots settings (e.g., the 
                                                   
115 For more discussion on this matter, see (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing 1996), 3 – 4.  
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volunteers’ work at a neighbourhood level) in facilitating and structuring the collective 
action. For example, some scholars in this camp such as Aldon Morris (1981, 1984) and 
Doug McAdam (1982) analyze the critical role played by local black institutions (e.g., 
mainly church organizations) in the emergence of the American civil rights movement. 
Comparatively, in the current digital era, counseling and fatwas in any religious 
rallies including in Islam that can become another main engine for resource mobilization 
are only a click away from a mouse (Chawki 2013, Lachow 2009). The internet offers a 
worldwide, near instantaneous communication link to exchange ideas, information, and 
lesson learned. Indoctrination and training of terrorists can be in a dispersed mode and 
greatly reduce a need for formal hierarchical organizational structure. The intention 
within an ideology can be placed into an action by individuals rather than depending on 
large networks with layers of coordination, control, and logistical support.116 
Whilst some proponents of these two approaches initially treated the two models of 
movement organization as mutually exclusive, over time the profusion of empirical work 
inspired by both camps has led to a growing awareness among movement scholars 
pertaining to the diversity of collective settings in which movements develop as well as 
regarding the organizational forms to which they give rise (McAdam, McCarthy, and 
Zald 1996). That is why, it is important to understand the historical patterns of resource 
mobilization of any social movements to predict where the future trajectory of such 
movements is likely to arise by assessing the relationship between types of movement, 
organizational forms, and organizational cultures in any given countries in which such 
movements take place.  
 
2.2.2 Towards the Internationalization Theory of Is lamist terrorism 
 
In addition to the social movements theory discussed in part 1, by referring to the 
framework of internationalization of terrorism, the Islamist terrorism (Salafi jihad 
movements) in Indonesia is related with international networks. Correspondingly, this 
part will review the wave theory postulated by David Rapoport (2004).  
                                                   
116 For more discussion on this matter, see (Black 2006). See also (Lachow 2009). 
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The wave theory is important because first, it allows us, particularly the 
counterterrorist analysts to view and acknowledge the pattern in a greater depth or 
otherwise counterterrorist analysts will usually be focusing on terrorist’s organizations or 
movements during their own era. Second, the wave theory can capture the energy 
behind terrorism movements. This energy includes ideology, inspiration, and opportunity 
that allow identical terrorist phenomena to occur in several countries and are well 
connected transnationally by their mutual respect. When the energy fails to create more 
organizations, the movement usually will decline and disappear. The movements 
themselves succeeding and overlapping from one to another that contains four waves: 
the anarchist; the national determination; the leftist; and the religious wave. Third, the 
wave theory also reflects the expansion and contraction of activity cycle in a given time 
period. The waves were overlapping and succeeding from one wave to another. Each 
wave produces major technical works that reflect special properties or energies (e.g., 
ideology, inspiration, and opportunity) of that wave and contribute to a common modern 
effort to formulate “the science of terror.”  
 Ultimately, the wave theory is significant because it helps us to map out the 
movements in a more orderly manner by which we can comprehend the phenomena of 
terrorism and counterterrorism more thoroughly in the modern era and at an 
international level. The wave theory connects the international character such as similar 
activities occurring in several countries, mutual relationship, and similar energy behind 
the movement. When a wave’s energy cannot inspire new organizations, the wave 
disappears. Otherwise, without understanding the wave theory, counterterrorism 
analysts will only be focused on the characteristics of terrorist movements in their own 
era. The wave theory also allows us to see the general pattern or characteristics linking 
identical terrorist organizations and movements in the single wave of terrorism. Knowing 
the waves will also help us to better formulate specific counterterrorism measures.  
 However, other than the categorization according to the wave theory, terrorism 
could also be categorized into four categorizations based on its types: the leftist-Marxist; 
the rightist/white supremacy/anti-governments such as the Neo-Nazi; the ethno-
nationalist such as the LTTE and the Irish Republican Army; and the religious groups. 
These groups were globally prominent during their own era and survived over a long 
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span of time. For an example is the IRA. Preceded by Irish Republican Brotherhood 
(IRB) as a militant Irish republican organization that grew out of the Fenian movement in 
the mid-nineteenth century and being disbanded in 1924, IRA was formed in the early 
twentieth century to fight for Irish independence from the Great Britain. The “Old” IRA 
then split in late 1969 into “the Provisionals and the Officials.” The Provisionals soon 
became synonymous with IRA and waged a thirty-five-year-long violent campaign for 
Irish unity, until they called an end to their campaign in summer 2005.118  
 
The Overlapping Waves according to Rapoport (2004) 
 
a. The Anarchist (1880s – 1920s) 
The First wave was initially about the anarchist who assassinated prominent 
officials. It started in the 1880s in Russia and lasted for a decade later in the Western 
Europe, Balkans, and Asia. This wave gave the examples of tactic and training for the 
successors, the second wave. The written manuals and approaches were well 
documented and allowing the next waves to tap and to develop such knowledge. 
 
b. The National Determination (1920s – 1960s) 
 The Second wave was about the national determination/anti-colonial movements. 
Such movements were identical with the resisting power against the colonials that were 
often ambivalent whether to keep the colonies. Terrorist movements in Algeria that 
demanded the independence from France and Indonesian insurgency against Dutch in 
1945 – 1949 marked this era. 
 
c. The Leftist (1960s – 1990s) 
The third wave was the leftist wave that displayed profoundly left-wing 
aspirations. This wave existed during the Cold-War with the purpose of furthering and 
advancing the Marxist agenda. This wave diminished greatly at the end of the twentieth 
century with some still existing in some countries such as Nepal and Columbia. During 
                                                   
118  For more references on ethno-nationalist terrorism that is combined with religious aspect like in the 
case of the IRA, see (Githens-Mazer 2006). 
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this era, Indonesia also dealt with various leftist terrorist activities including in the 1965 
coup of PKI/Indonesian Communist Party (one of the biggest political parties in the 
world at that time) that killed six army generals including the Army Chief of Staff and all 
his assistants.   
 
d. The Religious (1979 – Present) 
The fourth wave is the religious wave that uses a variety of sacred texts or 
revelations for legitimacy that started since 1979 in the Iranian revolution. In addition to 
the 1979 revolution, this wave was also inspired by the success of driving the Red Army 
out of Muslim land, Afghanistan. This era is characterized by not abiding by one’s state 
law, bounded rationality that is not understandable by secular views, and having 
religious symbol in their commitment towards terrorism activities (e.g., scripture-based, 
involving religious figure as their leader, martyrdom driven by religion, sectarian 
violence, and determination to change the structure). Al-Qaeda and its associated 
movements (AQAM) fit with this wave since it aims to kill as many people as possible, 
has religious figures as their leader, “hijacks” Quranic scripts, exploits religiously 
symbolic concept of martyrdom, presents in the global landscape, involves in the legal 
and illegal activities, and has overarching, strategic aims of restoring the world under 
the Islamic caliphate.  
 The religious wave of terrorism can also be found in the IRA. Like their “religious” 
terrorist counterparts of al-Qaeda and JI, these IRA men, who were at first reviled for 
their participation in the Rising, were later starting to be reinvented and rehabilitated as 
“misguided” but brave and selfless. Their reinvention and rehabilitation were complete 
when this was combined with religious images of martyrdom and with their popular 
beatification since they died out like saints of their sense of moral rectitude (Githens-
Mazer 2006).119 
 In terms of religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments, 
Jonathan Fine (2015) argues that there are differences between secular and religious 
political violence, on ideological, strategic, and tactical levels, whilst Mark 
                                                   
119 For more, see Ibid.,141 - 142.  
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Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that there is a unique connection between religion and 
terrorism. His argument relies on two premises.  
 The first premise is driven by his conviction that religion itself is not the inherent 
cause of violence or terrorism since violence might occur with or without religious 
context. However, religion provides mores and symbols which make horrific bloodshed 
easier to vindicate. Hoffman (2006) argues that Jews and Christians, as well as 
Muslims, have much to answer for as fomenters of religious terror. Hoffman reminds us 
of the enormities perpetrated by Rabbi Meir Kahane, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, and Yigal 
Amir as well as the threat in America posed by William Pierce-inspired Christian 
supremacist movements. Ayatollah Khomeini, Imam Sheikh Ahmad Ibrahim Yassin of 
Hamas, and Osama bin Laden have their counterparts in the Jewish and Christian 
worlds.  
 Nevertheless, Hoffman acknowledges that the Islamist fanatics have a much 
greater opportunity for mayhem because of the alienated hordes in the Middle East who 
see no hope at all in the status quo. The opportunity created by despair and rage, not 
the intrinsic elements of the religion itself, gives Islam the edge over Christianity and 
Judaism as a force for terror. This is corresponding to what Hafez (2003) argues by 
using the frustration-aggression models that were based on Ted Robert Gurr’s seminal 
work, Why Men Rebel? (1970). According to Hafez, the primary source of Islamist 
insurgencies lies in the repressive political environments within which the clear majority 
of Muslims find themselves.  
 Hafez’s combination of sophisticated theoretical approach, ideological frames, 
and resources mobilization to explain his detailed case studies in his book, Why 
Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World highlights when and 
how institutional exclusion and indiscriminate repression contribute to the large-scale 
rebellion. The basic question on Hafez’s work is not, therefore, why Muslims revolt, but 
instead why states in these countries have the authoritarian character they do. He 
develops a case for analysis in terms of political context, particularly regarding the 
ability or failure of the state to provide the opening channels to Islamist movements for 
participation in the political process and the way it represses dissent. Moreover, 
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according to Hafez, the espousal of anti-system worldviews by Islamists is a result less 
of an inherent ideological inclination, but more of political exclusion and repression. 
 Correspondingly, according to Hoffman, if the Old Testament and the 
Christendom era are guides, Jews and Christians have shown little aptitude for 
pacifism, except when they hold the upper hand. The first premise, however, leads to an 
important point that only religion that provides a moral justification to commit violence in 
the name of a cosmic war between good and evil. In his way, all groups committing 
such violence believe that their God is on their side and through them, the judgment is 
ready to be executed.  
 Subsequently, this premise also leads to the belief system (including the 
ideological conviction) that the war has already been going on so that the perpetrators 
just need to continue engaging in such war and use that belief system (including the 
ideological conviction) as their justification of self-defence. The involvement in this way 
also gives the new illusion of power to the marginalized individuals who tend to be 
involved in such movements. It provides them with status, meaning, and identity in the 
world that no longer recognize them. In short, this act is called the performance 
violence. This performance violence is also deemed the ritual whilst sending the 
message to the audience. Victims are targeted not because they attack the 
perpetrators, but they are merely perceived and portrayed as symbols, tools, animals, or 
corrupt beings.  
 That is why moral disengagements are often used by religious terrorists to justify 
their attacks since the victims are not necessarily guilty against these perpetrators. 
Such moral disengagements include the displacement of responsibility, the diffusion of 
responsibility, the dehumanization of targets, the euphemistic language, the 
advantageous comparisons, the distortion of sequence of events, and the attribution of 
blame (Bandura 1990). Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement, although not 
developed specifically for terrorists, is a useful theory to analyze the rhetoric of terrorist 
propaganda (Weimann 2008). Terrorists, like criminals, attempt to disengage or to 
distance themselves from their horrific use of violence, and modern communications 
media undoubtedly created opportunities for the almost instantaneous transmission of 
dramatic and eloquent images, and to any modern-day Mikhail Bakunin there were 
Page 100 of 436 
 
extraordinary opportunities for propaganda of the deed. Favourable images created by 
these perpetrators, let alone whole belief systems, could not be fired directly into the 
minds of the target audience as a form of precision weapon (Freedman 2013). 
 The Displacement of responsibility. This involves distorting the relationship 
between one’s actions and the effects of those actions, and/or blaming the victim or 
circumstances for violent actions and innocent deaths. 
 The Diffusion of responsibility. This is performed by segmenting duties, where 
each individual action by itself is benign, but the totality is harmful. Correspondingly, in 
this case, the group decisions can be legally sued as they diffuse the individual 
responsibility for each separate action. 
 The Dehumanization of targets. Committing violence against innocents is easier 
if they are not perceived as fellow, individual humans. One can minimize the brutality 
imposed on others by focusing instead on the impersonal character of the attacks and 
the targets’ symbolic meaning, and by naming and viewing the victims as less than 
human (e.g., vermin, dogs, and so forth). Osama bin Laden, for example, bestializes 
Americans as “lowly people” perpetrating acts that “the most ravenous of animals would 
not descend to.” 
 The Euphemistic language. This includes making injurious conduct as something 
that is respectable and reducing personal responsibility by referring to it in impersonal 
terms. For example, al-Qaeda always refers to the 9/11 events as attacks on symbols of 
American power and consumerism, never to the murder of some 3,000 men, women, 
and children.  
 The Advantageous comparisons. Reprehensible conduct is masked by 
comparing it to other, more injurious behaviour. Again, the deaths of innocent people, 
including children, in the 9/11 attacks during peacetime are comparable to the U.S. 
atomic bombing of Japan to put the World War II to the end, in which hundreds of 
thousands were killed. However, in this narrative, the U.S. is never called the aggressor. 
  The Distortion of sequence of events and attribution of blame. Disregarding facts 
or distorting the consequences of a violent action on fellow citizens by arguing that a 
terrorist attack was only a retaliatory action or a defensive measure against a previous 
provocation of the enemy that allows terrorists to reduce personal feelings of guilt. The 
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victims are blamed, and others are accused of causing reprehensible actions. For 
example, the kidnapped hostages are beheaded not because of terrorists’ cruelty, but 
because of their own governments that fail to meet terrorist’s demands.  
 According to Weimann (2008), an analysis of the rhetoric used on Salafi jihad 
terrorist websites reveals that the most popular moral disengagement used is the 
displacement of responsibility. Violence is uniformly presented as a necessity to deal 
with an oppressive enemy, an all-ensuing murder and destruction are attributed to 
others. The prime agency for jihadists engaging in terror, for example, is displaced by 
Allah, thereby attempting to sanitize murder and mayhem whilst glorifying martyrdom. 
Another rhetorical structure found on the terrorist web pages is the attempt to legitimize 
any members of anti-establishment group as freedom fighters and anyone who speaks 
against them as the real terrorists. Finally, some of the sites of violent terrorist 
organizations are replete with the rhetoric of nonviolence, with messages claiming love 
of peace and support for a diplomatic solution. This mix of images and arguments are 
presented to reach all available target audiences. 
 Therefore, as ritual, the acts are timed, script-connected and involving activist, 
audience, and victims. In this way, religion transforms the brutality and bloodshed into 
something transcendent and holy. This holy war makes them more determined that the 
purpose of war itself is not to be achieved in short term but will take longer years to 
achieve. The religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments 
always involves religious figure as their leader, uses religious symbolism, and refers to 
the scripture. 
 The second premise of Juergensmeyer is driven by his conviction that the cure 
for religious violence may ultimately lie in a renewed appreciation for religion itself and 
in the acknowledgment of religion in the public life. Such an approach aims to generate 
a new kind of mindset for individuals as the agents who refer to their own religion in 
their life. Based on this premise, he argues that the solution to religious violence is not 
the secularization but instead a renewed/revived understanding of religion. The 
proponents of this argument believe that human is the independent agent that has 
freedom in choosing what they think, believe, and act. Human is independent in 
choosing what becomes their worldview and courses of action. Through a revived 
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understanding of religion, they will not likely commit what Juergensmeyer calls as the 
religious violence. That is why, according to Juergensmeyer, the cure to religious 
violence and terrorism is the revived and better appreciation of religion itself. 
 
2.2.3 The Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions  
 
According to David Rapoport (1984), there are at least three categories of 
terrorist in the earliest religious tradition, out of which we could learn their goals, 
practices, targets, and historical significance. 
The first one is the thugs, whose goals are to make their victims to experience 
terror and to express it visibly for the pleasure of Kali, the Hindu goddess of terror and 
destruction.  They tend to avoid publicity and only to target travelers. Their motivation is 
rather to serve their religious needs than to be altruistic. Although they confiscate the 
property of their victims, they are not financially and economically driven. They believe 
that they have a positive role, which is to save humans’ live. Without their sacred 
service, Kali may destroy all humankind. The thugs give the historical significance of 
understanding violent and murderous activities of the cult whose aim is to be purely 
religious. In conclusion, thugs focus on the assailants, victims, and their deity. 
The second one is the assassins, whose goals are political, which is to purify 
Islam, a community whose political and religious institution is inseparable. During their 
presence in the past, they threatened the governments of several states especially 
those of the Turkish Seljuk Empire in Persia and Syria. At the operational level, they are 
engaged in the martyrdom concept of Islam, which dares to die as a religious sacrifice 
and as a direct route to the heaven. Unlike Thugs, the assassins aim at establishing the 
distinct Islamic state or community not only at the domestic level but also at 
international level. Exploring the Assassins is significant to understand the behavioural 
roots of Islamist terrorist movements (e.g., Salafi jihad movements) in the twentieth 
century. 
The third one is the Zealots-Sicariis, which is rooted in the Judaism whose goals 
are apocalyptic and messianic-driven with the purpose to drive out the foreign 
occupation of the promising land. Their modus operandi is by assassination and 
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instigating people to engage in the mass uprising against the occupying force. Their 
main targets are mainly the Gentiles dwelling in the land and anyone considered the 
stumbling blocks to the redistribution of the land as described in the Old-Testament 
according to the Hebrew Bible. 
 
2.2.4 The Social Movement Theory as Applied in the Case of Islamist terrorism 
Omar Ashour (2009) clearly defines radical Islamist groups as those movements 
that ideologically reject democracy as well as the legitimacy of political and ideological 
pluralism. As a clear comparison, radical Islamist groups are different in some ways with 
their moderate Islamist counterparts. Moderate Islamist groups ideologically accept, at a 
minimum, electoral democracy as well as political and ideological pluralism, and aims 
for gradual social, political, and economic changes. Therefore, they accept the principle 
of working within the established state institutions and could be called Islamic 
reformists, pluralists, or modernists.  
In contrast, radical Islamist groups aim for revolutionary social, political, and 
economic changes and refuse to work within the established state institutions. Radical 
Islamist movements, according to Ashour (2009), can use violent and/or non-violent 
methods to achieve their goals. Radical Islamists could also be called revolutionaries, 
extremists or exclusivists. In order to reach the stage of being radical, they have gone 
through a process of relative change in which such groups undergo ideological and/or 
behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including 
the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political 
pluralism) and possibly to the utilization of violence, or to an increase in the level of 
violence, in order to achieve political goals. 
Therefore, by referring to Ashour’s definitions we can use the theoretical 
framework of a social movement to explain the dynamics of Islamist terrorism. This 
approach will fill gaps in the academic and policy literature in terms of explaining 
Islamist terrorism, especially why it occurs and how variables of grievances, radical 
ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive relate to each 
other in generating Islamist terrorism. Later, through this academic research project, we 
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expect to see whether this theoretical framework is accurate to portray the case (the 
existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia) under this study.  
 


















Salafism Saudi Arabia 
(Najd Province) 
International Critical (but 
mixed) 
Mixed 




Rejection Upheld and 
promoted 
Takfirism Egypt International Rejection Mixed 
Al-Jaz’ara Algeria National Acceptance Pragmatic 
 
Source: (Ashour 2009), 11.120 
 
As previously discussed, Rodney Stark (2006) argues that grievances are the 
root cause of a social movement and may subsequently develop into a radical 
movement, including violent terrorist acts. Many types of terrorism originate from 
economic, social, and political grievances that lead to the creation/occurrence of some 
sort of a social movement. Out of such a movement, splinters start breaking off to 
engage in violent ways that subsequently form the networks of individuals (through 
social networks) to further conduct violent actions that are susceptible to radical 
ideologies. The importance of such social networks in generating Islamist terrorism is 
                                                   
120 The elaborate profile of the most influential modern radical leaders is available on the attachment #6 in 
the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis. 
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also convincingly argued by Marc Sageman (2004). Christopher Boucek (2008) also 
supports this argument by arguing that to deter the radicalization and recruitment of 
young men, activities have been created to keep them busy and away from social 
networks of radicals.121 
 
On Grievances 
A theory that sophisticatedly examines the very importance of political grievances 
on Muslims turning into violence is well explained by Mohammed Hafez (2003). Hafez’s 
“political participation” approach to social movements accurately analyzes how political 
exclusion, anti-system framing, and repression can drive peaceful political opposition to 
violent political opposition including in the form of terrorism. Through his multinational 
coverage on case studies in the Islamic world such as Pakistan, Tunisia, Jordan, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir, Chechnya, etc, he 
argues that economic and psychological approaches are not enough to explain the 
phenomenon of Islamic rebellions in many parts of the Islamic world. By rejecting 
several theories like economic impoverishment, ideology, or jihad as explanations of 
why Muslims turning into violence, Hafez argues that when people are excluded from 
politics and repressed brutally (political grievances), it makes sense that some will turn 
into violence. 
In terms of grievances, according to Bernard Lewis, Islamist fundamentalists 
blame western civilization, modernization, and the U.S. for the backwardness of the 
Islamist Middle East. All of these have been the root cause of today’s emerging radical 
terrorist movements (Lewis 1996, 2001, 2003). Lewis’ arguments are also supported by 
Assaf Moghadam (2003) that examines the Shi'ite perception of Jihad. In other words, 
grievances in economic, social, and political aspects often become the starting point for 
religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments (Stern 1999, 
2003). The interaction of grievances and shared beliefs among these people then 
                                                   
121 Similar programs of deradicalization designed to demobilize violent extremists and their supporters are 
increasing in popularity, with several countries adopting comparable counter-radicalization programs. 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia have all established rehabilitation 
and engagement programs, as has the U.S. military through Task Force 134 in Iraq. As such, the 
importance of understanding the Saudi strategy, and counter-radicalization broadly, is increasing in 
relevance in the fight against violent radical-Islamist extremism. For more, see (Boucek 2008). 
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become the underlying reasons for why religious militants resort to violent terrorism in 
the name of their religious values (Pape 2003, 2005).  
By providing a set of data from 315 identified acts of suicide terrorism from 1980 
through 2003, Pape concludes that the source of their grievances is also politics, which 
is the imposed democracy by force. The occupying force seems always to be found 
where there are acts of suicide terrorism. Three factors are associated with nearly every 
suicide terrorism campaign: a territory is occupied by a foreign power; this foreign power 
is of a different religion; and this foreign power is a democracy (Pape 2003, 2005).  
Pape then investigates what motivates and drives an individual to commit a 
suicide act of terrorism. Interestingly, his study is contrary to the conventional wisdom 
perceiving suicide terrorists as mostly poor, uneducated, and socially isolated religious 
fanatics. He instead found that the demography of suicide bombers shows that they are 
often secular, relatively well educated, and integrated into society. Many are venerated 
after their death and their acts might be best explained by altruism: the desire to do 
good for the community. Their posthumous status as martyrs provides a clear evidence 
to other potential suicide bombers that their final act would be highly valued by their 
community.  
Subsequently, Pape argues that the U.S. is targeted by suicide terrorists not for 
what it is (its values and culture) but for what it does, specifically its maintenance of a 
large military presence in the Middle East. He clearly argues that the U.S. military policy 
in the Persian Gulf was the pivotal factor leading to the 9/11 attacks. He even posits that 
future terrorist recruits will not be dissuaded by heavy-handed Western attempts at 
remaking Muslim societies. His arguments are supported by Stern’s argument that U.S. 
counterterrorism measures must be balanced by smart geopolitics which avoids actions 
that precipitate or inflame Islamist terrorism, such as the unquestioning support of 
Israel, economic sanctions that disproportionately punish Arab peoples, the support for 
corrupt Arab governments, and a high-profile U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf 
and the Middle East. Pape’s findings also strengthen the hypothesis that the state 
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where (potential) radical terrorists live has the influence on the emergence of Islamist 
terrorists.122 
 
On Radical ideology 
The crucial dates in the evolution of global jihad ideology in the twentieth century 
at least encompass five historically significant timelines: 1918 – 1924 (the end of 
Caliphate/Ottoman Empire); 1945 – 1948 (the creation of Israel state); 1979 (Iranian 
Revolution, the Siege of Mecca, and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan); 1988 (Soviet 
Withdrawal from Afghanistan); and 1990 – 1991 (Fall of USSR and Gulf War I).123 
Correspondingly, according to Sebastian Gorka (2012), there are at least four 
ideologues in the twentieth century whose works significantly influence the occurrence 
of Islamist terrorism (e.g., Salafi jihad) at the global level.124 Their writings also reflect 
the five pillars of radical Islamist philosophy.125 
The first ideologue is Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1965), an Egyptian national who wrote 
Milestones Along the Road. The book is based upon his very short years (about two 
                                                   
122 Given the premises of Pape’s argument that there is a close association between foreign military 
occupations and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied regions, the policy implication 
should be not to “conquering countries in order to transform their political system” or “to get more energy 
independence to that region so that the need or interest to be present there will be less”. The force 
presence in the foreign region may be effective in “disrupting” terrorism in the short term, but occupying 
more countries will create more terrorism in the longer run.  
 
However, the critiques against his arguments include the oversimplification (correlation does not mean 
causation), al-Qaeda is a global caliphate movement, terrorists such as in Iraq were fighting for their right 
of shares rather than just for driving the foreign forces out of the region, terrorists are not altruistic, foreign 
fighters entered Iraq in order to exacerbate the conflict, and victims are civilian so that they are not 
attacking the foreign forces. 
 
123 For more, see (Gorka and Sookhdeo 2012), 198.  
 
The four major caliphates of Islamic history: The Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar ibn Al-
Khattib, Uthman bin-Affan, and Ali ibn Abu Talib) from A.H. 11 – 40 / A.D. 632 – 661 (29 years); Umayyad 
Dynasty from A.H. 41 – 132 / A.D. 661 – 751 (90 years); Abbasid State (defeated by Mongols in A.H. 
656/A.D. 1258) from A.H. 132 – 656 / A.D. 750 – 1258 (508 years); and Ottoman Empire (dismantled by 
Kemal Ataturk in 1924) from A.D. 1301 – 1924 (623 years). Please the attachment #7 in the 
accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis. 
 
124 Ibid., 198 – 201.  
 
125 These pillars are to obey no law but Islamic law, infidels are all around, Islam must rule, jihad is the 
only way to win, and faith is the reason. See the early section of this Ph.D. thesis: select definitions, 
glossaries and abbreviations. 
 
Page 108 of 436 
 
years) being in the United States on an exchange student program, during which Qutb 
perceived the United States was a godless, sex-obsessed, materialistic, heretic nation 
that must be destroyed. Milestones Along the Road’s message is clear-cut, which goes 
back to the pre-history of Islam. According Qutb, the current world is again a state of 
jahiliyya, mirroring the state of pagan ignorance of Allah that propthet Muhammad found 
in Mecca when the Quran was revealed to him. Mecca had been a site of pilgrimage for 
centuries before Muhammad was born, but it was indeed a site of pilgrimage for 
polytheist pagans to worship their multiple gods. Identical with the concept of thagut, 
that state of pagan ignorance and worshipping things that are not Allah is called 
jahiliyya. In this sense, Qutb reaches back to the seventh century and uses this word 
and wrenches it into the 1950s and states that we are again in a state of jahiliyya and 
must cleanse the world of its ignorance of Allah. For Qutb, the only way to deal with this 
challenge is through jihad that is understood as the holy war of Islam that is in the path 
of Allah. Even in a direct sense, Qutb bluntly states that “Islam is not a religion, but 
indeed it is a revolutionary party.”126 It is therefore not a coincidence that this book lifts 
heavily from Marxist, Leninist, and fascist doctrine. Qutb lifts whole concepts, such as 
the “vanguard” from Lenin and Marx, which will be used by Abdullah Azzam and bin 
Osama bin Laden years later. Looking at the Qutb’s ideology, he built a whole new 
theology of Islamist jihad by exploiting Western totalitarian ideologies. Later in his life 
Qutb was eventually arrested by President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s regime and being 
executed accordingly.  
The second ideologue is Abdullah Azzam (1941 – 1989), who was the creator of 
the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) or pre-al-Qaeda and served as bin Laden’s former 
mentor and boss. He was a Palestinian national from 1941 – 1948 and a Jordanian 
national from 1948 – 1989. As a Ph.D. in Islamic Jurisprudence from the prestigious al-
Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt he wrote a book titled In Defense of Muslim Lands. In 
his book, he argues that because Kemal Ataturk dissolved the Caliphate and there is no 
Caliph who can declare war, jihad is now fard’ayn, meaning holy war is now the 
individual obligation of every good Muslim. This obligation is no longer a collective 
                                                   
126 Ibid., 199. 
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responsibility that would be initiated by the Caliph; instead Muslims must take this 
responsibility upon themselves to self-deploy and defend Muslim lands. Azzam went on 
to say that a Muslim did not need permission from anyone to declare jihad; not parents, 
wife, or even husband (this last idea being very radical in the Arabic culture). 
The third ideologue is the head of al-Qaeda after the death of Osama bin Laden 
(1957 – 2011).127 He is Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951 -), a medical doctor and an Egyptian 
national from an influential Cairo-based family and thus clearly not a representative from 
the fringes of society. His grand father was, Rabia’a al-Zawahiri, was an imam at al-
Azhar University in Cairo, whilst his great-uncle, Abdel Rahman Azzam, was the first 
secretary of the Arab League. Al-Zawahiri was also a founding member of the Islamic 
Egyptian Jihad or EIJ (originally referred to as al-Jihad and then the Jihad Group, or the 
Jihad Organization). Because he was considered a radical in Egypt, the government of 
Egypt arrested, tortured, and released him from prison in 1984. After the release he 
went on jihad by travelling to Pakistan both as a medical doctor and as a jihadist fighting 
the Soviets. It was in this opportunity he met Osama bin Laden and first encountered 
the puritanical Wahhabi jihadism of bin Laden. The combination of al-Zawahiri’s 
previous Egyptian-based fundamentalism and bin Laden’s puritanical Wahhabi jihadism 
produces what we know today as the al-Qaeda.  
The fourth ideologue whose ideology of terror also influences Indonesian Islamist 
terrorism is Pakistani Brigadier (General) S.K. Malik. Through his book, The Quranic 
Concept of Power that was written in 1975 he showed himself as the equivalent of a 
Thomist theologian combined with two Western strategic thinkers: von Clausewitz or 
Jomini. Interestingly this book was endorsed by General Zia ul-Haq, the commander of 
all Pakistani forces, who, after a coup, became the President of Pakistan. Genera ul-
Haq wrote an introduction of this book. In his book, General Malik delivers three 
messages. First, it repudiates the Clausewitzian concept of war as the continuation of 
politics by other means (e.g., when other tools such as economics or diplomacy are 
inadequate to protect the national interest one must use violence or war to achieve 
those ends). General Malik rejects this concept by saying that only does war have 
nothing to do with the national interest; in fact, it has nothing to do with the nation-state 
                                                   
127 He was a Saudi Arabian national from 1957 until 1994 before became stateless since 1994 until 2011. 
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since the nation-state is a heretical Western invention. For him, war only ever has one 
purpose and that is the realization of Allah’s sovereignty on this earth. It does not matter 
where one is fighting, or when you are fighting, because war can only ever serve the 
realization of Allah’s sovereignty here on earth. Second, for him there is only one 
centre-of-gravity in war, which is the soul of your enemy (e.g., the faith system of the 
enemy). According to him, instead of finding the enemy’s points of weakness, the soul 
of your enemy is what you must crush if you wish to win in war. Therefore, since the 
soul of your enemy is the only centre-of-gravity, thus the third message is clear: the best 
weapon in war is indeed a terror.  
 
On Social Network 
In addition to all these findings, Sageman (2004) shows the importance of social 
networks as the cause of radical terrorism, and the analysis on social network analysis 
as a new type of intelligence needed by homeland security (Ressler 2006). Originally 
the contemporary social network analysis can be traced back to the work of Stanley 
Milgram whose 1967 experiment researches leads to the famous phrase of “six degrees 
of separation” where most people were connected by six acquaintances.128 The basis of 
social network analysis (also known as network science or network sociology) is that 
individual nodes (e.g., could be based on people, events, etc) are connected by 
complex yet understandable relationships that form networks.129 These networks are 
ubiquitous, with an underlying order and simple laws. Networks form the structural basis 
of many natural events, organizations, and social processes.  
That is why, Ressler (2006) argues that social network analysis is useful for 
studying terrorist organizations as they consist of networks of individuals that span 
countries, continents, and economic status, and form around specific ideology. Social 
network analysis can provide important information on the unique characteristics of 
terrorist organizations, ranging from issues of network recruitment, network evolution, 
and the diffusion of radical ideas, all of which form the basis of more effective 
counterstrategies to deal with network-based threats such as Islamist terrorism.  
                                                   
128 For more, see (Ressler 2006).  
 
129 For more, see (Barabasi 2002). 
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Another important feature in the development of social network analysis is 
explained by Mark Granovetter (1973) who argues that “weak ties” (one’s relationships 
with acquaintances) are more important than “strong ties” (one’s relationships with 
family and close friends) when trying to find the employment. This finding becomes the 
basis for his extended argument by positing that more disperse, non-redundant, open 
networks have greater access to information and power than smaller, denser, and more 
interconnected networks because they supply more diversity of knowledge and 
information. Subsequently, it infers that most networks in the natural and man-made 
world are highly clustered yet far-reaching. These networks have a “clustered” centre, 
where most nodes are neighbours, tightly interconnected. In addition, each has weak 
ties that can connect it to any nodes in the network in a few short connections (Watts 
1999).130  
The value of social network theory, however, is its focus on the value of the 
network structure rather than the characteristics of the individual as mostly found in the 
political science approaches. Whilst social network analysis leaves room for individuals 
to affect their fate, it argues that the structure of the network, relationships and ties with 
others in the network are more important. The network structure of a terrorist 
organization will affect its ability to access new ideas, recruit new individuals, and 
achieve sustainability. The network structure used by modern terrorist organizations 
build the power upon the idea of disintermediation whose definition is the removal of the 
intermediary role in a process or supply chain (a proverbial “cutting out the middleman).”  
Through disintermediation, individuals can directly connect to each other 
especially with the advancements of modern telecommunications and the internet. 
Consequently, the power of loosely terrorist structured networks will enable them to 
move quickly and be adaptive, as they do not have to go through layers of a hierarchical 
chain. In other words, by cutting out layers of bureaucracy, individuals can join a 
network through weak ties and plan attacks through loose connections. Later in 2000, 
Malcolm Gladwell added important points to the social network analysis by describing 
the importance of three types of people: connectors; mavens; and salesman. 
                                                   
130 For more, see (Watts 1999).  
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Connectors (those with wide social circles) is the hubs of human social network and 
responsible for the small world phenomenon (e.g., Salafi jihad terrorism in Indonesia).131  
The importance of social network analysis in struggling against terrorism was 
recognized even before the 9/11 attacks. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s work 
Networks and Netwars released in 2001 before the terrorist attacks, describes the 
increased network principles in modern criminal organizations. The premise of their 
argument is the reality that war is no longer solely a head-to-head battle of two powers, 
but indeed the war of “modern war” that is characterized by the netwar whose definition 
is a lower-intensity battle by terrorists, criminals, and extremists with a networked 
organizational structure. These networked structures are often leaderless and able to 
attack more quickly. Novel, asymmetric approaches are needed to combat a network-
based criminal organization (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001).  
It is after 9/11, social network experts in academia began to look explicitly at the 
use of network methodology in understanding and countering terrorism. Valdis Krebs is 
the one, among others, who begins to map out the al-Qaeda network by collecting 
publicly available data on the al-Qaeda hijackers and running basic network 
principles.132 Generally, researchers on social network analysis in the field of terrorism 
can be divided into two groups: the data collectors and the modellers. Whilst data 
collectors focus primarily on data collection of terrorist organizations (by based on open 
source or government intelligence data), and then analyzing the information through 
description and straightforward modelling; the modellers offer another insight on 
theoretical terrorist networks. The modellers usually look at how to model the shape of a 
covert network when little information is known, through predictive modelling techniques 
based on inherent network structures.133  
Using a computational tool created at Computational Analysis of Social and 
Organizational Systems (CASOS) at Carnegie Mellon University, known as DyNet, they 
                                                   
131 For more, see (Gladwell 2000). 
 
132 For more, see (Krebs 2001). 
 
133 For more, see (Dombroski, Fishback and Carley 2003). 
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look at ways to estimate the vulnerability of terrorist networks and to destabilize them.134 
However, as the modellers often do not have the best data, as they might have not 
collected individual biographies and who do not have access to classified data, their 
models also do not fully consider the human and data limitation. The implication of this 
lack is that the results can be potentially misleading, as they cannot consider 
behavioural and contextual issues that might affect the network structure and activity. 
That said, combining these two types of researchers will be of great contribution to 
understanding terrorist networks. 
On the other hand, data collection is also difficult for any network analysis 
because it is hard to create a complete network. It is especially difficult to gain 
information on terrorist networks since they do not provide information on their 
members, and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data. 
Consequently, several academic researchers focus primarily on the data collection of 
terrorist organizations, and then analyzing the information through description and 
straightforward modelling. Based on Krebs (2001) and Jose A. Rodriguez (2005)’s 
social network analysis on respectively the 9/11 attacks and the Madrid bombing, it is 
found that many ties indeed exist between the hijackers of the four planes, where 
diffused networks also exist based on weak ties among the terrorists.135   
Another bright spot is the 2004 publication of Understanding Terror Networks by 
Marc Sageman. In his research, Sageman (a data collector) focuses not on grand ideas 
but on details of al-Qaeda's recruitment and support networks. His findings may imply 
that grievances are necessary but not sufficient to generate radical terrorism. Social 
networks are needed to make radical terrorism emerges. Sageman uses the 
biographies of individual terrorists and obscure al-Qaeda-linked groups to explain the 
movement's evolving structure. By using data on 172 participants in the global Jihad, he 
provides a social explanation of the global wave of activity or the religious wave 
according to Rapoport (2004), where he traces its roots in Egypt, Afghanistan during 
Soviet-Afghan war, Sudan, and growth of branches worldwide, including the Hamburg 
and Montreal cells that planned the 9/11 attacks.  
                                                   
134 For more, see (Carley 2004).  
 
135 For more, see (Rodriguez 2005).   
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Sageman’s social network analysis specifically on al-Qaeda operatives since 
1998 yields four large terrorist clusters. The first cluster resides in the Pakistan-Afghan 
border and consists of the central staff of al-Qaeda and the global Salafist jihad 
movement. The second cluster is a group of operatives located in core Arab states such 
as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait. The third cluster is known as the Maghreb 
Arabs who, although they come from North African nations, currently reside in France 
and England. The fourth cluster is centred in Indonesia and Malaysia and is affiliated 
with Jemaah Islamiya (JI).  
In his findings, Sageman also challenges the conventional understanding of 
terrorism causes: poverty; trauma; madness; and ignorance. He instead shows the 
proof that out of the sample taken from the clear majority of the mujahedin, it is the 
social bonds that predated the ideological commitment, and it was these social 
networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad. Social bonds among 
young volunteers, the sense of clandestine they develop, and their ability to make 
reinforcing contacts with al-Qaeda leaders or trainers making these young individuals to 
become effective terrorist cells through the psycho-ideological internal process: the 
mutual emotional and social support; the development of a common identity; and the 
encouragement to adopt a new faith.  
These internal group’s ties are more significant than external factors such as 
common hatred for an outside group. Being excluded from the rest of society, these 
men were then transformed into fanatics with a desire for martyrdom, and eager to kill. 
The tight social bonds of family and friendship, paradoxically enhanced by tenuous links 
among the cell groups, contribute to the jihadist movement's flexibility and longevity. 
These tenuous links among the cell groups make it difficult for authorities to trace their 
proliferating connections.  
According to Sageman, a group of people or individuals indeed can be viewed as 
a network, which is a collection of nodes connected through links. As Sageman argues, 
some nodes are more popular and are attached to more links, connecting them to other 
more isolated nodes. These more connected nodes, called hubs, are important 
components of a terrorist network and will not stay static but evolve over time. A few 
highly connected hubs dominate the architecture of global Salafist jihad. This kind of 
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social network gives global Salafist jihad flexibility since small-world networks have 
interesting properties.  
Unlike a hierarchical network that can be eliminated through the decapitation of 
its leadership, a small-world network resists fragmentation because of its dense 
interconnectivity. A significant fraction of nodes can be randomly removed without much 
impact on its integrity (Barabasi 2003). Random attacks, such as stopping terrorists 
arbitrarily within one country’s borders, will not affect the network’s structure. These 
actions may stop individual terrorists from coming and operating in certain countries, but 
they will leave the network largely undisturbed. 
As a concluding thought, we now could see that social network analysis is just 
one tool that can be used to understand the latent threats of Islamist terrorism in 
Indonesia and in the region and is just one piece of the puzzle. The network structure 
may impact the ability of an organization to endure over the years and to complete 
attacks. Therefore, it is important for counterterrorism experts and intelligence analysts 
to understand how to break up a network; they could potentially exploit the small world 
topology by eliminating weak ties to isolate the network and diminish its reach and 
power. That said, the removal of individuals in key network locations may be even more 
important than attacking the traditional leaders of a group (Ressler 2006).   
 
On Agency-Structure Relationship 
Structure is the recurrent patterned arrangements which influence or limit the 
choices and opportunities available, whilst agency is the capacity of individuals to act 
independently and to make their own free choices. On the other hand, the structure 
versus agency debate may be understood as an issue of socialization against autonomy 
in determining whether an individual act as a free agent or in a manner dictated by 
social structure. The relationships between structure and agency that shape human 
behaviour are the dialectical one where society forms the individuals who create 
society, thus forming a continuous loop (Berger and Luckmann 1966). 
Correspondingly, Sageman’s argument on the strategic importance of social 
networks also corresponds to the fact that social networks become the basis for 
external and internal social interactions among any agents involved (Ashour 2009). 
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Although Sageman shows that social networks play the critical role in the success of 
terrorism movement, he also concludes that the level of commitment and choice to 
embrace such radical violence are entirely their own. In other words, Sageman still 
clearly states that social networks (structure-oriented/social logic) and personal choice 
(agent-focused/individual logic) become two determining factors of individuals to commit 
radical terrorism. The relationship between social structure, agency, process, and 
feedback effects is also systematically explained by Ashour (2009).  
 











Source: (Ashour 2009), 12.  
 
Therefore, it seems that Sageman’s findings complement the assumption 
regarding the causes of terrorism: the combination of grievances; radical ideology; and 
social networks. It may be true that social networks and human choice can predate an 
ideological commitment, but it is not a complete explanation for the emergence of a 
violent terrorism movement. In fact, grievances should exist first before the 
embracement of radical ideology and social networks. 
Grievances due to poverty, trauma, madness, and ignorance are still the inherent 
factors inside the jihadists’ mind, and thus exacerbate the influence of radical ideology 
and social networks. Regarding the jihadists’ mind, Jerrold Post (1998, 2007) argues 
that there is a multiplicity of individual motivations: the sense of power to the powerless; 
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the revenge; and the sense of significance. Post also argues, there is a broad spectrum 
of terrorist groups and organizations, each of which has a different psychology, 
motivation, and decision-making structure. Indeed, one should not speak of terrorist 
psychology in the singular, but rather of terrorist psychologies (Post 1998, 2007).  
Putting all these together, the literature review provides the basis for building 
postulations in this proposed research by connecting the variables of grievances, radical 
ideology, social network, and Islamist terrorism. 
 
2.2.5 The Theoretical Framework to Examine the Isla mist Terrorism in Indonesia 
 
According to Juergensmeyer (2003), the solution to the Islamist radicalization is 
not secularism but more religious approaches. Based on this argument, Wahid, ed., 
(2011) through their book, The Illusion of an Islamic State: How an Alliance of 
Moderates Launches a Successful Jihad Against Radicalization and Terrorism in the 
World’s Largest Muslim-Majority Country, approaches the issue of Islamist radicalism in 
Indonesia with the perspective of former President Wahid’s Sufism and his close 
encounter with Judaism and Christianity.  
According to Wahid, there are two kinds of Muslim people from the Islamic 
perspective: people with the tranquil soul and people with the anxious soul. The first is 
associated with people who peacefully work with others to build the civilization. The 
latter is associated with people seeking the political power and domination over others 
through their religion and use of violence. Therefore, the clashing wills and interaction 
between moderate versus radical Muslims; as well as between the agents of moderate 
Muslim versus the agents of Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbut Tahrir have 
been predominantly taking place in Indonesia until today (Wahid, ed. 2011). 
Indonesia as the World’s most Muslim populated country, yet with the secular 
ideology, used to be a Buddhist, Hindu and Christian nation before Islam came. The 
coming of Islam to Indonesia in the fourteenth century was filtered by the preexisting 
culture, thus making Islam in Indonesia an Indonesian version of Islam as opposed to 
the Middle Eastern version of Islam. However, over the years the three streams of 
transnational Islamist movements from the Middle East: Wahhabism; Muslim 
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Brotherhood; and Hizbut Tahrir began to infiltrate Indonesia to change the Indonesian 
version of Islam into “pure”/the Middle-Eastern version of Islam (Wahid 2011). 
This is corresponding to what is explained by Eliraz (2004) who observes 
similarities between radical fundamentalists in Indonesia and their brothers with the 
same ideology in the Islamic world. Out of his observation he founds that the Middle 
Eastern influence appears a profound one on Indonesian radical fundamentalists. The 
dissemination of ideas from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, according to Eliraz, is 
grounded in age-old cross-regional and global processes of the transference of ideas. 
New methods of communication (e.g., the internet and physical transportation) facilitate 
further the general process of the globalization of Islam, including dissemination of 
radical fundamentalist ideas to the Indonesian archipelago.136    
Consequently, the two multifaceted phenomena of Islamic modernism and 
radical-Islamist fundamentalism clearly illustrate the significant contemporary influence 
of the Middle East on the Indonesia archipelago, in an Islamic context (Eliraz 2004). 
Later in their development, some violent and political engagements of radical-Islamist 
fundamentalism were failed by the government, particularly during General Suharto’s 
regime (1966 – 1998). The fundamentalist movements that consist of these three 
transnational movements (Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood, and Hizbut Tahrir) have 
similar characteristics which are a part of the international Sunni pan-Islamist political 
movements. They are commonly associated with a goal of unifying all Muslim countries 
under an Islamic caliphate ruled by Islamic (Shari’a) law and led by a caliph as the head 
of state elected by Muslims (Wahid, ed. 2011). 
Historically, the original source of grievance for radical Islamist movements in 
Indonesia including Darul Islam (DI) as the origin of JI, was the Dutch and Japanese 
imperialism for more than three centuries coupled by global Islamic Salafist movements 
(also called as the Salafi jihadism) inspired by Hassan al-Banna (1906 – 1949), Sayyid 
Qutb (1906 – 1965), both of which are Egyptian nationals, as well as an Indian national 
Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903 – 1979). Whilst Hassan al-Banna was the founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, Sayyid Qutb was becoming the member of it in 1950. 
On the other hand, Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi was the founder of Jema’at e-Islami in 
                                                   
136 For more, see (Eliraz 2004), 26 – 66.  
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1941. This made the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, which is closely associated to the 
Salafi jihadism or Salafist jihadism a typical of religious terrorism or terrorism justified by 
religious-based arguments that historically originates out of the religious and national-
determination wave (Rapoport 2004). In addition to that, since almost nearly JI 
associates and key leaders are the Javanese ethnics, there is a possibility that to some 
extents Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is also a typical of ethno-nationalist terrorism. I 
also view that the general pattern of Islamist radicalism in Indonesia reflects the 
strategic pattern outlined in the Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s strategy.137 According to 
Honorable Robert Blake, the U.S. ambassador to Republic of Indonesia, the Salafist 
jihad ideology is still among the most significant factors that drive the existence and 
latent threats of radical terrorism in Indonesia.138 
This is also corresponding to the definition by Ashour (2009) that clearly defines 
jihadism as a radical ideology within Islamism that stresses the use of violence as a 
legitimate, and in some versions the legitimate method of political and social change. 
Jihadists mostly use selective and literal Salafi interpretations of Islamic sources, hence 
the term “Salafi jihadist or Salafist jihadist.” To be specific, Salafism is a school of 
thought in Sunni Islam (a majority of Islam in Indonesia) that attributes its beliefs to the 
first three generations of Muslims: the sahaba (companions of Muhammad) and the two 
succeeding generations (the seventh and eighth century). Literally, the term Salafi 
means a follower of the salaf and Salafism believes that pure Islam was practiced by 
these three generations. “Innovations” in religious matters are unacceptable to Salafis. 
Vaguely and broadly defined, those “innovations” could range from modern ideas like 
democracy to different understandings of Islam like mystical-Islam (Sufism) or Shi’ite 
Islam (Ashour 2009). 
By the same token, jihadism in this manner is also characterized by the rejection 
of democracy, whether electoral or liberal, as well as by the intolerance and the frequent 
use of violence against political rivals. Some researchers classify jihadists into global 
(internationalists), internal (mainly concerned with toppling nationalist regimes) or 
                                                   
137 For a detailed history of Darul Islam, see (Solahudin 2013). 
 
138 Robert Blake (the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia from 2014 until 2016) in a discussion with the author, 
May 13, 2016. 
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irredentists/secessionists. That said, in general the activities of jihadist movements can 
usually fit into more than one of these categories (Ashour 2009). 
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Figure 2.5 A Visualization of Islamist Transnational Movement to Indonesia 
 
Source: Self-made.139 
                                                   
139 Adapted. This visualization reflects a main framework of Islamism in Indonesia according to the view of Indonesian Islamist mainstream, as 
also argued by Rahmat M. Imdadun (The Deputy Secretary General of Nahdlatul Ulama and Deputy Chairman of National Human Rights 
Commission). For more discussion on this matter, see (Imdadun n.d.). 
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140 Ibid. 
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On Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s Strategy: How Does It Reflect the Strategic Pattern of the 
Islamist terrorism in Indonesia? 
Based on the detailed explanation by Brynjar Lia (2008), I can conclude that Al-
Suri is a typical strategic planner and his strategy reflects the strategic pattern of the 
Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. So often when we read about a key terrorist writing, it is 
a religious treatise justifying the terrorist tactic as part of jihad and hyperbolizing the 
greatness of the holy war. Indeed, with Al Suri’s writings, he proves to be a simply 
devoted pragmatist. Although he is uncompromising in his principals or his belief in the 
global jihad, he is willing to take a realist viewpoint to examine strategy and tactics. He 
does not claim to be a religious authority (e.g., Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri). 
Instead, he claims to be a historian, strategist, and tactician. He is one of the only 
jihadist authors who is very critical of jihadist movements. By being critical, he can 
identify what went wrong in numerous case studies, rather than simply waxing about 
how great the martyrs were.   
Similarly, it is good to see a strategist who is not power-hunger and self 
aggrandizing. Unlike Osama bin Laden, Al-Suri thoroughly believes in the cause of 
global jihad, but never visioning himself to lead it or becoming the Caliph on some day. 
This also reminds us of great strategists of the past (e.g., Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, 
and Machiavelli) who studied and understood strategy but were happy to serve princes 
rather than insisting on becoming one.   
Al-Suri studies three different formations for operations in the global jihad and 
evaluates each formation according to a set of criteria by using case studies. The ideal 
formations according to him are secret military organizations, open fronts and covert 
confrontations, and individual jihad; whilst his criteria of measurement are military 
success/failure, security success/failure, agitation success/failure, educational 
success/failure, and political success/failure. He defines secret military organizations as 
like those of combat vanguard of the Muslim Brotherhood and concludes that these 
types of organizational formations worked at one time in the past but are doomed for 
failure in the current state. He cites many organizations that were crushed by the 
governments of the Arab states, often before they were able to even form. 
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He defines open fronts and covert confrontations as primarily guerrilla tactics. 
Through his evaluation, he concludes that they work, but only under certain favourable 
conditions. The most favourable example was the overthrow of the Soviet and then the 
Afghan Communist regime, and the final installation of the Taliban regime. Finally, he 
defines the individual jihad as the lone member or cell conducting purely terrorist acts 
(as opposed to insurgency). He claims that this is by far the best formation, but it is still 
not a perfect one. Each of these individuals and cells requires guidance, both militarily 
(e.g., the knowledge of bomb-making and of the identification of strategic targets), as 
well as religiously in order to ensure that the members are remain devoted to one 
common cause. Here, he argues that by promulgating such guidance to these 
members, all devout followers could take up the cause of jihad from anywhere they live.  
As even more evidence of his strategic thinking, he illustrates the so-called light 
guerilla warfare mixed with the civilian terror (al-irhab al-madani). This mixed strategy 
occurs where the global resistance movement should focus, along with secret methods, 
especially on the level of individual operations and small resistance units that are totally 
separated from each other. However, he adds, that if the opportunity presents, for open 
warfare to liberating a land and to imposing the Shari’a law (e.g., Taliban Afghanistan), 
then it should be taken.   
He also encourages all Sunni Muslims to view themselves belonging to the 
ummah, and not to the colonial-Imposed boundaries of nation-states. He hates the 
definition and use of word terrorism according to the Western world. He instead defines 
the two types of terrorism: the blameworthy terrorism (irhab madhmum) such as action, 
speech, behaviour, etc, which inflicts harm and fear among the innocents without a true 
cause; and praiseworthy terrorism (irhab mahmud), which he defines as terrorism by the 
righteous that have been unjustly treated, thus removing injustice from the oppressed 
by repelling the oppressor. Terrorism, therefore, is a religious duty, and assassination is 
a prophetic tradition. He goes on to prioritize targets according to their strategic value, 
whilst justifying the Western economic resources as the valid target to attack. In terms 
of resource mobilization, he also highlights the importance of fundraising and the self-
sustaining movement (e.g., not having to rely on the government and state-sponsorhip).  
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Uprooting and Seeking the Pattern of Islamist Radicalism in Indonesia 
As we previously examined, the radical Islamist movements in Indonesia 
historically fitted into the category of religious and ethno-nationalist where such 
movements struggling for self-determination against the two main occupying and 
illegitimate forces: the Dutch and Japanese imperialism until 1945. Later in the recent 
era, I view that the general pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia fits into three 
characteristics of modern religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based 
arguments as defined by Bruce Hoffman (1999) and John Arquilla, et al. (1999): the 
perpetrators must use religious scriptures to justify or explain their violent acts or to gain 
recruits; clerical figures must be involved in leadership roles; apocalyptic images (e.g., 
martyrdom and a better place in the heaven) of destruction are seen by the perpetrators 
as a necessity. In this part, I will examine, uproot, and seek the pattern of Islamist 
radicalism in Indonesia by referring to the theoretical framework and literature review 
explained in the previous parts. 
Until today, the critical underlying factor leading to Islamist terrorism or Salafi 
jihadism or Salafist jihadism in Indonesia is the huge population that exacerbates the 
imbalance in economic development, poverty, and corruption in the government and 
nongovernment sectors. Until 2013, out of around 245 million Indonesians, at least 30 
million earn less than $1 per day and 100 million earn less than $2 per day.141 The 
proponents of this argument believe that the tendency of Indonesia becoming a 
potential pool of recruitment is still significantly high until today. 
At this stage, the radical (religious) ideology enters as the key intervening 
variable and source of courage. According to Juergensmeyer (2003), religion is not the 
inherent cause of violence or terrorism, as violence might happen even without the 
religious context. Nevertheless, religion provides the mores and symbols which make 
horrific bloodshed easier to vindicate. Only religion provides the moral justification to 
commit violence in the name of a cosmic war between good and evil.  
                                                   
141 Despite Indonesia's efforts to eliminate statistical poverty, the facts are clear — 100 million out of 245 
million Indonesians still live under $2 per day. Considering the World Bank sets the poverty line at $1.25 a 
day, the Indonesian government’s insistence that only 30 million are living in the poverty becomes 
clouded. For more elaborate information, see (Jumlah Penduduk Miskin Turun 1 Juta n.d.) and (Mortara 
2011). 
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After being radicalized, splinters further their action in regular violent activities 
and operate independently in loose networks. This is the critical stage where these 
splinters begin to break away from the social movement. Once they become 
clandestine, they are separated from the society and joined by the bonds of solidarity 
with people who share similar values and purposes, one of which is to establish the 
Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. Under such conditions, they reinforce each other to 
take certain collective actions, whilst at the same time, they begin to attack the 
innocents, civilians, and non-combatants. At this stage, their activity can be called 
terrorism.  
However, based on the nature of fighting against terrorism, any forms of state 
repression including repressive counterterrorism measures taken by state’s authorities 
(e.g., some decapitations/attacking the leadership and raids by the Indonesian 
government) would ironically open up the possibility of adverse reactions in which 
terrorists to some extent would have more courage, supporters, and capabilities to 
continue fighting back, thus creating more terrorism. This is corresponding to what has 
been argued by Hafez (2003). According to him, economic and psychological 
approaches are not enough to explain Islamic rebellions in places like Egypt, Algeria, 
Kashmir, Chechnya, Indonesia, etc. All these violent places suffer from political 
exclusion and indiscriminate repression, which are the main factors for violent dissent. 
To be more precise, the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia also shares the 
grievances of radical Muslims at the international level that blame the Western 
civilization and the U.S. for the backwardness of Middle East; democratic imposition; 
economic, social, and political ills of the third world countries; Israeli-Palestinian 
conflicts; and the high-profile U.S. military presence in Muslim nations especially in the 
Arabian peninsula. As Jessica Stern (1999, 2003) emphasizes on general grievances 
and ideological radicalization as the source of terrorism, Robert Pape (2003, 2005) 
emphasizes on specific political grievances such as foreign occupation, democratic 
imposition, and foreign military presence as the cause of radical terrorism and suicide 
bombing in the Arab peninsula and Islamist nations. As previously discussed, he 
convincingly argues that nearly every suicide terrorism campaign occurs in the 
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territories that are occupied by foreign forces whose political system is a democracy and 
whose religion is different.142 
These grievances are subsequently coupled by economic, social, and political 
grievances in their daily life at the local level so that returning to Islamic Shari’a law and 
establishment of an Indonesian Salafi Islamist state become their utopian solution.143 
That said, Islamist terrorism movements in Indonesia are inseparable with their utopian 
and global vision. Like their ideological founding fathers: Hassan al-Banna (1906 – 
1949); Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1965); and Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903 – 1979), they 
strive to ensure that Islam will define the political, legal and public space everywhere.  
To achieve this goal, like their international counterparts Islamist terrorism 
movements in Indonesia also seek the Islamization of entire social and political system 
of their societies, their states, the whole Muslim world, and ultimately the entire globe 
(Sidahmed and Ehteshami, ed. 1996). The Islamization in this case involves bringing 
everything under Allah’s sovereignty, rule and law (as perceived by them), and its 
integration within a total-Islamic system in which implementation of Shari’a is the crucial 
element.  
The proponents of such movements emphasize on Tawhid, the traditional 
doctrine of the unity of Allah. In their interpretation, this becomes a unitary and uniform 
vision of Allah, universe and society: one God, one people, one law. Just as Allah’s 
physical laws are imposed on the universe, so Allah’s religious law (Shari’a) must be 
imposed too on society. Correspondingly, the radical Islamists in Indonesia have been 
shaped by three assumptions: the narrow understanding between us and them; the 
defensive character viewing outsiders as the enemy so that their actions are justified as 
a self-defence; and the conspiracy-inspired narrative viewing the outside world as 
organized groups under Jewish and Western civilization to destroy Islam (Liddle 1996). 
                                                   
142 However, although Pape’s finding is useful, his data and methods have been subject to criticism by 
some other scholars. 
 
143 Particularly important in this aspect is Hafez’s theory (2003) that emphasizes on political grievances as 
the main causes of Muslims turn into violence. Hafez rejects several theories like economic 
impoverishment, ideology, or jihad as explanations of why Muslims turn into violence. When people are 
excluded from politics and repressed brutally, it makes sense that some will turn into violence. See 
(Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World 2003). 
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For the Jemaah Islamiya (JI), since its inception as the Darul Islam/DI (1945 – 1965) 
until its transformation into Structural JI (1992 – 2002), Non-Structural JI (2002 – 2011), 
the Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid/JAT (2008 – 2010), ISIS-associated cells in 2014, and 
most recently into the neo-JI in 2016, the end-state is still clear, which is to win the 
worldwide unfinished battle, which is the struggle to create a global caliphate by 
transforming Indonesia into a Salafi Islamist state.144  
To achieve this ultimate and hard-won goal, they must survive, and to survive 
and remain effective they must continuously adapt to the changing circumstances. Over 
the years (2002 – 2009 and 2009 – 2017), the organizational patterns of JI and its 
associated groups have followed the pattern of organizational dynamics as they evolved 
from the more “traditional” hierarchical organization types such as Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA), to increasingly cellular and network-based structures that are 
part of a “solar” network of linked groupings, that are typical in the case of al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates. This adoption of the “leaderless resistance” organizational model, in which 
operational cells deny that they are part of larger units with identifiable leaders has 
enabled JI as a movement or as an organization to survive and remain the formidable 
latent threats in Indonesia and in the region.145 
By the same token, we also can see the operational pattern of JI that involves 
five lines of operation reflecting Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s strategy. This operational pattern 
is also inspired by guerilla war theories of Mao Tse-Tung, Fidel Castro, and Ernesto 
“Che” Guevara: mass base (independent fighters, Muslim communities particularly 
those of unemployed and radicalized by JI radical ideology); united front (e.g., JI, the 
JAT, and some other radical-Islamist groups); armed wing (violent arms/group of people 
who dare to commit terrorist acts); political warfare (receiving indirect supports from 
some Islamist political hardliners who also aim at establishing the Shari’a law); and 
international support (e.g., non state or possible state actors).146 
Whilst Bin Laden has been killed, JI and JAT still receive international support 
from al-Qaeda (although they were not operating as an al-Qaeda subordinate). 
                                                   
144 For a detailed history of Darul Islam, see (Solahudin 2013).  
 
145 For more, see (Sinai 2007), 41. 
 
146 For more, see (Lia 2008), 347-484 and (Zabel 2007).  
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According to Abuza (2003, 2006, 2009, 2011), the JI’s support system is nimble, 
autonomous in decision-making, and self-funded by committing criminal activities, 
although their sources of financial support have been successfully disrupted. Given the 
JI’s setbacks from their efforts to establish an Indonesian Salafi Islamist state for more 
than a decade, JI regroups and builds upon the experience of terrorist groups in the 
Middle East. Even JI adopts philosophical underpinnings that guide its dual strategy. 
From Hamas and Hezbollah, it borrows what is called an inverse triangle model in which 
a broad network of social services supports a smaller jihadist core, and from Saudi 
Arabia and the Persian Gulf emirates, it adopts a model of charities and NGOs that help 
JI advance its jihadist goals.147   
According to Abuza (2003), JI used to raise and transfer funds by using Islamic 
charities (many of which are associated with charities based in Saudi Arabia) and front 
companies to raise funds and move money around the region. This scheme has taken 
place in Indonesia as it secures pledges from its members and supporters, as well as 
diverts legitimate donations away from mosques and charities to its coffers. Abuza also 
explains how JI uses the hawala (underground banking) system and personal couriers 
to transfer funds across borders almost without a trace; some cells are engaged in 
resorting to petty criminal activities, such as bank robberies, to support their operations. 
Their linkage to al-Qaeda is the result of the identical ideological bondage of 
global Salafist doctrine envisaged to create a caliphate in Southeast Asia. This 
ideological bondage is multiplied by other historical factors and cultural forces 
intermingling between them and al-Qaeda since their common struggle against the 
Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan. Ultimately, they tie themselves in the implementation 
of the purest Islam that according to them was practiced by the Prophet Mohammad in 
the seventh century through all forms of jihad, including the violent one. Like networks 
of radical Muslim in other countries, as of today, the JI and its related loose networks 
have been designed to survive against national and international counterterrorism 
measures.  
                                                   
147 For more, see (Abuza, Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model: Assessing Hezbollah's 
Influence 2009). According to Zachary Abuza (2011), following the raid on terrorists’ camp in Aceh in 
2010 and the arrest of Umar Patek in 2011, terrorism in near future will likely be perpetrated by smaller, 
more diffuse groups, without any real centralized command and control. See (Abuza, JI Operative Umar 
Patek Arrested in Pakistan 2011).  
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The thriving and survivability of these social networks are mainly influenced by 
four factors: The lack of political will in deradicalization and counter-radicalization efforts 
even by the government since fighting against terrorism is linked to Islam and therefore 
a very sensitive issue in Indonesia (Rabasa et al. 2010); Indonesian society in the lower 
strata that is reluctant to deal with Islamist radicalism as doing so would be portrayed by 
their society as opposing Islamic values; the economic, social and political hardship; 
and the infiltration of radical and Salafist ideology into various Islamic religious activities, 
not only in the lower strata of Indonesian society but also the infiltration at all levels from 
primary schools to higher educational institutions.148 As previously discussed, the 
importance of social networks as the cause of radical terrorism is convincingly argued 
by Marc Sageman (2004). His framework of examining social networks of Islamist 
terrorism is useful to comprehend similar phenomena found in Indonesia (the pattern is 
hypothetically identical).  
This implies that social networks coupled by grievances and radical ideology that 
has serious anger towards Western civilization are a set of determining factors for the 
(re)emergence of the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia with or without the presence of Bin 
Laden and the current JI or other related radical-Islamist groups’ leaders. Simply stated, 
Indonesian struggles towards radical Islamist grievances and networks have existed 
long before the U.S. struggles against the Islamist terrorism. Although Indonesian 
struggle against radical Islamist fundamentalists have taken a long period of time, 
according to Eliraz (2004), it appears unlikely that radical Islamist fundamentalism, in 
near future, would evolve into a real political option in the Indonesian archipelago, either 
by way of democratic politics, or as a political player acting outside the conventions and 
rules of the democratic political system. Nor does it appear poised to become a 





                                                   
148 Saudi officials often assert that the greatest source of extremist radicalization within the educational 
system comes from “deviant teachers” who abuse their time with students by discussing extracurricular 
issues such as politics and religion and by advocating extremist positions. For more, see (Boucek 2008). 
 
149 For more, see (Eliraz 2004), 93.   
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On Resource Mobilization of JI 
Based on the extensive review in the previous parts, it is conclusive that JI is 
effectively supported by a series of resource mobilization, including political 
opportunities and other tangible means that spans over a long period of time.150 In 
terms of networking, the war and subsequent safe haven in Afghanistan (1985 – 
October 2002) provided JI with the opportunity to establish a partnership with al-Qaeda 
and Southeast Asian militant groups, who in fact provided critical training, resources, 
and guidance. Simultaneously the 1998 political transition that led to the stepping down 
of President Suharto attenuated government pressure on Islamists, creating a more 
permissive environment for JI. This turmoil transition also led to local sectarian conflicts 
that became an important cause célèbre and combat venue for the organization.  
During this period, the al-Qaeda core as defined by Marc Sageman in his social 
network analysis acted as a terrorist patron that encouraged and enabled the JI 
members to strike Western targets independently of the group’s central leadership. In 
addition to encouraging JI members to strike the West, al-Qaeda core subsidized 
operations against Western targets. Al-Qaeda core sent no less than $30,000 to the cell 
that carried out the first Bali attacks and helped underwrite the 2003 Marriott hotel 
bombing in the capital city of Jakarta. In addition to that, al-Qaeda-linked individuals in 
Pakistan provided $50,000 to Hambali, a portion of which went towards the Australian 
embassy bombing. Al-Qaeda’s financial contribution ensured that these operations 
could take place without the permission and resource of JI’s leadership.  
Subsequently, there have been two political opportunities that simultaneously 
occur within JI that impacts its resource mobilization: the realignment and fragmentation 
of JI (October 2002 – present) where in terms of leadership, fundamental 
disagreements among senior JI leaders catalyzed the group’s realignment and 
fragmentation, so that violent hard-liners formed new and active splinter groups whilst 
the group’s remaining leadership temporarily shifted away from violence to emphasizing 
religious approach. The second one is the rise and decline of JI splinters (2004 – 
                                                   
150 For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011). This study is a part of initiative that will produce a series of 
alternative futures regarding the state of AQAM (Al-Qaeda and its associated movements) in the year 
2025. 
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present), where the charismatic leadership, connections, and operational experience of 
Non-Structural JI operatives provide coherence and direction to radicalized militants 
who are eager for the action but lack an adequate platform.  
In terms of local support, although JI relatively never enjoys the widespread 
support in Indonesia, Indonesians tolerated the organization until one of its splinters 
detonated bombs on the island of Bali in 2005. Such simultaneous attacks culminating 
in 2005 eventually galvanized public opposition to the group, thus empowering 
Indonesian leaders to aggressively dismantle the infrastructure of JI. To more disrupting 
the conditional resource of JI, global counterterrorism operations have relatively 
severed the JI’s links with al-Qaeda core and deepened the split between its factions. 
By the time of 2005 Bali bombing attacks, the domestic opposition to terrorism had 
grown as well, and local governments began to have the political backing from public 
and politicians to exert counterterrorism pressure, thus further weakening the group. 
However, referring to Zachary Abuza’s assessment of JI (2009), like many 
Middle Eastern Islamist groups, Jemaah Islamiyah has embraced the inverse triangle in 
which a broad range of charities and nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) serve as a 
cover for a narrower terrorist mission. And like many Islamist groups in the Middle East, 
as JI regroups, it shows no intention of abandoning its core ideology even as some 
Indonesian officials wishfully see moderation where none exists. As the organization 
seeks to rebuild, it becomes an example of how al-Qaeda affiliates, beaten back by 
successful counterterrorism strategies, regroup using both the democratic process they 
simultaneously fight, and the legitimacy naively bestowed by the international 
community on any organizations that call itself a nongovernmental organization. 
According to Abuza (2009) who pays a serious attention to the resource 
mobilization of JI, the United States and Western governments should have a strong 
interest in Indonesian political-Islam and its growing radicalism. Any Islamist gains in the 
archipelago, according to him, will have profound repercussions on the United States 
and wider Western security interests. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the 
world, and according to Abuza the United States should not cede the Indonesian 
population to the same Saudi-funded Islamists who radicalized their Arab brethren, 
recruited unencumbered for years in Afghan and Pakistani refugee camps, and 
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professed an inflexible hatred of the United States, Israel, and the West. By paying a 
strong attention to the potential resource mobilization of JI, he also calls for the United 
States to put pressure on Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to uproot the JI’s 
overt presence and cede them no political space where they can recruit and indoctrinate 
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1985 – 2011  
 






Establishing the Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and the Salafi 
Islamist state of Indonesia and 
in the Southeast Asia. 
 
The ideological resonance 
necessary for violent action 
will persist, even if the 
organizational structures 








War against the Red Army in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan 
providing them with 
international networks of 
militants (including al-Qaeda, 
MILF, Abu Sayyaf Group, 
among others). 
 
JI will be taking advantage of 
Indonesian government’s tacit 
tolerance of non-violent 
Islamist organizations to allow 
militants to use those groups 











Taking advantage of 
Indonesian political transition 
to a newly democratic era in 
1998 (the stepping down of 
President Suharto). JI was 
also empowered in terms of 
recruitment, training, and 
radicalization through various 
local conflicts in Indonesia 
following the 1998 national 
reform era. 
 
The most likely combat 
opportunities for JI operatives 
in the future are the 
insurgencies in the southern 
Philippines, southern Thailand, 
and Burma or a fresh round of 
sectarian bloodshed in 
Indonesia. 






Mainly al-Qaeda core. Funds 
from the patron or other 
contributors were also 
distributed discreetly through 
the hawala system. 
 
Possibly through Pakistan-
based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 
and other militants from 






Structural (emphasis on 
religious preaching) and Non-
Structural JI leadership 
(violence oriented), nearly all 
of them was charismatic, well 
connected, and experienced 
on the battle field. 
 
The rise of a charismatic 
leader could breathe new life 
into Structural or Non-
Structural JI. There is a 
serious concern where 
incarcerated militants could 









Population that was reluctant 
to address or acknowledge the 
threat of terrorism in their 
midst. 
Structural JI is also best 
positioned for long-term 
survival. Although Structural JI 
has been degraded, critical 
portions of the group’s 
infrastructure remain intact. 50 
schools affiliated with 
Structural JI are still open, as 
is the network of publishing 
houses run by the 
organization. These platforms 
have enabled JI to continue 
recruiting new members, 
spreading propaganda, and 
maintaining its social network. 
Their current use of internet 
and social media for openly 
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conducting recruitments, 
fundraising, and propagation 
are very concerning for the 









Structurally JI focused on 
religious preaching//da’wah 
(Islamic proselytization) in an 
effort to boost its strength, 
which its leaders saw as a 
prerequisite for armed 
resistance. If and when JI’s 
commanders believed that 
their organization was 
powerful and popular enough 
to reengage in violence, they 
could resume terrorist attacks. 
Structural JI’s tactical decision 
to abandon terrorist attacks is 
not a renunciation of violence. 
The group remains committed 
to its long-term objective of 
creating Salafi Islamist state 
and WILL continue to pose a 
terrorist threat until it formally 
rejects violence, abandon its 














#1 Darul Islam: Since 1950s. 
Rebounded in 1970s.   
#2 Structural JI: since 1992.  
#3 Majelis Mujahedin 
Indonesia (MMI) Since 1998-
1999. 
#4 Non-Structural/loose 
networks of JI splinters since 
2002.  
#5 Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid 
(JAT) since 2008. 
Non-Structural and other JI-








Source: Self-made.151  
                                                   
151 Adapted. See (Gordon and Lindo 2011). 
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On Two Control Variables (State Repression and Government Incentive)  
Examining the impact of grievances, radical ideology, and social networks on the 
Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is not enough to satisfy the requirement of content 
validity if we do not examine the impact of state repression and government incentive 
on the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. Corresponding to Ashour’s argument that these 
two variables are significant on dealing with Islamist radicalism, indeed these two 
variables play important roles in counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia. Based on the 
examination of deradicalization and counter-radicalization programs in the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia, and Europe, it could be concluded that the best-designed programs 
leverage local cultural patterns to achieve their objectives. Such programs cannot 
simply be transplanted from one country to another country but need to be developed 
organically in a specific country and culture (Rabasa et al. 2010).  
That said, if we want to know the specific variables that have significant impacts 
on the Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, we should refer to the organic localities that have 
a strong impact on Islamist radicalism in Indonesia. Two of such localities are at least 
the impact of state repression and the government incentive on the Islamist terrorism in 
Indonesia. According to Police Inspector General (Ret) Ansyaad Mbai (the former head 
of Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency), when Islamist terrorists are arrested, 
very few of them are willing to talk. They will speak only to those they trust, and, in their 
minds, everyone connected to the government is their enemy. Even the most 
prestigious religious scholars have little credibility with the extremists because they are 
seen as having failed to establish the Islamic (Shari’a) law in Indonesia (Rabasa et al. 
2010). Given this reality, the role of government incentive including but not limited to the 
approach and treatment of Indonesian security apparatus towards Islamist terrorists are 
critical.  
For example, the methodology developed by Indonesia in dealing with convicted 
radicals is called the cultural interrogation. It requires the interrogator to become the 
ethnomethodologist by immersing in the culture of the detainee, understanding his 
hopes and fears, and speaking his language. According to the police consulting 
psychologist Sarlito Sarwono, the militants speak a jargon heavily laden with Arabic 
terms. That is why the Indonesian approach towards these Islamist terrorists requires 
Page 138 of 436 
 
the Indonesian security apparatus to treat the prisoners with a selective inducement 
(government incentive) which is to treat them in a humane way and to develop bonds of 
trust. This argument is convincingly proven by Police Brigadier General (Ret) 
Suryadharma, a former commander of the Indonesian police’s Bali Bombing Task Force 
and a devout Muslim. Corresponding to Juergensmeyer’s argument on dealing with 
religious terrorists, he believes that the government has the religious obligation to help 
these men find true Islam (Martin 2007). Driven by this philosophy, certain programs are 
designed to provide these radicals with certain, selective inducements (government 
incentive). A critical part of the program is by reuniting the inmates with their families, to 
remind them of their earthly responsibilities as husbands and fathers and to approach 
them personally. After Indonesian security apparatus gains their trust through this way, 
some of these men are released back to the society to become the double-agent for the 
government or to publicly renounce Islamist terrorism itself.   
However, such approach works on some and does not work on some others. A 
notoriously unremorseful terrorist was Imam Samudra, executed for his role in the first 
Bali bombing. He wrote two books, Aku Melawan Terroris (I Fight the Terrorists), 
published by a JI-linked publisher in 2004 and a best-seller with more than 12,000 
copies sold, and Satu Jihad Sejuta Vonis: Mengungkap Al Haq Menghalau Al-Batil (One 
Jihad, One Million Verdicts: Revealing the Truth and Banishing the Wrong) in 2008. For 
several months before their execution, Imam Samudra and other convicted fellows 
(Mukhlas and Amrozi) urged their followers to avenge their death by killing the 
president, vice president, minister of justice, prosecutors, and others (Arianti 2008). 
Another unremorseful terrorist, Iwan Darmawan (a.k.a. Rois) and Abu Syaukat, on the 
death row for his role in the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy, also wrote and 
published in 2009 a book, Apa itu Jihad?: Kupas Tuntas Kewajiban dan Pelaksanaan 
Jihad (What is Jihad?: Responsibility and Implementation), in which he stated that 
legitimate targets for jihad must include non-believers, Muslims abandoning their 
beliefs, hypocrites, those who disobey the Islamic (Shari’a) law, and despotic 
governments.152 
                                                   
152 The book can be obtained from National Library of Australia 
(http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/4556194). See also (Convicted Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Writes 
Book 2009). 
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There are two prominent figures in JI that experience the significant impact of 
state repression and government incentive. One of them is Nasir Abas, the best-known 
figure who was born a Malaysian citizen but residing in Indonesia. He has been 
removed from the United Nations terrorist list. Abas has gone through several 
international battles with his global radical fellows such as the war along with Afghan 
mujahidin in Afghanistan and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) before his rise as 
one of the regional chiefs of JI overseeing the Philippines, the Eastern Malaysia, and 
Sulawesi. It is, however, his arrest by the Indonesian government (a form of state 
repression) that made him repent.  
Personally, he felt that his arrest was God’s will and there was something that 
God wanted him to do. Later, this conviction was confirmed by his unprecedented 
expectation that his first interrogator, a Christian policeman, never used abusive 
language and treated him with respect (a form of selective inducement or government 
incentive). Precisely, Abas made it very clear that it was his capture and the 
unexpectedly decent treatment that he received from the police that crystallized his 
decision to leave JI (Rabasa et al. 2010). After going through a series of personal and 
respective engagement by the Indonesian security apparatus, Abas began to work with 
the government to reveal and crack down the JI networks.  
Another remorseful extremist and Bali perpetrator include Ali Imron whose two of 
his brothers (Mukhlas and Amrozi) were executed under the death sentence. Ali Imron 
is serving a life sentence and works with the government by preaching a non-violent 
interpretation of jihad as a spiritual struggle in God’s name on audiocassette recordings 
that he sends to his family’s Islamic boarding school (pesantren) in the East Java. 
Based on this experience, we can indeed conclude that state repression and 
government incentive play the important role in dealing with the Islamist terrorism in 
Indonesia, and the inclusion of these two control variables into the equation is 
significant to comprehend and make sense the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism in 
Indonesia.153 
                                                   
153 According to the Indonesian Minister of Defense, General TNI (Ret) Ryamizard Ryacudu in a 
discussion with the author in August 2015, if the Indonesian government can afford to give more sufficient 
attention (e.g., proper government incentives) towards the Islamist radicals, it would become a strategic 
instrument to winning their heart and mind. The similar view was also expressed by the Vice Chief of 




2.3.1 The Research Propositions and Hypotheses: The ory Building 
 
The reviews of relevant academic literature and exploratory multi-dimensional 
analysis provide several hypotheses (out of two main propositions) which are tested 
throughout this Ph.D. thesis. The first proposition argues that there is a significant 
impact of economic-social-political grievances, radical ideology, social network, and two 
other control variables (state repression and government incentive) on the Islamist 
terrorism.  
Second, alternatively, the Islamist terrorism is not caused by the intertwining 
factors of economic-social-political grievances, radical ideology, social network, and two 
other control variables (state repression and government incentive). Instead, according 
to Pape (2003, 2005), it can be caused by other factors such as psychological reasons 
(e.g., altruism). In this case, they want to be perceived as doing something good for the 
community at a net welfare loss to oneself (Elster 2007). Suicide bombers are often 
secular, relatively well educated, and integrated into society. Many of them are 
venerated after their death (Pape 2003, 2005).  
Specifically, out of these two propositions, there are two sets of hypotheses that 
will be evaluated: 
H0: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is not 
caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political 
grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government 
incentive.  
 
Therefore, hypothesis H0 will be proven if in the analysis we eventually find that the 
main explanatory variables (or along with the two control variables) will partially or 
entirely have a negative relationship on people committing Islamist terrorism. That said, 
I will assume that their decision to commit Islamist terrorism is simply caused by another 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (2015 – 2017) Lieutenant General TNI (Ret) Torry Djohar in a 
discussion with the author in October 2015. 
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factor other than economic grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical 
ideology, social network, as well as state repression and government incentive.  
 
Ha: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is 
caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political 
grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government 
incentive. 
 
Hypothesis Ha1 (Causal Relationship with Mediating Variables): Economic, 
social, and political grievances are the necessary factors for people committing 
Islamist terrorism. However, it will only lead people to commit Islamist terrorism if 
the mediating variables (radical ideology and social network) take part in 
transforming people with such grievances to commit Islamist terrorism. 
Economic, social, and political grievances along with radical ideology and social 
network are the significant factors leading people to commit Islamist terrorism, 
where the higher the intensity of these variables, the higher the likeability of them 
to commit Islamist terrorism. 
 
Hypothesis Ha2 (Multi-Chain Relationship): Economic, social, and political 
grievances along with radical ideology and social network all together form the 
multi-chain relationship with people’s decision on committing Islamist terrorism. 
Economic, social, and political grievances along with radical ideology and social 
network are the significant factors leading people to commit Islamist terrorism, 
where the higher the intensity of these variables, the higher the likeability of them 
to commit Islamist terrorism. 
 
Hypothesis Ha3 (The Significant Role of Control Variables): When included as 
control variables in the equation, state repression and government incentive will 
be proven significant in leading people to be either more willing or less willing in 
committing Islamist terrorism. The higher the intensity of these variables, the 
higher the likeability of them to commit Islamist terrorism. 
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2.3.2 The Research Framework and Design: Variables and Me thodology 
 
Given the purpose of this Ph.D. thesis which is to explore the multi-dimensional 
factors/elements leading people to commit Islamist terrorism, this Ph.D. thesis is 
specifically aimed at providing us with a better understanding of the characteristics of 
the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism, where the social network and 
ideology are proven as the facilitators in the Indonesian context.  
The research framework of this Ph.D. thesis consists of two major approaches. 
The first framework approach is to examine the effects of grievances, radical ideology, 
and social network on people committing Islamist terrorism; and the second framework 
approach is to examine the multi-dimensional causes of Islamist terrorism after two 
control variables (state repression and government incentive) are placed into the 
equation.  
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Source: Thomas Marks, 2006. 
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The unit of analysis in this Ph.D. thesis is individual. As discussed earlier, 
according to Audrey Cronin (2004) we should view terrorism from four levels of analysis: 
individual; group; state; and global level. However, to better examine the phenomenon 
in depth, Cronin argues that we need to delve into one level of analysis (e.g., individual) 
whilst still acknowledging other levels of analysis (e.g., group, state, and global level). 
The use of the individual as the unit of analysis in the study of terrorism and 
counterterrorism is common, since it enables us to understand the violent Islamist 
society and almost anything laying within that society including but not limited to their 
radical ideology. Society is a human/individual product, society is an objective reality, 
and man is a social product. When a definition of reality comes to be attached to a 
concrete power interest, it may be called an ideology (Berger and Luckmann 1966). 
This Ph.D. thesis rigorously uses qualitative (interpretivism) and quantitative 
(multivariate statistical analysis) research methods in terms of data collection and 
analysis. There are three clusters of samples for this thesis: 22 individuals of convicted 
Islamist terrorists serving in the prison (6 of them have recently been released); 15 Key 
state/security officials and experts in the field; and 40 former convicted Islamist terrorists 
living outside prisons but currently supporting the government in the deradicalization 
efforts. This overall sample that is chosen based on the purposive method has its own 
strength and weakness. 
First, for the specific sample of 22 individuals of convicted Islamist terrorists 
serving in the prison (6 of them have recently been released) is chosen by based on the 
purposive method. Although this method has its own strength since they are the key 
individuals involved in the violent Islamist movement under study, this choice is limited 
only to those who are incarcerated in the Indonesian jurisdiction and whose documents 
are available to be further examined. Correspondingly, the examination on them is also 
based on the documentation-archival evidence, so that there is no direct interaction with 
them that can be used to double-check their current opinions about the issue being 
studied. However, the examination of the documents related to them is also based on 
the ethical aspects and nothing done jeopardizes them. 
Second, for the specific sample of 15 key state/security officials and experts in 
the field is chosen by based on the purposive method. Although this method has its own 
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strength if we look at from their special expertise and deep insight of the field, it has its 
own limitation. It may only represent the view of officials and experts who are against 
the ideology and/or behaviour of violent Islamist movement (e.g., salafi jihadism) and 
who are available to be interviewed. The opinions of these officials and experts are also 
limited by their bounded rationality and subjectivity. However, all these 15 individuals 
are given the University of Exeter-approved consent form and have agreed on that form 
before they are involved in this survey. 
Third, for the specific sample of 40 former convicted Islamist terrorists living 
outside prisons, but currently supporting the government in the deradicalization efforts is 
also chosen by based on the purposive method. Although this method has its own 
strength since they are the key individuals involved in the violent Islamist movement 
under study, this choice is limited only to those who are living in the Indonesian 
jurisdiction and to those who are willing to be involved in this survey. The survey of 
these individuals is designed in such a way to minimize any ethical issues to the lowest 
possible level. Correspondingly all these 40 individuals are given the University of 
Exerter-approved consent form and have agreed on that form before they are involved 
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Table 2.7 The Methodology for Data Collection and Analysis 
Cluster Sample 
(n=77) 




1 n=22 Convicted 
Islamist 
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In addition to the qualitative and quantitative methods, this Ph.D. thesis also 
performs some discussions and reinterpretations on the social network analysis of the 
79 JI-related individuals (chapter 4.3). The reference for this part is the work of 
Wiphusana Klaimanee and Mariusz Nogaj (2008) that is based on the work of 
International Crisis Group (2006).154 Social network analysis is useful for studying 
terrorist organizations as they consist of networks of individuals that span countries, 
continents, and economic status, and form around specific ideologies. Social network 
analysis can provide important information on the unique characteristics of terrorist 
organizations, ranging from issues of network recruitment, network evolution, and the 
diffusion of radical ideas, all which form the basis of more effective counterstrategies to 
deal with network-based threats such as Islamist terrorism (Ressler 2006).  
The combination of these various, complementary research methodological 
approaches will provide more comprehensive answers to the research questions, whilst 
decreasing the risk of bias in this research. Subsequently, to assure the research quality 
of this study, prove hypotheses, and address skepticism, the research design is 
arranged to satisfy five criteria: face validity; content validity; external validity; internal 
validity; and reliability. Strictly speaking, the thesis is made up of its compliance with the 
standard criteria of modern research in terrorism studies (Sinai 2007).  
First, the research in this Ph.D. thesis gathers data from multiple layers of the JI 
networks outside and inside prisons (total of 22 and 40 individuals) whilst establishing 
the chain of evidence in this terrorist organization. Additionally, this Ph.D. thesis also 
includes 15 key state/security officials and experts in the field. The choice of the sample 
size of total 77 individuals is based on purposive (judgmental) sample rather than on 
probabilistic sampling.155 The purposive sampling is a type of non-probability sampling 
in which the units to be observed are selected based on researchers’ judgment about 
which ones will be the most useful representative (Singleton and Straits 2010). 
                                                   
154 See (Klaimanee and Nogaj 2008) and (International Crisis Group 5 May 2006). For these two works, 
see the attachment #4 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis. 
 
155 This is considered a normal sample size for this kind of study. As a comparison, the Tony Blair Insitute 
for Global Change’s Centre for Religion and Geopolitics’ most recent work used the sample size of 100 
jihadists, Omar Ashour’s previous work used the sample size of 63 individuals, and John Horgan’s 
seminal work on deradicalisation of IRA factions used 16 individuals. For more, see (Ahmed, Comerford 
and El-Badawy 2016). 
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The total of 62 individuals (22 and 40 individuals) are taken from the four layers 
of pyramid-style JI structure: sympathizers; foot soldiers (e.g., bombers); field 
leaders/planners; and ideological patrons (e.g., radical clerics). Radical clerics are on 
the top of the pyramid because they use radical da’wah (radical-Islamic proselytization) 
that led people on the path towards radicalization. This factor cannot be understated: 
detainees do not sit down with religious figures who lack credibility in the eyes of 
fundamentalists and their admirers (Boucek 2008). Such clerics represent the 
leadership that is perceived by most of the followers as credible, pious, and 
theologically knowledgeable (Ashour 2009). To satisfy the requirement of external 
validity, based on records of government intelligence agencies their background 
indicates that the composition of these 62 individuals relatively reflects the typical 
variations in the real population of JI’s entire organization and networks. 
Second, the thesis seeks to see whether the relationships between grievances, 
radical ideology, social network, and Islamist terrorism exist in this case. The effect of 
the two control variables, state repression and government incentive, on this theoretical 
framework is also examined. A rival postulation is also used in this proposed research 
project. Key informants will also be tasked to review the research draft.  
Third, the theoretical model is expected to be modified after finding a new pattern 
in this Ph.D. thesis, and then to be tested in other case studies and samples.  
 
Figure 2.8 The Illustration of Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods 
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CHAPTER 3: THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF JI 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe JI that is laid out according to the 
timeline of its origins, historical development, and likely form in the future. Whilst the 
organization of this chapter is arranged accordingly by based on the inter-linked 
development timeline, it still reflects the determining variables of Islamist terrorism in 
Indonesia that are examined in this Ph.D. thesis: economic grievances; social 
grievances; political grievances; radical ideology; social networks; state repression; and 
government incentive. In this chapter, we can see that these variables have inherently 
characterized the phenomena of JI from time to time. 
As previously examined in chapter 2 pertaining to the origin and existence of 
radical-Islamist movements in Indonesia, historically such radical movements fitted into 
a category of religious terrorism or terrorism justified by religious-based arguments that 
were also affected by the national-determination wave. They were initially a form of 
struggling for a self-determination against the two main occupying forces: the Dutch and 
Japanese imperialism until 1945. Later in its development, the general pattern of 
radical-Islamist movements in Indonesia have turned into Islamist terrorist movements 
influenced by the Salafi jihadism that reflect three distinct characteristics of modern 
terrorism justified by religious-based arguments: the use of religious scriptures to justify 
or to explain perpetrators’ violent acts or in order to gain recruits; the involvement of 
clerical figures in the leadership role; and apocalyptic images of destruction where 
martyrdom and a better place in the heaven are seen by the perpetrators as a necessity 
(Hoffman, 1999; Arquilla, et al, 1999). 
For the Jemaah Islamiya (JI), since its inception as the Darul Islam/DI (1945 – 
1965) until its transformation into Structural JI (1992 – 2002), Non-Structural JI (2002 – 
2011), the Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid/JAT (2008 – 2010), ISIS-associated cells in 2014, 
and most recently into the neo-JI in 2016; the end-state is still clear, which is to win the 
worldwide unfinished battle: the struggle to create a global caliphate, by transforming 
Indonesia into a Salafi Islamist state by using violent tactics.156 That said, throughout 
                                                   
156 For a detailed history of Darul Islam, see (Solahudin 2013). The first leader, commander, and imam of 
Darul Islam/DI (The Indonesian Islamist State) was Raden Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo. 
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their existence, they emphasize on three distinct features of radicalism: takfirism that 
accuses others without similar ideologies and behavioural conducts of apostasy or 
infidel; the implementation of violent jihad; and the persistent struggle to establish a 
khilafah Islamiyah in Indonesia and southeast Asia.157 
 
3.1 The General Overview of JI 
Jemaah Islamiya a.k.a. Jemaa Islamiyah; Jema’a Islamiyah; Jemaa Islamiyya; 
Jema’a Islamiyya; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Jema’a Islamiyyah; Jemaah Islamiah; Jemaah 
Islamiyah; Jema’ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema’ah Islamiyyah; and JI is a 
terrorist group seeking for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate spanning over 
Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern 
Philippines.158  
In December 2000, JI coordinated bombing attacks at numerous Christian 
churches in Indonesia and was involved in the bombings of several targets in Manila. In 
December 2001, Singaporean authorities unveiled a JI plot to attack the U.S., Israeli, 
British, and Australian diplomatic facilities in Singapore. Other significant JI attacks 
included the October 2002 Bali bombing attack, which killed more than 200 people, the 
August 2003 bombing attack of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, and the September 
2004 bombing attack outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. Later, JI’s October 
2005 suicide bombing attack in Bali left 26 dead, including the 3 suicide bombers. On 
July 17, 2009, a Non-Structural JI faction led by a Malaysian citizen, Noordin 
Mohammad Top, also conducted the subsequent high-profile bombing attack at the 
J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta when 2 suicide bombers detonated 
explosive devices. In total this bombing attack killed 7 people and critically injured more 
than 50, including 7 United States and European Union citizens. 
                                                   
 
157 Police Senior Commissioner/Colonel Ibnu Suhendra (the Head of Intelligence Section at the 
Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) in interview with the author, October 17, 
2016. The accusation itself is called takfir, derived from the word kafir (unbeliever). When takfirism applies 
this word to define other Muslim fellows, it means that for them such Muslim fellows are deemed as the 
“impure” Muslim (apostate or infidel). 
 
158 For more, see (Sauter and Carafano 2012), 568 – 569.  
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According to Sauter and Carafano (2012), up to 2012, there were at least more 
than 400 JI operatives, including the operational chief and al-Qaeda associate, Hambali, 
who has been captured since 2002. JI capabilities were subsequently degraded after a 
series of high-profile arrests and killings between 2005 and 2008 by the Indonesian 
government. These high-profile arrests and killings included the 2006 arrests of several 
JI members connected to JI’s 2005 suicide attack in Bali, the 2007 arrests of former 
acting JI Amir, Muhammad Naim alias Zarkasih, and JI military commander, Abu 
Dujana; the 2008 arrests of 2 senior JI operatives in Malaysia; the mid-2008 arrest of a 
JI-linked cell in the Sumatra island; and the September 2009 death of JI-splinter group 
leader, Noordin Mohammad Top.  
The progress of counterterrorism campaigns against JI continued in 2010 when a 
crackdown on JI’s base in the province of Aceh, Indonesia resulted in the capture of 
over 60 militants. This capture led to the killing of a Non-Structural JI leader Dulmatin. 
Dulmatin, a mastermind of the 2002 Bali bombing was killed in the outskirts of 
Indonesian capital city of Jakarta during a counterterrorism raid in March 2010. Another 
blow to JI happened in June 2010 when Abdullah Sunata, a wanted JI commander was 
captured whilst planning to detonate a bomb at the Danish Embassy in Jakarta. In 
August 2010 the JI co-founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was also arrested whilst planning 
multiple attacks in Jakarta. In December 2010, the JI weapons expert Abu Tholut was 
also captured by the Indonesian counterterrorism forces.  
With the estimates of total JI members vary from 500 to several thousand, JI is 
based in Indonesia and is also believed to have elements in Malaysia and the 
Philippines (Sauter and Carafano, 2012).159 Based on investigations by many, JI is fully 
capable of its own fundraising efforts through membership donations (infaq) as well as 
criminal and business activities. JI has also received financial, ideological, and logistical 
support from Middle Eastern contacts and non-governmental organizations. According 
to the official statement of the Chief of Indonesian National Police in January 2016, JI is 
still considered the most dangerous terrorist organization in Indonesia whose members 
and other support networks have become the stronghold for any other Islamist violent 
                                                   
159 Ibid., 569.  
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radicalism.160 The terrorist attack in Jakarta on January 14, 2016, broke the silence of JI 
and other related Islamist violent movements where it was the first terrorist attack in 
Indonesia since 2009. Gordon and Lindo (2011) predicted that some manifestation of JI 
or its offshoots will probably exist in 2025.161 
The strategic importance of JI in the academic and policy arena gained its global 
prominence since JI was specifically mentioned by the U.S. National Security Strategy 
(NSS) in 2002. That is why, the purpose of the following graph is to emphasize the fact 
that JI has been part of al-Qaeda networks since 2002, and this is in line with the time 
frame of this study (2002 – 2017). The NSS specifically mentions that JI is linked with 
the al-Qaeda by the factors of ideology, resources, common enemy, mutual support, 
and sponsorship. These linking factors are still the important strategic tools for JI’s 
resource mobilization efforts until today.  
 
Figure 3.1 JI within the Transnational Terrorist Networks According to the U.S. National 
Security Strategy 
 
Source:  (President of the United States of America 2002)
                                                   
160 For more, see (Hermawan 2016), (Waluyo 2016), (Sofwan 2016). 
 
161 For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011).  
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Figure 3.2 A View of Looking at Al-Qaeda and Its Global Affiliates 
 
 
Source: Self-made, adapted from many sources. 
(AQAP: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQIM: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)
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3.2 The Emergence of JI (1950s – 1992) 
Historically JI grew out of Darul Islam (DI), an insurgent movement based in the 
western part of Java island that struggled to impose the Islamic (Shari’a) law during the 
Indonesian transition from the Dutch rule in the 1940s. Later in the mid-1950s, DI 
movements also spread to the northwestern part (Aceh) and to the southeastern part of 
Indonesia (South Sulawesi). During this period, the Indonesian army under President 
Sukarno’s era successfully crushed all three rebellions.162  
As the national leadership transitioned from President Sukarno to President 
Suharto in the second half of the 1960s, DI rebounded in the 1970s. The most 
significant factor for this rebound was indeed the Indonesian government’s support for 
DI. As the world during that era was in the Cold War, the Indonesian government which 
at that time “in-facto” siding with the Western block expected that DI would become a 
strategic partner to fight against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).163 Ironically this 
pragmatic effort would not last long, and soon DI was once again becoming an enemy 
of the state.164  
On November 10, 1978, the two Indonesian citizens of Yemeni descent, Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir (1938 -) and Abdullah Sungkar (1937 – 1999), were arrested for their 
ties to DI. Later in 1982 they received the nine-year prison sentence but were released 
on appeal. In 1985 the Indonesian Supreme Court reversed that decision, and the two 
immediately fled to Malaysia.165 By using Malaysia as their home-base, it was during 
their exile they began to expand their network, recruit men, and send them away for 
waging the guerilla war against the Soviet army in Afghanistan.  
Consequently, the exposure of Afghan conflict significantly transformed Ba’asyir 
and Sungkar’s radical network. Those traveling to the training camps in Pakistan and in 
the battlefields of Afghanistan gained important military skills, including tactical 
                                                   
162 For more, see “Indonesia Conflict History,” International Crisis Group, February 16, 2016; quoted in 
(Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 2. 
 
163 For more, see Sydney Jones, “Darul Islam’s Ongoing Appeal,” Tempo Magazine, August 18, 2010; 




165 For more, see “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the ‘Ngruki Network’ in Indonesia, 
“International Crisis Group, August 8, 2002, 11; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 2. 
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instruction on explosives, mines, maps, and other infantry skills.166 Not only were they 
exposed to various military skills but also were they exposed to new ideologies, 
especially through their contact with Abdullah Azzam and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.167 Whilst 
the first was the man responsible for catalyzing the foreign fighters migration to 
Afghanistan, the latter was a fundamentalist Afghan insurgent leader. Most importantly, 
they built lasting relationships with Osama bin Laden and other “Afghan Arabs” who 
later formed the backbone of al-Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM). Many 
Indonesians, for example, who would take a top leadership position in JI had 
participated in the battle of Jaji in April 1987 along with Azzam, bin Laden, Sayyaf, 9/11 
mastermind Khaled Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), and Samer al-Suwailam, who would 
later become a key commander in Chechnya (Jones, 2010; Gordon and Lindo, 2011). 
 
Figure 3.3 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar 
 
 
The Afghan exposure also created strong bondage and linkages (social 
networks) among Southeast Asian militants where Indonesian “cadres” trained 
alongside their Southeast Asian comrades: Thais; Malaysians; and Filipinos in a camp 
run by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. These Southeast Asian cohorts included manpower from 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abdulrajak Janjani, a Moro insurgent who 
                                                   
166 For more, see “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous, “International 
Crisis Group, August 26, 2003, 5; quoted in (Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 3. 
 
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf is an Afghan national and former mujahed. Currently he is an Afghan politician. 
Sayyaf took part in the war against the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government in 
the 1980s, leading the Afghan mujahedeen faction, Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. 
Sayyaf was an announced candidate for the President of Afghanistan in the 2014 election, in which he 
received 7.04% of the vote in the first round, as the candidate for the Islamic Dawah Organisation of 
Afghanistan, and winning Kandahar Province. 
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later become the founder of the Abu Sayyaf Group, an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group in 
the Philippines that was named after Janjani’s Afghan host: Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.168 
 
3.3 The Initial Reshaping and Operations of JI (199 2 – 2002) 
a. Initial Reshaping of JI 
It was around 1992 when the disagreement between Sungkar and a DI leader 
named Ajengan Masduki developed after Sungkar charged Masduki with having Shi’ite 
and Sufi tendencies, and therefore straying from the Salafi teaching.169 Sungkar actually 
had preached about the impressing need to create a new organization since the 1970s, 
and over the years his argument with Masduki led him to split from DI in order for him to 
pursue his own objectives.170 Sungkar then formed a new group called JI, and the men 
that Sungkar and Ba’asyir had previously dispatched to Afghanistan formed the 
backbone of this newly created organization. 
As JI initially took shape, it adopted a hierarchical structure whose operational 
and administrative coverage included Singapore and Malaysia (Mantiqi I); Indonesia 
(Mantiqi II); Mindanao, Sabah, and Sulawesi (Mantiqi III); and Papua and Australia 
(Mantiqi IV).171 In addition to these regional/territorial based compartments, JI also had 
a special operation unit that was not tied to a specific location. According to the JI’s 
charter, known by its Indonesian acronym as PUPJI, the group clearly sought to create 
a Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia.172 Once that goal had been achieved, the group 
hoped that the boundaries of that state would expand to include Malaysia, Singapore, 
Brunei, and Mindanao.173 
 





170 For more, see “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,“ 
International Crisis Group, December 11, 2003, 3; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3. 
 
171 For more, see “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia,“ International Crisis Group, 11; quoted in 
(Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 3. 
 
172 For more, see “What Governments Are Doing: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),” Australian Government, 
November 8, 2010; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3. 
 
173 Ibid.  
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Figure 3.4 JI Top Leadership Structure  
(At the apex of the JI structure is the amir. Beneath the amir are four councils) 
 
Source: Police Brigadier General (Ret.) Suryadharma (the Former Head of Indonesian National Police 
Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) in discussion with the author, October 18, 2016.  
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Figure 3.5 JI Organizational Structure: Another Look 
 
Source: Police Brigadier General (Ret.) Suryadharma (the Former Head of Indonesian National Police 
Anti Terror Special Detachment 88). Interviewed by the author on 18 October 2016. 
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However, although JI focused on Southeast Asia, the JI leadership maintained a 
presence in South Asia to continue providing the jihadi fighters with sufficient training. 
Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, JI’s training facilities were 
relocated from Pakistan to a camp near Khost, Afghanistan.174 Later around 1993, 
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf set up a JI camp in Torkham, Afghanistan that also trained Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) members.175 JI continued to send their best trainees to 
Afghanistan until 2000 as Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali organized training for 
several men.176 Between 2000 and 2003, JI had a strong cell in Karachi, Pakistan which 
allegedly received training supports from Lashkar-e-Taiba.177 
In addition to the training camps in the Afghanistan – Pakistan territory (the first 
core according to Sageman’s social networks theory), JI also established an 
infrastructure closer to the home. In the mid-1990s, Sungkar established training camps 
in Mindanao that were cheaper and easier to access than those in Afghanistan – 
Pakistan area.178 As most Mindanao areas were controlled by MILF, and the connecting 
sea-lanes in the area were also poorly policed, this island seemed like a best, natural 
safe haven for Sungkar’s fighters. JI constructed a facility within the compound of 
MILF’s Camp Abu Bakar and began to train and to indoctrinate a new cadre of Salafi 
jihad fighters. Many years later, the growing relationship between JI and Moro 
insurgents would prove to be an important source of resilience for Sungkar’s 
organization and its offshoots. 
 
 
                                                   
174 For more, see “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia,” International Crisis Group, 6; quoted in (Gordon 




176 For more, see “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia,” International Crisis Group, 10; quoted in 
(Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 3. 
 
177 For more, see “Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings,” International Crisis Group, July 24, 2009, 7; quoted in 
(Gordon and Samuel Lindo 2011), 3. 
 
178 For more, see “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia,” International Crisis Group, 16; quoted in 
(Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3. 
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Figure 3.6 The Map of JI Area of Operations 
 
Source: (Benedict 2017)
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b. JI’s Operations in Indonesia 
It was such a great political opportunity for JI when the 30-year reigning 
President Suharto resigned in May 1998 followed by the separation of Indonesian 
armed forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/ABRI) into the Indonesian 
national military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI) and Indonesian national police 
(Kepolisian Republik Indonesia/Polri). This sudden separation created the loophole 
within the Indonesian domestic security system (Pandjaitan 2003). Ba’asyir and 
Sungkar took advantage out of this opportunity by returning to Indonesia, having 
decided that the moment for creating a Southeast Asian caliphate was at hand.179 
However, a month later, Sungkar died of natural causes, leaving the organization in the 
hands of Ba’asyir, whom many saw as a weak leader.180 Ba’asyir only needed a few 
months after his return to Indonesia in order for him to become the head of the 
governing council of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), an overtly operating group 
seeking the implementation of Islamic (Shari’a) law in Indonesia. 
With Ba’asyir in charge, significant gaps soon emerged within JI. Mantiqi II 
leaders questioned whether the moment was right for a violent action in Indonesia, and 
instead preferred to concentrate on building the resources necessary to establish a 
Salafi Islamist state over the long run, setting a target date of 2025.181 Mantiqi I leaders, 
on the other hand, had a different focus altogether and pointed to bin Laden’s 1996 and 
1998 fatwas authorizing strikes against the United States and its allies. Another spats 
emerged over Ba’asyir affiliation with MMI, which some JI members saw as a potential 
conflict of interest.  
As another political opportunity for JI emerged following the outbreak of sectarian 
violence in the main city of Ambon and wider Maluku province in January 1999, the 
internal divides within JI were exacerbated. Whilst members of Mantiqis II and III were 
cautious about getting involved, members of Mantiqi I, however, were angry that their 
                                                   
179 For more, see “Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi,” International Crisis Group, 
February 3, 2004, 2; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3. 
 
180 For more, see “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates” 
International Crisis Group, December 11, 2002, 3; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3. 
 
181 For more, see “Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi,” International Crisis Group, 
February 3, 2004, 3; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3. 
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Muslim brothers were being killed and wanted to act.182 Some JI fighters eventually 
participated in the conflict, joining a loose coalition known as Laskar Mujahedeen that 
also included Darul Islam (DI) factions and members of other radical-Islamist groups.183  
A few months later, JI members operating within Laskar Mujahidin also took part 
in another sectarian conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi. These conflicts served as the 
“mini-Afghanistan” that helped network to grow and train a new generation of JI 
members.184 On the Christmas Eve of 2000, JI executed a number of coordinated 
bombings against 38 churches (along with the priests) in the capital city of Jakarta, 
Sumatra island, and Java island.185 Although not all the explosives detonated, 19 
people were killed and leaving 120 others severely wounded. These attacks signaled 
JI’s growing capacity as a serious terrorist organization, but indicated an ongoing focus 
on local, nationwide targets throughout the archipelago of Indonesia. 
By 2001, a group of JI members who supported bin Laden’s fatwas made a 
more-determined decision to pursue the mass-casualty terrorism that was advocated by 
the al-Qaeda core. After a plot to strike British, United States, Israeli, Australian, and 
Singaporean targets in Singapore was disrupted in December 2001, JI shifted their 
targets to the Westerners located in Indonesia.186 On October 12, 2002, JI members 
detonated bombs at the Sari Club and Paddy’s Bar on the Indonesian famous island of 
Bali, killing 202 people, many of whom were Western tourists. 
 
                                                   
182 For more, see “Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi,” International Crisis Group, 
February 3, 2004, 4; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 3. 
 
183 For more, see “Weakening Indonesia’s Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso,” 
International Crisis Group, October 13, 2005; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4. 
 
184 This term is credited to Sally Neighbour, a member of the second CSIS Trusted Information Network 
(TIN). For more, see Arnaud de Borchgrave, Thomas Sanderson, and David Gordon, The Power of 
Outreach: Leveraging Expertise on Threats in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, April 2009), 27; 
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185 For more, see “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” 
International Crisis Group, 5; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4. 
 
186 For more, see “Treasury Designates Four Leaders of Terrorist Group-Jemaah Islamiyah,” U.S. 
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Figure 3.7 A Social Network Analysis of JI Bombers in the 2000 Christmas Eve 
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Source: (Artran, et al. n.d.). 
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3.4 The Realignment and Fragmentation of JI (2002 – 200 3/2004)   
 
Right after the first Bali bombing attacks in 2002, JI’s leadership that was still 
committed to establish a Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia and in the broader region 
within the long run (violently if necessary) began to realize that the current environment 
was not conducive to the armed confrontation and any mass-casualty terrorism within 
Indonesia was futile for the time being. Instead of focusing on terrorism, JI began to 
focus on education and da’wah (the religious outreach to sharing Islam). During this 
time the JI’s leadership distanced themselves from the al-Qaeda core that remained 
calling for attacks against the Western targets.187  
Subsequently the realignment away from the global jihadist movement 
“alienated” hard-line members of the organization, leading to the group’s gradual 
fragmentation. Those who left the group turned into “free agents” pursuing their own 
agendas independently by keeping engaged in the violent engagements (e.g. terrorism). 
Later these splinters engaged in the violent tactics are known collectively by some JI 
analysts and scholars as “Non-Structural JI.” Thus, the terminology of “Non-Structural 
JI” coined by some JI analysts and scholars is aimed to describe the JI individuals who 
acted in a decentralized way, independent of JI formal structure, and by maintaining 
their violent engagements (e.g., terrorism).  
On the other hand, “Structural JI” represents the remnants of the formal 
organization growing out of Sungkar and Ba’asyir networks. This “Structural JI” is also 
known as a constellation of Indonesia-based schools, publishing houses, and other 
businesses held together by the JI social network, which itself retains a degree of 
hierarchy. This “Structural JI” began to abandon violent engagements and limiting itself 
only to non-violent ones.188 However, the strict separation/division between what is 
called as “the Structural and Non-Structural” JI is also criticized by some other JI 
analysts and scholars as in some degree the two divisions complement to each other. In 
                                                   
187 For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4. 
 
188 Ibid. At some moment, the Structural JI adjusted its tactics from the violent to non-violent ones. 
However, the Structural JI that at some moment using non-violent tactics was still connected to with JI 
violent movement performed by the Non-Structural JI. That is why in the latter part of this chapter is also 
discussed that this kind of separation/division (Structural and Non-Structural JI) is criticized by some other 
JI scholars. Such critics argue that the Structural JI is merely an unarmed wing of JI. 
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another terminology, the “Structural JI” can be categorized as “JI with non-violent 
engagements” whilst the “Non-Structural JI” can be categorized as “JI’s armed wing that 
maintains its violent engagements (e.g., terrorism).” 
The disagreements among JI’s top ranks proved to be the driving force behind 
the group’s realignment and fragmentation. Many JI members felt that the costs 
associated with terrorist violence outweighed the benefits, at least for the time being. 
This viewpoint prevailed, and the organization decided to reorient its energy and funding 
into religious outreach until conditions changed. JI’s decision to instead focus on da’wah 
alienated its hard-line members, who advocated a more aggressive approach. Noordin 
Mohammad Top wanted to continue bombings, and Umar Patek and Dulmatin had their 
own plans in the southern Philippines.189 
Eventually, these divergent opinions led to JI’s fragmentation into Structural and 
Non-Structural elements. Initially, the Structural JI’s leadership tolerated Non-Structural 
JI, where the official common practice among them allowed Structural JI members to 
shelter Non-Structural JI operatives but should not participate in the latter’s 
operations.190 This split unfolded over time but came into a sharper focus by July 2004 
as Structural JI’s position had changed. Surprisingly, at this point, Structural JI’s 
leadership authorized its subordinates to betray the whereabouts of certain Non-
Structural JI operatives to government authorities.191 This decision was clearly an 
indication of a serious split between Structural and Non-Structural JI. 
 
3.5 The Rise and Decline of JI Splinters (2003 - 20 11) 
These Non-Structural JI members, however, were not entirely separated from 
their Structural counterparts, thus systematizing the clear separation between the two 
became the target of critiques from some counterterrorism experts.192 In fact, Non-
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190 For more, see Sidney Jones, “The Changing Face of Terrorism in Indonesia: Weaker, More Diffuse, 





192 For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 4. 
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Structural JI members were products of JI-linked schools, consumers of JI publications, 
and frequently drew on their relationships with other (Structural) JI members. Since this 
separation/division in 2004 at least there were three prominent clusters of Non-
Structural JI members that merited more specific analysis (Gordon and Lindo, 2011).  
 
a. Noordin Mohammad Top’s Network (2003 – 2009) 
Noordin Mohammad Top’s network was in fact the most high-profile Non-
Structural JI network. A Malaysian citizen and prominent JI member, Noordin was tied 
to the 2002 Bali bombings and independently led his group called al-Qaeda for the 
Malay Archipelago to continue perpetrating Bali-type operations against the “far enemy” 
long after the Structural JI’s realignment.193 His group was also linked to the 2003 
bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. The year of 2003 was the year of transition in 
the separation/division of Structural and Non-Structural JI that culminated in 2004. 
Noordin Mohammad Top’s network was also directly involved in the 2004 attack on the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta, another Bali attack in 2005 that proved crucial to turning 
public sentiment against the group, and a pair of suicide bombings against Western 
hotels in Jakarta in 2009.194 Noordin Mohammad Top was eventually killed in 2009 
during a counterterrorism raid by the Indonesian security forces in the Central Java city 
of Solo.195 His close followers have not carried out a successful attack since his death. 
 
b. Umar Patek’s Network (2003 – 2011) 
Another prominent Non-Structural JI network was led by Umar Patek and 
Dulmatin, the two Islamist militants that received training in al-Qaeda core camps in 
Afghanistan during the mid-1990s.196 After being wanted by the Indonesian government 
due to their role in the 2002 Bali attacks, Patek and Dulmatin fled to the southern 
                                                   
193 For more, see Associated Press, “Terrorism Mastermind Noordin Top Killed,” CBS News, March 9, 






196 For more, see Zachary Abuza, “Umar Patek: Indonesia’s Most Wanted,” Jamestown Foundation, April 
30, 2010; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5. 
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Philippines in mid-2003.197 Corresponding to the earlier pattern of connections with their 
Southeast Asian counterparts in the Mindanao, both Patek and Dulmatin trained 
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the manufacturing and using of improvised 
explosive devices (IED).198 Despite the leaders’ exile in the southern Philippines, the 
cells in Indonesia and in the Southern Philippines still maintained their communication. 
It was between 2003 and 2005 when Patek used contacts in the Central Java province 
to recruit fighters and to raise funds for supporting his activities in the southern 
Philippines.199  
According to the intelligence reports from Indonesian and the Philippines 
authorities, Patek left the southern Philippines in May 2010 and traveled to the Middle 
East before settling in Pakistan.200 Other sources, however, indicate that he departed 
earlier and spent one year living in Jakarta suburb before departing to Pakistan with the 
intention to fight in Afghanistan.201 On January 25, 2011, Patek was arrested in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan, the same town where Osama bin Laden would be killed only four 
months later.202 Patek’s arrest in Abbottabad came as a surprise to many and raised 
questions about the current relationship between al-Qaeda and Non-Structural JI. The 
intelligence gathered at bin Laden’s compound and obtained from Patek’s subsequent 
interrogations may shed light on this nexus.203 
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198 For more, see Rommel C. Banloi, “The Sources of the Abu Sayyaf’s Resilience in the Southern 
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c. Dulmatin’s Lintas Tanzim Network (2007 – 2010) 
In the late 2007, Dulmatin, who was the Patek’s close associate returned to 
Indonesia and began to establish a third cluster of Non-Structural JI in Aceh. Dulmatin’s 
network was also known as Lintas Tanzim or cross-organization project that included 
manpower associated with several radical-Islamist groups: disgruntled JI members; the 
Islamist group KOMPAK; the Banten Ring; a group of new recruits from Aceh; and a 
network centred around a man named Aman Abdurrahman.204  
This coalition under the leadership of Dulmatin both perceived Structural JI as 
too passive and Noordin Mohammad Top’s approach as too excessive and ultimately 
futile. Unlike Structural JI and Noordin Mohammad Top’s group, the Dulmatin coalition 
sought a violent, but disciplined campaign that focused on carving out a secure base in 
the Indonesian society for implementing Islamic (Shari’a) law and whilst necessary 
attacking whatever obstacles emerged in the process. The Lintas Tanzim camp in Aceh 
went undetected for nearly a year until a tip from a local villager alerted government 
security apparatus to the Lintas Tanzim’s presence. A subsequent series of Indonesian 
national police raids between February and March 2010 captured or killed nearly 100 
militants, including Dulmatin, and disrupted Lintas Tanzim.205 
Later in August 2010, the Indonesian authorities during President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s era arrested Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the former leader of Structural 
JI, for his alleged links to the Aceh camp.206 Given the fact that Ba’asyir was reported to 
have renounced violence and remained in Structural JI, this development was 
significant for the counterterrorism experts who questioned the Structural/Non-Structural 
separation of JI. According to the testimony of Ubeid, a former associate of Noordin 
Mohammad Top, Ba’asyir had met with Dulmatin face-to-face to discuss the Aceh 
                                                   
204 For more, see “Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh,” International Crisis Group, April 20, 2010, 5; 
quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 5. 
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project.207 On June 16, 2011, Ba’asyir was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for his 
activities related to the Aceh camp.208   
 
Why Did JI Splinters/Non-Structural JI Decline? 
The most important factor and centre-of-gravity of Non-Structural JI is indeed its 
leadership (Gordon and Lindo, 2011). Based on those three Non-Structural JI networks, 
it is obvious that their leadership played significantly for the existence and survivability 
of the networks. Top, Patek, and Dulmatin were all charismatic leaders who were able 
to personally cultivate networks transcending organizational boundaries. As skilled 
militants with battle-tested experiences they were savvy to operate effectively in the 
increasingly inhospitable environments, in some cases transnationally. Their charisma, 
connections, and operational experience provided coherence and direction for 
radicalized militants who were eager for action but lacked an organizational platform.209  
Under the leadership of these three charismatic and operationally skillful leaders, 
the three Non-Structural JI networks operated with surprising effectiveness. Top’s 
network carried out several high-profile attacks in Indonesia whilst Patek’s group fueled 
instability in the southern Philippines. Although Dulmatin’s Lintas Tanzim was nipped in 
the bud, his ability to leave the southern Philippines and clandestinely cobble together a 
coalition on the Indonesian soil came as a shock to most counterterrorism experts. 
Therefore, without the key role played by these prominent figures, the chance of these 
disgruntled JI members and like-minded individuals to carry out significant operations or 
develop infrastructure has greatly diminished.210  
The second most important factor is the local support (Gordon and Lindo, 2011). 
Most Indonesians generally were reluctant to address or acknowledge the threat of 
terrorism in their daily live. This was an advantage for JI which never had the broad-
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based support in general Indonesian society. Even after the first Bali attack in 2002, 
conspiratorial rumors circulated that the bombings were carried out by the United States 
or the Indonesian military. It was right after the second round of Bali bombings in 2005, 
the public mentality significantly shifted where Indonesians’ “tolerance” for JI (deemed 
clearly culpable for the attack) began to disintegrate.211  
The third most important factor is the counterterrorism pressure (Gordon and 
Lindo, 2011). It was well proven where counterterrorism operations at the global, 
regional, national, and local level were critically important to disrupt the evolution of 
Non-Structural JI. Such operations have captured and killed several key figures 
connecting al-Qaeda core and JI. The killing of Mohammed Atef by the U.S. airstrike in 
Kabul in November 2001, the capture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammad (KSM) in 
Rawalpindi in March 2003, and the capture of Hambali in Thailand in August 2003 have 
weakened JI-al Qeada core relationship, thus making JI hard-liners such as Top, 
Dulmatin, and Patek to work self-sufficiently and independent of support from the al-
Qaeda core. This condition eventually impacted the survivability of JI.212 
Later in 2005, following the second Bali bombing attacks, the combination of 
Western counterterrorism pressure, regional counterterrorism operations in the Pacific 
theatre (e.g., Southeast Asia), and the Indonesian government’s mounting pressure 
against JI have isolated JI’s pro al-Qaeda faction and dismantled JI’s organizational 
infrastructure. With significant political will and support at the national level, central 
authorities in Southeast Asian countries worked together to aggressively confront, kill, 
or capture dozens of JI militant members and their associates across Southeast Asia. 
The governments across Southeast Asian countries also engaged in various soft 
approaches to prevent radicalization (e.g., through a series of deradicalization 
campaigns). All these successes were significantly underpinned by the 
professionalization of security forces and regional cooperation that were coupled by the 
Australian and U.S. assistance (Gordon and Lindo, 2011). 
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3.6 The Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid /JAT (2008 – 2010) 
The name of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) has been an enigma since its 
founding in 2008 by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the former leader of Structural JI who later 
joined Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).213 The name of JAT gained its prominence 
following the Ba’asyir capture in May 2010 as he was allegedly involved in the Aceh 
project with Dulmatin, a Non-Structural JI leader that led the Lintas Tanzim network.  
As an overt/above-the-ground organization, JAT under Ba’asyir leadership as its 
Amir has embraced individuals with known ties to fugitive extremists. It has welcomed 
many members of the militant JI but clashed with the JI leadership over strategy and 
tactics. It preached jihad against enemies of Islam but insists it stays within the law – 
though it rejects man-made laws as deemed illegitimate. It is a mass membership 
organization but entirely dependent upon Ba’asyir, without whom it would quickly 
disintegrate. This is the main reason to believe that the JAT would be progressively 
weakened as Ba’asyir was convicted and put in jail since 2010. 
That said, Ba’asyir’s celebrity status and an active religious outreach (da’wah) 
campaign have turned JAT into an organization with a nationwide structure within two 
years of its founding in 2008. JAT recruited people through mass rallies and smaller 
religious instruction sessions in which Ba’asyir and other JAT figures, until 2016, 
fulminate against democracy, advocate full application of Islamic (Shari’a) law, and 
preach a militant interpretation of jihad. That public face gives “plausible deniability” to 
what appears to be the covert support on the part of a small inner circle for the use of 
violent force. JAT cannot have it both ways: in the beginning, its attraction to the 
potential followers was almost certainly the non-violent da’wah option (the militancy 
without the risks). Consequently, any established links to violence will lose it followers.  
The dark side of JAT’s activities came into the spotlight on 6 May 2010, when 
Indonesian police raided its Jakarta headquarters and charged 3 JAT officials with 
raising funds for a militant training camp uncovered in Aceh in the late February 2010. 
JAT’s alleged involvement in fundraising and combat training immediately led to a 
speculation that another arrest of 72-year-old Ba’asyir was imminent and unavoidable. 
However, many also predicted that the impact of Ba’asyir arrest (the third time since the 
                                                   
213 For more, see (Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) 2010). 
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first Bali bombing attacks in 2002) was limited both in terms of Indonesian extremism 
and the domestic political fallout. It is indeed true that Ba’asyir has been a perpetual 
thorn for the Indonesian government since the early 1970s. But, as an elder statesman 
of Indonesia’s radical movements, the old Ba’asyir is neither the driving force behind it 
nor its leading ideologue, and he has numerous critics among fellow jihadists who cite 
his lack of strategic sense and poor management skills.  
However, regardless of the Ba’asyir effective influence on the existence and 
latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, since its establishment in 2008 JAT has 
become an important element in the network of Indonesian jihadi groups but 
simultaneously has also been the target of harsh criticism from some erstwhile allies. 
Understanding JAT’s nature, its many faces, and the ideological rifts it has generated is 
still important, since it would help us to illuminate the weakness and divisions within the 
Indonesian jihadi movement. It also highlights the possible diminishing influence of 
Ba’asyir who has been in the prison since 2010 until today. 
According to some counterterrorism experts, the jihadi project in which Ba’asyir 
has been involved during his lifetime has practically failed in Indonesia. They argue that 
the rifts and shifting alignments we have seen so far in the jihadi community are merely 
a reaction to that failure, and there is no indication that violent extremism is gaining 
ground in the archipelago. Instead, as with JAT’s formation, we are seeing the same old 
faces (e.g., Ba’asyir) finding new packages for old goods. Indeed, the far bigger 
challenge for Indonesia is to manage the aspirations of thousands who join JAT rallies 
for its public message: that democracy is antithetical to Islam, that only a Salafi Islamist 
state can uphold the faith, and that Islamic (Shari’a) law must become the source of all 
justice. 
 
3.7 The Remnants of Radical-Islamist Networks and t he Emergence of ISIS in 
Indonesia (2010 – Today) 
According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) report in 
September 2014, although until 2014 the capacity of violent extremist groups in 
Indonesia remain low following the capture of Structural and Non-Structural JI key 
figures, the rising support for the Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS) could 
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significantly raise the risk of violence in the archipelago since the eventual return-home 
of Indonesians who were fighting in Syria and Iraq would utilize their training, combat 
experience, and leadership potential that were lacking in Indonesia’s extremist 
community.214 Factually JI is still the most important “nodes” for ISIS in Indonesia. From 
late 2012 until January 2014, JI’s humanitarian wing, Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia 
(HASI), sent ten delegations to Syria, bringing in cash and medical assistance to the 
Islamist resistance in a way apparently designed to open channels for more direct 
participation in the fighting.215 Other Salafi jihadists, including from various Darul Islam 
factions, are also trying to go, as members of the non-violent Salafi community.216 
 
Apocalyptic Syria and the End of the World 
The conflict in Syria has uniquely captured the imagination of Indonesian 
extremists in a way no foreign war has before. For the first time, Indonesians are going 
overseas to fight, not just to train as in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and 1990s, or to 
give moral and financial support as in the case of Palestine. There are at least four 
following factors contributing to the special attraction of Indonesian extremists to fighting 
with ISIS in Syria.  
The first factor is the enthusiasm for Syria, as this is directly linked to predictions 
in Islamic eschatology, which one of them is the final battle of the end times that will 
take place in Sham, the region sometimes is called the Greater Syria or the Levant, 
encompassing Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. Indeed, within some 
extremist circles, the Syrian conflict is known as the “one-way ticket of jihad” because 
anyone goes there to fight will be able to stay and see the Islam’s final victory. 
The second factor is the impact of a best-selling book, The Two-Arm Strategy, 
which was translated from Arabic into Indonesian.217 This intellectual product has made 
                                                   




216 For more, see (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 30 January 2014).  
 
217 This is based on the investigative reports that were issued by the Indonesian authorities. This is also 
mentioned by the report of Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict. See (Institute for Policy Analysis of 
Conflict 30 January 2014). 
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many extremists believe that the chaos and suffering produced by the Arab Spring can 
be exploited in a way that will lead to the restoration of an Islamist caliphate.  
The third factor is the atrocities of government forces against Sunni Muslims. 
Such atrocities have been given the wide play in the local media, including in radical 
websites, playing into a campaign that was already underway before the conflict erupted 
to portray Shi’ite Muslims, represented by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as deviant 
and murderous.  
The fourth factor is the geographical factor. Syria is easier to reach for 
Indonesians, especially through Turkey than any other major conflicts that feed the 
global jihad. As a result, Indonesians from different radical streams including those 
associated with JI are going or trying to go to Syria.  
These four factors affecting Indonesians willing to fight with the ISIS correspond 
to the view of Gareth Stansfield (2014). Not only is ISIS a different organization that is 
on the verge of being a state, the ISIS presents a narrative of success to those young 
and youngish Arabs and/or Sunni Muslims who feel a genuine sense of powerlessness 
in the modern world. In this sense, ISIS takes this deep-rooted feeling and molds it into 
a dynamic which is strong, proud, vengeful, and immensely transformative.218 
The Syrian conflict, however, has also caused divisions among Indonesian 
jihadists. The tensions between two of the most hard-line Islamist factions there, the 
Islamic state of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and the al-Nusra front, have carried over to 
Indonesia, where each side has its supporters of Indonesian jihadists. Divisions have 
also emerged in Indonesia between those seeing the conflict in Shi’a-Sunni terms and 
those saying these sectarian differences are being deliberately fanned by the West to 
mobilize opposition against the Assad government because of its strong opposition to 
Israel. These differences could anyway weaken the overall impact of the conflict on 
Indonesian extremists and keep them divided. Nevertheless, the danger remains as 
fighters returning from Syria could infuse new energy into Indonesia’s weak and 
ineffectual jihadi movement. 
Having examined “the apocalyptic spirit” of ISIS movement, we can conclude that 
this appearance of ISIS and its support networks in Indonesia was rather a rare 
                                                   
218 For more, see (Stansfield 2014).  
P a g e  | 174 
 
 
example where the international development becoming a direct driver of jihadi 
recruitment in Indonesia; whilst contrastingly, in the past, such drivers have been 
overwhelmingly local.219 When Indonesians went to Afghanistan to train in the mid-
1980s and early 1990s, they were mostly spurred by the repression at home and the 
desire to develop the capacity to fight President Suharto. The bombing campaign of JI 
between 1999 and 2002 was also mostly sparked by domestic socio-politico 
opportunities: the communal conflicts in Ambon and in Poso. Despite all the rhetoric 
about support for Palestine within the Israeli-Palestinian continuous conflicts, in fact, 
very few Indonesians have ever gone to fight there. However, the appeal of ISIS is 
distinct where a combination of religious prophecies involving Sham (greater Syria), the 
string of victories in Iraq in June 2014 that gave a sense of backing a winner, the 
resonance of the concept of the caliphate, and the sophisticated use by ISIS of social 
media has effectively and uniquely generated ISIS cells, fighters, and support networks 
in Indonesia. 
Factually, support for ISIS in Indonesia goes back to the links of one young 
Indonesian activist, Tuah Febriwansyah alias Muhammad Fachry, to the organization of 
Al-Muhajiroun. Founded by a militant Syrian cleric named Omar Bakri Muhammad, Al-
Muhajiroun started out in 1983 as a Salafi jihadi wing of the organization Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(HT; the Indonesian spelling is Hizbut Tahrir), the radical international organization 
campaigning for a caliphate and the application of Islamic (Shari’a) law. In 1986, Omar 
Bakri was expelled from Saudi Arabia for creating a clandestine network of HT cells. He 
moved to the United Kingdom where he became simultaneously the head of Al-
Muhajiroun and leader of the British branch of HT. He broke completely with the latter in 
1996 and together with a cleric named Anjem Choudary set up Al-Muhajiroun as a 
separate organization.  
Whilst it was officially disbanded in 2004, Al-Muhajiroun has lived on under 
different names. Whilst Omar Bakri was expelled from Britain in 2005 and moved to 
Lebanon, where he was arrested in May 2014, Anjem Choudary stayed in Britain. Since 
its establishment in 1983, both Omar Bakri Muhammad and Anjem Choudary have 
                                                   
219 The multivariate statistical analysis in chapter 4 will be proving that the influence of foreign global jihad 
is the most significant variable with the greatest impact on the occurrence of Islamist terrorism (Salafi 
jihadism) in Indonesia. 
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gone on to establish a global network of advocacy groups supporting the establishment 
of Islamic (Shari’a) law, if necessary by violent means. The first branch, in the U.K. 
where Choudary is based, was called Islam4UK, later Sharia4UK. Each national branch 
had “Sharia4” in its title; where Sharia4Indonesia was established in 2010. 
 
Al-Muhajiroun in Indonesia 
The cyberspace provides an excellent medium through which the ISIS-supporting 
networks in Indonesia have been developed since 2005. Al-Muhajiroun came to 
Indonesia through the Internet. In 2005, Muhammad Fachry, usually seen as just M. 
Fachry, found Al-Muhajiroun through a video chat forum called Paltalk 
(www.paltalk.com) and began to take part in online religious discussions led by Omar 
Bakri. Omar Bakri reportedly gave him the green light to establish an Al-Muhajirun 
group in Indonesia. He dropped the “o” in the spelling, as the organization considered 
Indonesia a key country. Fachry built up two mailing lists that he called Al Ghuraba and 
Ahl us Sunnah Wal Jama’ah for sending out Al-Muhajiroun materials. In 2006 he also 
began to use the free Geocities web hosting service to promote Al-Muhajiroun.220 He 
later bought the domain www.almuhajirun.com. Fachry and his wife, Ummu Fauzi, 
translated Omar Bakri’s writings from English into Indonesian and uploaded them to the 
site. 
Around the same time, Fachry began to take part in an online religious 
discussion run by a jihadi who used nickname Qital (the Arabic word for “battle”), to 
which another person using the name Al-Irhab, or “terror”, was a frequent contributor. 
Qital turned out to be Abdul Aziz, a junior high school teacher from the Central Java city 
of Pekalongan who was arrested in 2005 for assisting the terrorist mastermind Noordin 
Mohammad Top in setting up a website called www.anshar.net, long since the shut 
down by the Indonesian government. Al-Irhab was the Bali bomber then on death row 
and since executed, Imam Samudra. From others in the discussion group, Fachry 
obtained translations from Arabic into Indonesian of writings by two other radical clerics, 
Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz, better known in the West as Dr. Fadl, and Abu Muhammad 
al Maqdisi, and uploaded these as well. With the knowledge he gleaned from these 
                                                   
220 The name of the website was www.geocities.com/abuya_2005/almuhajirun.  
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discussions, Fachry in 2006 set up his own study circle via Yahoo messenger and MSN 
messenger and invited those on his lists to take part in Omar Bakri’s lectures via 
Paltalk. He also began to move beyond cyberspace to promote Omar Bakri’s teachings 
in-person through lectures and sermons. 
Later on, August 4, 2014, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration 
announced a ban on ISIS after the appearance on YouTube of a video called “Joining 
the Ranks”, in which an Indonesian calling himself “Abu Muhammad al Indunisi” urges 
others to follow his example and join the jihad in Syria. Abu Muhammad turned out to be 
an activist named Bahrum Syah with links to an extremist organization once known as 
Al-Muhajiroun. Having traced their activities a few years back Al-Muhajiroun in 
Indonesia consisted only the small group of Indonesians inspired by Bakri and 
Choudary that initially became the engine of the pro-ISIS networks in Indonesia.  
The group later runs the website www.al-mustaqbal.net, hereafter referred to as 
Al-Mustaqbal. It has links to most of the terrorist groups still operating in Indonesia, 
including the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia and the Mujahidin of Western Indonesia. It 
sponsored most of the ceremonies across Indonesia pledging loyalty to IS after the 
latter on 29 June 2014 announced the establishment of a caliphate, whilst its fighters in 
Syria, including Bahrum Syah, have formed an Indonesian-Malaysian unit of ISIS in 
Syria that reportedly aims at eventually establishing an archipelagic Islamic state in 
Southeast Asia that would be called the Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara.221  
Later the announcement of the caliphate has split the Indonesian jihadi 
community, leading to numerous deep divisions among convicted terrorist prisoners and 
the splintering of a leading jihadi organization, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). The 
individual who has emerged as the most important ideological promoter of ISIS is Aman 
Abdurrahman, a cleric associated with Dulmatin’s Lintas Tanzim who is imprisoned in 
the maximum-security compound on the island of Nusakambangan, off the south coast 
of Java Island. It is Aman Abdurrahman who became the mentor of the 
Sharia4Indonesia group, and whose followers constitute the glue that binds disparate 
elements of the Indonesian ISIS network together. 
 
                                                   
221 For more, see (Waluyo 2016). 
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Indonesia’s Lamongan Network 
According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)’s report in April 
2015 titled “Indonesia’s Lamongan Network: How East Java, Poso and Syria are 
Linked,” it is well explained of how the trajectory of an extremist network in Lamongan, 
East Java illustrates how support for local jihadi struggles has been transformed into a 
significant system of support for ISIS. Lamongan, a district some 50km west of 
Surabaya (Indonesia’s second largest city) was the home to the Bali bombers from JI: 
Amrozi; Mukhlas, and Ali Imron as well as the Islamic boarding school their family run: 
pesantren al-Islam. In March 2015 two sisters-in-law from Lamongan were deported 
from Turkey with their children after trying to get to ISIS-controlled Syria. One was a 
widow; whilst the other was trying to join her husband, Siswanto, one of the thousands 
of foreign fighters in the ISIS army and a former student at pesantren al-Islam. In other 
words, Lamongan’s extremist community was indeed shaped by JI and remain a 
significant source of Islamist terrorism movements in Indonesia. 
 
Figure 3.8 The Map of Indonesia and the Location of Lamongan  
(Next to the City of Surabaya) in the Eastern Part of Java Island 
 
Source: (Map of Indonesia n.d.). 
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In 1993, around the same time JI was founded by a group of Indonesian exiles 
living in Malaysia (e.g., Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar), the three brothers of 
Amrozi, Mukhlas, and Ali Imron established pesantren al-Islam in the village of 
Tenggulun, Lamongan. It was a satellite school of pesantren al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Solo 
that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir helped found in the 1970s and that became the centre of JI 
activities in Indonesia. Pesantren al-Islam borrowed teachers from pesantren al-Mukmin 
to help it get started, and Ali Imron, trained in Afghanistan like his brother Mukhlas, 
returned to teach there. 
Between 1999 and 2002, pesantren al-Islam, largely because of the brothers’ 
involvement in a JI special operations unit, became a critical centre of jihadi activities. 
Many of the early JI bombing operations such as the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, 
the attack on the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta, and the Bali bombing themselves 
were partially planned in or started from the city of Lamongan. After the three brothers 
were arrested in late 2002, the two were tried and sentenced to death. Ali Imron, the 
“remorseful” bomber, was given a life sentence, and then with his half-brother, Ali Fauzi, 
began to work to move the school away from its association with violence. But by this 
time, it was so integrated into JI that this was easier said than done for several reasons. 
JI was not just a terrorist organization; it was a tightly knit social community. A 
single class pesantren al-Mukmin in Ngruki could produce one hundred or more 
students who had lived and studied together, sometimes married into each other’s 
families, and went to teach at or send their children to other JI-affiliated schools. Any 
students or teachers at pesantren al-Islam, whatever their views, were still only one 
degree of separation away from a committed extremist and most of them would feel 
obligated to help if asked to provide shelter or other forms of support. Students 
frequently moved from one JI school to another, so even if the environment at 
pesantren al-Islam became less militant over time, any moderating influences could be 
counteracted by the teachers encountered at the next schools. 
Until 2007, according to the IPAC report, JI maintained an active program of 
religious outreach (da’wah) and jihad in Central Sulawesi city of Poso, with a branch 
there that regularly mounted attacks on Christians and less frequently on informers and 
government officials. Youth from the local JI affiliates were occasionally sent to study at 
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pesantren al-Islam to broaden their religious knowledge, and individuals fleeing police 
operations that these JI attacks triggered frequently also came through Lamongan. After 
a shoot-out with the police in Poso on 22 January 2007, JI effectively disengaged from 
violence in Indonesia, but the network it left behind, including men it had trained and 
indoctrinated like Santoso, went on to regroup as the military wing of JAT in late 2010. 
Until July 2016 Santoso was still the most wanted Indonesian terrorist associated with 
ISIS. Santoso was killed and many of his networks were dismantled by the Indonesian 
government during the Counterterrorism Operation Tinombala. 
From 2002 to 2008, when Mukhlas, Amrozi, and their confederate from West 
Java, Imam Samudra, were executed, there was a steady stream of their admirers 
coming to pesantren al-Islam to see the family or join them on visits to the prison where 
they were held. The brothers’ burial after their capital punishment in 2008 by the 
Indonesian government was also an occasion for thousands of militants to gather and 
celebrate their “martyrdom”; where their graves later became a popular destination for 
young people hoping to follow in their footsteps.  Thus, despite the efforts of Ali Imron 
and Ali Fauzi to moderate pesantren al-Islam’s teachings, until today Lamongan 
remains an important hub for radical-Islamists such as Siswanto who is a Ngruki 
alumnus who plays his role as the preacher; Sibghotullah who is Siswanto’s brother-in-
law and a alumnus of LIPIA, a Saudi-funded Salafi institute in Jakarta; Arif Tuban who is 
a former student at pesantren al-Islam who plays his role as the networker; Arif 
Wicaksono alias “Hendro Laptop” who is a Ngruki alumnus who plays his role as the 
cyber jihadist; Mohammad Hidayat alias Dayat who is a computer student who plays his 
role as a hacker through whom they were able to steal a significant amount of money to 
help Santoso and ISIS activities in Indonesia; and Salim Mubarok Attamini who is a 
Yemeni graduate and former member of the Laskar Jihad, the Salafi force that fought in 
Ambon, Maluku at the height of the communal conflict in 2000.     
Therefore, from this nexus (JI-Lamongan Networks-Poso-ISIS) we could identify 
three lessons. One of the most important lessons of the Lamongan network, according 
to IPAC and Indonesian authorities is that pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia have emerged 
from existing radical networks that basically have never gone away. They may have 
morphed, realigned, regrouped, and regenerated but they are not new.  
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Figure 3.9 The Route of Islamist Terrorist Cells from their Training-Camp in Southern Philippine (MILF) Where Poso 
Becoming the Important Spot Within Their Outreach 
 
Source: (Buku Petunjuk Lapangan Anti-Teror TNI-AD 2008)222 
 
The translation of four points above: First, the ideological tension between MILF and the Philippines government 
significantly influenced the ideological perception of Sangihe-Talaud society in the North Sulawesi. Second, the Sangihe-
Talaud island became an important transit point for terrorists that took part in the military training in the Southern 
Philippines. Third, these territories also became the distributing point of weapons and other munitions. Fourth, the 
Miangas, Marore and Marampit islands (within the constellation of Sangihe-Talaud island) were included in the official 
Philippines tourism map by the Philippines government. 
                                                   
222 Translated in English: Indonesian Army 2008 Field Manual (FM) on Counterterrorism. 
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The second lesson is that it is impossible to understand Indonesian pro-ISIS 
networks without understanding Poso, the former conflict area in central Sulawesi. 
Since 2000, extremists have seen it as a secure base (qaedah aminah) and training 
centre with the potential to expand into a community that eventually applies the Islamic 
(Shari’a) law. From 2009 – 2010, there was a short-lived project to relocate that base to 
Aceh, the only Indonesian province authorized to apply the Islamic (Shari’a) law. When 
it failed, with the Indonesian security forces breaking up a training camp in late February 
2010 and eventually arresting more than 100 suspects, Poso again became the refuge 
of choice, under the leadership of a former combatant named Santoso, the target of a 
massive Indonesian security apparatus operation until 2016, who sought to train recruits 
for the jihad against enemies of a Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. Lamongan indeed 
provided some of those recruits. Until July 2016 the Indonesian government was 
carrying out the Joint Law Enforcement and Military Counterterrorism Operations code 
name the Counterterrorism Operation Tinombala to go after the Santoso’s networks in 
the Poso area that also involved the foreign nationals from ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang, 
China.223 The Counterterrorism Operation Tinombala has also killed three one-star 
generals from the Indonesian Army.224 
The third lesson is that the case of Poso provides us with a clear example of how 
radical ideologues will always try to keep “a secure base” alive. Based on the historical 
exploration of JI evolution on this chapter we can learn that the extremists were never 
very strong in terms of numbers (quantity) or competence (quality). Even interest in 
jihadi activities at home had steadily declined after the strength of radical groups once 
peaked between 1999 – 2001. But, however committed radical ideologues still wanted 
to keep alive “the idea of a secure base” in the archipelago. They needed to convince 
themselves that the dozens of often not-very impressive men sent to Poso for training 
would eventually be transformed into an army of reliable mujahidin (holy warriors) that 
could join the global jihad and lead to the establishment of a Salafi Islamist state of 
                                                   
223 For more, see (Sofwan, Warga Asing Tewas dalam Baku Tembak Poso 2016) and (Sofwan, WNA 
Uighur Gabung Kelompok Teroris Santoso Sejak 2014 2016). The Uyghurs /ˈwiːɡər/ are a Turkic ethnic 
group living in Eastern and Central Asia. Today, Uyghurs live primarily in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region in China, where they are one of 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities. 
 
224 For more CNN coverage, see (Fantz 2016). 
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Indonesia. The key to this was providing Santoso with an effective media arm, and the 
Lamongan network did just this, connecting Santoso first with al-Qaeda Global-Islamic 
Media Front and then with ISIS.  
The objective of “keeping the secure base” like in Poso was clearly to create the 
illusion, both internationally and at home, that the Indonesian effort (keeping a base and 
war alive in Indonesia) was bigger and more significant than it really was. The 
propagandists may have wanted international recognition for Indonesia’s homegrown 
jihad, but they wanted even more to persuade small-town recruits from other parts of 
Indonesia that conflict in Poso was always a war worth fighting. As the wave theory 
postulating, the international links are always the unique attraction for keeping terrorist 
activities at the national and local level alive (Rapoport, 2004). 
These would-be mujahidin never actually seemed to realize how dangerous the 
connection to Poso was because Poso simply was one place that had intense police 
surveillance. If Indonesia’s extremists had not kept trying to come to Poso, they 
probably could have avoided many of the crackdowns that followed. But the pursuit by 
the Indonesian National Police was a factor in pushing several key Lamongan members 
to leave for Syria. Many wanted to go anyway, but the steady stream of arrests and the 
information they produced turned departure into a necessity. 
Based on the stories of six Indonesian citizens who were involved in the pro-ISIS 
groups in Indonesia as of 2015, it is clear to conclude that their lives intersected with 
how a pro-ISIS network in Lamongan and Poso is shaped. These six individuals were 
Siswanto, Sibghotullah, Arif Tuban, Arif Wicaksono alias “Hendro Laptop”, Mohammad 
Hidayat alias Dayat, and Salim Mubarok Attamini. 
As of early April 2015, Salim Mubarok Attamini and Siswanto were in Syria 
fighting with ISIS. Since Indonesian ISIS fighters suffered heavy casualties in Syria in 
the first weeks of April 2015; it is unknown whether these two were among them. 
Sibghotullah was arrested by Malaysian authorities trying to leave for Syria in early 
December 2014; he remains in a police detention in Jakarta. Arif Wicaksono alias 
“Hendro Laptop” and Dayat are dead, killed by the Indonesian National Police anti terror 
detachment 88 (Densus 88), in Poso and East Java respectively. Arif Tuban was 
arrested in June 2014 and subsequently was tried and convicted of terrorism.  
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Based on the IPAC’s report in April 2015, there are at least three features that 
characterizes the enduring importance of several kinds of bonds of JI-Lamongan 
Network-Poso-ISIS.  
The first feature is where the alumni networks of pesantren al-Islam and other 
schools are once affiliated to the JI. Although some key individuals are not-or in some 
cases, no longer-JI members, these schools remain a critically important component of 
the extremist community long after JI itself has disengaged, at least temporarily, from 
violence at home.  
The second feature is a strong commitment to the ideology propounded by the 
detained cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Siswanto and Salim Mubarok Attamini were 
Aman’s most trusted associates in East Java. His followers control the channels in 
Indonesia for sending fighters to Syria. Mapping out Aman Abdurrahman’s support base 
and understanding his teachings are essential prerequisites to any targeted programs to 
counter violent extremism.  
The third feature is the kinship and marriage. Family ties have been a recurring 
theme in studies of Indonesian Islamist violent extremists. The Lamongan network 
shows they are more important than ever as ISIS appeals to families and sets up 
Indonesian-language schools in Syria for its “cubs”. Women in extremist families can be 
the main motivators, urging their husbands and children to fight, but they can also be 
the key to disengagement. Documenting the family’s orientation in this regard (towards 
or away from violence) is another prerequisite of an effective counter-extremism effort. 
There are also, however, bonds produced by training in Poso; experience in 
prison; and participation in radical study groups as well as the close ties that often 
emerge between fugitives and those who hide them. All these relationships produce a 
complicated web of interactions, but if the bonds can be identified, then at least there is 
a possibility of effective target interventions to address them. One potentially useful 
program is underway in Lamongan, that is run by a former JI member but much more 
needs to be done. It has always been the case that the key to designing counter-
extremism programs that have any hopes of success is to root them in a thorough 
knowledge of the patterns of radicalization in local communities. The story of the 
Lamongan network reinforces such premise. 
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Prospect of Pro-ISIS Networks in Indonesia. 
The upheaval in the Middle East still has direct consequences in Indonesia, but 
the dangers should not be overdrawn. The drivers of jihad will continue to be mostly 
local as they have been from the beginning. Indonesians coming back from Afghanistan 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s did not use their skills and training to undertake 
violence in Indonesia until after President Suharto fell and the Ambon communal conflict 
erupted, with Indonesian Muslims dying in a local war. Without local grievances to build 
on, no mujahidin coming back from Syria or Yemen or anywhere else can build such of 
a movement, and without community support, no movement can succeed.  
However, although Indonesian democratic politics is relatively stable and 
peaceful, it is still nonetheless worth keeping an eye on Syria. Until 2016, ISIS has 
triggered a bigger backlash than ever seen before in the Indonesian Muslim community, 
suggesting that although the ISIS network in Indonesia is dangerous, the support 
towards it will stay limited to the radical fringe. The Chief of Indonesian National Police, 
Police General Badrodin Haiti on January 24, 2016, made a public statement that there 
were more networks and organizations in Indonesia increasingly tending to support the 
formation of ISIS. At least until January 2016, the three biggest radical groups in 
Indonesia according to him were Jamaah Islamiya (JI) that targets the Western 
interests; Tauhid Wal Jihad that targets the takfir; and Negara Islam Indonesia (NII).  
Besides these three, according to Police General Haiti, there were at least 15 out 
of 21 Islamist radical groups that proactively support ISIS: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 
Timur; Mujahidin Indonesia Barat; Ring Banten; Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid; Jamaat al-
Tawhid wal-Jihad; Pendukung dan Pembela Daulah Islam; Jemaah Ansauri Daulah; 
Ma’had Ansyarullah; Laskar Dinullah; Gerakan Tauhid Lamongan; Halawi Makmun 
Grup; Ansharul Khilafah Jawa Timur; IS Aceh; Ikhwan Muahid Indonesia fil Jazirah al-
Muluk; and Khilafatul Muslimin.  
As of the final stage of writing this Ph.D. thesis in the academic year 2017 - 2018, 
the profiling of these organizations is still valid. According to a prominent member of 
Indonesian Islamist party Partai Keadilan Sejahtera who served as the Chairman of 
Defence, Intelligence, Foreign Affairs and Information Committee at Indonesian 
Parliament from 2009 – 2014, the ISIS threats along with its supporting networks in 
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Indonesia have reached its serious level since “the raw material” are simply the old 
radical-Islamist networks that have persisted in Indonesia.225 
                                                   
225 For more, see (Hermawan 2016).  
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Figure 3.10 The Estimated Number of Foreign Fighters (including Indonesians) in Iraq and Syria 
 
 
Source: (The Soufan Group 2015). 
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Source: (Charlton 2015). 
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Figure 3.12 The City of Lamongan and Poso within the Reach of ISIS’ Influence in Southeast Asia 
 
Source: (Gunaratna n.d.). 
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226 Adapted. Synthesized from the point of view of Police Inspector General DR. Petrus Golose (The Deputy for the International Relations to the 
Head of Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency/BNPT) in a discussion with the author, October 1, 2014. 
P a g e  | 190 
 
 
The IPAC report in September 2014 was also confirming that from the late 2013 
onwards, some of the networks that were getting to Syria run instead through prisons.227 
As of January 2015, according to figures compiled by the Indonesian National Police 
anti terror detachment 88 (Densus 88), there were 123 Indonesians who had been 
identified as having joined the fighting in Syria. This total included men and women 
identified by name, including wives who have accompanied their mujahidin husbands, 
but it does not include individuals going back and forth to Syria as members of 
humanitarian missions, even when the missions are linked to extremist groups. As the 
individuals involved are nonetheless dangerous, and it is cause for concern that inmate 
of high security prisons continues to be among the most active propagators of ISIS 
views and teachings; Indonesian counterterrorism policy, strategy, and operations under 
the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency must implement a strict prison system 
of these radical inmates. 
 
3.8 The Neo Jemaah Islamiyah  (2016 – Today) 
In March 2016 the Indonesian National Police officially made the statement 
declaring that Neo-JI exists and is connected to a number of old figures of Islamist 
terrorists in Indonesia such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Imam Samudra, and Dr. Azhari.228 
According to the official statement of Chief of Indonesian National Police and Sydney 
Jones (2016), the Neo-JI structure consists of hundreds of members, and is more 
sophisticated than the ISIS structure that tends to operate with smaller radical networks. 
Neo-JI is also readier to operate in Indonesia since it has been strengthening its footing 
in the archipelago for the last 5 years (since 2011) with its main base in the Java 
island.229 
The members of Neo-JI which were convicted from 2014 – 2015 did not 
acknowledge this name. But, since the Indonesian National Police found the indication 
that this group has its roots in JI, this group is named after Neo-JI. According to the 
                                                   
227 For more, see (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 24 September 2014). 
 
228 For a detailed account of counterterrorism operation on Dr. Azhari in 2005, see (Wachjunadi 2017). 
 
229 For more, see (Sofwan, Polisi Sebut Neo Jamaah Islamiyah Terkait Abu Bakar Baasyir 2016).  
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official statement of Indonesian National Police, this group has undergone name and 
formation changes, but the members are the same and have roots in JI. Recently, the 
Indonesian government authority have begun to pay a serious attention on this group 
since its members were getting active in making weapons and other explosive devices. 
 
3.9 The Prospect of Structural (Non-Violent) and No n-Structural (Violent) JI 
Having descriptively discussed the existence of JI and other radical-Islamist 
groups/networks, and how they are transformed along the way, we can conclude that 
Islamist terrorism in Indonesia has its unique latent presence, and thus its latent threats 
are still tend to exist in the future. Gordon and Lindo (2011) argue that some 
manifestation of JI or its offshoots will probably exist in 2025. This is however in line 
with the predictions of other counterterrorism experts and intelligence assessments.  
According to Gordon and Lindo (2011), with the assumption that the Indonesian 
government counterterrorism efforts are maintained at the current level, Structural JI (JI 
with non-violent engagements) is best positioned for the long-term survival. Although 
Structural JI has been severely degraded, critical portions of the group’s infrastructure 
remain intact. The roughly 50 schools affiliated with Structural JI are still open, as is the 
network of publishing houses run by the organization.230 These platforms have enabled 
the group to continue recruiting new members, spread propaganda, and, most 
importantly, maintain its social network. If JI-linked institutions continue to operate, 
Structural JI’s survival seems all but guaranteed.  
JI’s splinter groups (JI with violent engagements) are unlikely to remain 
operationally viable in 2025. If Top, Dulmatin, and Patek are any indications, high-profile 
militants who break off from Structural JI and conduct violent attacks have relatively 
short life spans. The most violent and active JI splinters will probably remain be 
anchored in the ungoverned corners of the southern Philippines. If the slow-going 
negotiations between MILF and Manila bear fruit (a distinct possibility over the next 
decade and a half) this haven will probably become unviable. Some Non-Structural JI 
members (the armed wing of JI with violent engagements) may remain active in 
                                                   
230 For more, see (International Crisis Group 20 April 2010). 
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Indonesia in 2025, but they would face an increasingly capable Indonesian 
counterterrorism apparatus. 
In the nearer term, one wonders whether a new generation of JI members will 
follow the examples set by Top, Dulmatin, and Patek, and to conduct activities outside 
of the group’s formal command structure. Whilst possible, this scenario seems unlikely. 
For more than half a decade, Structural JI has prioritized da’wah over violence. Those 
who disagree with this approach have probably already left the organization. Younger 
cadres who are eager for action probably recognize Structural JI’s posture and will seek 
other, more aggressive platforms for activism. These alternative options are multiplying 
due to the recent proliferation in Indonesia of small, informal operational cells.231 By the 
process of elimination, then, the only individuals left in Structural JI today are those 
patiently committed to the group’s long-term approach. This suggests that Structural JI’s 
fragmentation will slow or cease in the years ahead. According to Gordon and Lindo 
(2011), five factors seem most likely to alter the future trajectory of JI and its splinters 
through 2025.  
 
a. Ideological Resonance  
Variations of the Salafi jihadist ideology promoted by JI and like-minded groups 
and individuals have become embedded in certain Indonesian communities. From the 
height of the DI insurgency to the smaller cells and even individuals carrying out attacks 
today, the ideological resonance necessary for violent action persists, even if the 
organizational structures behind such attacks have atrophied. In addition, the 
Indonesian government’s tacit tolerance of non-violent Islamist organizations has 
allowed militants to use those groups as a platform for recruitment and radicalization 
(Gordon and Lindo 2011). Compared with other radical-Islamist groups, JI-associated 
individuals and cells have their own uniqueness in terms of their inclusivity and adaption 
to the society wherever they are existing. Prior to his arrest, for example, Ba’asyir used 
his new aboveground group, Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), to disseminate the Salafi 
                                                   
231 For more, see “Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans,” International Crisis Group, April 19, 
2011; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 8. 
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jihadi propaganda. This pattern of reality suggests that a latent pool of recruits could be 




The second factor is the outbreak of escalation of conflict in Southeast Asia. As 
previously explained in this chapter, the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, 
sectarian conflicts in Indonesia, and violence in the southern Philippines were crucial to 
radicalizing, training, and mobilizing the JI network. Rumors about Patek aside, no 
Indonesians seem to have fought U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, so it is unlikely 
that conflict in far-off places such as Yemen or Somalia would mobilize the next 
generation of JI to the same extent as did the Afghan theater in the 1980s. Instead, the 
most likely combat opportunities for JI operatives in the future are the insurgencies in 
the southern Philippines, southern Thailand, and Burma or a fresh round of sectarian 
bloodshed in Indonesia (Gordon and Lindo, 2011). Significant involvement in these 
conflicts could reinvigorate JI. 
 
c. Terrorist Patron 
The third factor relates to the emergence of a new terrorist patron. As the 
foregoing analysis illustrates, al-Qaeda core had a major impact on the evolution of JI. A 
new terrorist patron could have a similar effect. The transnational terrorist organization 
which is best positioned to support terrorism in Southeast Asia is probably Pakistan-
based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Although LeT’s network of training camps and financial 
resources could theoretically fill the void left by al-Qaeda core’s erosion, there is no 
indication that it has the intent to do so. That said, JI and LeT have cooperated in at 
least one instance in the past and this nexus could further develop if LeT’s objectives 
were to expand to include Southeast Asia.232 
                                                   
232 According to the International Crisis Group and the Australian government, JI operated a cell in 
Karachi, Pakistan, between 2000 and 2003 that received training from LeT. See “Indonesia: The Hotel 
Bombings,” International Crisis Group, 7; and “The Terrorist Threat in South-East Asia,” Australian 
Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004; quoted in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 8. 
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Beyond LeT, other South Asian or Middle Eastern-based terrorist groups could 
also become patrons for JI or its offshoots. Recent efforts by JI members and 
associated individuals to cultivate ties with militant groups abroad support this 
hypothesis. Abu Husna and Dr. Augus are clear examples of this. Both men served as 
senior JI operatives and were detained in Malaysia in 2008 before they could travel to 
Syria on a Qatar Airways flight.233 According to an Australian government document, 
intelligence from their arrest detailed JI’s links and desire to renew its international 
terrorist links.234 Muhammad Jibriel, the alleged conduit for foreign funds used in 
Noordin Mohammad Top’s July 2009 attack in Jakarta, also made significant efforts to 
develop relationships with militants from outside the region.235 This pattern of reality 
suggests that individuals associated with Non-Structural JI may also seek foreign 
patrons in the future. 
 
d. Leadership 
The fourth factor pertains to the leadership influence. The rise of a charismatic 
leader could breathe the new life into Structural or Non-Structural JI. Such a leader 
could potentially emerge from the population of incarcerated JI militants to be released 
in the coming years. Although the number of JI members behind bars is relatively small, 
many of them are the hardened veterans with the proper bona fides to assume 
leadership positions.236 Documented incidents of recidivism reinforce concerns that the 
incarcerated militants could reengage in the violent activity.237 
                                                   
233 For more, see (International Crisis Group 20 April 2010), 7. 
 
234 For more, see “What Governments Are Doing: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),” Australian Government; quoted 
in (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 9. 
 
235 According to Gordon and Lindo (2011), from documents in the trial of Muhammad Jibriel, arrested on 
suspicion of seeking foreign funds for the July 2009 hotel bombings, it is clear that Jibriel had met the late 
Pakistan Taliban leader Mehsud and that he was in regular communication with the media division of al-
Qaeda, al Sahab. He was also trying to send Indonesians for training in Waziristan, meeting with al-
Qaeada members in Saudi Arabia, and planning to open an office in Cairo,” See “Indonesia: Jihadi 
Surprise in Aceh,” International Crisis Group, 14. For more, see (Gordon and Lindo 2011), 9. 
 
236 According to the International Crisis Group, less than half of the roughly 170 men in Indonesian 
prisons “linked to jihadism” in 2007 were JI members. See “Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons,” 
International Crisis Group, November 19, 2007. For more, see (Gordon and Lindo (2011), 9. 
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e. Strategic Calculus 
The fifth and final factor worth contemplating is the strategic calculus of Structural 
JI. Currently JI is focused on da’wah to boost its strength, which its leaders view as a 
prerequisite for the armed resistance. When JI’s commanders believe that their 
organization is powerful and popular enough to reengage in violence, they could 
resume terrorist attacks. Alternatively, the group’s leadership could recalculate its 
decision to postpone violence. Although nowadays both scenarios seem unlikely, it is 
important to bear in mind that Structural JI’s tactical decision to abandon terrorist 
attacks is not a renunciation of violence. The group is still committed to its long-term 
objective of creating a Salafi Islamist state and it will continue to pose a terrorist threat 
until it formally rejects violence, abandons its struggle, or is comprehensively 
dismantled. 
 
3.10 Looking Ahead: Indonesia, JI, and the Globaliz ation of Terrorism Justified 
by Religious-Based Arguments. 
As extensively discussed in chapter 2, terrorism has been used as an old tactic 
by governments to suppress revolution as well as by revolutionaries who have sought to 
achieve power over a government. The terrorist whether in possession of governmental 
power or in-want of governmental power, uses terror to achieve a political, social or 
religious goal. Modern terrorism is at least two hundred years old and she has not aged 
a day. The Anarchist started in the 1880s in Russia and lasted for a decade later in 
Western Europe, Balkans, and Asia; as well as the Marxist/Leftist and the Rightist 
terrorist groups throughout the twentieth century. The religious terrorism or terrorism 
justified by religious-based arguments is even older and rooted for more than the last 
two thousand years in Hinduism (the Thugs), Judaism (Zealot Zicariis), Islam (the 
Assassins during the Turkish Seljuk Empire era), and Christianity (the Ku Klux Klan in 
the U.S.). 
                                                                                                                                                                    
237 According to Gordon and Lindo (2011), at least 12 members of the Aceh cell had served time in 
prison, mostly on terrorism charges. For more, see  (International Crisis Group 20 April 2010) and 
(Gordon and Lindo 2011), 9. 
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Since the early 1980s the world has entered the era of modern religious terrorism 
movement or terrorism movement justified by religious-based arguments where this era 
is characterized by not abiding to one’s state law, bounded rationality not 
understandable by secular views, and having religious symbolic meaning in their 
commitment towards terrorism to change the structure of society. Al-Qaeda and its 
associated movements including the JI and ISIS fit with this wave, and they have a 
strategic aim of restoring the world under the Islamic caliphate. Correspondingly, this is 
in line with a definition of Islamist terrorism, which is a form of political violence partly 
manifested in the form of terrorism as a criminal armed tactic that rejects democracy 
and pluralism whilst aiming to make sudden, deep socio-politico-economic changes and 
legitimating the violent action by selective and extreme interpretation of Islamic texts. 
The religion itself is not the inherent cause of violence or terrorism since violence 
might occur with or without religious context. However, religion provides mores and 
symbols which make horrific bloodshed easier to vindicate. Jews and Christians, as well 
as Muslims, have much to answer for as fomenters of religious terror. Nevertheless, the 
Islamist fanatics have a much greater opportunity for mayhem because of the alienated 
hordes in the Middle East who see no hope at all in the status quo. The opportunity 
created by despair and rage, not the intrinsic elements of the religion itself, gives Islam 
the edge over Christianity and Judaism as a force for terror. Consequently, the cure for 
religious violence may ultimately lie in a renewed appreciation for religion itself and in 
the acknowledgement of religion in public life. The solution is not the secularization but 
a renewed/revived understanding of religion. 
As for Indonesia, this great archipelago used to be a Buddhist, Hindu and 
Christian nation before the arrival of Islam. The coming of Islam to Indonesia in the 
fourteenth century was filtered by the pre-existing culture, thus making Islam in 
Indonesia an Indonesian version of Islam. However, over the years the streams of 
transnational-Islamist movements from the Middle East began to transform the 
Indonesian version of Islam into the “pure”/Middle Eastern version of Islam. The Middle 
Eastern influence appears a profound one on Indonesian radical fundamentalists.  
The dissemination of ideas from the Middle East to Southeast Asia is grounded 
in age-old cross-regional and global processes of the transference of ideas. New 
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methods of communication (e.g., the Internet and physical transportation) further 
facilitate the general process of the globalization of Islam, including the dissemination of 
radical fundamentalist ideas to the Indonesian archipelago. The fundamentalist 
movements, consisting of Islamist transnational movements, have similar 
characteristics, which are part of the international Sunni pan-Islamist political 
movement. They are commonly associated with a goal of unifying all Muslim countries 
under an Islamist caliphate ruled by Islamic (Shari’a) law and led by a caliph as the 
head of state elected by Muslims. 
Having identified such global patterns, Indonesia should address this 
phenomenon no longer as a tactical and temporary phenomenon, but as a strategic, 
national security issue, which in turn calls for the objective academic research and the 
involvement of all instruments of national power. Historically, Indonesia’s national 
security is characterized by the fact that global conflicts would always permeate through 
the Indonesian society, so the Indonesian government must be vigilant about the threat 
of global violent Islamist movements permeating through the Indonesian society and 
exacerbating potential domestic conflicts.  
All that said, to better formulate the right counterterrorism policy, strategy, and 
operations for Indonesia, Indonesia should engage terrorism from four levels of 
analysis: individual; group; state; and global level. Ending terrorism should become the 
goal of any counterterrorism policies and strategies, and this is not a simple task. In 
dealing with radical-Islamist groups, the Indonesian government so far has engaged in 
decapitation through eliminating group leaders, negotiation (e.g., winning their heart and 
mind), and repression. 
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Figure 3.14 A Transnational Terrorism Networks Model 
 
Source: (Marks 2006)
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238 The articulation from many sources based on the author’s interviews with the Indonesian authority and experts in the field. For the source of the 
map, see (Countries in which Islamist terrorist attacks have occurred between September 11, 2001, and May 2013 n.d.). 
P a g e  | 200 
 
 
However, the case of Santoso terrorist group and its connection with the 
dismantled but still dangerous JI, which lost its leader in a security operation and saw 
many of its members captured in July 2016 suggests that violent Islamist groups in 
Indonesia do not simply self-implode when they fail to reach their ultimate goals, but 
rather transition to another modus operandi, where their cells engage in illegal criminal 
activities (e.g., through the cyber crime in order to extract and mobilize financial 
resources).239 There is no guarantee that they have abandoned their goal to establish a 
Salafi Islamist state and will refrain from terrorist attacks in the future. 
 Unity between people (civil society as well as the academic community), national 
security forces, and democratic government is highly relevant in the protracted 
counterterrorism struggle, since in the view of radical-Islamists, they are engaging in an 
unfinished war to achieve their utopian goals that may be unachievable during their 
lifetime, so their war becomes their heritage to future generations. As a nation guided by 
the national and state ideology of Pancasila, Indonesia must be highly vigilant to ensure 
that this country will become neither a producer of terrorists nor the battlefield of a 















                                                   
239 Police Brigadier General (Ret) Suryadharma (the Former Head of the Indonesian National Police Anti 
Terror Special Detachment 88) in a discussion with the author, October 18, 2016. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE ANALYSIS 
 
As the continuation of previous chapters, the purpose of this chapter is to 
critically analyze and systematically synthesize the independent (determining) variables 
of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that are examined in this Ph.D. thesis: economic 
grievances; social grievances; political grievances; radical ideology; social networks; 
state repression; and government incentive. On the other hand, the dependent variable 
in this analysis is the creation/occurrence of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, which is 
measured in terms of the ideology and/or behaviour to establish the Islamic (Shari’a) 
law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of 
terror). 
In this chapter, I conduct the combined analyses by using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, which are coupled with the discussion on the social network 
analysis of JI-related individuals. Part 4.1. is focused on the qualitative analysis by using 
the discovering patterns analysis, the content analysis, and the discourse analysis. Part 
4.2. is focused on the quantitative analysis by using the chi-square test, the logistic 
regression, and the proportional test to build several multivariate statistical models. Part 
4.3 is focused on the discussion of social network analysis of JI-related individuals to 
complement both qualitative and quantitative analysis in parts 4.1. and 4.2. Part 4.4. is 
focused on addressing the analysis warranty of this Ph.D. thesis. 
 
4.1 The Qualitative Analysis 
 
a. The Discovering Patterns Analysis 
 
There are 22 individuals in the sample who are examined by the discovering 
patterns analysis. All them have been indicted in the terrorism case. 16 individuals are 
still in the prison, whilst 6 individuals have been recently released.240 They are 
examined only through public documentation-archival evidence including legal court 
                                                   
240 For the profiling of these 22 individuals, please the attachment #1 in the accompanying materials of 
this Ph.D. thesis. 
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cases and published media documents. The discovering patterns analysis in this part 
uses a systematic pattern of “who-how-frequencies-magnitudes-structures-processes-
causes-consequences” to achieve the aim of comprehending the systematic pattern of 




On the Ideology 
They are the individuals who adamantly believe that the Islamic Shari’a law and 
the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia must be established within a wider Islamic 
caliphate at the international level. The radical and violent way is both the necessary 
and sufficient variable to achieve their aim. The nation-state and democracy are not the 
valid form of government through which they could not channel out their aspirations. For 
them, the idea of the nation-state with its democratic system that bestows the state 
legitimacy on the popular will of people is an absolute violation of the purity of Islamic 
faith. In other words, for them the idea of liberal democracy as manifested by the 
Indonesian national and state ideology (Pancasila) and the Indonesian national motto 
whose meaning is the unity in diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) are the idol, thus must 
be replaced.  
They also view that anything or anyone, which are not in-line with them in terms 
of ideology and operational courses of action are deemed as the takfir, togut or taghut, 
and enemy of the Islam. All them are deemed as the “hindrances” and the legitimate 
targets of attack and killing. Meanwhile, for any Islamic imams/clerics who are not in-line 
with their view are called as “ulama su.” The meaning of “ulama su” for them is the 
Islamic clerics who are deemed apostate, money-oriented, and power-hunger by willing 
to collaborate with the status-quo government.  
Other than with JI, these 22 individuals have mixture associations with the 
following organizations along with their inherent political ideology. HTI (Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia) that believes in the establishment of Islamic caliphate that must be currently 
implemented; NII (Negara Islam Indonesia) that believes in the establishment of Salafi 
Islamist state of Indonesia; MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) and JAT (Jamaah 
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Anshorut Tauhid) that also believe in the establishment of Salafi Islamist state of 
Indonesia. For MMI and JAT, the Islamic caliphate may later be implemented when the 
situation permits. 
 
On the Political Background 
Based on the profiling of these 22 individuals, there are two camps of political 
backgrounds. The first camp is the anti-democracy and anti-pluralism, whilst the second 
camp is the ones who believe that pragmatically using democracy and da’wah (religious 
preaching) as a means and ways to achieve their aims are something that is permitted. 
Nevertheless, the individuals in the second camp are not associated with any registered 
political parties in Indonesia, but merely being the sympathizers of Islamist parties.  
As the Indonesian Muslims, all these 22 individuals are aspired to and inspired 
by the Darul Islam and its founding father, Raden Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo 
(1905 – 1962). Darul Islam, which in English means the House of Islam is also known 
as the DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia), which means the House of Islam 
and the Islamic military forces of Indonesia. It is also called as the NII (Negara Islam 
Indonesia), which means the Islamic State of Indonesia. It began its activities in 1942 
and led by a group of Muslim militias and insurgents under the coordination of Raden 
Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo. The entity only recognized Shari’a as the valid 
source of law. Later the movement has produced splinters and offshoots ranging from 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to other Islamist radical groups. This cluster of Indonesian 
Muslims is not the majority but they are still vociferous for the majority of Indonesian 
democratic and pluralistic society.  
These 22 individuals are also aspired to rewrite the eliminated seven-words in 
the Jakarta Charter. The Jakarta charter written on 22 June 1945 was the earliest form 
of Pancasila (the national and state ideology). The essential meaning of these seven 
Indonesian words is “the obligation to apply the Islamic Shari’a law for all Indonesian 
Muslims.” These seven words were suddenly eliminated on August 18, 1945, which was 
only one day after Indonesia declaring her independence on August 17, 1945. 
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On the Social Class and Their Encounter with Radical Ideology 
Generally, they come from the lower-to-middle economic class with educational 
backgrounds reaching up to the high school level. During their formative years, they 
encountered “enlightened” Islamic teachings that emphasize on the Salafi jihad through 
selective and extreme interpretation of the Islamic text. These encounters were 
experienced mainly through Islamic boarding schools, Quran recitation fellowships, and 
some other interactions within their social networks. Such interactions were 
exacerbated by their common involvement in a number of training and operational 
activities. 
 
On the Criminal Background 
Their involvement in the terrorism (the act of violence) is also directly or indirectly 
connected with other ordinary criminal violations where many of them are also the 
recidivists. After their capture, these 22 individuals are either disengaged from terrorism 
activities, successfully deradicalized from their radical ideology, or they are still aspired 
to continue on their violent jihad activities once the opportunities are opened (e.g., 
fighting and died for the ISIS in Syria among many others). 
 
Frequencies and Magnitudes: How Often and How Much?  
 
JI and other related Islamist radical/extremist/violent jihadist movements in 
Indonesia (as represented by these 22 individuals) have numerously become the thorn 
throughout the Indonesian history, especially through their violent and non-violent 
extremist movements. They have existed throughout the history of independent 
Indonesian state (since 1945) and acted violently since the early 1950s until today. 
During their presence, the magnitude of their extremism have reached a full 
spectrum of extremist movements covering from the non-violent engagement (e.g., the 
extreme da’wah; the selective, extreme interpretation and teaching of Islamic texts; and 
the hatred speech), ordinary criminal violations, up to violent engagement (e.g., deadly 
attacks on civilians and government symbols that are manifested both as insurgent as 
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well as non-insurgent terrorist attacks). Until today, they have been vociferous and 
disturbing for the majority of Indonesians who are themselves are also Muslims. 
 
Structures: To Whom? 
 
These 22 individuals target whoever deemed as the hindrance to the 
establishment of the Islamic Shari’a law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. Such 
hindrance within their bounded rationality is called togut or taghut: anything/anyone 
being worshipped or anything/anyone that rules but non-Shari’a conforming laws. Their 
radical, violent activities throughout the years reflect a general pattern of terrorism that 
is justified by religious-based arguments. They use the victims (the direct targets) not as 
the ultimate targets. Instead, the government and the leadership of current democratic 
political establishment are indeed their ultimate targets. 
Based on the profiling of these 22 individuals, they have two main agendas. The 
first agenda is to ruin down the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and to 
have it replaced with the Indonesian Salafi Islamist state of their own version (al-daulah 
al-Islamiyyah). The second agenda is to implement the Islamic teachings at all layers of 
society according to their own interpretation as reflected by fashion/apparel that Muslim 
must wear and other cultural manifestations among many others.  
Otherwise, without such implementation, they will deem Indonesian society as 
the jahiliyah society. That is why for this particular reason these 22 individuals agree 
with JI’s ideology since JI believes in the establishment of the Salafi Islamist state of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the southern Philippines, that is followed by 
the establishment of Islamic caliphate at the international level. After they successfully 
establish the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia, they aim to fix the governance of the 
state under the Islamic Shari’a law, and then to restore the glory of the Islamic caliphate 
(al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah).  
Subsequently, the last step is to become the Islamic ummah that has a very 
significant role in the global arena. Therefore, in order to realize all these strategic 
objectives, they believe that it is imperative to start this movement as early as possible 
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by the enforcement of Shari’a law in the purest sense and to garner the general support 
to liberate the society from the influence of infidel (kafir) state. For them, these first two 
steps are imminent to be realized. 
 
Processes: In What Order? 
 
The exposure of these 22 individuals to the radicalization (in terms of non-violent 
and violent extremist movements) is started from joining the small circle/cell of Qur’an 
recitation fellowships to the more inclusion of extensive but exclusive social networks, 
and taking the allegiance oath (bai’at) to the causes, missions, and visions of JI and 
other related Islamist radical/extremist/violent jihadist movements. As such individuals 
have embraced this stepwise, subsequently they are trained and prepared to take their 
role within the organization either as the sympathizers, bombers, field leaders or 
imams/ideologues. Other than playing one of these roles, these radicalized individuals 
are also ready to become the lone wolf acting upon their own initiation. Looking at this 
phenomenon from another perspective, they also implement the da’wah strategy as 
commanded by Hasan al-Banna, where their exposure to the radicalization and 
committing the act of violence can also be explained as follow: the first step which is the 
introduction (marhalah al-tarif); the second step which is the leadership and character 




On the Ideology and Social Network 
Based on the discovering patterns analysis on these 22 individuals, radical 
ideology seems to be the most significant factor that is boosted by the social network. 
These two independent variables (radical ideology and social network) are exploiting 
the combination of existing grievances (economic, social, and political). This situation is 
exacerbated by the lack of serious government incentive programs given to these 
individuals. In fact, the maximum level of repression (e.g., the death penalty or life 
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imprisonment) as the maximum level of deterrence that is implemented according to the 
rule of law in Republic of Indonesia must be balanced by effective deradicalization 
efforts and consistent government incentive programs in order to moderate the ideology 
and behaviour of violent jihadists. These already radicalized individuals must be 
disengaged from radical networks and activities, must be de-radicalized from radical 
ideology, must be re-empowered to do the right things (e.g., working along with the 
government in the extensive deradicalization engagements among many others), and 
must be persuaded to voluntarily embracing the pluralism and democracy at the 
ideological and behaviour level. 
 
On the Ontology and Epistemology of Their Ideology 
The discovering patterns analysis of these 22 individuals also gives us the insight 
pertaining to the ontology and epistemology of their radical ideology. They believe in the 
takfirism, which means they ontologically believe that any Islamic practices that are not 
in-line with their ideology and behaviour are deemed as the stain on the purity of Islam 
(takfir means “to declare someone an apostate or an infidel”). They are also literalist 
(harfiyyah), which means they totally reject any implicit meanings/interpretations on 
Quran and Hadith. They also believe in limiting the capacity of human ratio, that within 
their bounded rationality the revelation is the ultimate source of istinbath in Islam. For 
them, the revelations have been clearly and literally manifested in the Quran and 
Hadith. Thus, any interpretations of human ratio on these revelations cannot supersede 
any literal statements of Quran and Hadith.  
They are also against the Islamic imams whom according to their bounded 
rationality ignore their own way of using and interpreting “the Yellow Book.”241 This is 
indeed the old (Salafi) Islamic boarding school (pesantren) that uses “the Yellow Book” 
                                                   
241 See also (Abegebriel, Abeveiro and Team 2004). In the Islamic education, “the Yellow Book” refers to 
the traditional books that consist of Islamic teaching materials (diraasah al-Islamiyyah) that are taught in 
the Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). “The Yellow Book” covers a wide spectrum of Islamic teaching 
materials: fiqh; aqidah; akhlaq/tasawuf; Arab grammar (‘ilmu nahwu and ‘ilmu sharf); Hadith; tafsir; 
‘ulumul Quran; as well as social affairs and humanities (mu’amalah).”The Yellow Book” is an Arabic-
language book that is without vowel (harakah) or commonly known in Indonesian language as “the Arab 
Gundul.” In fact, there are many Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia that use “the Yellow Book” but 
produces a constructive, peaceful, and pluralistic Islamic teaching and ideology. For more, see 
(Bruinessen 2013), (NU 2006), (Narendra 2015), (Kosim n.d.), and (Suryaningsih and Marbun 2013). 
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as the main reference of studying Islam.242 Therefore, for their basic principles of 
tawheed, fiqh, and aqeedah they mainly refer to the Hanbali Sunni Islamic school of 
jurisprudence according to the interpretation of ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab .243 Lastly, they are intolerant and unconsciously tend to be against any 
groups that are not in-line with their views. For them, Islam is the only way of life and 
must be enforced at all costs without considering its impacts on other stakeholders. In 
their view, the straight way of life has been pre-ordained through the Shari’a law. This 
concept is called as-Shirat al-Mustaqim. 
 
On Their Methodology 
In terms of methodology, they have identical characteristics with their Islamist 
fundamentalist counterparts at overseas. They radically believe that the implementation 
of Islamic life and governmental system in the current Islamic world as a deviation, thus 
any fundamental changes must be unavoidably implemented. Therefore, they strongly 
support the violent ways. It means that any corrections to such deviations must be done 
either through violent jihad or non-violent da’wah. For them, any forms of jihadism are 
mandatory and must be unconditionally implemented in the offensive ways. They 
believe in Sayyid Qutb’s teachings. First, the core of tauhid uluhiyyah is the al-
hakimiyatu lillah. Whoever formulate, implement, and comply to the man-made 
regulations is syirik and kafir (although he/she is a Muslim). Thus, he/she is deemed as 
an apostate and killing him/her is valid. Likewise, the society that is apathetic/silent 
towards such condition is called a jahiliyah (uncivilized) society. Since fighting against 
kafir is mandatory for every Muslim, thus there is no difference between the dzimmy 
kafir and the mu’ahad kafir. All them are deemed as the harbi kafir. 
                                                   
242 See also (Suryaningsih and Marbun 2013). 
 
243 This does not mean that the strict adherents of the works of Imam Bin Hanbal according to the 
interpretation of ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab are the violent salafi jihadists. 
However, the data proves that these 22 individuals only recognize/endorse such works. Muhammad ibn 
Abd-al Wahhab had based many of his Quranic interpretations on the fatwas of ibn Taymiyyah 
(Sageman, 2004), 8. The works of these two Islamic scholars become the main reference for their basic 
principles of tawheed, fiqh, and aqeedah. At the same time, these 22 individuals also greatly admired and 
were inspired by Khalid ibn Walid, one of Muhammad’s companions, known as the “Sword of Allah” for 
his fierceness in battle. 
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They are fanatical and militant, meaning they believe that their belief system 
(including the ideological conviction) is the absolute truth that must be spread out by 
any possible ways and means. They are also anti-Western, which means that they view 
the Western civilization as the prime cause of the decadence in the Islamic civilization 
(e.g., Islamic culture, Islamic intellectualism, Islamic economic system, and Islamic 
politics). They believe that the political power of nation-state must be held by Muslim 
since this is the religious duty. They are fanatic towards a strict, single interpretation of 
Islam as religion and state system (ad-din wa ad-daulah). That said, whoever, including 
Muslim who does not implement the Islamic Shari’a law and does not establish the 
Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia is deemed as kafir and valid to be killed.  
Therefore, for them, Islam must have a special privilege in the state system. This 
means that Islam must become the only official religion recognized/endorsed by the 
government, full right of citizenship for Muslim and dhimmi system for non-Muslim, the 
nationwide implementation of Islamic Shari’a law, the mandatory that any high-rank 
governmental positions must be held by Muslim, and the government must support only 
Islam where any non-Islamic divisions inside the Indonesian government’s ministry of 
religious affairs must be abolished. They also tend to be tatharruf, which means they 
are excessively extreme in many ways. They often place Sunnah as the mandatory, 
furu/furu’uddin (non-principal/non-fundamental) as ushul/ushuluddin 
(principal/fundamental), and something profane as sacral. 
 
Consequences: With What Outcomes? 
 
This radical phenomenon will produce five possible consequences: the possibility 
for the thriving of non-violent extremist movements; the thriving of violent extremist 
movements; the terrorized society; the establishment of Islamic Shari’a law and the 
Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia; or otherwise the moderation of ideology and 
behaviour where they will eventually decide to abandon their extreme ideology and 
action/behaviour. 
It is also noteworthy that not all these 22 individuals have truly abandoned their 
violent ideology and/or behaviour. Once the opportunity is available for them to 
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reactivate their violent behaviour, it is likely that they will come back accordingly. It is 
well proven by the fact where a number of these 22 sentenced individuals are indeed 
the recidivist or have decided to continue on their fighting by joining the ISIS at 
overseas among many other radical/violent activities. 
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Figure 4.1.1 A Way of Looking at the Pattern of Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia 
 
Source: Self-made.
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b. The Content Analysis 
Similar with the discovering patterns analysis, the content analysis in this part is 
also based on the same sample of 22 individuals who are examined only through 
public documentation-archival evidence including legal court cases and published 
media documents. All them have been indicted in the terrorism case. 16 individuals are 
still in the prison, whilst 6 individuals have been recently released.244  Correspondingly, 
based on the content analysis in this part I could draw on several selective words that 
are most mentioned and have substantial meanings in the mind of violent (Salafi) 
jihadists in Indonesia. This profiling is based on the official investigative reports and 
court documents published by the Indonesian authority. These selective words are also 
deemed as the most important concepts by the academicians and policy scholars in 
understanding the phenomenon of Islamist movement in Indonesia particularly the 
extremist, radical, and violent one.  
 





The Most Mentioned 
and Important 




Meaning Within Their 
Bounded Rationality 
 






The establishment of 
Salafi Islamist State of 
Indonesia. 
 
Their goal. This is the 
integral part of their 
belief and obligation as 
the devout Muslim. 
 
 
This word is mentioned 
by 22 individuals and has 
very important meaning 
for them. 
                                                   
244 For the profiling of these 22 individuals, please the attachment #1 in the accompanying materials of 
this Ph.D. thesis. 






The implementation of 
Islamic (Shari’a)  law in 
Indonesia. 
 
Their goal. This is the 
integral part of their 
belief and obligation as 
the devout Muslim. 
 
 
This word is mentioned 
by 22 individuals and has 











As a necessary way. 
For them this is 
something justified by 
the Quran and Hadith. 
 
 
This word is mentioned 
by 22 individuals and has 










As a necessary way. 
They believe that this 
is something 
mandated by the 
Quran and Hadith. 
For them, with or 
without violent acts, 
da’wah is still very 
important element in 
the Islamic struggles. 
 
This word is mentioned 
by 22 individuals and has 
very important meaning 
for them. Da’wah is 
deemed by them as an 









Their goal (nationally, 
regionally, and 
globally). This is the 
integral part of their 
belief and obligation as 
the devout Muslim. 
 
 
This word is mentioned 
by 22 individuals and has 
very important meaning 
for them. 








They believe that 
others with different 
view, ideology, and 
belief system are 
deemed as kafir (in the 
wrong way and not 
being grateful to Allah). 
Muslim people with 
different view are also 
deemed as takfir 
(apostate or infidel). 
Thus, they must be 
excommunicated and 
are also the valid 
targets to be attacked 
and fought on.  
 
 
This word is mentioned 
by 22 individuals and has 













rules but non-Shari’a 
conforming laws. 
This meaning goes 
beyond, where 
Togut or taghut is also 
 
This word is mentioned 
by 22 individuals and has 
very important meaning 
for them. 
 
                                                   
245 In general, this is an Islamic concept that refers to any voluntary allegiances other than to Allah and 
His commands. However, in another perspective taghut is more complex than that. As an Islamist/jihadist 
literature, taghut is understood as anything/anyone being worshipped or anything/anyone that rules but 
non-Shari’a conforming laws. 
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interpreted as any 
hindrances (in the 
government or outside 
the government) to 
their goal. Togut or 
taghut must be fought 
on. For them, fighting 
the togut or taghut is 






The Enemy of Islam 






These enemies of 
Islam are actively 
conspiring to destroy 
Islam at various lines 
of life. These enemies 
are the retarding force 
for both the 
advancement of 
Islamic civilization and 
the establishment of a 
just society at the 
global level. 
For them, this belief is 
also justified by their 
selective and extreme 






This word is mentioned 
by 22 individuals and has 























Pancasila is not 
acknowledged within 
their bounded 
rationality as the 
legitimate national and 
state ideology. 
Anything related to the 
state system is man-
made and not worthy 
to be complied on. 
They believe that this 
“secular” ideology 
must be replaced by 
the Islamic-based 
ideology/Islamism 
(reflected by Quran 
and Hadith) as the 
ideological foundation 
and ultimate source of 
law in Indonesia. 
 
22 individuals believe and 
mention Pancasila as the 
idol, man-made ideology 









UUD 1945 is not 
recognized as the 
legitimate constitution 
of Republic of 
Indonesia. Like 
Pancasila, anything 
related to the state 
system is man-made 
and not worthy to be 
 
22 individuals also 
believe and mention UUD 
1945 as the idol, man-
made foundational 
constitution that must not 
be followed.  
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complied on. They 
believe that this 
secular-based 
foundational 
constitution must be 
replaced by the Islamic 
Shari’a law as the only 





Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. 
 
 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, 
which is the national 
motto whose meaning 
is “the unity in 
diversity” is also not 
recognized within their 
bounded rationality. 
Anything related to the 
state system is man-
made and not worthy 
to be complied on. 
 
They believe that this 
“secular-based” 
national motto must be 
replaced by the 
uniformity under the 
Islamic-based 
ideology/Islamism and 
the application of 
Shari’a law in the 
 
22 individuals also 
believe and mention 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as 
the idol, man-made motto 
that must not be followed.  
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NKRI is the Indonesian 
acronym for “the 
Unitary State of 
Republic of Indonesia.” 
This is the state 
formation according to 
the UUD 1945. NKRI is 
also not recognized by 
them. They believe 
that this state 
formation must be 
replaced by the 
establishment of Salafi 






22 individuals also 
believe and mention 
NKRI as a ramification of 
both the illegitimate 
national and state 
ideology of Pancasila, as 
well as the national 




c. The Discourse Analysis 
The discourse analysis in this part is based on the series of interview with the 15-
key state/security officials and experts in the field. There are three stages carried out in 
this discourse analysis. The first stage is where these 15 individuals filled out the written 
open ended-questionnaire to express their opinions about the examined independent 
(determining) variables, dependent variable (Islamist terrorism), and counterterrorism 
measures in Indonesia. Some of these 15 individuals also discuss the matter directly 
with me as the author of this Ph.D. thesis. These 15 individuals portray the 
phenomenon of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia including its countermeasures in the 
various ways, thus providing us with a synthesized view of the phenomenon being 
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examined. The second stage is where I analyze their opinions and have them 
elaborated according to the independent and dependent variables examined in this 
Ph.D. thesis. The first and second stage’s materials of analysis are available in the 
attachment of this Ph.D. thesis.246 The third stage is where I synthesize and rephrase 
their opinions in the following part. 
 
On the Economic Variable (The Independent Variable #1) 
 
The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts in the 
field indicate that nearly all violent Salafi jihadists come from the lower-level economic 
class so that their economic condition is dire that makes it hard to plan their financial life 
ahead. Indeed, there are some individuals who come from the mid-level economic 
class, but their numbers are relatively low and most of them rather play their role as the 
planner, specialist (e.g., ICT/Information and Communication Technology expert), 
resources provider, and ideologue. In other words, often their families are not well off 
and these individuals are living a very low quality of life. The individuals coming from the 
low-level economic class usually could not afford secular education beyond public 
schools, so that joining the Islamic boarding schools becoming an alternative. Although 
not all Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia are emphasizing on the ideology of Salafi 
jihadism (many of them are still the Pancasila-based Islamic boarding schools), the 
radical boarding schools emphasizing on the ideology of Salafi jihadism become an 
attractive choice for them to learn about religion. Whilst they are attending such 
boarding schools, they are concurrently forming a strong social network. In addition to 
that, a harder economic life will make these individuals more willing to seek “their God” 
through certain religious activities (e.g., the Quran recitation) that eventually would 
expose them to the radical ideology.  
It seems that the economic variable could become necessary, but not a sufficient 
variable for Salafi jihad terrorism to occur in Indonesia. Generally, after they are 
exposed to the radical ideology they believe that their economic difficulties are caused 
by external forces including the conspiracy of the secular government, Jewish, 
                                                   
246 For the first and second stage’s materials, see the attachment #2 in the accompanying materials of 
this Ph.D. thesis. 
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Christian, and the Western civilization that invisibly conquer and dominate the world 
whilst at the same time destroying Islam. That said, the economic variable is not the 
motivation, although the economic variable is needed to finance terrorist activities.  
From another perspective, we also can see that by joining radical and terrorist 
networks they have their immediate financial needs fulfilled. The economic imbalance in 
Indonesia as indicated by the gini-coefficient index is also still a concerning factor for 
the terrorist recruitment and for Salafi jihad terrorism to occur. The fact showing that 
extremists/violent jihadists not only come from the lower-level economic class also 
confirms the hypothesis that there is no single economic class that is impenetrable by 
radical/extremist/violent jihadist ideology.    
 
On the Social/Education Variable (The Independent Variable #2) 
 
The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts in the 
field indicate that nearly all violent Salafi jihadists who have been indicted in the 
terrorism case have various, formal educational exposures ranging from the elementary 
to the doctorate level. However, according to the series of interview with these 15-key 
state/security officials and experts, most them is at least the high school graduates with 
some college courses (or its equivalence in the Islamic boarding school system). This 
indication provides us with the insight that the influence of Salafi jihad terrorism in 
Indonesia has a tremendous capability to penetrate every level of educational 
background and wider social structures.  
According to the opinions of these key state/security officials and experts, such 
influence infiltrates through Islamic boarding schools and Quran-recitation fellowships. 
Moreover, the infiltration of ideology is also carried through the da’wah council of 
various mosques and the Islamic student body of various college/universities. They 
receive some support from certain political parties and overseas sources. The Islamist 
ideology that directly or indirectly supports the establishment of Islamic Shari’a law and 
the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia to some degree is deemed as a national security 
threat to the Republic of Indonesia.  
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On the Employment Variable (The Independent Variable #2) 
 
The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate 
that the employment status of Salafi jihadists is usually a low-paying one, thus making 
their social status generally from the lower class of society. That is why they would find 
a more financial stability by aligning themselves with a radical group since many of them 
having no high-paying jobs prior to their joining with a radical group. Their social 
grievances are largely compensated by centring on a sense of wanting to feel important 
and feel like leaders in the community. They do not have important jobs or positions of 
power before joining with an Islamist group, so they find that working towards a radical 
goal will be providing them with some meanings in life. Additionally, the association with 
the radical social network also add to the sense of self-importance. They find safety, 
comfort, and acceptance in those groups. Nearly all violent jihadists are involved in the 
Salafi jihad terrorism because they have been previously connected with the related 
social networks.  
 
On the Political Variable (The Independent Variable #3)  
 
The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate 
that the political grievances are not the main reason for these individuals before joining 
with an Islamist radical group. That said, in the Indonesian context, the radical ideology 
precedes political grievances instead of being otherwise. In this case, the weight of 
radical ideology seems to be heavier than that of political grievances. This is indeed an 
interesting finding that challenges the conventional findings in security studies where 
the factor of political repression usually causes politically repressed people to become 
radical. In other words, addressing the political grievances is indeed not their main 
priority. However, upon joining the group, the political dimension becomes an important 
end-state for such individuals to help achieve. Correspondingly, nearly all violent 
jihadists view that democracy including in Indonesia as a failure in terms of its 
conceptual model and of its application.  
They view that in the authoritarian system they could not channel out their 
political aspiration, whilst within their bounded rationality the product of Indonesian 
P a g e  | 222 
 
 
democracy also could not produce the expected outcomes characterized by the free-
corruption society, economic equality and equitability, equal justice, and the come-back 
of Islamic Golden Age. The failure to apply the Islamic values and Shari’a law in the 
society is deemed as the most significant factor for the defects found in the politico-
social-economic life. 
  
On the Radical Ideology Variable (The Independent Variable #4) 
 
The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate 
that the religious knowledge of Islamist terrorists (the Salafi jihadists) is very minimal 
before joining radical groups. In often cases, their first in-depth exposure to Islam is 
through radical groups. This allowed radical leaders to take advantage of their lack of 
religious knowledge and misinformation, and then to manipulate these individuals. 
These conditions are exacerbated by the radicals’ use of social media and cyberspace. 
Whilst the old, al-Qaeda type of radicals (e.g., Taliban’s Afghanistan) desired to turn 
back the clock, the current Islamist radicals/terrorists embrace and exploit technology. 
As previously mentioned, a harder economic life will make these individuals more willing 
to seek “their God” through certain religious activities (e.g., the Quran recitation) that 
eventually would expose them to the radical ideology. The interviews with the key 
state/security officials and experts indicate that the radical ideology is the most 
significant factor for the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. It 
is for this reason that the biggest Indonesian Islamist organizations (NU and 
Muhammadiyah) have been trying to develop in the archipelago an Islamist movement 
that is Pancasila-based (inclusive and pluralistic Islamism). 
 
On the Social Network Variable (The Independent Variable #5) 
 
The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate 
that social network is an important venue through which they are gradually exposed to 
the radical ideology and behaviour including in the act of terrorism. Practically it is 
through a social network that these individuals would have the desire to feel important in 
the exclusive community where the striving for something greater than themselves is 
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deemed as very important. The complex interaction within the social network is also 
related to a sense of acceptance by their peers. If they do a good job of committing 
radical activities, their peers will view them as strong leaders. 
 
On the State Repression Variable (The Independent Variable #6/“Stick”) and 
Government Incentive Variable (The Independent Variable #7/“Carrot”) 
 
The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate 
that the current level of state repression in Indonesia is already enough to deter Salafi 
jihad terrorism activities. However, this is not an absolute term, meaning that any 
adjustments must be made depending upon the dynamic development of Salafi jihad 
terrorism movement. The correlation of state repression and government incentive must 
also be in the positive state, which means that the higher the state repression level, the 
higher government incentive level should be. The state repression is aimed to deter 
people from becoming violent jihadists/terrorists, whilst the government incentive is 
aimed to moderate the view, ideology, and belief system of already radicalized 
individuals. In other words, the government incentive is a significant policy tool to both 
disengage radicalized individuals from terrorism networks and activities as well as to de-
radicalize them from extremist/violent jihadist ideology.  
 
On the Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia (The Dependent Variable) 
 
The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate 
that Indonesia is still potential to become both the producer of violent jihadists as much 
as to become the training field and battlefield for global religious terrorism (terrorism that 
is justified by religious-based arguments). For the Indonesian context, the individuals 
who have been involved in the act of terrorism (Salafi jihad) still have the strong passion 
as they are talking about the application of Islamic values and Shari’a law in every level 
of society, although at this moment this aim would not be effectively achieved through 
radical, violent ways. The peaceful jihad to gradually/progressively achieve their aim 
through democratic ways is the only current way they could do. However, once the 
opportunity for them to re-engage in the radical and violent ways is opened, they will 
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make their come-back accordingly. For the Indonesian general society and national 
security community, the Islamist ideology that directly or indirectly supports the 
establishment of Islamic Shari’a law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia is deemed 
as a serious threat to the Indonesian national security.  
The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts also 
indicate that the radical ideology is the most significant factor for the existence and 
latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. According to these key state/security 
officials and experts, within the bounded rationality of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists), 
violence is permitted and encouraged in the Quran and the Hadith as a form of lesser 
jihad, thus committing violent jihad in the form of terrorists attacks against the civilian as 
well as the government and national security apparatus will erode the power and 
legitimacy of the establishment, and to provide for a space in which the Islamic Shari’a 
law and the Salafi Islamist state to potentially arise. Such radical, violent ways are 
needed for them to establish the caliphate within the traditional Muslim lands (e.g., Arab 
peninsula extending to some parts of southeast and southwest Asia) before reaching 
out the northern and eastern Europe, the Americas, and sub-Saharan Africa. Such 
caliphate is deemed by these Salafi jihadists as a perfect system that will rid the lands 
of the ummah of any crimes, poverty, or decadence.  
 
On the Indonesian Counterterrorism Efforts 
 
The questions/interviews with the key state/security officials and experts indicate 
that the Indonesian counterterrorism efforts must be done in a consistent way and still 
need to be improved in many aspects.  
First, the government must continue to effectively address the root causes of 
Islamist terrorism: economic, social, and political grievances; radical ideology; social 
networks; state repression; and government incentive. Second, in terms of constitutional 
aspect, the current counterterrorism bill needs to be passed as a new counterterrorism 
act with some revisions in the substantial matters. 
Third, in terms of strategic engagement and holistic whole-of-government-and-
society approaches, the Indonesian counterterrorism efforts must maximize the 
involvement of all national instruments of power, sustained by the recalibration of 
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Indonesian national counterterrorism agency/BNPT. This recalibration includes the 
centralization of national counterterrorism policy and strategy at the presidential cabinet 
level; coordination, strategic decisionmaking process, and the specialization in 
counterterrorism efforts at the BNPT level; and the development of effective and timely 
operational capabilities among the involved agencies (including the prison system 
among many others).  
On top of these dimensions, the Indonesian government must promote Quran 
research activities by using positivist approaches. Such engagement will help to counter 
Quran recitation activities that often lead people to blindly believe in something which 
they do not actually understand. Rationalizing the radicalized mind is an important step 
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4.2 The Quantitative Analysis. 
 
The quantitative analysis in this part is based on the close-ended survey over 40 
former convicted Islamist terrorists living outside prisons. Currently they support the 
Indonesian government in the deradicalization efforts. There are four stages carried out 
in this analysis. The first stage is where they filled out the questionnaires. The second 
stage is where their responses are converted into the excel format. The third stage is 
where their responses are transformed into specific STATA data set files.247 The fourth 
stage is where I analyze all converted data in this specific STATA data set by using 
various multivariate statistical techniques available in the STATA software. 
The entire analysis is directed towards independent variables (economic 
grievances, social grievances, political grievances, radical ideology, social network, 
state repression, and government incentive) and the dependent variable. The variable 
“YBelieveOnJihadAndTerrorism or ybeliefonjihadandterrorism” is the dependent 
variable that captures and measures the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour towards 
the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through 
violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).248 
 
a. Individual Relationship Between Each Independent Variable with the Dependent 
Variable. 
 
In this sub-part of chapter 4.2., I conduct several statistical analyses to measure 
the existence of a relationship between each independent variable and the dependent 
variable. The statistical test used is the chi-square test. The test is to be conducted 
under the two models: with the initial categorical variables (for all independent variables 
                                                   
247 For the first, second and third stage’s materials, see the attachment #3 in the accompanying materials 
of this Ph.D. thesis. 
 
248 As a reminding, this Ph.D. thesis excludes other perpetrators since the sample for this Ph.D. thesis is 
only focused on the salafi-jihadists who are convicted of terrorism acts. There are no other categories of 
perpetrators from different political ideology camps (e.g., communists or etno-nationalists) in this sample. 
Communists or etno-nationalists could perform the acts of terror/terrorism for different objectives. 
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and the dependent variable) and with the binary variables (for all independent variables 
and the dependent variable). 
 
In the binary model, the dependent variable will be re-categorized into agree and 
less agree (1) and disagree (0). Likewise, the independent variables are re-categorized 





Table 4.2.1 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           34      100.00
                                                
          3           20       58.82      100.00
          2            5       14.71       41.18
          1            9       26.47       26.47
                                                






1. Disagree (0) 
2. Less Agree (1) 
3. Agree (1) 
 
Interpretation/Analysis: Out of 40 individuals surveyed, 58.82% of them is agree, 
14.71% is less agree, and 9% is disagree with the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law 
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1. The Independent Variable “Age” and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.2 The STATA Calculation 
 
         Pearson chi2(34) =  35.8222   Pr = 0.383
                  3.13       3.13       3.13       3.13      100.00 
                   5.4        0.8        2.6        0.8        35.8 
                   1.0        1.0        1.0        1.0        32.0 
     Total           1          1          1          1          32 
                                                                   
                  0.00       5.56       0.00       5.56      100.00 
                   0.6        0.3        0.6        0.3         9.1 
                   0.6        0.6        0.6        0.6        18.0 
         3           0          1          0          1          18 
                                                                   
                 20.00       0.00       0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   4.6        0.2        0.2        0.2        12.6 
                   0.2        0.2        0.2        0.2         5.0 
         2           1          0          0          0           5 
                                                                   
                  0.00       0.00      11.11       0.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.3        1.8        0.3        14.1 
                   0.3        0.3        0.3        0.3         9.0 
         1           0          0          1          0           9 
                                                                   
    rorism          49         53         55         65       Total
ihadAndTer                       Age
YBeliefOnJ  
                  6.25      12.50       6.25       6.25       3.13       6.25       6.25      100.00 
                   2.1        1.6        0.7        0.7        0.8        2.1        5.1        35.8 
                   2.0        4.0        2.0        2.0        1.0        2.0        2.0        32.0 
     Total           2          4          2          2          1          2          2          32 
                                                                                                    
                  5.56       5.56       5.56       5.56       5.56       5.56       0.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.7        0.0        0.0        0.3        0.0        1.1         9.1 
                   1.1        2.3        1.1        1.1        0.6        1.1        1.1        18.0 
         3           1          1          1          1          1          1          0          18 
                                                                                                    
                 20.00      20.00       0.00       0.00       0.00      20.00       0.00      100.00 
                   1.5        0.2        0.3        0.3        0.2        1.5        0.3        12.6 
                   0.3        0.6        0.3        0.3        0.2        0.3        0.3         5.0 
         2           1          1          0          0          0          1          0           5 
                                                                                                    
                  0.00      22.22      11.11      11.11       0.00       0.00      22.22      100.00 
                   0.6        0.7        0.3        0.3        0.3        0.6        3.7        14.1 
                   0.6        1.1        0.6        0.6        0.3        0.6        0.6         9.0 
         1           0          2          1          1          0          0          2           9 
                                                                                                    
    rorism          35         36         38         40         41         42         45       Total
ihadAndTer                                       Age
YBeliefOnJ  
                  3.13       6.25       3.13       3.13       6.25       9.38       9.38      100.00 
                   0.8        3.0        0.8        2.6        1.6        2.3        2.3        35.8 
                   1.0        2.0        1.0        1.0        2.0        3.0        3.0        32.0 
     Total           1          2          1          1          2          3          3          32 
                                                                                                    
                  5.56       0.00       5.56       0.00      11.11      16.67      16.67      100.00 
                   0.3        1.1        0.3        0.6        0.7        1.0        1.0         9.1 
                   0.6        1.1        0.6        0.6        1.1        1.7        1.7        18.0 
         3           1          0          1          0          2          3          3          18 
                                                                                                    
                  0.00      20.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.2        1.5        0.2        0.2        0.3        0.5        0.5        12.6 
                   0.2        0.3        0.2        0.2        0.3        0.5        0.5         5.0 
         2           0          1          0          0          0          0          0           5 
                                                                                                    
                  0.00      11.11       0.00      11.11       0.00       0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.3        0.3        1.8        0.6        0.8        0.8        14.1 
                   0.3        0.6        0.3        0.3        0.6        0.8        0.8         9.0 
         1           0          1          0          1          0          0          0           9 
                                                                                                    
    rorism          24         25         26         29         31         33         34       Total
ihadAndTer                                       Age
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism Age, cchi2 chi2 expected row
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H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Age”. 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Age”. 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Age.” 
 
 
Tab 4.2.3 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           37      100.00
                                                
         65            1        2.70      100.00
         55            1        2.70       97.30
         53            1        2.70       94.59
         49            1        2.70       91.89
         45            3        8.11       89.19
         42            2        5.41       81.08
         41            1        2.70       75.68
         40            3        8.11       72.97
         38            4       10.81       64.86
         36            4       10.81       54.05
         35            2        5.41       43.24
         34            3        8.11       37.84
         33            3        8.11       29.73
         31            2        5.41       21.62
         30            1        2.70       16.22
         29            1        2.70       13.51
         26            1        2.70       10.81
         25            2        5.41        8.11
         24            1        2.70        2.70
                                                




Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
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2. The Independent Variable “Birth Place” and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Tab 4.2.4 The STATA Calculation 
 
. 
         Pearson chi2(18) =  19.5000   Pr = 0.362
                  4.17       4.17       8.33      100.00 
                   1.0        5.0        2.0        19.5 
                   1.0        1.0        2.0        24.0 
     Total           1          1          2          24 
                                                        
                  8.33       0.00      16.67      100.00 
                   0.5        0.5        1.0         5.4 
                   0.5        0.5        1.0        12.0 
         3           1          0          2          12 
                                                        
                  0.00      25.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.2        4.2        0.3         8.0 
                   0.2        0.2        0.3         4.0 
         2           0          1          0           4 
                                                        
                  0.00       0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.3        0.7         6.1 
                   0.3        0.3        0.7         8.0 
         1           0          0          0           8 
                                                        
    rorism           5          8          9       Total
ihadAndTer              BirthPlace
YBeliefOnJ  
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “BirthPlace”. 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “BirthPlace”. 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Tab 4.2.5 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.3750   Pr = 0.540
                 33.33      66.67      100.00 
                   0.3        0.1         0.4 
                   8.0       16.0        24.0 
     Total           8         16          24 
                                             
                 37.50      62.50      100.00 
                   0.1        0.0         0.1 
                   5.3       10.7        16.0 
         1           6         10          16 
                                             
                 25.00      75.00      100.00 
                   0.2        0.1         0.3 
                   2.7        5.3         8.0 
         0           2          6           8 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer        BirthPlace
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      














P a g e  | 232 
 
 
Tab 4.2.6 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           29      100.00
                                                
          9            2        6.90      100.00
          8            1        3.45       93.10
          7            1        3.45       89.66
          5            2        6.90       86.21
          4            2        6.90       79.31
          3            5       17.24       72.41
          2            8       27.59       55.17
         12            1        3.45       27.59
         11            1        3.45       24.14
         10            2        6.90       20.69
          1            4       13.79       13.79
                                                
 BirthPlace        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
. tab BirthPlace
 
1. Province of DKI Jakarta (1) 
2. Province of JATENG (1) 
3. Province of JATIM (1) 
4. Province of JABAR (1) 
5. Province of SUMBAR (0) 
6. Province of SUMSEL (0) 
7. Province of LAMPUNG (0) 
8. Province of KEPRI (0) 
9. Province of NTB (0) 
10. Province of SULTENG (0) 
11. Province of SULUT (0) 
12. Province of SUMUT (0) 
 
Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
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3. The Independent Variable “Ethnicity” and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Tab 4.2.7 The STATA Calculation 
         Pearson chi2(16) =  19.0846   Pr = 0.264
                  3.45       3.45      100.00 
                   0.9        0.9        19.1 
                   1.0        1.0        29.0 
     Total           1          1          29 
                                             
                  6.67       6.67      100.00 
                   0.5        0.5         3.8 
                   0.5        0.5        15.0 
         3           1          1          15 
                                             
                  0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.2        0.2         9.3 
                   0.2        0.2         5.0 
         2           0          0           5 
                                             
                  0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.3         6.0 
                   0.3        0.3         9.0 
         1           0          0           9 
                                             
    rorism           8          9       Total
ihadAndTer         Ethnicity
YBeliefOnJ  
                 65.52       3.45       3.45      10.34       3.45       3.45       3.45      100.00 
                   0.3        0.9        4.8        1.9        4.8        2.2        2.2        19.1 
                  19.0        1.0        1.0        3.0        1.0        1.0        1.0        29.0 
     Total          19          1          1          3          1          1          1          29 
                                                                                                    
                 73.33       6.67       0.00       6.67       0.00       0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.1        0.5        0.5        0.2        0.5        0.5        0.5         3.8 
                   9.8        0.5        0.5        1.6        0.5        0.5        0.5        15.0 
         3          11          1          0          1          0          0          0          15 
                                                                                                    
                 60.00       0.00      20.00       0.00      20.00       0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.2        4.0        0.5        4.0        0.2        0.2         9.3 
                   3.3        0.2        0.2        0.5        0.2        0.2        0.2         5.0 
         2           3          0          1          0          1          0          0           5 
                                                                                                    
                 55.56       0.00       0.00      22.22       0.00      11.11      11.11      100.00 
                   0.1        0.3        0.3        1.2        0.3        1.5        1.5         6.0 
                   5.9        0.3        0.3        0.9        0.3        0.3        0.3         9.0 
         1           5          0          0          2          0          1          1           9 
                                                                                                    
    rorism           1         10          2          3          5          6          7       Total
ihadAndTer                                    Ethnicity
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism Ethnicity, cchi2 chi2 expected row
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H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Ethnicity.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Ethnicity.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Ethnicity.” 
 
Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.8 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.5732   Pr = 0.449
                 34.48      65.52      100.00 
                   0.4        0.2         0.6 
                  10.0       19.0        29.0 
     Total          10         19          29 
                                             
                 30.00      70.00      100.00 
                   0.1        0.1         0.2 
                   6.9       13.1        20.0 
         1           6         14          20 
                                             
                 44.44      55.56      100.00 
                   0.3        0.1         0.4 
                   3.1        5.9         9.0 
         0           4          5           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer         Ethnicity
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
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Tab 4.2.9 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           33      100.00
                                                
          9            1        3.03      100.00
          8            1        3.03       96.97
          7            1        3.03       93.94
          6            1        3.03       90.91
          5            1        3.03       87.88
          4            1        3.03       84.85
          3            3        9.09       81.82
          2            1        3.03       72.73
         10            1        3.03       69.70
          1           22       66.67       66.67
                                                




1. Javanese (1) 
2. Malay (0) 
3. Sundanese (0) 
4. Palembang (0) 
5. Betawi (0) 
6. Batak (0) 
7. Poso/Bugis (0) 
8. Bima/Sasak (0) 
9. Minang (0) 
10. Mbojo/Bima (0) 
 
Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the ethnicity 
category. However, it is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 
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4. The Independent Variable “Marriage Status” and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.10 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(2) =   1.9128   Pr = 0.384
                 22.58      77.42      100.00 
                   1.5        0.4         1.9 
                   7.0       24.0        31.0 
     Total           7         24          31 
                                             
                 29.41      70.59      100.00 
                   0.4        0.1         0.5 
                   3.8       13.2        17.0 
         3           5         12          17 
                                             
                  0.00     100.00      100.00 
                   1.1        0.3         1.5 
                   1.1        3.9         5.0 
         2           0          5           5 
                                             
                 22.22      77.78      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   2.0        7.0         9.0 
         1           2          7           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer      MarriageStatus
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism MarriageStatus, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “MarriageStatus.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “MarriageStatus.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“MarriageStatus.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.11 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0009   Pr = 0.976
                 22.58      77.42      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   7.0       24.0        31.0 
     Total           7         24          31 
                                             
                 22.73      77.27      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   5.0       17.0        22.0 
         1           5         17          22 
                                             
                 22.22      77.78      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   2.0        7.0         9.0 
         0           2          7           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer      MarriageStatus
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism marriagestatus, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
 
Table 4.2.12 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           36      100.00
                                                
          1           28       77.78      100.00
          0            8       22.22       22.22
                                                







Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
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through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the marriage 
category. However, it is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 
77.78% of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) are married or already having 
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5. The Independent Variable “Location” and Y: Significant Relationship (the 
confidence level of 90%) 
 
Table 4.2.13 The STATA Calculation 
         Pearson chi2(18) =  28.3429   Pr = 0.057
                  3.13       9.38       6.25      100.00 
                   0.8        2.3        1.6        28.3 
                   1.0        3.0        2.0        32.0 
     Total           1          3          2          32 
                                                        
                  5.56       5.56      11.11      100.00 
                   0.3        0.3        0.7         5.3 
                   0.6        1.7        1.1        18.0 
         3           1          1          2          18 
                                                        
                  0.00       0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.2        0.5        0.3        15.9 
                   0.2        0.5        0.3         5.0 
         2           0          0          0           5 
                                                        
                  0.00      22.22       0.00      100.00 
                   0.3        1.6        0.6         7.1 
                   0.3        0.8        0.6         9.0 
         1           0          2          0           9 
                                                        
    rorism           6          7          8       Total
ihadAndTer               Location
YBeliefOnJ  
                  6.25       3.13       6.25      25.00      21.88      15.63       3.13      100.00 
                   0.7        2.6       10.8        0.4        0.0        3.9        5.4        28.3 
                   2.0        1.0        2.0        8.0        7.0        5.0        1.0        32.0 
     Total           2          1          2          8          7          5          1          32 
                                                                                                    
                  5.56       0.00       0.00      22.22      22.22      27.78       0.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.6        1.1        0.1        0.0        1.7        0.6         5.3 
                   1.1        0.6        1.1        4.5        3.9        2.8        0.6        18.0 
         3           1          0          0          4          4          5          0          18 
                                                                                                    
                  0.00       0.00      40.00      20.00      20.00       0.00      20.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.2        9.1        0.1        0.0        0.8        4.6        15.9 
                   0.3        0.2        0.3        1.3        1.1        0.8        0.2         5.0 
         2           0          0          2          1          1          0          1           5 
                                                                                                    
                 11.11      11.11       0.00      33.33      22.22       0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.3        1.8        0.6        0.3        0.0        1.4        0.3         7.1 
                   0.6        0.3        0.6        2.3        2.0        1.4        0.3         9.0 
         1           1          1          0          3          2          0          0           9 
                                                                                                    
    rorism           1         10         11          2          3          4          5       Total
ihadAndTer                                     Location
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism Location, cchi2 chi2 expected row
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H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Location.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Location.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is smaller than 0.1. 
Therefore, by using 90% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “Location.” 
 
However, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship becomes insignificant. 
 
Table 4.2.14 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0253   Pr = 0.874
                 31.25      68.75      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                  10.0       22.0        32.0 
     Total          10         22          32 
                                             
                 30.43      69.57      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   7.2       15.8        23.0 
         1           7         16          23 
                                             
                 33.33      66.67      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   2.8        6.2         9.0 
         0           3          6           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer         Location
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
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Table 4.2.15 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           37      100.00
                                                
          9            1        2.70      100.00
          8            2        5.41       97.30
          7            3        8.11       91.89
          6            1        2.70       83.78
          5            1        2.70       81.08
          4            5       13.51       78.38
          3            7       18.92       64.86
          2           11       29.73       45.95
         11            3        8.11       16.22
         10            1        2.70        8.11
          1            2        5.41        5.41
                                                




1. Province of DKI Jakarta (1) 
2. Province of JATENG (1) 
3. Province of JABAR (1) 
4. Province of JATIM (1) 
5. Province of SUMUT (0 
6. Province of SULSEL (0) 
7. Province of SULTENG (0) 
8. Province of NTB (0) 
9. Province of LAMPUNG (0) 
10. Province of KEPRI (0) 
11. Province of BANTEN (0) 
 
Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, based on the first model I can conclude that the 
individual’s ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law 
and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is 
dependent upon the location category. It is important to notice that based on this 
sample of 40 individuals, 29.73% (the highest percentage) of Islamist terrorists (Salafi 
jihadists in Indonesia) live and come from the province of Central Java followed by West 
Java (18.92%) and East Java (13.51%). 
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6. The Independent Variable X1 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.16 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(6) =   4.9700   Pr = 0.548
                 11.76      67.65      17.65       2.94      100.00 
                   0.3        0.1        1.7        2.8         5.0 
                   4.0       23.0        6.0        1.0        34.0 
     Total           4         23          6          1          34 
                                                                   
                 10.00      65.00      25.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.1        0.0        0.6        0.6         1.3 
                   2.4       13.5        3.5        0.6        20.0 
         3           2         13          5          0          20 
                                                                   
                 20.00      80.00       0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.1        0.9        0.1         1.4 
                   0.6        3.4        0.9        0.1         5.0 
         2           1          4          0          0           5 
                                                                   
                 11.11      66.67      11.11      11.11      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0        0.2        2.0         2.3 
                   1.1        6.1        1.6        0.3         9.0 
         1           1          6          1          1           9 
                                                                   
    rorism           1          2          3          4       Total
ihadAndTer                X1GrievOnDailyInc
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X1GrievOnDailyInc, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X1GrievOnDailyInc.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “GrievOnDailyInc.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X1GrievOnDailyInc.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.17 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0200   Pr = 0.888
                 79.41      20.59      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                  27.0        7.0        34.0 
     Total          27          7          34 
                                             
                 80.00      20.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                  19.9        5.1        25.0 
         1          20          5          25 
                                             
                 77.78      22.22      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   7.1        1.9         9.0 
         0           7          2           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer     X1GrievOnDailyInc
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
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Table 4.2.18 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           40      100.00
                                                
          4            2        5.00      100.00
          3            7       17.50       95.00
          2           27       67.50       77.50
          1            4       10.00       10.00
                                                




1. Rp. 200,000 and Up (0).  
This range of income level is already above the income level of average 
Indonesians (the middle-to-upper class). 
 
2. Rp. 30,000 – Rp. 200,000 (0).  
This is the range of income level for average Indonesians (the lower-to-middle 
class). 
 
3. Less Than Rp. 30,000 (1).  
This range is already below the poverty line in Indonesia (the poor-to-the middle 
class).249 
 
4. No Income (1).  
This is already below the poverty line in Indonesia. 
 
Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the daily income 
category. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 67.50% 
(the highest percentage) of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) earns within 
                                                   
249 Even the current Indonesian government uses US$ 1/day as the lowest income per capita. See 
(Sukmana 2017). 
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the range of average Indonesians, whilst the other 10% earns above average 
Indonesians. In fact, only 22.5% of them earns below the poverty line of about 
US$2/day. 
 
Note: This finding is in line with Leon Trotsky’s argument that people need more than 
just poverty to motivate them to revolt. Precisely in his 1936 book, The Revolution 
Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going, he argued that if poverty was 
the cause of revolutions, there would be revolutions all the time since most people in the 
world is poor. Corresponding to Trotsky’s argument, Ted Robert Gurr (1970) in his 
book, Why Men Rebel? also argues that people need to feel more intense and 
prolonged frustration (not only poverty) to make them become rebellious. In other 
words, Gurr argues that poverty does not necessarily cause people to become 
rebellious. It is the relative deprivation that causes people to become aggressive and 
rebelious. This relative deprivation is the perceived discrepancy between value 
expectations and value capabilities, and the intensity and scope of relative deprivation 
determine the potential for collective violence. These value include welfare, security, 
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7. The Independent Variable X2.1 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.19 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(6) =   3.7354   Pr = 0.712
                 20.59      20.59      50.00       8.82      100.00 
                   1.3        1.7        0.2        0.5         3.7 
                   7.0        7.0       17.0        3.0        34.0 
     Total           7          7         17          3          34 
                                                                   
                 20.00      20.00      50.00      10.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   4.1        4.1       10.0        1.8        20.0 
         3           4          4         10          2          20 
                                                                   
                 40.00       0.00      60.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.9        1.0        0.1        0.4         2.5 
                   1.0        1.0        2.5        0.4         5.0 
         2           2          0          3          0           5 
                                                                   
                 11.11      33.33      44.44      11.11      100.00 
                   0.4        0.7        0.1        0.1         1.2 
                   1.9        1.9        4.5        0.8         9.0 
         1           1          3          4          1           9 
                                                                   
    rorism           1          2          3          4       Total
ihadAndTer             X21GrievOnEmployStatus
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X21GrievOnEmployStatus, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X21GrievOnEmployStatus.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X21GrievOnEmployStatus.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X21GrievOnEmployStatus.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.20 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0540   Pr = 0.816
                 41.18      58.82      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.1 
                  14.0       20.0        34.0 
     Total          14         20          34 
                                             
                 40.00      60.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                  10.3       14.7        25.0 
         1          10         15          25 
                                             
                 44.44      55.56      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   3.7        5.3         9.0 
         0           4          5           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer             s
YBeliefOnJ   X21GrievOnEmployStatu
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x21grievonemploystatus, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
 
Table 4.2.21 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           40      100.00
                                                
          4            3        7.50      100.00
          3           21       52.50       92.50
          2            7       17.50       40.00
          1            9       22.50       22.50
                                                





1. Employer (0) 
2. Employed (0) 
3. Self-Employed (1) 
4. Unemployed (1) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the employment 
status category. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 
60% (the highest percentage) of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) did not 
have a permanent job (category 3 and 4) whilst they were committing terrorism acts: 
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8. The Independent Variable X2.2 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.22 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(4) =   1.2698   Pr = 0.866
                 26.47      70.59       2.94      100.00 
                   0.4        0.1        0.7         1.3 
                   9.0       24.0        1.0        34.0 
     Total           9         24          1          34 
                                                        
                 25.00      70.00       5.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0        0.3         0.3 
                   5.3       14.1        0.6        20.0 
         3           5         14          1          20 
                                                        
                 40.00      60.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.1        0.1         0.6 
                   1.3        3.5        0.1         5.0 
         2           2          3          0           5 
                                                        
                 22.22      77.78       0.00      100.00 
                   0.1        0.1        0.3         0.4 
                   2.4        6.4        0.3         9.0 
         1           2          7          0           9 
                                                        
    rorism           1          2          4       Total
ihadAndTer         X22GrievOnEducLevel
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X22GrievOnEducLevel, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X2.2GrievOnEducLevel.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X2.2GrievOnEducLevel.” 
 
Based on the following chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not 
smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X2.2GrievOnEducLevel.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.23 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.3709   Pr = 0.543
                 97.06       2.94      100.00 
                   0.0        0.4         0.4 
                  33.0        1.0        34.0 
     Total          33          1          34 
                                             
                 96.00       4.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.1         0.1 
                  24.3        0.7        25.0 
         1          24          1          25 
                                             
                100.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.3         0.3 
                   8.7        0.3         9.0 
         0           9          0           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer    X22GrievOnEducLevel
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x22grievoneduclevel, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
Table 4.2.24 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           40      100.00
                                                
          4            2        5.00      100.00
          3            1        2.50       95.00
          2           27       67.50       92.50
          1           10       25.00       25.00
                                                




1. Undergraduate (0) 
2. SMP/SMA (0) 
3. Passing Elementary (1) 
4. Not Passing Elementary (1) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the educational level 
category. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 92.5% of 
them at least have completed the minimum mandatory educational years (9 years) 
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9. The Independent Variable X3 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.25 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(4) =   2.4719   Pr = 0.650
                 54.55      15.15      30.30      100.00 
                   0.8        1.1        0.6         2.5 
                  18.0        5.0       10.0        33.0 
     Total          18          5         10          33 
                                                        
                 47.37      15.79      36.84      100.00 
                   0.2        0.0        0.3         0.5 
                  10.4        2.9        5.8        19.0 
         3           9          3          7          19 
                                                        
                 80.00       0.00      20.00      100.00 
                   0.6        0.8        0.2         1.5 
                   2.7        0.8        1.5         5.0 
         2           4          0          1           5 
                                                        
                 55.56      22.22      22.22      100.00 
                   0.0        0.3        0.2         0.5 
                   4.9        1.4        2.7         9.0 
         1           5          2          2           9 
                                                        
    rorism           1          2          3       Total
ihadAndTer             X3GrievOnPol
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X3GrievOnPol, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X3GrievOnPol.” 
 
Ha: There is statistically significant relationship between variable  
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X3GrievOnPol.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X3GrievOnPol.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.26 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0051   Pr = 0.943
                 54.55      45.45      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                  18.0       15.0        33.0 
     Total          18         15          33 
                                             
                 54.17      45.83      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                  13.1       10.9        24.0 
         1          13         11          24 
                                             
                 55.56      44.44      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   4.9        4.1         9.0 
         0           5          4           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer       X3GrievOnPol
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x3grievonpol, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
Table 4.2.27 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          3           11       28.21      100.00
          2            5       12.82       71.79
          1           23       58.97       58.97
                                                





1. Neither One (0) 
2. Unrepresented (1) 
3. Marginalized (1) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the political 
grievances category. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 
58.97% (the majority) of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) did not feel that 
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10. The Independent Variable X4.1 and Y: Significant Relationship (95% of 
Confidence Level) 
 
Table 4.2.28 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(4) =  11.1683   Pr = 0.025
                 14.71      50.00      35.29      100.00 
                   3.2        2.3        5.7        11.2 
                   5.0       17.0       12.0        34.0 
     Total           5         17         12          34 
                                                        
                 10.00      35.00      55.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.9        2.2         3.4 
                   2.9       10.0        7.1        20.0 
         3           2          7         11          20 
                                                        
                  0.00      80.00      20.00      100.00 
                   0.7        0.9        0.3         2.0 
                   0.7        2.5        1.8         5.0 
         2           0          4          1           5 
                                                        
                 33.33      66.67       0.00      100.00 
                   2.1        0.5        3.2         5.8 
                   1.3        4.5        3.2         9.0 
         1           3          6          0           9 
                                                        
    rorism           1          2          3       Total
ihadAndTer            X41SyariahLaw
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X41SyariahLaw, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X41SyariahLaw.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X41SyariahLaw.” 
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Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is smaller than 0.05 
Therefore, by using 95% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X41SyariahLaw.” 
Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still significant (but decreasing to 90% of confidence level). 
 
Table 4.2.29 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   3.3859   Pr = 0.066
                 14.71      85.29      100.00 
                   2.9        0.5         3.4 
                   5.0       29.0        34.0 
     Total           5         29          34 
                                             
                  8.00      92.00      100.00 
                   0.8        0.1         0.9 
                   3.7       21.3        25.0 
         1           2         23          25 
                                             
                 33.33      66.67      100.00 
                   2.1        0.4         2.5 
                   1.3        7.7         9.0 
         0           3          6           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer       X41SyariahLaw
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x41syariahlaw, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
 
Table 4.2.30 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           38      100.00
                                                
          3           16       42.11      100.00
          2           17       44.74       57.89
          1            5       13.16       13.16
                                                




1. Not Islamic (Shari’a) law (0) 
2. Islamic (Shari’a) law (1) 
3. Islamist State (1) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the category of how the 
individual perceive the mandatory to establish the Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi 
Islamist state of Indonesia. It is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 
individuals, 44.74% of Islamist terrorists (Salafi jihadists in Indonesia) firmly believe that 
the Islamic (Shari’a) law must be established in Indonesia, whilst the other 42.11% 
believe even more which was the mandatory to establish the Salafi Islamist state of 
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11. The Independent Variable X4.2 and Y: Significant Relationship (95% of 
Confidence Level) 
 
Table 4.2.31 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(2) =   8.8220   Pr = 0.012
                 64.71      35.29      100.00 
                   3.1        5.7         8.8 
                  22.0       12.0        34.0 
     Total          22         12          34 
                                             
                 45.00      55.00      100.00 
                   1.2        2.2         3.4 
                  12.9        7.1        20.0 
         3           9         11          20 
                                             
                 80.00      20.00      100.00 
                   0.2        0.3         0.5 
                   3.2        1.8         5.0 
         2           4          1           5 
                                             
                100.00       0.00      100.00 
                   1.7        3.2         4.9 
                   5.8        3.2         9.0 
         1           9          0           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer     X42IslamistState
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X42IslamistState, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.2IslamistState.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.2IslamistState.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is smaller than 0.05 
Therefore, by using 95% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.2IslamistState.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still significant. 
 
Table 4.2.32 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   6.6764   Pr = 0.010
                 64.71      35.29      100.00 
                   2.4        4.3         6.7 
                  22.0       12.0        34.0 
     Total          22         12          34 
                                             
                 52.00      48.00      100.00 
                   0.6        1.1         1.8 
                  16.2        8.8        25.0 
         1          13         12          25 
                                             
                100.00       0.00      100.00 
                   1.7        3.2         4.9 
                   5.8        3.2         9.0 
         0           9          0           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer     X42IslamistState
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x42islamiststate, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
Table 4.2.33 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           40      100.00
                                                
          1           16       40.00      100.00
          0           24       60.00       60.00
                                                







Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
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through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the category of how the 
individual perceive the mandatory of establishing the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia.  
Connecting to the table 4.2.33 above, 40% of individuals surveyed in this sample (of 40 
individuals) firmly believe in the mandatory to establish the Salafi Islamist state of 
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12. The Independent Variable X4.3 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.34 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(6) =   4.0262   Pr = 0.673
                 12.90      48.39      29.03       9.68      100.00 
                   1.9        0.5        0.3        1.4         4.0 
                   4.0       15.0        9.0        3.0        31.0 
     Total           4         15          9          3          31 
                                                                   
                  5.56      55.56      27.78      11.11      100.00 
                   0.8        0.2        0.0        0.0         1.0 
                   2.3        8.7        5.2        1.7        18.0 
         3           1         10          5          2          18 
                                                                   
                 20.00      40.00      20.00      20.00      100.00 
                   0.2        0.1        0.1        0.6         1.0 
                   0.6        2.4        1.5        0.5         5.0 
         2           1          2          1          1           5 
                                                                   
                 25.00      37.50      37.50       0.00      100.00 
                   0.9        0.2        0.2        0.8         2.1 
                   1.0        3.9        2.3        0.8         8.0 
         1           2          3          3          0           8 
                                                                   
    rorism           1          2          3          4       Total
ihadAndTer               X43IslamicEduYears
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X43IslamicEduYears, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.3IslamicEduYears.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.3IslamicEduYears.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X4.3IslamicEduYears.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.35 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.4040   Pr = 0.236
                 12.90      87.10      100.00 
                   1.2        0.2         1.4 
                   4.0       27.0        31.0 
     Total           4         27          31 
                                             
                  8.70      91.30      100.00 
                   0.3        0.0         0.4 
                   3.0       20.0        23.0 
         1           2         21          23 
                                             
                 25.00      75.00      100.00 
                   0.9        0.1         1.0 
                   1.0        7.0         8.0 
         0           2          6           8 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer    X43IslamicEduYears
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x43islamiceduyears, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
Table 4.2.36 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           37      100.00
                                                
          4            3        8.11      100.00
          3           10       27.03       91.89
          2           18       48.65       64.86
          1            6       16.22       16.22
                                                




1. Never (0) 
2. 1-3 (1) 
3. 3-6 (1) 
4. More than 6 (1) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of how 
many years the individual having the full-time Islamic teaching at the Islamic boarding 
school. Based on this sample of 40 individuals, only 16.22% had never attended the 
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13. The Independent Variable X4.4 and Y: No Significant Relationship Under the 1st 
Model and Significant Under the 2nd Model 
 
Table 4.2.37 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(8) =   9.0981   Pr = 0.334
                 26.47       8.82      14.71      44.12       5.88      100.00 
                   0.8        2.6        3.5        1.4        0.7         9.1 
                   9.0        3.0        5.0       15.0        2.0        34.0 
     Total           9          3          5         15          2          34 
                                                                              
                 20.00       5.00      15.00      55.00       5.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.3        0.0        0.5        0.0         1.2 
                   5.3        1.8        2.9        8.8        1.2        20.0 
         3           4          1          3         11          1          20 
                                                                              
                 40.00       0.00      40.00      20.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.4        2.2        0.7        0.3         3.9 
                   1.3        0.4        0.7        2.2        0.3         5.0 
         2           2          0          2          1          0           5 
                                                                              
                 33.33      22.22       0.00      33.33      11.11      100.00 
                   0.2        1.8        1.3        0.2        0.4         4.0 
                   2.4        0.8        1.3        4.0        0.5         9.0 
         1           3          2          0          3          1           9 
                                                                              
    rorism           1          2          3          4          5       Total
ihadAndTer                       X44IslamicOrg
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X44IslamicOrg, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.4IslamicOrg.” 
 
Ha: There is statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.4IslamicOrg.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X4.4IslamicOrg.” 
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However, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship becomes significant. 
 
Table 4.2.38 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   3.2834   Pr = 0.070
                 41.18      58.82      100.00 
                   1.9        1.4         3.3 
                  14.0       20.0        34.0 
     Total          14         20          34 
                                             
                 32.00      68.00      100.00 
                   0.5        0.4         0.9 
                  10.3       14.7        25.0 
         1           8         17          25 
                                             
                 66.67      33.33      100.00 
                   1.4        1.0         2.4 
                   3.7        5.3         9.0 
         0           6          3           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer       X44IslamicOrg
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x44islamicorg, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
Table 4.2.39 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           40      100.00
                                                
          5            3        7.50      100.00
          4           17       42.50       92.50
          3            5       12.50       50.00
          2            5       12.50       37.50
          1           10       25.00       25.00
                                                




1. NU (0) 
2. Muhammadiyah (0) 
3. Non-NU and Muhammadiyah Campus Islamic Da’wah Fellowship/LDK (1) 
4. Non-NU and Muhammadiyah Quran Recitation Fellowship (1) 
5. Never (0) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, under the second model we can see that the 
individual’s ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law 
and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is 
dependent upon the category of Islamist organization to which they have association (at 
90% of confidence level). Based on this sample of 40 individuals, 42.50% of them 
associate themselves with the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation 
fellowship, whilst 12.50% associate themselves with the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-
based campus Islamic Da’wah fellowship. In other words, this model indicates that the 
dependent variable is dependent upon whether individuals being associated with the 
non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and 
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14. The Independent Variable X4.5 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.40 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(4) =   4.1241   Pr = 0.389
                 23.53      70.59       5.88      100.00 
                   2.3        0.4        1.4         4.1 
                   8.0       24.0        2.0        34.0 
     Total           8         24          2          34 
                                                        
                 15.00      75.00      10.00      100.00 
                   0.6        0.1        0.6         1.3 
                   4.7       14.1        1.2        20.0 
         3           3         15          2          20 
                                                        
                 20.00      80.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.1        0.3         0.4 
                   1.2        3.5        0.3         5.0 
         2           1          4          0           5 
                                                        
                 44.44      55.56       0.00      100.00 
                   1.7        0.3        0.5         2.5 
                   2.1        6.4        0.5         9.0 
         1           4          5          0           9 
                                                        
    rorism           1          2          3       Total
ihadAndTer           X45TakfirismView
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X45TakfirismView, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.5TakfirismView.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.5TakfirismView.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X4.5TakfirismView.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.41 The STATA Calculation 
 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.1845   Pr = 0.276
                 91.18       8.82      100.00 
                   0.1        1.1         1.2 
                  31.0        3.0        34.0 
     Total          31          3          34 
                                             
                 88.00      12.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.3         0.3 
                  22.8        2.2        25.0 
         1          22          3          25 
                                             
                100.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.1        0.8         0.9 
                   8.2        0.8         9.0 
         0           9          0           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer     X45TakfirismView
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x45takfirismview, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
Table 4.2.42 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          3            2        5.13      100.00
          2           29       74.36       94.87
          1            8       20.51       20.51
                                                





1. Not Kafir (0) 
2. Not Necessarily Kafir (0) 
3. Kafir (1) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of how 
the individual views others with different ideology and point of view as kafir. This is 
important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact only 5.13% of 
them firmly view others with different ideology and point of view as kafir. 74.36% of 
them believe that others with different ideology and point of view were not necessarily 
kafir. 
 
Note: the meaning of kafir within the bounded rationality of the 40 individuals questioned 
is the derogatory term to define the unbelievers who reject God and the teachings of the 
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15. The Independent Variable X4.6 and Y: Significant Relationship (99% of 
Confidence Level) 
 
Table 4.2.43 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(2) =  17.5591   Pr = 0.000
                 26.47      73.53      100.00 
                  12.9        4.6        17.6 
                   9.0       25.0        34.0 
     Total           9         25          34 
                                             
                  0.00     100.00      100.00 
                   5.3        1.9         7.2 
                   5.3       14.7        20.0 
         3           0         20          20 
                                             
                 60.00      40.00      100.00 
                   2.1        0.8         2.9 
                   1.3        3.7         5.0 
         2           3          2           5 
                                             
                 66.67      33.33      100.00 
                   5.5        2.0         7.5 
                   2.4        6.6         9.0 
         1           6          3           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer   X46ForeignGlobalJihad
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X46ForeignGlobalJihad, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.6ForeignGlobalJihad.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.6ForeignGlobalJihad.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is 0.000. Therefore, by using 
99% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.6ForeignGlobalJihad.” 
P a g e  | 271 
 
 
Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still significant. 
 
Table 4.2.44 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  10.1607   Pr = 0.001
                 26.47      73.53      100.00 
                   7.5        2.7        10.2 
                   9.0       25.0        34.0 
     Total           9         25          34 
                                             
                 12.00      88.00      100.00 
                   2.0        0.7         2.7 
                   6.6       18.4        25.0 
         1           3         22          25 
                                             
                 66.67      33.33      100.00 
                   5.5        2.0         7.5 
                   2.4        6.6         9.0 
         0           6          3           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer   X46ForeignGlobalJihad
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x46foreignglobaljihad, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
 
Table 4.2.45 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          1           30       76.92      100.00
          0            9       23.08       23.08
                                                





1. Helping fellow Muslims at the global level through jihad 
0. Helping fellow Muslims at the global level through peaceful ways (e.g., prayer) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the category of how the 
individual aspires to be involved in the global jihad activities (e.g., helping fellow 
Muslims at the global level through various physical jihad activities). This is important to 
notice that based on this sample, this factor has the smallest p-value, meaning this is 
the independent variable with the strongest correlation (at 99% of confidence level) with 
the dependent variable. This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 
individuals, in fact 76.92% of them firmly have the aspiration to be involved in the global 
jihad activities. Only 23.08% of them believe that their involvement in helping other 
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16. The Independent Variable X4.7 and Y: Significant Relationship (95% of 
Confidence Level) 
 
Table 4.2.46 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(6) =  14.9630   Pr = 0.021
                  5.88      23.53       5.88      64.71      100.00 
                   5.6        2.3        3.3        3.8        15.0 
                   2.0        8.0        2.0       22.0        34.0 
     Total           2          8          2         22          34 
                                                                   
                  0.00      15.00       0.00      85.00      100.00 
                   1.2        0.6        1.2        1.3         4.2 
                   1.2        4.7        1.2       12.9        20.0 
         3           0          3          0         17          20 
                                                                   
                  0.00      20.00      20.00      60.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.0        1.7        0.0         2.0 
                   0.3        1.2        0.3        3.2         5.0 
         2           0          1          1          3           5 
                                                                   
                 22.22      44.44      11.11      22.22      100.00 
                   4.1        1.7        0.4        2.5         8.7 
                   0.5        2.1        0.5        5.8         9.0 
         1           2          4          1          2           9 
                                                                   
    rorism           1          2          3          4       Total
ihadAndTer                X47ViewTowardWest
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X47ViewTowardWest, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.7ViewTowardsWest.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.7ViewTowardsWest.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is smaller than 0.021. 
Therefore, by using 95% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X4.7ViewTowardsWest.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still significant, but the confidence level increases from 95% 
into 99%. 
 
Table 4.2.47 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   9.6734   Pr = 0.002
                 35.29      64.71      100.00 
                   6.3        3.4         9.7 
                  12.0       22.0        34.0 
     Total          12         22          34 
                                             
                 20.00      80.00      100.00 
                   1.7        0.9         2.6 
                   8.8       16.2        25.0 
         1           5         20          25 
                                             
                 77.78      22.22      100.00 
                   4.6        2.5         7.1 
                   3.2        5.8         9.0 
         0           7          2           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer     X47ViewTowardWest
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x47viewtowardwest, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
Table 4.2.48 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           38      100.00
                                                
          4           25       65.79      100.00
          3            3        7.89       34.21
          2            8       21.05       26.32
          1            2        5.26        5.26
                                                




1. Not Kafir (0) 
2. Not Sure (0) 
3. Some Kafir Some Not (0) 
4. Kafir or viewing/generalizing the Western world as kafir (1) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the category of how the 
individual perceives the Western world as kafir. This is important to notice that based on 
this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 65.79% of them firmly viewing/generalizing the 
Western world as kafir instead of being otherwise. 
 
Note: the meaning of kafir within the bounded rationality of the 40 individuals is the 
derogatory term to define the unbelievers who reject God and the teachings of the 
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17. The Independent Variable X4.8 and Y: Significant Relationship (95% Confidence 
Level) 
 
Table 4.2.49 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(2) =   6.8063   Pr = 0.033
                 12.50      87.50      100.00 
                   6.0        0.9         6.8 
                   4.0       28.0        32.0 
     Total           4         28          32 
                                             
                  0.00     100.00      100.00 
                   2.3        0.3         2.6 
                   2.3       15.8        18.0 
         3           0         18          18 
                                             
                 40.00      60.00      100.00 
                   3.0        0.4         3.5 
                   0.6        4.4         5.0 
         2           2          3           5 
                                             
                 22.22      77.78      100.00 
                   0.7        0.1         0.8 
                   1.1        7.9         9.0 
         1           2          7           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer           tine
YBeliefOnJ   X48ViewOnIsraeliPales
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X48ViewOnIsraeliPalestine, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.8ViewOnIsraeliPalestine.” 
 
Ha: There is statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.8ViewOnIsraeliPalestine.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 is rejected since p-value is smaller than 0.033. 
Therefore, by using 95% of confidence level, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X4.8ViewOnIsraeliPalestine.” 
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However, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship becomes insignificant. 
 
Table 5.2.50 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.0821   Pr = 0.298
                 12.50      87.50      100.00 
                   0.9        0.1         1.1 
                   4.0       28.0        32.0 
     Total           4         28          32 
                                             
                  8.70      91.30      100.00 
                   0.3        0.0         0.3 
                   2.9       20.1        23.0 
         1           2         21          23 
                                             
                 22.22      77.78      100.00 
                   0.7        0.1         0.8 
                   1.1        7.9         9.0 
         0           2          7           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer           tine
YBeliefOnJ   X48ViewOnIsraeliPales
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x48viewonisraelipalestine, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
 
Table 4.2.51 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           35      100.00
                                                
          1           30       85.71      100.00
          0            5       14.29       14.29
                                                





1. Palestine is Right 
0. Neutral (Israel and Palestine could be equally right) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, under the first model the individual’s ideology 
and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is dependent upon the 
category of how the individual perceives the Israeli-Palestine conflict. This is important 
to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 85.71% of them firmly 
support Palestine, whilst the rest of 14.29% view the conflict in the neutral way.  
 
Note: The specific purpose of measuring this independent variable is to see whether 
there is a significant impact of Israeli-Palestinian conflicts on the mind and behaviour of 
Indonesian Salafi jihadists. This is important to anticipate whether any developments in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts can cause Indonesian Salafi jihadists to execute/perform 
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18. The Independent Variable X4.9 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.52 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(2) =   2.2443   Pr = 0.326
                 32.35      67.65      100.00 
                   1.5        0.7         2.2 
                  11.0       23.0        34.0 
     Total          11         23          34 
                                             
                 25.00      75.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.2         0.5 
                   6.5       13.5        20.0 
         3           5         15          20 
                                             
                 60.00      40.00      100.00 
                   1.2        0.6         1.7 
                   1.6        3.4         5.0 
         2           3          2           5 
                                             
                 33.33      66.67      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   2.9        6.1         9.0 
         1           3          6           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer    X49HeavenAssurance
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X49HeavenAssurance, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.9HeavenAssurance.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X4.9HeavenAssurance.” 
 
Based on the following Chi-Square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not 
smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X4.9HeavenAssurance.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.53 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0054   Pr = 0.942
                 32.35      67.65      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                  11.0       23.0        34.0 
     Total          11         23          34 
                                             
                 32.00      68.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   8.1       16.9        25.0 
         1           8         17          25 
                                             
                 33.33      66.67      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   2.9        6.1         9.0 
         0           3          6           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer    X49HeavenAssurance
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x49heavenassurance, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
Table 4.2.54 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          1           26       66.67      100.00
          0           13       33.33       33.33
                                                





0 Not Sure 
 
Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of how 
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the individual believes in the heavenly assurance once they experience the physical 
death. 
This is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 33.33% of 
them actually did not have a certain feeling or belief that they would go to the heaven if 
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19. The Independent Variable X5.1 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.55 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(4) =   7.7186   Pr = 0.102
                 61.76      23.53      14.71      100.00 
                   0.8        3.5        3.5         7.7 
                  21.0        8.0        5.0        34.0 
     Total          21          8          5          34 
                                                        
                 60.00      15.00      25.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.6        1.4         2.1 
                  12.4        4.7        2.9        20.0 
         3          12          3          5          20 
                                                        
                 40.00      60.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.4        2.8        0.7         3.9 
                   3.1        1.2        0.7         5.0 
         2           2          3          0           5 
                                                        
                 77.78      22.22       0.00      100.00 
                   0.4        0.0        1.3         1.7 
                   5.6        2.1        1.3         9.0 
         1           7          2          0           9 
                                                        
    rorism           1          2          3       Total
ihadAndTer          X51RoleInNetworks
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X51RoleInNetworks, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X51RoleInNetworks.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X51RoleInNetworks.” 
 
Based on the following chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not 
smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X51RoleInNetworks.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.56 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.3290   Pr = 0.249
                 61.76      38.24      100.00 
                   0.5        0.8         1.3 
                  21.0       13.0        34.0 
     Total          21         13          34 
                                             
                 56.00      44.00      100.00 
                   0.1        0.2         0.4 
                  15.4        9.6        25.0 
         1          14         11          25 
                                             
                 77.78      22.22      100.00 
                   0.4        0.6         1.0 
                   5.6        3.4         9.0 
         0           7          2           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer     X51RoleInNetworks
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x51roleinnetworks, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
 
Table 4.2.57 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          3            6       15.38      100.00
          2            8       20.51       84.62
          1           25       64.10       64.10
                                                




0. Sympathizer (0) 
1. Indirectly Connected (1) 
2. Directly Connected (1) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of 
Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the 
category of the individual’s role in the terrorist networks. This is important to notice 
that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 64.10% of them actually were 
only the sympathizer, whilst the other 35.9% were either directly or indirectly 
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20. The Independent Variable X5.2 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.58 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(4) =   1.7268   Pr = 0.786
                 59.38      15.63      25.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.8        0.9         1.7 
                  19.0        5.0        8.0        32.0 
     Total          19          5          8          32 
                                                        
                 57.89      10.53      31.58      100.00 
                   0.0        0.3        0.3         0.7 
                  11.3        3.0        4.8        19.0 
         3          11          2          6          19 
                                                        
                 60.00      20.00      20.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.1        0.1         0.1 
                   3.0        0.8        1.3         5.0 
         2           3          1          1           5 
                                                        
                 62.50      25.00      12.50      100.00 
                   0.0        0.5        0.5         1.0 
                   4.8        1.3        2.0         8.0 
         1           5          2          1           8 
                                                        
    rorism           1          2          3       Total
ihadAndTer      X52ConnectionToIndividual
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X52ConnectionToIndividual, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X5.2ConnectionToIndividual.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X5.2ConnectionToIndividual.” 
 
Based on the following chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not 
smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X5.2ConnectionToIndividual.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.59 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0432   Pr = 0.835
                 59.38      40.63      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                  19.0       13.0        32.0 
     Total          19         13          32 
                                             
                 58.33      41.67      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                  14.3        9.8        24.0 
         1          14         10          24 
                                             
                 62.50      37.50      100.00 
                   0.0        0.0         0.0 
                   4.8        3.3         8.0 
         0           5          3           8 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer           dual
YBeliefOnJ   X52ConnectionToIndivi
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x52connectiontoindividual, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
Table 4.2.60 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           37      100.00
                                                
          3            8       21.62      100.00
          2            5       13.51       78.38
          1           24       64.86       64.86
                                                






1. Sympathizer to certain prominent individuals in the networks (0) 
2. Indirectly Connected to certain prominent individuals in the networks (1) 
3. Directly Connected to certain prominent individuals in the networks (1) 
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Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of the 
individual’s connection to certain prominent individuals within terrorist networks. This is 
important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 64.86% of them 
actually were only the sympathizer towards certain prominent individuals in the 
networks, whilst the other 35.14% were either having direct or indirect connections to 
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21. The Independent Variable X5.3 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
 
Table 4.2.61 The STATA Calculation 
 
          Pearson chi2(8) =  11.8211   Pr = 0.159
                 47.83      34.78       8.70       4.35       4.35      100.00 
                   0.1        1.7        1.7        3.6        4.8        11.8 
                  11.0        8.0        2.0        1.0        1.0        23.0 
     Total          11          8          2          1          1          23 
                                                                              
                 50.00      42.86       7.14       0.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.3        0.0        0.6        0.6         1.5 
                   6.7        4.9        1.2        0.6        0.6        14.0 
         3           7          6          1          0          0          14 
                                                                              
                 50.00       0.00      25.00       0.00      25.00      100.00 
                   0.0        1.4        1.2        0.2        3.9         6.7 
                   1.9        1.4        0.3        0.2        0.2         4.0 
         2           2          0          1          0          1           4 
                                                                              
                 40.00      40.00       0.00      20.00       0.00      100.00 
                   0.1        0.0        0.4        2.8        0.2         3.6 
                   2.4        1.7        0.4        0.2        0.2         5.0 
         1           2          2          0          1          0           5 
                                                                              
    rorism           1          2          3          4          5       Total
ihadAndTer                     X53AffToIndAndGrp
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X53AffToIndAndGrp, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X5.3AffToIndAndGrp.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X5.3AffToIndAndGrp.” 
 
Based on the following chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not 
smaller than even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no 
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statistically significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X53AffToIndAndGrp.” 
 
However, for this variable, I intentionally do not test it under the binary model. 
 
Table 4.2.62 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           26      100.00
                                                
          5            1        3.85      100.00
          4            1        3.85       96.15
          3            2        7.69       92.31
          2            8       30.77       84.62
          1           14       53.85       53.85
                                                




1. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir/StructuralJI/Ngruki 
2. ISIS/Santoso/Poso/Aman Abdurahman/Salim Mubarok Attamini/Lamongan 
3. M Fachry of Al-Muhajiroun 
4. Habib Rizieq of the Islamic Defender Front/Front Pembela Islam/FPI 
5. DR. Azhari Husin 
 
 
Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of the 
individual’s affiliation towards certain prominent individuals within radical Islamist 
networks. However, it is important to notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, 
53.85% of them have the affiliation to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir/Structural JI/Ngruki networks, 
and 30.77% have the affiliation to ISIS/Santoso/Poso/Aman Abdurahman/Salim 
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22. The Independent Variable X6 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.63 The STATA Calculation 
          Pearson chi2(4) =   5.5492   Pr = 0.235
                 16.67      33.33      50.00      100.00 
                   4.2        0.1        1.2         5.5 
                   5.0       10.0       15.0        30.0 
     Total           5         10         15          30 
                                                        
                  5.56      33.33      61.11      100.00 
                   1.3        0.0        0.4         1.8 
                   3.0        6.0        9.0        18.0 
         3           1          6         11          18 
                                                        
                 20.00      40.00      40.00      100.00 
                   0.0        0.1        0.1         0.2 
                   0.8        1.7        2.5         5.0 
         2           1          2          2           5 
                                                        
                 42.86      28.57      28.57      100.00 
                   2.9        0.0        0.6         3.6 
                   1.2        2.3        3.5         7.0 
         1           3          2          2           7 
                                                        
    rorism           1          2          3       Total
ihadAndTer       X6ViewOnStateRepression
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism X6ViewOnStateRepression, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X6ViewOnStateRepression.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X6ViewOnStateRepression.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between variable “YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and 
“X6ViewOnStateRepression.” 
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Likewise, when both independent and dependent variable is tested under the binary 
model, the relationship is still not significant. 
 
Table 4.2.64 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.6770   Pr = 0.195
                 50.00      50.00      100.00 
                   0.8        0.8         1.7 
                  15.0       15.0        30.0 
     Total          15         15          30 
                                             
                 43.48      56.52      100.00 
                   0.2        0.2         0.4 
                  11.5       11.5        23.0 
         1          10         13          23 
                                             
                 71.43      28.57      100.00 
                   0.6        0.6         1.3 
                   3.5        3.5         7.0 
         0           5          2           7 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer            on
YBeliefOnJ   X6ViewOnStateRepressi
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tabulate ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x6viewonstaterepression, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
Table 4.2.65 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           34      100.00
                                                
          3           19       55.88      100.00
          2           10       29.41       44.12
          1            5       14.71       14.71
                                                





1. Low Level Repression (0) 
2. Mid Level Repression (0) 
3. High Level Repression (1) 
P a g e  | 292 
 
 
Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of how 
the individual perceives and experiences the state repression. This is important to 
notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 55.88% of them actually 
perceive and experience the state repression as the high level one as opposed to the 
low and middle level one. What is included as the high-level repression is the life 
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23. The Independent Variable X7 and Y: No Significant Relationship 
 
Table 4.2.66 The STATA Calculation 
. 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.3709   Pr = 0.543
                  2.94      97.06      100.00 
                   0.4        0.0         0.4 
                   1.0       33.0        34.0 
     Total           1         33          34 
                                             
                  4.00      96.00      100.00 
                   0.1        0.0         0.1 
                   0.7       24.3        25.0 
         1           1         24          25 
                                             
                  0.00     100.00      100.00 
                   0.3        0.0         0.3 
                   0.3        8.7         9.0 
         0           0          9           9 
                                             
    rorism           0          1       Total
ihadAndTer   X7ViewOnGovIncentive
YBeliefOnJ  
                      
    row percentage    
  chi2 contribution   
  expected frequency  
      frequency       
                      
  Key                 
                      
. tab ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x7viewongovincentive, cchi2 chi2 expected row
 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X7ViewOnGovIncentive.” 
 
Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between variable 
“YBeliefOnJihadAndTerrorism” and “X7ViewOnGovIncentive.” 
 
Based on the chi-square test, H0 could not be rejected since p-value is not smaller than 
even 0.1. Therefore, even by using 90% of confidence level, there is no statistically 
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Table 4.2.67 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           40      100.00
                                                
          1           35       87.50      100.00
          0            5       12.50       12.50
                                                





1. They view that the government gives no incentives at all, need to give them the 
power-sharing concession, and to stop the repression. 
0. Otherwise. 
 
Interpretation/Analysis: In other words, the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is not dependent upon the category of how 
the individual perceives and experiences the government incentive. This is important to 
notice that based on this sample of 40 individuals, in fact 87.50% of them actually 
perceive that the government has not given them enough incentives. They expect that 
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b. The Various Multivariate Analysis Using the Logistic Regression. 
 
Based on a number of previous chi-square tests, it can be concluded that there 
are 8 independent variables that have statistically significant relationship with the 
dependent variable (either 90%, 95%, or 99% of confidence level). Such variables are 











Therefore, in this sub-part I conduct several logistic regression analyses in order 
to examine the causal relationship, direction and strength of such relationship between 
all independent variables and the dependent variable. The logistic regression models 
run in this part will be using the binary model where all independent and dependent 









                                                   
250 This independent variable is not further analyzed in the following part. The chi-square test to test the 
statistically significant relationship between this independent variable and the dependent variable is not 
included in the draft of this Ph.D. thesis. However, upon the specific request it is available to be shown. 
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Table 4.2.68 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .8472979   .6900656     1.23   0.220    -.5052058    2.199802
                  location     .1335314   .8398554     0.16   0.874    -1.512555    1.779618
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -18.999601                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0007
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.8741
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.03
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         32
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -18.999601  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -18.999601  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.999604  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.012161  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism location
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that being in the Java island (the province of 
DKI Jakarta, JATENG, JABAR and JATIM) increases the log-odd of someone to believe 
and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.13. However, the 















Table 4.2.69 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons    -.4054651   .9128709    -0.44   0.657    -2.194659    1.383729
             x41syariahlaw       1.7492   1.021508     1.71   0.087    -.2529187    3.751318
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -18.149714                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0763
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0833
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       3.00
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -18.149714  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -18.149714  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -18.149817  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.202435  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x41syariahlaw
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that having the belief (including the ideological 
conviction) that both Islamic (Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist state must be 
established in Indonesia increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.7. This prediction has 90% of 
confidence level (p-value is smaller than 0.1), and the causal effect on the dependent 
variable based on this model is significant. The explanatory power of this model is 















Table 4.2.70 The STATA Calculation 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .3677248   .4336291     0.85   0.396    -.4821726    1.217622
          x42islamiststate            0  (omitted)
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -14.883571                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0000
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          .
                                                  LR chi2(0)      =       0.00
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         22
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -14.883571  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -14.883571  
      x42islamiststate dropped and 12 obs not used
note: x42islamiststate != 0 predicts success perfectly
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x42islamiststate
 























Table 4.2.71 The STATA Calculation 
 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .2876821   .5400617     0.53   0.594    -.7708195    1.346184
             x44islamicorg     1.446919   .8269362     1.75   0.080    -.1738462    3.067684
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -18.014895                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0832
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0706
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       3.27
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -18.014895  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -18.014895  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -18.014928  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.055011  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x44islamicorg
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that being associated with the non-NU and 
Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and 
Muhammadiyah-based campus Islamic da’wah fellowship as opposed to only being 
associated with NU and Muhammadiyah increases the log-odd of someone to believe 
and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.45. This prediction 
has 90% of confidence level (p-value is smaller than 0.1), and the causal effect on the 
dependent variable based on this model is significant. The explanatory power of this 




                                                   
251 Under the second/binary model, there is a statistically relationship between being associated with the 
non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation fellowship and campus Islamic da’wah fellowship 
(as opposed to be associated only with NU and Muhammadiyah) with being agree and less agree with 
the ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state 
of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). 
 





Table 4.2.72 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons    -.6931472   .7071068    -0.98   0.327    -2.079051    .6927566
     x46foreignglobaljihad     2.685577   .9374369     2.86   0.004     .8482348     4.52292
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -14.901752                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2416
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0021
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       9.50
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -14.901752  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -14.901752  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -14.90295  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -15.091612  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x46foreignglobaljihad
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that having an aspiration to help fellow 
Muslims by being involved in the physical (jihad) activities at the global level increases 
the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of 
terror) by 2.69. This prediction has 99% of confidence level (p-value is smaller than 
0.01), and the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is 
















Table 4.2.73 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons    -.3364722     .58554    -0.57   0.566     -1.48411    .8111652
         x47viewtowardwest     2.639057   .9449111     2.79   0.005     .7870652    4.491048
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -14.852313                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2441
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0020
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       9.59
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -14.852313  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -14.852314  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -14.855011  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -15.115885  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x47viewtowardwest
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that firmly viewing/generalizing the Western 
world as kafir (as opposed to otherwise: being unsure and viewing/generalizing the 
Western world as not necessarily kafir) increases the log-odd of someone to believe 
and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 2.64. This prediction 
has 99% of confidence level (p-value is smaller than 0.01), and the causal effect on the 
dependent variable based on this model is significant. The explanatory power of this 
model is 24.41% (Pseudo R2). 
 
Note: the meaning of kafir within the bounded rationality of these 40 individuals is the 
derogatory term to define (and to generalizing) the unbelievers who reject God and the 
teachings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, as well as deny the absolute dominion 









Table 4.2.74 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons    -2.04e-11          1    -0.00   1.000    -1.959964    1.959964
 x48viewonisraelipalestine     1.098612   1.091089     1.01   0.314    -1.039884    3.237108
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -18.517973                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0260
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3201
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.99
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         32
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -18.517973  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -18.517973  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.528398  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.012161  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x48viewonisraelipalestine
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that for Indonesian Salafi jihadists with having 
a firm support towards Palestine (as opposed to be neutral and pro-Israel) increases the 
log-odd of them to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of 
terror) by 1.1. The explanatory power of this model is 2.6% (Pseudo R2). However, the 
causal effect on the dependent variable based on this model is not significant. 
 
Note: The specific purpose of measuring this independent variable is to see whether 
there is a significant impact of Israeli-Palestinian conflicts on the mind and behaviour of 
Indonesian Salafi jihadists. This is important to anticipate whether any developments in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts can cause Indonesian Salafi jihadists to execute/perform 
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b.2. The Logistic Regression of Each Non-Significant Independent Variable Towards 
the Dependent Variable. 
 
In this part I examine the causal relationship between each non-significant 
independent variable on the dependent variable by using the logistic regression 
technique. Although these independent variables do not have significant corelational 
relationship according to the previous chi-square tests, it does not mean I cannot 
examine their causal relationship by using the logistic regression technique. Out of 
these regression models we can see how strongth their causal relationship is, and 




Table 4.2.75 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .4054651   .6454972     0.63   0.530    -.8596862    1.670616
                 ethnicity     .6241543   .8295151     0.75   0.452    -1.001665    2.249974
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -17.680465                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0157
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.4531
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.56
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         29
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -17.680465  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -17.680465  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -17.681477  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -17.961912  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism ethnicity
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that being a Javanese (as opposed to be 
other ethnicities) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards 
the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through 
violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.62. The explanatory power of this model is 
1.6% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this 
model is not significant. 





Table 4.2.76 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .9162907     .83666     1.10   0.273    -.7235328    2.556114
            marriagestatus    -.0289875   .9495687    -0.03   0.976    -1.890108    1.832133
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -18.675181                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0000
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.9756
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.00
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         31
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -18.675181  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.675181  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -18.675648  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism marriagestatus
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that being a married individual (as opposed to 
be single) decreases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the 
establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through 
violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.29. The explanatory power of this model is 0 
(Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on this 


















Table 4.2.77 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     1.049822    .439155     2.39   0.017     .1890941     1.91055
         x1grievondailyinc    -.1335314   .9449112    -0.14   0.888    -1.985523     1.71846
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -19.639466                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0005
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.8882
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.02
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -19.639466  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -19.639466  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.639471  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x1grievondailyinc
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that earning under the poverty line (as 
opposed to be above the poverty line) decreases the log-odd of someone to believe and 
be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state 
of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.13. The explanatory power 
of this model is 0.05% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent 
variable based on this model is not significant. 
 
For this sample and model, it can be interpreted another way: based on this sample of 
40 individuals, earning under the poverty line does not necessarily increase the log-odd 
of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) 













Table 4.2.78 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .9162907    .591608     1.55   0.121    -.2432396    2.075821
    x21grievonemploystatus     .1823216   .7852813     0.23   0.816    -1.356801    1.721445
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -19.622477                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0014
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.8167
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.05
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -19.622477  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -19.622477  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -19.62249  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x21grievonemploystatus
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that having a non-permanent job (as opposed 
to being either an employee or employer) increases the log-odd of someone to believe 
and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.18. The explanatory 
power of this model is 0.14% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the 

















Table 4.2.79 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .9808293    .390868     2.51   0.012     .2147421    1.746916
       x22grievoneduclevel            0  (omitted)
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -19.336436                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0000
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          .
                                                  LR chi2(0)      =       0.00
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         33
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.336436  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.336436  
      x22grievoneduclevel dropped and 1 obs not used
note: x22grievoneduclevel != 0 predicts success perfectly
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x22grievoneduclevel
 
 
























Table 4.2.80 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .9555114   .5262348     1.82   0.069    -.0758898    1.986913
              x3grievonpol     .0560895    .786023     0.07   0.943    -1.484487    1.596666
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -19.333888                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0001
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.9431
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.01
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         33
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -19.333888  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.333888  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.336436  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x3grievonpol
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that having a political grievance such as 
feeling politically marginalized and unrepresented (as opposed to not having/feeling any 
political grievances) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.06. The explanatory power of this 
model is 0.01% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable 

















Table 4.2.81 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons    -5.55e-10          1    -0.00   1.000    -1.959964    1.959964
        x43islamiceduyears     1.252763   1.101946     1.14   0.256    -.9070122    3.412538
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -17.074656                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0354
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.2628
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       1.25
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         31
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -17.074656  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -17.074657  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -17.096364  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -17.701704  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x43islamiceduyears
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that having religious education in the islamic 
boarding school increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards 
the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through 
violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.25. The explanatory power of this model is 
3.54% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable based on 
















Table 4.2.82 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .8938179   .3956838     2.26   0.024     .1182919    1.669344
          x45takfirismview            0  (omitted)
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -18.675648                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0000
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          .
                                                  LR chi2(0)      =       0.00
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         31
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.675648  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -18.675648  
      x45takfirismview dropped and 3 obs not used
note: x45takfirismview != 0 predicts success perfectly
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x45takfirismview
 
 
























Table 4.2.83 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .9808292   .6770032     1.45   0.147    -.3460727    2.307731
        x49heavenassurance     .0606247   .8269362     0.07   0.942    -1.560141     1.68139
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -19.646662                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0001
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.9416
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.01
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -19.646662  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.646662  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x49heavenassurance
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that a belief in the heavenly assurance (as 
opposed to otherwise) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved 
towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.06. The explanatory power of this 
model is 0.01% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable 


















Table 4.2.84 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .6931471     .46291     1.50   0.134    -.2141399    1.600434
         x51roleinnetworks     1.011601   .8973264     1.13   0.260    -.7471266    2.770328
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -18.947997                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0357
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.2363
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       1.40
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -18.947997  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -18.947998  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.960449  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x51roleinnetworks
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that having a role in the network (as opposed 
to merely being a sympathiser) increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be 
involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of 
Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.01. The explanatory power of 
this model is 3.57% (Pseudo R2). However, the causal effect on the dependent variable 



















Table 4.2.85 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     1.029619   .5209881     1.98   0.048     .0085016    2.050737
 x52connectiontoindividual     .1743534    .839501     0.21   0.835    -1.471038    1.819745
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -17.973002                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0012
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.8349
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.04
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         32
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -17.973002  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -17.973002  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -17.973014  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -17.994725  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x52connectiontoindividual
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that having a connection to certain prominent 
individuals in the networks (as opposed to merely as a sympathiser) increases the log-
odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of 
terror) by 0.17. The explanatory power of this model is 0.12% (Pseudo R2). However, 
















Table 4.2.86 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .6931472   .5477226     1.27   0.206    -.3803693    1.766664
   x6viewonstaterepression     1.178655   .9364417     1.26   0.208     -.656737    3.014047
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood =  -15.43783                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0528
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1896
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       1.72
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         30
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -15.43783  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -15.43783  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -15.437854  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -15.457957  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -16.298183  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x6viewonstaterepression
 
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that having a feeling that the government has 
the high-level repression level towards terrorist perpetrators (as opposed to otherwise) 
increases the log-odd of someone to believe and be involved towards the establishment 
of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., 
the act of terror) by 1.18. The explanatory power of this model is 5.28% (Pseudo R2). 
















Table 4.2.87 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .9808293    .390868     2.51   0.012     .2147421    1.746916
      x7viewongovincentive            0  (omitted)
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -19.336436                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0000
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          .
                                                  LR chi2(0)      =       0.00
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         33
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.336436  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.336436  
      x7viewongovincentive dropped and 1 obs not used
note: x7viewongovincentive != 1 predicts success perfectly
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x7viewongovincentive
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b.3.  The Moderating/Interaction Variables 
 
In this part I have three examples of how certain independent variables when 
they are combined/interacted with another independent variable will produce greater 
effect on the dependent variable.  
 
The Moderating/Interaction Variable #1: Variable x44 and Variable x46 
Scenario #1: The impact of being being associated with the non-NU and 
Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and 
Muhammadiyah-based campus Islamic da’wah fellowship. 
 
Table 4.2.88 The STATA Calculation 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .2876821   .5400617     0.53   0.594    -.7708195    1.346184
             x44islamicorg     1.446919   .8269362     1.75   0.080    -.1738462    3.067684
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -18.014895                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0832
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0706
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       3.27
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -18.014895  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -18.014895  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -18.014928  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -18.055011  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x44islamicorg
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that being associated with the non-NU and 
Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and 
Muhammadiyah-based campus Islamic da’wah fellowship as opposed to only being 
associated with NU and Muhammadiyah increases the log-odd of someone to believe 
and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.45. This prediction 
has 90% of confidence level (p-value is smaller than 0.1), the causal effect on the 
dependent variable based on this model is significant. The explanatory power of this 
model is 8.32% (Pseudo R2). 
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Scenario #2: The impact of being associated with the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-
based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based campus 
Islamic da’wah fellowship (x44) will produce a greater causal impact on the dependent 
variable when they also have an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad (x46). 
 
Table 4.2.89 The STATA Calculation 
 
. gen x44_x46 = x44islamicorg*x46foreignglobaljihad
. 
                                                                                            
                     _cons      .117783   .4859127     0.24   0.808    -.8345883    1.070154
                   x44_x46     2.654806   1.139566     2.33   0.020      .421297    4.888314
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -15.557281                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2083
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0042
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       8.18
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -15.557281  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -15.557281  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -15.557288  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -15.562666  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -15.886103  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x44_x46
 
Based on this model, it can be concluded that the log-odd of being associated with the 
non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and 
Muhammadiyah-based campus Islamic da’wah fellowship as opposed to only being 
associated with NU and Muhammadiyah increases the log-odd of someone to believe 
and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) after they begin to have 
an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad.  
 
In this case, the log-odd increases from 1.45 to become 2.65, and the causal effect on 
the dependent variable based on this model is significant. This prediction has also an 
increasing confidence level (from 90% into 95% where its p-value is becoming smaller 
than 0.05). In addition to that, the explanatory power of this model also increases from 
8.32% to become 20.83% (Pseudo R2). 
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The Moderating/Interaction Variable #2: Variable x6 and Variable x46 
Scenario #1: The impact of feeling a high-level state repression. 
 
Table 4.2.90 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .6931472   .5477226     1.27   0.206    -.3803693    1.766664
   x6viewonstaterepression     1.178655   .9364417     1.26   0.208     -.656737    3.014047
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood =  -15.43783                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0528
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1896
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       1.72
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         30
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -15.43783  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -15.43783  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -15.437854  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -15.457957  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -16.298183  



















Like the previous case, as the interaction of two independent variables are 
made, all these three indicators: coefficient value; p-value; and pseudo R2 
are improved. See the scenario #2 below. 
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Scenario #2: The impact of feeling a high level state repression (x6) will produce a 
greater causal impact on the dependent variable when they have an aspiration to be 
involved in the global jihad (x46). Precisely, the p-value in this model is also becoming 
quite small, making this new variable almost reaching at 90% of significance level, and 
both the coefficient level of moderating/interaction variable and the Pseudo R2 of this 
new model also increase.  
 
 
Table 4.2.91 The STATA Calculation 
 
(7 missing values generated)
. gen x46_x6 = x46foreignglobaljihad*x6viewonstaterepression
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .6061358   .5075192     1.19   0.232    -.3885836    1.600855
                    x46_x6     1.878771   1.157976     1.62   0.105     -.390821    4.148363
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -14.562684                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1065
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0625
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       3.47
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         30
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -14.562684  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -14.562684  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -14.563264  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -14.667812  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -16.298183  





Increasing the log-odd by 1.88 Still not significant  10.65% of Pseudo R2. 







After the interaction of two independent variables is made, all these three 
indicators: coefficient value; p-value; and pseudo R2 are improved. 
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The Moderating/Interaction Variable #3: Variable x7 and Variable x46 




Table 4.2.92 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons     .9808293    .390868     2.51   0.012     .2147421    1.746916
      x7viewongovincentive            0  (omitted)
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -19.336436                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0000
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          .
                                                  LR chi2(0)      =       0.00
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         33
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -19.336436  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.336436  
      x7viewongovincentive dropped and 1 obs not used
note: x7viewongovincentive != 1 predicts success perfectly

















Like the previous case, as the interaction of two independent variables is 
made, all these three indicators: coefficient value; p-value; and pseudo R2 
are improved. See the scenario #2 below. 
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Scenario #2: The impact of feeling a that government does not give enough incentives 
(x7) will produce a greater causal impact (increase the log odd by 2.35) on the 
dependent variable when they have an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad 
(x46). The p-value in this model is also becoming very small, making this new variable 
reaching at 99% of significance level. 
 
Table 4.2.93 The STATA Calculation 
(1 missing value generated)
. gen x46_x7 = x46foreignglobaljihad*x7viewongovincentive
                                                                                            
                     _cons    -.4054651   .6454972    -0.63   0.530    -1.670616    .8596862
                    x46_x7     2.351375   .8930952     2.63   0.008     .6009408     4.10181
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -15.772601                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1973
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0054
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       7.75
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -15.772601  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -15.772601  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -15.773087  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -15.93395  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
















After the interaction of two independent variables is made, all these three 
indicators: coefficient value; p-value; and pseudo R2 are improved. 
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b.4.  The Multivariate Models Using Several Independent Variables 
 
Multivariate Model #1 
Table 4.2.94 The STATA Calculation 
 
                                                                                            
                     _cons    -2.350644   1.354603    -1.74   0.083    -5.005617    .3043287
     x46foreignglobaljihad     2.792314   1.015422     2.75   0.006     .8021231    4.782505
             x41syariahlaw     1.960614   1.244147     1.58   0.115    -.4778686    4.399097
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -13.613319                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3072
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0024
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      12.07
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         34
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -13.613319  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -13.613319  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -13.615575  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -13.877258  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -19.649341  
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x41syariahlaw x46foreignglobaljihad
 
 
Based on this model that at the same time controlling the two variables with the 
highest significance level, it can be concluded that having an aspiration to help fellow 
Muslims by being involved in the physical (jihad) activities at the global level is still a 
significant factor, whilst having a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) to 
establish the Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia becomes 
insignificant in this equation. The explanatory power of this model is 30.72% (Pseudo 
R2). That said, by looking at this model it can be concluded that:  
 
Having a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) to establish the Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia increases the log-odd of someone to 
believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi 
Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 1.96. 
However, in this equation the variable “a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) 
to establish the Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia” does not 
have a causal significant effect on the dependent variable. 
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Having an aspiration to help fellow Muslims by being involved in the physical (jihad) 
activities at the global level significantly increases the log-odd of someone to believe 
and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 2.80. This prediction 
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Multivariate Model #2 
 
Table 4.2.95 The STATA Calculation 
 
. 
                                                                                            
                     _cons    -2.183987   2.099926    -1.04   0.298    -6.299766    1.931793
        x410christendtimes            0  (omitted)
 x48viewonisraelipalestine     .0093881   1.961002     0.00   0.996    -3.834106    3.852882
         x47viewtowardwest     .9497066   1.462008     0.65   0.516    -1.915776    3.815189
     x46foreignglobaljihad      1.34955   1.376525     0.98   0.327    -1.348388    4.047489
             x44islamicorg     .5601928   1.343607     0.42   0.677    -2.073228    3.193614
        x43islamiceduyears     .5119289   1.442151     0.35   0.723    -2.314636    3.338493
             x41syariahlaw      1.58712   1.393481     1.14   0.255    -1.144053    4.318293
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -10.979317                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2453
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3083
                                                  LR chi2(6)      =       7.14
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         28
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -10.979317  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -10.979318  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -10.981951  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -11.23644  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -14.548235  
      x410christendtimes dropped and 2 obs not used
note: x410christendtimes != 1 predicts failure perfectly
> st x48viewonisraelipalestine x410christendtimes
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x41syariahlaw x43islamiceduyears x44islamicorg x46foreignglobaljihad x47viewtowardwe
 
Based on this model that at the same time controlling the seven ideological variables 
(all are significant), we can see that neither variables are significant. The explanatory 
power of this model is 24.53% (Pseudo R2). However, based on the coefficient values 
on the this model we can still say that the variable x4.1 (having a firm belief, including 
the ideological conviction to establish the Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state 
of Indonesia) and x4.6 (having an aspiration to help fellow Muslims by being involved in 
the physical jihad activities at the global level) are still the variables with the highest 
causal impact on the dependent variable. 
However, it is important to note that when these two variables are combined in the 
same model (model #1), the variable x4.1 which has a bigger lod-odds in the model #2 
would become insignificant in the previous model #1 (whilst the variable x4.6 is still 
consistently significant). Thus, it can be concluded that the variable x4.6 (global jihad) 
has a very strong causal impact on the dependent variable. 
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Multivariate Model #3 
 
Table 4.2.96 The STATA Calculation 
 
. 
                                                                                            
                     _cons    -5.921618   3.771902    -1.57   0.116    -13.31441    1.471173
      x7viewongovincentive            0  (omitted)
   x6viewonstaterepression     .8599328   1.387321     0.62   0.535    -1.859167    3.579033
     x46foreignglobaljihad     3.886797    1.69827     2.29   0.022     .5582499    7.215344
             x41syariahlaw     3.772268   2.488046     1.52   0.129    -1.104212    8.648748
              x3grievonpol     .5505043   1.362451     0.40   0.686    -2.119851     3.22086
    x21grievonemploystatus     2.309511    1.75467     1.32   0.188    -1.129578    5.748601
         x1grievondailyinc     .3212124   2.182568     0.15   0.883    -3.956543    4.598968
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood = -8.8587339                       Pseudo R2       =     0.4473
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0261
                                                  LR chi2(6)      =      14.34
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         29
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -8.8587339  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -8.8587339  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -8.8590054  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -8.9117733  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -9.7739047  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -16.027274  
note: x7viewongovincentive omitted because of collinearity
> jihad x6viewonstaterepression x7viewongovincentive
. logit ybeliefonjihadandterrorism x1grievondailyinc x21grievonemploystatus x3grievonpol x41syariahlaw x46foreignglobal
 
Based on this model that at the same time controlling all representative variables from 
variable 1 (economic grievance), 2 (social grievance), 3 (political grievance), 4 (radical 
ideology), 5 (social network), 6 (state repression), and 7 (government incentive). 
By looking at this model we can find that all independent variables have a positive 
causal relationship on the dependent variable, although the only significant variable 
(95% of confidence level) is x4.6 (foreign global jihad). Again, it can be concluded that 
the variable x4.6 (global jihad) has a very strong causal impact on the dependent 
variable. The explanatory power of this model is 44.73% (Pseudo R2). The specific 
interpretation is as follow: 
 
Earning a daily income that is under the poverty line increases the log-odd to believe 
and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 0.32. 
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Having a non-permanent job (self-employed and unemployed) increases the log-odd to 
believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi 
Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 2.31. 
 
Having political grievances (feeling politically marginalized and unrepresented) 
increases the log-odd to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of 
terror) by 0.55. 
 
Having a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) that both Islamic (Shari’a) law 
and Islamist state must be established in Indonesia increases the log-odd to believe and 
be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state 
of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 3.77. 
 
Having an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad increases the log-odd to believe 
and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) by 3.89. 
 
Having a perspective that the government has the high level of repression increases the 
log-odd to believe and be involved towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law 
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Multivariate Model #4 
 
The construct of this model is similar with the previous model #3. The only 
difference is that this model control one more variable which is the 
“x4.7viewtowardswest.” In this model, neither independent variables have a significant 
causal relationship on the dependent variable. However, based on their coefficient 
values we can see that the three independent variables are still the variables with the 
highest impact on the dependent variable: x4.1syariahlaw; x4.7viewtowardswest; and 
x4.6foreignglobaljihad. 
 
Table 4.2.97 The STATA Calculation 
 
. 
                                                                                            
                     _cons    -6.184437   3.762539    -1.64   0.100    -13.55888    1.190004
      x7viewongovincentive            0  (omitted)
   x6viewonstaterepression     1.341046   1.562197     0.86   0.391    -1.720803    4.402894
         x47viewtowardwest     3.467588   2.341345     1.48   0.139    -1.121364     8.05654
     x46foreignglobaljihad      2.99732   1.936426     1.55   0.122    -.7980039    6.792645
             x41syariahlaw     3.665449    2.61725     1.40   0.161    -1.464266    8.795164
              x3grievonpol    -1.655876    2.32797    -0.71   0.477    -6.218614    2.906861
    x21grievonemploystatus     2.067923   1.729404     1.20   0.232    -1.321647    5.457492
         x1grievondailyinc     .7772365   2.454761     0.32   0.752    -4.034006    5.588479
                                                                                            
ybeliefonjihadandterrorism        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
Log likelihood =   -7.05499                       Pseudo R2       =     0.5598
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0122
                                                  LR chi2(7)      =      17.94
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         29
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =   -7.05499  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =   -7.05499  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -7.0559387  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -7.1475306  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -8.3289951  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -16.027274  
note: x7viewongovincentive omitted because of collinearity
> jihad x47viewtowardwest x6viewonstaterepression x7viewongovincentive
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c. The Comparative Condition Before and After The Deradicalization 
In this sub-part, we can see several statistical findings that capture the (violent) 




x4.1syariahlaw (in the second/binary model) Versus CurSyariahView 
 
Table 4.2.98 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           38      100.00
                                                
          3           16       42.11      100.00
          2           17       44.74       57.89
          1            5       13.16       13.16
                                                





Table 4.2.99 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           38      100.00
                                                
          1           33       86.84      100.00
          0            5       13.16       13.16
                                                





1. Disagree with the Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state (0). 
2. At least agree with Islamic (Shari’a) law (1). 
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Table 4.2.100 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          1           39      100.00      100.00
                                                




Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, surprisingly there is an increasing number of 
former radicals/terrorist in terms of firmly trusting at least in the mandatory 
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X4.2IslamistState Versus CurIslamistState 
 
Table 4.2.101 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           40      100.00
                                                
          1           16       40.00      100.00
          0           24       60.00       60.00
                                                






Table 4.2.102 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           35      100.00
                                                
          1           30       85.71      100.00
          0            5       14.29       14.29
                                                








Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, surprisingly there is an increasing number of 
former radicals/terrorist in terms of firmly trusting in the implementation of Salafi Islamist 
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X4.6ForeignGlobalJihad Versus CurSympathyISIS 
 
Table 4.2.103 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          1           30       76.92      100.00
          0            9       23.08       23.08
                                                





Table 4.2.104 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           35      100.00
                                                
          1           16       45.71      100.00
          0           19       54.29       54.29
                                                






0. Not Sympathy 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, there is a decreasing number of former 
radicals/terrorists in terms of being inspired by the global jihad. Before the 
deradicalization, there was 76.92% of them being inspired to be involved in the global 
jihad, whilst after the deradicalization process there are only 45.71% of them having a 




                                                   
252 ISIS can be used as a phenomenon to symbolize the aspiration to be involved in the global jihad. 
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x3grievonpol (in the second/binary model) Versus CurDemView 
 
Table 4.2.105 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          1           16       41.03      100.00
          0           23       58.97       58.97
                                                





Table 4.2.106 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          1            6       15.38      100.00
          0           33       84.62       84.62
                                                




1. Involved in Democracy 
0. Not Involved in Democracy 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, there is only 15.38% of them being involved in 
the democracy/democratic process in Indonesia. If we compare to the initial political 
grievances table, surprisingly we can see that 41.03% of them felt politically 
marginalized or unrepresented in the Indonesian democracy. However, after undergoing 
the deradicalization process the fact shows that only 15.38% begin to believe and 
involve in the democractic process. In other words, these 15.38% individuals who are 
already involved in the democratic process may come from the 58.97% individuals who 
previously never felt any political grievances in the Indonesian democracy. Note: only 5 
individuals are willing to declare their political party affiliations, all which are the Islamist 
political parties (See the table below). 
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Table 4.2.107 The STATA Calculation 
 
 
      Total            5      100.00
                                                
          3            1       20.00      100.00
          2            1       20.00       80.00
          1            3       60.00       60.00
                                                




1. PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) 
2. PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangungan) 
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Table 4.2.108 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           38      100.00
                                                
          1           33       86.84      100.00
          0            5       13.16       13.16
                                                




1. At least agree with Islamic (Shari’a) law. 
0. Agree with Salafi Islamist state. 
0. Disagree with the Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state. 
 
Table 4.2.109 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           37      100.00
                                                
          1           31       83.78      100.00
          0            6       16.22       16.22
                                                




1. Disagree/Not Sure 
0. Agree 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, there is 83.78% of former radicals/terrorists 
that still disagree and being unsure with the four most basic values of the nation: 
Pancasila, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity), UUD 1945, and the Unitary State of 
Republic of Indonesia. This number is not only majority, but it is quite concerning if we 
compare to the previous number (86.84%) before the deradicalization where all these 
86.84% individuals have a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) in the 
establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. 
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Table 4.2.110 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           34      100.00
                                                
          1           25       73.53      100.00
          0            9       26.47       26.47
                                                





Likewise, when we compare it with the dependent variable, it is also concerning. If in the 
past 73.53% of them have “agree/less agree view on the establishment of Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad and the act of 
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x6viewonstaterepression (in the second/binary model) Versus CurViewOnDerad 
 
Table 4.2.111 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           34      100.00
                                                
          1           19       55.88      100.00
          0           15       44.12       44.12
                                                






Table 4.2.112 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           33      100.00
                                                
          1           11       33.33      100.00
          0           22       66.67       66.67
                                                






0. Persuasive and Constructive 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation we can see that after undergoing the 
deradicalization process, there is a decreasing percentage in terms of perception about 
the state repression. If in the past 55.88% individuals viewed the state repression was 
high, after the deradicalization process only 33.33% of them view the government’s 
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X4.4IslamicOrg Versus CurIslamicOrg 
 
Table 4.2.113 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           40      100.00
                                                
          5            3        7.50      100.00
          4           17       42.50       92.50
          3            5       12.50       50.00
          2            5       12.50       37.50
          1           10       25.00       25.00
                                                





Table 4.2.114 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           36      100.00
                                                
          4           20       55.56      100.00
          3            5       13.89       44.44
          2            5       13.89       30.56
          1            6       16.67       16.67
                                                




1. NU (0) 
2. Muhammadiyah (0) 
3. Non-NU and Muhammadiyah Campus Islamic Da’wah Fellowship/LDK (1) 
4. Non-NU and Muhammadiyah Quran Recitation Fellowship (1) 
5. No Islamist organization (0) 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, there is an increasing number in terms being 
associated with the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation fellowship 
(from 17 to 20), whilst the number of individuals being associated with the non-NU and 
Muhammadiyah-based campus Islamic da’wah fellowship (LDK) is still same (5). This is 
important to notice since these two variables have the significant and positive causal 
relationship on the dependent variable as being tested in the previous logistic 
regression models. 
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X4.5TakfirismView Versus CurTakfirismView 
 
Table 4.2.115 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          3            2        5.13      100.00
          2           29       74.36       94.87
          1            8       20.51       20.51
                                                





Table 4.2.116 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           40      100.00
                                                
          3            1        2.50      100.00
          2           36       90.00       97.50
          1            3        7.50        7.50
                                                





1 Not Kafir (0) 
2. Not Necessarily Kafir (0) 
3. Kafir (1) 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, the apparent improvement of before-and-after 
the deradicalization is not promising. There is a decreasing number from 5.13% to 2.5% 
in viewing others as kafir; an increasing number from 74.36% to 90% in viewing others 
as not necessarily kafir; and a decreasing number from 20.51% to 7.5% in viewing 
others as not kafir. 
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Note: the meaning of kafir within the bounded rationality of these 40 individuals who are 
questioned for the analysis of chapter 4.2 is the derogatory term to define the 
unbelievers who reject God and the teachings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, as 
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X4.6ForeignGlobalJihad (already a binary model since beginning) Versus 
CurForeignGlobalJihad 
 
Table 4.2.117 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           39      100.00
                                                
          1           30       76.92      100.00
          0            9       23.08       23.08
                                                





Table 4.2.118 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           38      100.00
                                                
          1           26       68.42      100.00
          0           12       31.58       31.58
                                                





1 Jihad Engagement to Help Other Muslims at the Global Level 
0 Peaceful Engagement to Help Other Muslims at the Global Level 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, there is a decreasing percentage in terms of 
the aspiration to be involved in the global jihad. However, the decrease is only slightly 
which is from 76.92% to become 68.42%. This is also important to notice that based on 
this sample of 40 individuals, this specific variable is a variable with the most significant 
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x4.7viewtowardswest Versus CurViewOnWest 
 
Table 4.2.119 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           38      100.00
                                                
          1           25       65.79      100.00
          0           13       34.21       34.21
                                                





Table 4.2.120 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           38      100.00
                                                
          1           32       84.21      100.00
          0            6       15.79       15.79
                                                





0. Not Kafir 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation we can see that after undergoing the 
deradicalization process, there is an increasing percentage in terms of their perspective 
towards the Western world. If in the past there were 65.79% of them firmly 
viewing/generalizing the Western world as kafir (as opposed to otherwise), after 
undergoing the deradicalization process the percentage instead increases to become 
84.21%. This is also important to notice that based on this sample, this specific variable 
is a variable with the significant and positive causal effect on the dependent variable. 
Note: the meaning of kafir within the bounded rationality of 40 individuals questioned for 
the analysis of chapter 4.2 is the derogatory term to define the unbelievers who reject 
God and the teachings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, as well as deny the absolute 
dominion and sovereignty of God. 
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x4.8viewonisraelipalestine (already a binary model since beginning) Versus 
CurOnIsraelPalestine 
 
Table 4.2.121 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           35      100.00
                                                
          1           30       85.71      100.00
          0            5       14.29       14.29
                                                







Table 4.2.122 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           34      100.00
                                                
          1           28       82.35      100.00
          0            6       17.65       17.65
                                                





1. Pro Palestine 
0. Neutral (Israel and Palestine could be equally right) 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, there is a decrease in terms of their 
perspective towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If in the past there were 85.71% of 
them firmly supporting Palestine, after undergoing the deradicalization process the 
percentage of firmly supporting Palestine instead slightly decrease to become 82.35%. 
This is also important to notice that based on this sample, this specific variable is a 
significant variable with a positive causal effect on the dependent variable. 
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X6viewonterrorism Versus CurViewOnGovApproach. 
Table 4.2.123 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           34      100.00
                                                
          1           19       55.88      100.00
          0           15       44.12       44.12
                                                






1. High Level Repression 
0. Mid and Low Repression 
 
Table 4.2.124 The STATA Calculation 
      Total           35      100.00
                                                
          1           11       31.43      100.00
          0           24       68.57       68.57
                                                






0. Persuasive and Constructive 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, there is a decreasing percentage in terms of 
perception about the state repression. If in the past 55.88% viewed the state repression 
was high, after the deradicalization process only 31.43% of them view the government’s 










Table 4.2.125 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           35      100.00
                                                
          1           21       60.00      100.00
          0           14       40.00       40.00
                                                







1. No Difference of Treatment By the Government Institution and Personnel 
0. Some Personnel Gives More Personalized Attention 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, the former radicals/terrorists view that at least 



















Table 4.2.126 The STATA Calculation 
 
      Total           31      100.00
                                                
          3           19       61.29      100.00
          2            9       29.03       38.71
          1            3        9.68        9.68
                                                







2. More Revision Needed 
3. Disagree 
 
Based on this comparative statistical tabulation, it can be concluded that after 
undergoing the deradicalization process, the former violent jihadists/radicals/terrorists 
view that at least 9.68% being agree with the current counterterrorism bill, whilst 
29.03% says it must be revised, and the majority (61.29%) being disagree towards the 
current counterterrorism bill. 
 
Note: the Indonesian government is currently in the process of issuing a new 
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d. The Concluding Analysis of the Quantitative Part. 
This part is the conclusion of various quantitative analysis made throughout 
chapter 4.2. These various multivariate statistical analysis have indeed provided us with 
the elaborate pattern/picture/characteristic of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia.  
 
d.1.  The Pattern of Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia. 
 
The various multivariate statistical analysis made in this chapter 4.2. have 
confirmed that all determining variables encompassing economic-social-political 
grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government incentive 
have relationship and causal effects on the dependent variable (the ideology and/or 
behaviour of individuals through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) to establish the 
Islamic (Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia). However, not all them 
have a significant relationship and causal effect on the dependent variable. Indeed, only 
ideological and social networks-related variables have the significant relationship and 
causal effect on the dependent variable. In other words, based on these findings I can 
also conclude that the two latent characteristics of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia 
(according to this sample; n=40 individuals) are the ideological and social networks 
issue. 
That said, based on the findings in the various statistical analysis made in this 
part, it could be concluded that the pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is as follow. 
First. Economic grievances, social grievances, and political grievances are only a 
set of potential, necessary variables. With or without these economic, social and 
political grievances, individuals in Indonesia could believe and be involved towards the 
establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through 
violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). Consequently, these variables are also not a set of 
sufficient variables since they do not have the significant relationship or direct causal 
effect on the dependent variable. 
Second. It is through being associated with the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-
based Quran recitation fellowship and the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based campus 
Islamic da’wah fellowship, these individuals are more likely to be exposed to a firm 
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belief (including the ideological conviction) that generalizes the Western world is kafir as 
opposed to be otherwise. Their generalizing view of the Western world as kafir is 
identical with their view that Indonesian democratic political system is the Western-
based culture, thus making them to believe that it is mandatory to establish the Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia that is purely based on the Islamic 
teaching.  
Third. As they begin to have a belief system (including the ideological conviction) 
to establish the Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia, they will also 
start having an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad. Subsequently, once they are 
already determined to commit violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror), any negative feelings 
towards government repression and insufficient government incentive only play their 
role to exacerbate their determination to commit the act of terror. Part b.3. above (the 
moderating/interaction variables section) shows that when the variable 
“x6staterepression” is interacted with the variable “x46foreignglobaljihad” (e.g., for 
supporting ISIS among many others), the coefficient of this new moderating/interaction 
variable increase quite much (compared to the coefficient value of only variable 
“x6staterepression”) and make this new variable almost becoming significant (at 90% of 
confidence level). Meanwhile, another moderating/interaction variable combining both 
variable “x7govincentives” and “x46foreignglobaljihad” makes this new 
moderating/interaction variable into a significant variable with 99% of confidence level 
(with the coefficient value of 2.35 or increasing the log odd on the dependent variable by 
2.35). 
Therefore, a possible pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that is based on 








P a g e  | 348 
 
 
#1. Either experiencing or not experiencing economic, social and political grievances. 
These are just a set of regular independent variables without necessarily connect with 
and have the impact on the dependent variable.  
 
#2. Being associated with the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation 
fellowship and the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based campus Islamic da’wah 
fellowship. This is the 1st intervening variable.253  
 
#3. Viewing/generalizing the Western world and all its elements (e.g., democracy) as 
kafir. This is the 2nd intervening variable. 
 
#4. Having a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) to establish the Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. This is the 3rd intervening variable. 
 
#5. Having an aspiration to be involved in the global jihad (e.g., ISIS). This is the 4th 
intervening variable. 
 
#6. Experiencing/feeling a state repression + #7. Feeling that government incentive are 
not enough. Consecutively, these two are the endogenous or moderating variables.254 
 
 
#8. The individual is to believe (the ideological level) and being involved (the 
behavioural level) towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). 
Note: The event #6 and the event #7 only play their role to exacerbate the continuous 
impacts on the event #8 of the event #1 up to the event #5. On their own, the event #6 
and the event #7 will not cause the event #8. 
                                                   
253 The intervening variable is a variable that explains a relation or provides a causal link between other 
variables. Also called by some authors as the “mediating variable” or “intermediary variable.” 
 
254 The endogenous variable is a variable that is an inherent part of the system being studied and that is 
determined from within the system (a variable that is caused by other variables in a causal system). At the 
same time they also can be mentioned as the moderating variable: a variable that influences, or 
moderates, the relation between two other variables and thus produces an interaction effect. 
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Table 4.2.128 The Conclusion Table of Various Multivariate Statistical Analysis 
Category Meaning of Variables Correlation with the Dependent 
Variable 
Based on the chi-square test 





















Effect of Select 
Independent 








Earning a lesser daily 
income.  





Having a lesser year of 
education. 
Not Significant. Not Significant. 
Not completing a 
mandatory 9-years 




Having a less 
secure/permanent job. 
Not Significant. Not Significant. 
Not having a 
secured/permanent 


















































Being associated with the 
selected Islamist 
organizations.  
Not Significant. Significant** 
Being associated 










(as opposed to be 







Having attended more years 
at the Islamic boarding 
school. 
Not Significant. Not Significant. 
Having attended 
the Islamic 
boarding school (as 
opposed to never at 






Having a closer connection 
in the networks. 
Not Significant. Not Significant.  
Having a 
connection (as 
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Having a more role in the 
networks. 
Not Significant. Not Significant. 
Having a 
connection role as 








Having a firm belief 
(including the ideological 
conviction) to establish the 
Islamic (Shari’a) law and 
Salafi Islamist state of 
Indonesia. 




Western world as kafir. 
Significant* Significant** Positive*** 
2.64 
N/A 
Having an aspiration to be 
involved in the (physical) 
jihad at the global level. 




Pro-Palestine. Significant** Not Significant. Positive. 
1.1 
N/A 
Viewing others with different 
belief and ideology as kafir. 
Not significant. Not significant. N/A. N/A 
Being associated with the 
selected Islamist 
organizations. 
Not Significant. Significant** 
Being associated 
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(as opposed to be 
associated with NU 
and 
Muhammadiyah). 
Having attended more years 
at the Islamic boarding 
school. 









Viewing that government 
implements the high-level 
repression. 





Viewing that government 
does not give enough 
incentives. 





Location based on 
provinces in Indonesia 
Significant* Not Significant* 
Being in the Java 
Island (the province 








*90% of Confidence Level. 
**95% of Confidence Level. 
***99% of Confidence Level. 
The numbers displayed on the 5th and 6th columns represent the coefficient level. The greater the coefficient level, the 
greater the log-odd’s increase/decrease on the dependent variable that is caused by the respective independent 
variables.
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d.2.  Revisiting the Pattern of Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia After Such Radicals 
Undergoing the Deradicalization Efforts. 
 
By looking at the condition of former violent jihadists/radicals/terrorists after they 
undergo the deradicalization efforts, it can be concluded that the pattern is not 
significantly different. In general, they still preserve the four most significant variables 
that make them commit violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). These factors are the 
continuous attendance at the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation 
fellowship and the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based campus Islamic da’wah 
fellowship, the firm belief (including the ideological conviction) to establish Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia, the perception that generalizes 
the Western world as kafir, and the aspiration to be involved in the global jihad. Most of 
them also do not embrace democracy and being involved in such political mechanism.  
Currently, they merely hibernate without apparent willingness to be involved in 
further jihad activities nor being involved in the peaceful democratic process. That is 
why, once the opportunity is available either in the domestic or at the global level, there 
is no guarantee that they will not recommit themselves in such violence and the act of 
terror. Nevertheless, the only positive factor we can see from the deradicalization efforts 
is the fact that the government deradicalization efforts alter these individuals’ 
perspectives towards government approach. In this case, 68.57% of them begin to see 
that the Indonesian government deradicalization approach is persuasive and 
constructive rather than repressive, with at least 40% of them view that some security 
apparatus gives them some personal, kind attention during their detention and 
deradicalization process. 
The following table displays a set of statistical measurements to measure the 
elaborate impact of deradicalization efforts over these 40 individuals. This kind of 
measurement that uses the proportional test can become an indicator for program 
evaluation and policy analysis in this governmental effort.  
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Table 4.2.129 The Comparative Condition Between Before and After Undergoing Deradicalization 
 Variable tested 
before 
deradicalization 










1 The belief in the 
mandatory establishment 
of Islamic (Shari’a) law. 
44.74%
255 





100% Increase Significant*** Not a good 
performance. 
2 The belief in the 
mandatory establishment 
of Salafi Islamist state. 





85.71% Increase Significant*** Not a good 
performance. 
3 The belief in the 
mandatory establishment 
of both Islamic (Shari’a) 
law and Salafi Islamist 
state. 
86.84% Not Sure and 
Disagree with the 
4 core values of 
the nation. 






However, it is 
not significant. 
                                                   
255 For this percentage number, see Table 4.2.30 The STATA Calculation.  
 
256 For this percentage number, see Table 4.2.33 The STATA Calculation. 
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4 Viewing state repression 
as the high-level (as 
opposed to mid and low 
level). 







33.33% Decrease Significant*** A good 
performance. 
5 Being associated with the 
non-NU and 
Muhammadiyah-based 
Quran recitation fellowship 
and the non-NU and 
Muhammadiyah-based 
campus Islamic da’wah 
fellowship (as opposed 
only to NU and 
Muhammadiyah). 
55% Being associated 











opposed only to 
NU and 
Muhammadiyah). 
69.44% Increase Significant** Not a good 
performance. 
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6 Firmly viewing others as 
kafir. 
5.13% Firmly viewing 
others as kafir. 









7 Being aspired by the 
involvement in the global 
jihad. 
76.92% Being aspired by 
the involvement in 
the global jihad. 









8 Viewing/generalizing the 
Western world as kafir. 
65.71% Viewing/generali 
zing the Western 
world as kafir. 
 
84.21% Increase Significant*** Not a good 
performance. 
9 The firm support towards 
Palestine (as opposed to 
be neutral). 
85.71% The firm support 
towards Palestine 
(as opposed to be 
neutral). 












10 Viewing state repression 
as the high-level (as 
opposed to mid and low 
level). 








31.43% Decrease Significant*** A good 
performance. 
 
*90% of confidence level. 
**95% of confidence level. 
***99% of confidence level. 
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4.3 The Social Network Analysis. 
 
The biggest JI operations from 2002 until 2009, in terms of the number of 
casualties and other unquantifiable impacts, were the Bali bombing attack I and II, 
respectively carried out in 2002 and 2005. The combined attacks also significantly 
altered the history of JI and Indonesian counterterrorism efforts. That is why it is 
noteworthy to focus on JI individuals and networks that were involved in these two 
biggest attacks. Out of the social network analysis over 79 JI individuals involved in the 
Bali bombing attack I and II, at least we could draw the conclusion that the social 
network is indeed the significant factor to determine of why and how an individual would 
be involved in the radical network that culminated in the terrorist attack (e.g., the 
bombing attack). Every involved individual played his/her unique roles in the network, 
where his/her involvement was significantly shaped by at least four intertwining factors: 
personal relationship to other individuals in the network; shared educational 
backgrounds; shared training experiences; and shared involvement in the operations 
(Klaimanee and Nogaj 2008).257 As confirmed by the Indonesian Counterterrorism 
Agency (BNPT) and various trusted sources, this pattern not only reflected the JI 
networks in the past but also reflects the current Islamist radical/extremist/terrorist 









                                                   
257 For this material, see the attachment #4 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis. 
 
258 Police Brigadier General (Ret) Suryadharma (the Former Head of the Indonesian National Police Anti 
Terror Special Detachment 88) and Police Senior Commissioner Didik Novi (The Head of Foreign 
Terrorist Task Force at the Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) in a discussion 
with the author, respectively on October 18, 2016 and November 1, 2016. 
P a g e  | 359 
 
 






Based on the research finding of the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2006, 
Klaimanee and Nogaj (2008) conducted a comprehensive social network analysis over 
79 Non-Structural JI individuals.259 The research finding of ICG was based on 
interrogation depositions, court documents, and Indonesian press reports, with 
information crosschecked through extensive interviews with knowledgeable sources, 
both official and unofficial.  
In this social network analysis, they used the individual as the node where ties 
are shaped by four intertwining factors: personal relationship to other individuals in the 
network; shared educational backgrounds; shared training experiences; and shared 
involvement in the operations (Bali bombing attacks I and II). This pattern informs us 
that JI is a well-networked organization through which this entity evolves into a self-
discipline, agile, and highly adaptable entity able to culminate its activities in the form of 
                                                   
259 This social network analysis is based on International Crisis Group’s Asia Report No. 114 in 2006, 
titled Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks. See (International Crisis Group 5 May 2006). For this 
material, see the attachment #4 in the accompanying materials of this Ph.D. thesis. 
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terrorist attacks. Based on this analysis, the most important person in the JI network as 
they successfully culminated their attacks in 2002 and 2005 were indeed Zulkarnaen 
whose whereabouts is still unknown until today (the final stage of writing this Ph.D. 
thesis in 2018). 
 
Table 4.3.1 The Aspects to be Measured and Names of the Matrix 
Aspects to be Measured Names of 2-Mode Matrix Names of 1-Mode Matrix 
Personal relationship to 









Shared involvement in the 
operations. 
Bali bombings. Bali bombings-Aff. 
 
 
a. The Mechanism of Analysis 
First, as a starting point, the research focused on determining the 79 individuals 
as the nodes. These 79 individuals were investigated in terms of their relationship to 
each other by creating a 1-mode matrix linking each individual. This matrix was named 
“Friend.” 
 
Table 4.3.2 The Illustration of Relationship/Ties Among Individuals 
 Individual #1 Individual #2 Up To Individual #79 
Individual #1     
Individual #2     
Up To     
Individual #79     
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Second, the research also created a 2-mode matrix linking the 79 individuals with 
their involvement in the Bali bombing I and II. This matrix was named “Bali Bombings.” 
 
Table 4.3.3 The Illustration of Relationship/Ties Among Individuals Based on 
Their Involvement in Bali Bombing Attack I and II 
 Bali Bombing Attack I Bali Bombing Attack II 
Individual #1   
Individual #2   
Up To   
Individual #79   
 
 
Third, the research also created a 2-mode matrix linking the 79 individuals with 
certain schools they attended in the past. This matrix was named “school.”  
 
Table 4.3.4 The Illustration of Relationship/Ties Among Individuals Based on 















Individual #1       
Individual #2       
Up To       
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Fourth, the research also created a 2-mode matrix linking the 79 individuals with 
certain training exposures they had in the past. This matrix was named “train.” 
 
Table 4.3.5 The Illustration of Relationship/Ties Among Individuals Based on 














Individual #1      
Individual #2      
Up To      
Individual #79      
 
 
After the making of these four matrixes, all them were aggregated. First, before 
the aggregation was performed all 2-mode matrixes must be transformed into the 1-
mode matrix. After the transformation we have four 1-mode matrixes: “Friend,” “Bali 
bombings-Aff,” “School-Aff,” and “Train-Aff.” Second, after these transformations, all 
these 1-mode matrixes were stacked to produce one new integrated matrix called 
“Joined.” Third, these stacked 1-mode matrixes were aggregated to produce a single-
valued matrix called “Joined-wda.” Fourth, this single-valued matrix was later 
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Figure 4.3.2 The Sociogram Reflecting the Ties Based on the Relationship Among 
Individuals 
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Figure 4.3.3 The Sociogram Reflecting the Ties Based on Shared Educational 
Backgrounds 
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Figure 4.3.4 The Sociogram Reflecting the Ties Based on Shared Training Experiences 
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Figure 4.3.5 The Sociogram Reflecting the Ties Based on Shared Involvement in the Operations/Bali Bombing Attack I and 
II 
(With the Size of Nodes Depending Upon the Betweeness Centrality) 
 
1-Mode and 2-Mode Sociogram 
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Interpreting the Meaning by Looking at the Matrix of Centrality 
 
Figure 4.3.7 The Multiple Measures of Centrality in UCINET 
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Table 4.3.6 The Rearrangement of Measures 
(Selected Number of Actors/Nodes Arranged by Based on the Highest-to-the-Lowest 
Scores as Indicated by the Figure 4.3.7 Above) 
Matrix of Centrality 
Degree Closeness Betweeness Eigenvector 
Zulkarnaen Zulkarnaen Zulkarnaen Zulkarnaen 
Jabir Ahmad Rofiq Ahmad Rofiq Jabir 
Azhari Husin Jabir Abdullah Sunata Abdul Rauf 







Noordin M. Top 
Ubeid 
Suramto Noordin M. Top Suramto 
 
Degree Centrality: Indicating the number of incoming and outgoing ties that an 
actor/node has. This indicates how well an actor/node is connected within the overall 
network (the individual measure). 
 
Closeness Centrality: Indicating the number of links/steps along shortest paths from the 
focal to any other actors in the network. This is an indicator of how quickly an 
information can reach an actor. 
 
Betweeness Centrality: This is the extent to which an actor lies on the shortest path 
between other actors/nodes (adjusted by the number of alternative shortest paths). This 
measurement indicates the medium of information and of resource flow (e.g., when the 
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Table 4.3.7 Another Rearrangement of Centrality Measures by Scoring the Actors 
 
Actor/Nodes 
Matrix of Centrality 




5 5 5 5 20 
Jabir 
(killed in 2006) 
4 3 0 4 11 
Ahmad Rofiq 
(released) 
1 4 4 0 9 
Azhari Husin 
(killed in 2005) 




ISIS in 2014) 
2 0 0 3 5 
Abdullah 
Sunata (serving 
10 years in the 
prison) 
3 0 0 0 3 
Ubeid (serving 
10 years in the 
prison) 
0 1 2 0 3 
Noordin (killed 
in 2009) 
1 1 0 0 2 
Suranto 0 0 1 1 2 
Tohir (serving 
10 years in the 
prison) 
0 0 0 2 2 
Mohammed 
Rais (released) 
0 0 0 2 2 
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Note: 5 points are given to the actor with the highest position, 4 to the second highest, 3 
to the third highest, 2 to the second highest, 1 to the least high. 0 is given to the actors 
who are not listed in the table 4.3.7 above. 
 
 
Finding #1: The analysis of different types of centrality identified 11 individuals who 
scored the highest scores. Among them, the first five actors seem to be the central 
figures in the analyzed social network. These actors/nodes are Zulkarnaen , Jabir , 
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Figure 4.3.8 A Degree Centrality Measure Using the Pajek Software  
(Drawn in the y- direction and showing the same result as the one with UCINET) 
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Interpreting the Meaning by Looking at the Cut-Points/Vertices 
 
Figure 4.3.9 The Sociogram Indicating the Cut-Points/Vertices (Blue Color) in the 
Aggregated Network/Joined-wdaGTO 
(With the Size of Nodes Depending upon the Betweeness Centrality) 
 
 
Finding #2: The cut-points/vertices analysis informs us that the three actors/nodes with 
the highest scores (based on the betweeness centrality) are Ahmad Rofiq , Abdullah 
Sunata , and Iwan Dharmawan . All these are the three actors/nodes with the highest 
importance of communication flow throughout the network. When we want to disrupt the 
communication throughout the network, we should aim these three actors/nodes as the 
priority.  
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Interpreting the Meaning by Looking at the Brokerage Matrixes 
 
The brokerage matrix is designed to analyze the brokerage roles of nodes in the 
network in terms of being a coordinator, representative, consultant, and liaison. In this 
social network analysis, they used as a partition the sub-network of Bali I and Bali II 
bombing attacks. Subsequently, a new 2-mode matrix was created to transform this 2-
mode network into a format of partition. The numbers attached to actors/nodes in this 
new 2-mode matrix were as follow. 0 = actors/nodes were not involved in both Bali 
bombing attack I and II; 1 = actors/nodes were involved in Bali bombing attack I; 2 = 
actors were involved in Bali bombing attack II; and 3 = actors were involved in both Bali 
bombing attack I and II.  
 
Figure 4.3.10 The One-Column Matrix of Bali Bombings  
(Used as a partition for computing the brokerage functions) 
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Figure 4.3.12 The Brokerage Function #1: A Coordinator Role 
(Depicted in the NetDraw) 
 
 
Finding #3: The most prominent actors/nodes in terms of coordinator role are Ahmad 
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Figure 4.3.13 The Brokerage Function #2: A Representative Role 
(Depicted in the NetDraw) 
 
 
Finding #4: The most prominent actors in terms of representative role are Zulkarnaen , 
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Figure 4.3.14 The Brokerage Function #3: A Consultant Role 
(Depicted in the NetDraw) 
 
 
Finding #5: The most prominent actors/nodes in terms of consultant role are 
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Figure 4.3.15 The Brokerage Function #4: A Liaison Role 
(Depicted in the NetDraw) 
 
 
Finding #6: The most prominent actors/nodes in terms of liaison role are Azhari Husin , 
Zulkarnaen , and Jabir . 
 
Finding #7: The overall analysis of different brokerage functions identified Zulkarnaen  
and Jabir  as the key figures. Both actors/nodes appear 3 times in the top 3 positions in 
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b. A Concluding Analysis 
 
By referring to the previous qualitative and quantitative analysis in this chapter 
(chapter 4.1 and 4.2) we could see that social network is indeed a significant variable to 
determine of why and how an individual become involved in the terrorism activities. 
Correspondingly, the analysis of the aggregated social networks by Klaimanee and 
Nogaj (2008) that is discussed and reinterpreted in chapter 4.3 provides us with the 
information about the key actors/nodes in the JI networks that culminated their attacks 
in Bali bombing attack I and II respectively in 2002 and 2005. Given the high complexity 
of terrorist networks, this comprehensive social network analysis assumes that 
individuals’ involvement was shaped by at least four intertwining factors: personal 
relationship to other individuals in the network; shared educational backgrounds; shared 
training experiences; and shared involvement in the operations.  
To further identify which actors/nodes were important and playing the key roles in 
the network, the analysis used various techniques by using the UCINET, NetDraw, and 
Pajek software. The techniques used in this analysis were the different types of 
centrality, the cut-points/vertices, and the different brokerage matrixes. Such further 
identifications would allow us to better know the underlying structure of Islamist radical 
networks in Indonesia. 
In terms of centrality, this analysis found that 5 key individuals in the network 
were Zulkarnaen, Jabir, Ahmad Rofiq, Azhari Husin, and Abdul Rauf. In terms of cut-
points/vertices this analysis found that 3 key individuals in the network were Ahmad 
Rofiq, Abdullah Sunata, and Iwan Dharmawan. In terms of brokerage functions this 
analysis found that 2 key individuals in the network were Zulkarnaen and Jabir. 
The final, combined analyses also proved that the key actors/nodes in the 
analyzed network was Zulkarnaen, closely followed by Jabir. Zulkarnaen appeared to 
be the most important actor/node in terms of centrality and of brokerage functions. He 
was relatively less important as the cut-points/vertices, but it could be explained by the 
fact that he was located deep inside the structure of the network; thus, he had many ties 
and served rather as a consultant than as a liaison. This assumption was proved by the 
analysis of brokerage functions, where Zulkarnaen also scored highest as a consultant. 
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On the other hand, for Jabir, he scored less than Zulkarnaen, but he was always 
between the highest-ranked three to four individuals in terms of almost every matrix 
developed in this analysis. 
Therefore, as Jabir was already killed by the Indonesian government in 2006, it is 
indeed important to find the whereabouts of Zulkarnaen in order to disrupt the 
survivability and the development of JI social networks in the future. Based on the 
previous qualitative and quantitative analysis, the background of all important 
actors/nodes in this social network were also reflecting the general pattern of Islamist 
radicals/violent extremists/terrorists in Indonesia. Their behaviours were influenced by 
the combination of economic-socio-politico grievances, radical ideology, social 
networks, state repression and government incentive.  
Most of these key actors/nodes in the examined network were also notorious. 
They were either killed during the counterterrorism raids, serving the death sentence, 
serving the life sentence, serving minimum of 20 years in the prison, or returning to the 
radical/terrorism activities (e.g., fighting with the ISIS) once they were released from the 
prison. Another scholarly and policy importance that we could draw on from this social 
network analysis is the fact that the presence of Islamist radical networks in Indonesia 
could survive and develop by having a number of elusive consultants (e.g., Zulkarnaen) 
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4.4 The Analysis Warranty. 
 
4.4.1 The General Assessment on Analysis. 
 
Whilst the issues pertaining to sample and ethical aspects have been discussed 
in the part 2.3.2 (The Research Framework and Design: Variables and Methodology), 
this particular part is dedicated to provide a general assessment on the analysis.  
Independent variables in this Ph.D. thesis project cover and control multivariate 
aspects that potentially cause terrorism to occur. Specifically, all independent variables 
examined have the causal effect (some with statistically significant effect and some are 
not) on individuals to believe in the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi 
Islamist state of Indonesia through jihadism and act of terror. This is a fine and 
overarching coverage by to some extent referring to the Mutually Exclusive, Collectively 
Exhaustive (MECE) model.260 In general, all qualitative and quantitative analyses 
coupled by the discussion on social network analysis are also fine and complementary 
to each other.  
Whilst the qualitative analysis (using the discovering patterns analysis, content 
analysis, and discourses analysis) provides us with a general picture of Islamist 
terrorism in Indonesia, this picture reflects a number of phenomena and elements that 
subsequently are tested by multivariate statistical analysis. The chi-square test, logistic 
regression, and proportional test coupled by a number of descriptive statistical analyses 
indeed complement the findings in the qualitative and in the social networks analysis. 
Overall, these three pieces of analytical methods provide us with a much clearer and 
elaborate picture of the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, 
through which we also can make the prediction about the future state of Islamist 
terrorism (Salafi jihadism) in Indonesia from multi-dimensional strategic perspectives 
(Harrison 2013).261 
                                                   
260 MECE is a method used by McKinsey & Company to identify and describe a social phenomenon by 
the way of organizing information that is "Mutually Exclusive, Collectively Exhaustive." For more on MECE 
method, see also (Minto 1996). 
 
261 Please see (Harrison 2013) where he examines in-depth pertaining to the knowing of ourselves 
(internal part of strategy), knowing of what we face (external part of strategy), knowing of the system 
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However, as previously discussed, this Ph.D. study has its own limitations that 
need to be underlined and improved in the further study. The first limitation is in terms of 
sample size of 40 individuals surveyed whose response were analyzed by advance 
multivariate statistical analysis techniques. The initial intention was to have at least 100 
individuals in the quantitative part, but due to the unavailability of this number the 
sample size was reduced into 40 individuals. Later the compensation was made by 
adding two other groups of samples (to make overall into 77), which were analysed 
qualitatively.  
According to Koizumi (2012), this sample size (n=40) is still fine to be analysed 
statistically if it captures general characteristics of real population (the external validity 
aspect) and being analysed properly based on the proper theoretical assumptions and 
statistical techniques. The face validity is also emphasized to make sure that 
indicators/atributes used in the variable (e.g., economic income, years of education, etc) 
are reflecting the real phenomena to be measured. It is for this reason the analysis of 
these 40 individuals are rigorously based on the same theoretical framework as the 
other 32 individuals, plus being complemented by the internal validity measurement 
(e.g., Pseudo R2) on logistic regression models developed in this Ph.D. thesis. 
Another limitation is from the sample of 22 individuals of convicted Islamist 
terrorists serving in the prison (6 of them have recently been released), which is chosen 
by based on the purposive method. This choice is limited only to those who are 
incarcerated in the Indonesian jurisdiction and whose documents are available to be 
further examined. Correspondingly, the examination on them is also based on the 
documentation-archival evidence, so that there is no direct interaction with them that 
can be used to double-check their current opinions about the issue being studied.  
 The third limitation is from the sample of 15 key state/security officials and 
experts in the field, which is chosen by based on the purposive method. It may only 
represent the view of officials and experts who are against (or less sympathy towards) 
the ideology and/or behaviour of violent Islamist movement (e.g., salafi jihadism) and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(external part of strategy), and knowing of the groups impacting one’s national interests (external part of 
strategy).  
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who are available to be interviewed. The opinions of these officials and experts are also 
limited by their bounded rationality and subjectivity.  
 
4.4.2 Inputs/Suggestions for the Future Research. 
 
Several improvement toolkits can be implemented to overcome limitations of this 
Ph.D. research project and to leverage the quality of it.  
First, the size of the sample could be increased (by covering more layers and 
types of Islamist radicals spanning not only over Indonesia but also over the regional 
and global level). This improvement should also be coupled with the implementation of 
more qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques. There are many qualitative and 
multivariate statistical analysis techniques and validity assessments that can be 
creatively used for this kind of study.  
Second, the variables examined (and their inherent attributes) could also be 
expanded in more elaborated ways. By having implemented these two improving 
aspects, we expect to see the new and improved research that could provide us with a 
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CHAPTER 5: THE SYNTHESIS OF VARIOUS ANALYSIS 
 
 
This chapter is dedicated to synthesizing various analytical findings in chapter 4 
with the first purpose to prove whether the H0 established in this Ph.D. thesis could be 
rejected. The second purpose is subsequently to visualize the general pattern of 
Islamist terrorism in Indonesia that is based on the entire research of this Ph.D. thesis. 
 
5.1 The Rejection of H0. 
 
The entire analysis made through qualitative methods (the discovering patterns 
analysis, content analysis, and the discourse analysis) and quantitative/multivariate 
statistical methods (the chi-square test, the logistic regression, and the proportional test) 
have confirmed that all independent variables: economic grievances; social grievances; 
political grievances; radical ideology; social network; state repression; and government 
incentive play their own roles on the dependent variable: the creation/occurrence of 
individual’s ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law 
and of Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). In 
other words, this Ph.D. thesis has proven and confirmed the initial, general hypothesis, 
which is to reject the H0 and accepting the Ha. 
 
H0: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is not 
caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political 
grievances, radical ideology, social network, state repression, and government 
incentive.  
 
Ha: The Islamist terrorism (their violent ideology and/or behaviour) in Indonesia is 
caused by the intertwining of economic grievances, social grievances, political 
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Hypothesis Ha1 (Causal Relationship with Mediating Variables): Economic, social, and 
political grievances are the necessary factors for people committing Islamist terrorism. 
However, it will only lead people to commit Islamist terrorism if the mediating variables 
(social network and radical ideology) take part in transforming people with such 
grievances to commit Islamist terrorism. Economic, social, and political grievances 
along with social network and radical ideology are the significant factors leading people 
to commit Islamist terrorism, where the higher the intensity of these variables, the higher 
the likeability of them to commit Islamist terrorism. 
 
Figure 5.1 The Two Possible Models (Among Many Other Possibilities) Based on Ha1 
 
X4 X5 (intervening variables) 
 
X1       X2          X3            Y 
 
 
X4   X5 (intervening variables) 
        X1 
X2         Y 
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Hypothesis Ha2 (Multi-Chain Relationship): Economic, social, and political 
grievances along with radical ideology and social network all together form the 
multi-chain relationship with people’s decision on committing Islamist terrorism. 
Economic, social, and political grievances along with social network and radical 
ideology are the significant factors leading people to commit Islamist terrorism, 
where the higher the intensity of these variables, the higher the likeability of them 
to commit Islamist terrorism. 
 





X3    Y 
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Hypothesis Ha3 (The Significant Role of Control Variables): When included as 
control variables in the equation, state repression and government incentive will 
be proven significant in leading people to commit Islamist terrorism. The higher 
the intensity of these variables, the higher the likeability of them to commit 
Islamist terrorism. 
 
Figure 5.3 The Two Possible Models (Among Many Other Possibilities) Based on Ha3 
 
X4 X5 X6 X7 
 
X1               X2                        X3                          Y 
 
 
   X4   X5 X6 X7 
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5.2 The General Pattern of Islamist Terrorism in In donesia. 
 
By based on the rigorous qualitative and quantitative analysis, which are 
examined in chapter 4, at least I can lay out and predict several possible patterns of 
Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. The Ha1 and Ha3 are more likely to represent the 
general pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, although the Ha2 is also still a 
possible pattern. 
The economic, social and political grievances serve as the laying ground with or 
without which the social network and radical ideology could permeate through the 
society, and thus altering the affected individuals in the society to start believing in the 
radical ideology that along the way will make them more exposed to the idea of being 
involved in violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).  
The combined analyses have also proven that it is mostly through being 
associated with the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation fellowship and 
the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based campus Islamic da’wah fellowship, individuals 
are exposed to the radical ideology. Once they enter the vicious cycle of the radical 
social network, their mindset and behaviour are shaped by the interaction of four 
intertwining social network constructs: personal relationship; shared educational 
experiences; shared training experiences; and shared operational experiences.  
The findings in chapter 4 have also proven that the long-standing, traditionalist 
Islamist organizations in Indonesia such as NU/Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah 
(as opposed to the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation fellowship and 
the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based campus Islamic da’wah fellowship), could serve 
as the defending layer against the influx and permeate through of radical ideology in 
Indonesia. Consistent with this finding, according to Police Brigadier General (Ret) 
Suryadharma, the former head of Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Detachment 88 
who is still serving as the senior adviser on counterterrorism affairs to the Indonesian 
government, the spreaders of radical ideology (e.g., hard-liner organizations) are keen 
in using both Quran recitation fellowship and campus Islamic da’wah fellowship as the 
entry gate for the radical ideology to penetrate and permeate through the Indonesian 
society. It is according to General Suryadharma and the current head of intelligence 
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section at the Detachment 88 that once the hard-liner organizations taking advantage of 
such channels, they are sustained by strong fundings, teaching materials, technological 
supports, man-power, and other supporting infrastructures.262  
On the other hand, a large range of traditionalist organizations (e.g., NU and 
Muhammadiyah) also seek to obtain followers from among students through Quran 
recitation fellowship and campus Islamic da’wah fellowship.263 Not only must these 
traditionalist organizations compete to neutralize the influence of radical ideology in the 
Indonesian society through Quran recitation fellowship and campus Islamic da’wah 
fellowship, they also must “neutralize” themselves against the infiltration of radical 
ideology in these traditionalist organizations (Wahid, ed. 2011).264 
Regarding the radical ideology in this case, such ideology is basically an 
ideological system that makes the affected individuals believe that at all costs the 
Islamic (Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist state must be established in Indonesia. This 
is indeed in line with the open statements of Police Inspector General (Ret) Ansyaad 
Mbai, the former head of Indonesian Counterterrorism Agency and many other experts 
and senior policymakers in the field who argue that until today this is the end-
state/ultimate intention in the mind of affected individuals.265 This firm ideological 
system exists along with other concurrent perceptions that view the Western world 
(including its democratic culture that Indonesia adopts) as a man-made and kafir, thus 
making the de-establishment of current social order by physical (lesser) jihad and act of 
terror at the local, national, and global level (e.g., the foreign jihad) as both compulsory 
and a divine obligation. Subsequently, such ideological system is exacerbated by the 
fact that such affected individuals have a firm belief (including the ideological conviction) 
in the Apocalyptic Day (Qiyamah). Although all three Abrahamic religions (Judaism, 
                                                   
262 Police Brigadier General (Ret) Suryadharma (the Former Head of the Indonesian National Police Anti 
Terror Special Detachment 88) and Senior Commissioner/Colonel Ibnu Suhendra (the Head of 
Intelligence Section at the Indonesian National Police Anti Terror Special Detachment 88) in a discussion 
with the author, October 18, 2016. 
 
263 For more, see (Afrianti, Indonesia's Islamic Educational Institutions and Radicalism Among Muslim 
Youth 2011). See also (Loveita 2017). 
 
264 See also (Loveita 2017). 
 
265 See also (Police General Tito Karnavian 2016).  
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Christianity, and Islam) believe in the Judgment Day, this belief in the Qiyamah is 
important for these affected individuals. Specifically, within their bounded rationality 
these affected individuals also believe that their firm, consistent commitment in the 
establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia including 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror) is in line with their higher chance of being 
accepted in the heaven and being spared by the wrath of God in the Apocalyptic Day.  
In line with this fact, Jerry L. Walls (2008) also argues that the twentieth-century 
was marked by the emergence of Islamist fundamentalism as a significant energy in 
world politics and in the acts of terrorism, which have often been overtly motivated by 
eschatological convictions, especially with respects to the belief system about rewards 
in the afterlife of Islamist martyrs. Therefore, the failure by secularists to dismiss 
eschatological beliefs as nothing more than misguided fanaticism would expose their 
own failure to truly understand the world around them. Indeed, this failure will open 
more spaces for the “scroundrels” and “demagogues” to employ this eschatological 
multi-interpretation in manipulating the naive and uninformed. 266   
Correspondingly, once these Salafi jihadists have the determination, courage, and 
commitment to be involved in the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and the Salafi 
Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror), the other 
independent variables: the high-level state repression and the insufficient government 
incentive only play their own role to exacerbate the situation. Both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis have proven that the more these affected individuals feel that the 
level of state repression is high and the government incentive are insufficient, the more 
determined, courageous, and committed they become to be involved in the 
establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through 
violent jihad and the act of terror.267 
                                                   
266 For more, see (Walls 2008), 10 – 11.  In order to grasp the significance of Muslim teachings on the 
afterlife, we need first to have a sense of the basic eschatological narrative as set down in the Quran and 
the Hadith and elaborated upon by generations of preachers, scholars, and teachers. For more, see  
(Chittick 2008). 
 
267 According to the Indonesian Minister of Defense, General TNI (Ret) Ryamizard Ryacudu in a 
discussion with the author in August 2015, if the Indonesian government can dedicate more sufficient 
attention and resources allocation (e.g., proper government incentives) towards the Islamist radicals, it 
would become a strategic instrument to winning their heart and mind. The similar view was also 
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5.3 The Policy Analysis on the Deradicalization Eff orts of Indonesian 
Government. 
 
Having mapped out the general pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, it is 
also important to examine the effectiveness of Indonesian deradicalization policy since 
2002 - 2017. The statistical findings in chapter 4.2. indicate that the Indonesian 
deradicalization efforts have not significantly altered the end-state/ultimate intention in 
the mind of these affected individuals. Although during this timeframe the Indonesian 
counterterrorism forces have successfully prevented a number of potential terrorist 
attacks to occur, coupled by some successes to disengage the affected individuals from 
the violent networks, in general the Indonesian government has not been able to 
significantly deradicalize the affected individuals (by being measured by their end-
state/ultimate intention) and to make most of them embracing the political democratic 
process or being involved in the political democratic life.  
In this sense, although after undergoing the deradicalization efforts most of these 
deradicalized individuals feel and view that the Indonesian government’s 
counterterrorism approach is more constructive and persuasive (as opposed to being 
repressive), they merely become hibernate, which means that they neither adopt non-
gradual, violent ways nor embracing268 the political democratic process (or being 
involved in the political democratic life). At the same time, after they undergo the 
deradicalization efforts they also still disagree and being unsure with the four most basic 
values of the nation: Pancasila, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (the unity in diversity), UUD 
1945, and the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. This condition is quite concerning, 
because once any windows of opportunity to make “their come-back” at the domestic 
and at the global level are available, they could be potentially exposed to the old violent 
ideology and/or behaviour. Strictly speaking, this phenomenon requires more preventive 
measures of counterterrorism efforts other than the deradicalization itself. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
expressed by the Vice Chief of Indonesian State Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General TNI (Ret) Torry 
Djohar in a discussion with the author in October 2015. 
 
268 Police Brigadier General (Ret) Suryadharma (the Former Head of the Indonesian National Police Anti 
Terror Special Detachment 88) and a former terrorism prisoner who is now a Ph.D. student at one of the 
leading Universities in Indonesia in a discussion with the author, October 1, 2016. 
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5.4 Predicting the Existence and Latent Threat of I slamist Terrorism in 
Indonesia. 
 
Having identified a set of determining variables that determine the 
creation/occurrence of ideological and behavioural system that adopts violent jihad 
(e.g., the act of terror), at least I can make the prediction that the chance of Indonesia to 
produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious terrorism 
movement (terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based arguments) are still 
high. 
First. If in the future the Indonesian economic, social, and political conditions are 
not significantly well improved, it could contribute to the higher risk of Indonesia to 
produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious terrorism 
movement (terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based arguments). Such 
improving socio-economic-politico conditions include but not limited to a more economic 
equality and welfare in the whole Indonesian society, a better education (in terms of its 
quality and quantity) at the national level, a more enlightened society, a lesser 
unemployment level, and a more quality democracy and effective democratic 
government sustained by a high quality law enforcement.   
Second. If the Indonesian government along with the whole Indonesian society 
and its traditionalist, long-standing Islamist organizations fails to effectively curb the 
existence and the supporting factors of various social network modes that become the 
entry gate of radical ideology to influx and permeate through Indonesian society, the risk 
likelihood of Indonesia to produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global 
religious terrorism movement (terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based 
arguments) is still high. 
Third. If the Indonesian government along with the traditionalist, long-standing 
Islamist organizations (e.g., NU/Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) and other 
Islamist political parties fail to curb “the influencing power” of  radical-Islamist ideology 
to spread and permeate through the Indonesian society, the risk likelihood of Indonesia 
to produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious terrorism 
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movement (terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based arguments) is still 
high. 
Fourth. The Indonesian government and its national security establishment need 
to continuously keep the balance between the under-reaction and over-reaction when 
they deal with the potential and actual threats of Islamist terrorism. In this case, the 
state repression level must be sophisticatedly tailored and continuously adjusted. If they 
fail to maintain this balance, it will increase the risk likelihood of Indonesia to produce 
more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious terrorism movement 
(terrorism movement that is justified by religious-based arguments). 
Fifth. If the Indonesian government fails to improve its winning-heart-and-mind 
approaches in deradicalizing the affected individuals, it will increase the risk likelihood of 
Indonesia to produce more jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global religious 
terrorism movement. The better government incentive perceived in the mind of affected 
individuals will attenuate/lessen the risk likelihood of Indonesia to produce more 
jihadists and to becoming a battlefield of global terrorism movement (terrorism 
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CHAPTER 6: THE CONCLUSION AND POLICY RELEVANCE/RECO MMENDATION 
 
6.1 The Thesis Conclusion. 
 
A series of research processes conducted throughout this Ph.D. thesis project 
have confirmed that the existence and latent threat of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia are 
caused by the intertwining set of determining multivariate/multi-dimensional variables, 
instead of being otherwise. Although the unit of analysis of this project is the individual, 
the thorough analysis made in this Ph.D. thesis project still accommodates the scope of 
other units of analysis: group level; state level; and global level, thus making this Ph.D. 
thesis project comprehensively covering all related aspects in the field. Concurrently, 
throughout the research processes, the pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is also 
examined from the perspective of terrorism as a logic of action, a method of action, and 
a psychological phenomenon. 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis complemented by the 
discussion on social networks analysis has proven that radical ideology is the most 
significant variable in making the individuals believe in the establishment of Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act 
of terror). The second most significant variable after the radical ideology is the social 
network through which the radical ideology influxes and permeates through the 
Indonesian society and affects certain individuals. As these two variables are found as 
the significant variables, so that these two variables play their own role as the mediating 
variables connecting the economic-socio-political grievances and the dependent 
variable (the individual’s ideology and/or behaviour towards the establishment of Islamic 
(Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through violent jihad (e.g., the act 
of terror).  
Subsequently, once the affected individuals are exposed to such radical 
ideology, the two other variables (the state repression and the government incentive) 
only play their own role to exacerbate the situation. In this sense, the higher state 
repression level and the less government incentive will increase the likelihood of these 
affected individuals to become more determined, courageous, and committed in the 
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establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through 
violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror).  
Thus, by having mapped out the underlying, latent variables in this phenomenon 
it can be concluded that the likely future pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia is 
determined by how effective the Indonesian government in managing and manipulating 
these intertwining multivariate/multi-dimensional variables. These intertwining variables 
are the set of predictors that we can use to formulate a better national counterterrorism 
policy, strategy, and operation by employing all instruments of national power (military, 
intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, information, economic, and financial), 
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6.2 The Policy Relevance/Recommendation. 
 
In counterterrorism, the general guide to success is to catch or kill as many 
terrorists as you can without creating more.269 However, for Indonesia, the issue is not 
that simple. As the world’s most Muslim populated country and as a democracy, the 
counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia must require both the guarantee of security and the 
maintenance of broad and in-depth public support at the national level. Any 
counterterrorism policies must be specifically crafted and continuously updated based 
on the likely pattern of terrorist threats and movements this country is facing, whilst at 
the same time considering the fact that the long-term goals should not be undermined 
for the short-term gains.  
The effectiveness and accountability of Indonesian counterterrorism policy must 
balance between the two aspects: security (the under-reaction versus over-reaction) 
and political integration (the involvement of key political leadership and stakeholders of 
the nation). Actions need to be strategically chosen with proximate and ultimate goals in 
mind. Otherwise, according to Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, “individual 
application of selected tactics and policies without a comprehensive national plan can 












                                                   
269 See (Holmes 2015), 35 – 49. 
 
270 Ibid. 
P a g e  | 398 
 
 
Table 6.1 An Example of Spectrum of Terrorism Warning and Threat Assessment  
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271 Adapted. See (Pillar 2004). 
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a. Improving economic, social, and political conditions. 
Although the economic, social and political grievances are not necessarily the 
variables that can directly cause terrorism to occur in Indonesia, such variables are still 
important to notice and must be improved along the way. The economic, social and 
political improvement at the national level requires the concerted involvement of all 
instruments of national power. Such improvements could be measured by various 
indicators of governance. These indicators include but not limited to the higher Human 
Development Index (HDI), the better/higher Corruption Perceptions Index (HPI), the 
better index of World Bank Ease of Doing Business, the lesser Human Poverty Index 
(HPI) or UN’s Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI), the lesser Gini Coefficient 
(indicating the level of economic imbalance), the higher Per Capita Electricity 
Consumption (kilowatt hours per year), the better Human Freedom Index, the more 
enlightened and welfare society, and the more quality democracy as reflected by the 
higher Democracy Index (DI).  
This Democracy Index (DI) contains four elements: whether national elections 
are free and fair; the security of voters; the influence of foreign powers on government; 
and the capability of the civil servants to implement policies. As most of Indonesian 
(former) jihadists/radicals/terrorists are anti-democracy, this is indeed important for the 
Indonesian government to make sure that its democracy is not defect and does not 
generate the loopholes of which the Islamist radicals could exploit and further 
popularizing their extremist ideology throughout the society. That said, it is a very 
important task for Indonesia to assuring the survivability of her democracy, and how this 
democracy can afford to generate the best economic, social, and political outcomes and 
to serve the wider national interests. It is predictable that once the Indonesian 
democracy collapse, it will open a strategic entry point for certain Islamist ideologies to 
further their agenda by establishing the Islamic (Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia.  
Asia 2025, an already open-source U.S. Department of Defense assessment 
made in 1999 predicted the possibility of Indonesia’s internal implosion/breakdown 
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before 2025.272 Could it be prevented? Surely it could, and the answer is laid out in the 
hand of Indonesians themselves. According to Abraham Diskin, Hanna Diskin and 
Reuven Hazan (2005) in their comprehensive study over 62 democratic countries titled 
“Why Democracies Collapse: The Reasons for Democratic Failure and Success”, there 
are at least four main determining variables that encompass economic, socio and 
political aspects that determine the fate of democracy of a nation: whether it is going to 
survive, or it is going to collapse.  
The first determining variable is the institutional factor such as the state and 
government system, where the unitary state with pluralistic society and presidential 
system (like Indonesia) is more vulnerable towards a democratic collapse as opposed to 
the federal state with the parliamentary governmental system. The second variable is 
the social factor such as the social cleavages, non-functioning economy, and the 
historical factor. In this case, a democracy with deep social cleavages coupled with an 
unequal and/or equitable economic distribution will make a democracy to be more 
vulnerable to collapse. The third variable is the government instability where the more a 
democratic government has the reshuffle and re-election, the more likely a democracy 
of that nation to collapse. The fourth variable is the foreign intervention, meaning that 
the higher degree of foreign intervention will cause a democracy to be more likely to 
collapse. Based on their study, out of these four determining variables it is the social 
factor that most determines the fate of democracy: the deep social cleavages; the 
unequal and/or equitable economic distribution issue; and the historical aspect, all 
which Indonesia is currently having. However, this complex social condition is not only 
occurring today but already existed throughout the history of the Republic of Indonesia 
from 1945 until today. 
Historically Indonesian society consists of three divisions of social cleavages: 
pro-Islamist versus pro-secular nationalist (state ideology-based); the pro-the unitary 
state of the Republic of Indonesia versus pro-federalism (state and governmental 
system-based); and pro-socialist/people-based economy versus pro-capitalism/elitists-
based economy (political economy-based). These social cleavages were then reflected 
                                                   
272 See (U.S. Department of Defense 1999). For more on the scenario of Indonesia breakdown also see 
(Singer and Cole 2016).  
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in the multiparty system during the first 1955 Indonesian general election and still exist 
until today. These are the social cleavages that have been the characteristic of this 
nation, and a failure to fully comprehend and handle such phenomenon will lead to a 
poor management of political disagreement among Indonesia’s deeply-divided social 
cleavages, which in turn will be dangerous for the Indonesian democracy.  
As of 2014, before the current administration taking place, and with all due 
respects with the great leadership of previous Indonesian presidents, there were still at 
least 100 million out of 245 million Indonesians living with the income of less than $2 
USD/day. In addition to that, Indonesia that historically consists of highly pluralistic 
elements eventually decided to establish a nation-state called Indonesia. Therefore, any 
efforts to enforce a uniformity (e.g., Islamizing the whole nation) by certain elements in 
the society will become a serious threat to the Indonesian pluralistic nature. Such efforts 
will only disturb the economic development process, thus exacerbating the unequal 
and/or equitable economic distribution challenges that facing the archipelago since 
1945 until today. 
Looking forwards, it is the current ultimate challenge of Indonesian top national 
leadership to be able to manage all ideological differences and political disagreements 
at the national level by diligently looking at the whole characteristics examined above. 
The ideological differences followed by the political disagreement occurring in the 
peacetime is normal, and such disagreement has both the root causes and apparent 
symptoms. As discussed in chapter 2 of this Ph.D. thesis, according to Alex Schmid 
(1988), there are at least five levels of gradation in managing the political disagreement 
within a democracy: the full state of peace; the management of political disagreements 
through political persuasions; the engagement by political pressures; the use of political 
violence; and the civil war. 
Therefore, it is the braveness of top national leadership for having to 
acknowledge the root causes whilst at the same time gradually fixing the symptoms of 
political disagreements within this nation. Such political disagreements must be 
managed at the political persuasion level where the government consistently 
implements the rule of law (such as the routine rule legitimated by the traditional 
customs, constitutional procedures, and the political compromise of give-and-take). This 
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particular point is also stressed by Hamad El-Said who argues that in order to win our 
struggle against terrorism and other violent radicalism, the government needs to restore 
trust, legitimacy, respect for law and human rights, freedom of expression, and the 
promotion of good governance.273 Correspondingly, on the other side, the non-
government actors who want to settle any political disagreements should play their 
constitutional-based oppositional role in elegant and non-violent ways (such as through 
the formation of opposition press and parties, rallies, electoral contests, and 
litigation/use of courts for solving the political disputes).  
However, if the government fails to manage political disagreements within the 
boundary of political persuasion, the government would likely to start controlling the 
situation by engaging in the political pressure and oppression. Such pressures and 
oppressions could include the manipulation of the competitive electoral process, the 
censorship, the surveillance, the harassment, the discrimination/criminalization of 
political oppositions, the infiltration of oppositions, and the misuse of emergency 
legislation. If such conditions happen usually the non-government actors will respond by 
engaging in the various extra-parliamentary action (e.g., non-violent actions such as 
social protest, demonstrations to show the strength of public supports, the strikes, the 
boycotts, the civil disobedience and non-cooperation, and other forms of pressure 
politics short of violence). However, this is already an alarming situation and not 
conducive to the national security. 
Subsequently, if the government fails again to manage the political 
disagreements at this stage, it automatically will degrade to the worst level which is the 
political violence. In this case, the government will likely to engage in the violent 
repression for the control of state power that includes state terrorism/terrorism by the 
state actor or so-called the terror from above (e.g., the torture, the death squads, the 
disappearances, and the concentration camps); the counterinsurgency; the 
                                                   
273 For more, see (El-Said n.d.). See also, (Saadi 2012). Correspondingly, according to Lieutenant 
General TNI (Ret) Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo (the former Presidential candidate in 2014 and 
chairman of the third biggest political party in the parliament for the period of 2014 - 2019) in a discussion 
with the author, March 25, 2018, the Islamist movement in Indonesia can be well and peacefully managed 
as long as the Indonesian democracy and political leadership can deliver the best possible resources for 
its people, thus being respectable and exemplary in the eyes of its citizens. Another factor deemed 
important is the capacity of government and society to stand against transnational Islamist radical 
movements that spill over to Indonesia. 
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assassination; the massacres; and the “government political justice” (e.g., the mass 
arrest, the banning, and the deportation). Consequently, the non-governmental actors 
would like to respond with another kind of political violence for challenging the state 
power that correspondingly mirrors what the state actor does. It could include the 
terrorism (de-individuated political murder); the insurgency; the assassination (e.g., the 
individuated political murder); the indiscriminate massacres; and the material 
destruction (e.g., the sabotage and the arson). After the stage of political violence, the 
worst of the worst would happen which is the civil war and the implosion of the country. 
Having laid out a general pattern of Indonesian characteristics, of the challenge 
of keeping a stable democracy, and of addressing the root causes and apparent 
symptoms of Indonesian democratic challenges, it is not exaggerating if all elements 
involved in the political disagreement including the governmental and non-governmental 
actors to refrain themselves, not to be involved in the self-destructive political behaviour, 
and instead keeping their engagement within the border of political persuasion. Once 
the managing of political disagreement has shifted beyond the boundary of political 
persuasion, it would potentially become uncontrollable. Such condition could give the 
leeway for the radical-Islamist movement to take advantage of the situation and to 
exacerbate its condition. Indonesia is a big, promising nation where there is no political 
disagreement that is not unsolvable, and all together Indonesians should keep this 
nation strong and great through democratic, gradual, and non-violent ways.  
 
b. Effectively dealing with the social network as an entry point of radical ideology.  
This Ph.D. thesis project has proven that the social network and the radical 
ideology each plays its own significant role in the equation that generates Islamist 
terrorism to occur in Indonesia. In this sense, the social network is indeed the entry 
point for the radical ideology to influx and to permeate through the society, thus 
affecting the individuals to become radical. The involvement of individuals in the social 
network is shaped by the four intertwining social constructs: personal relationship; 
shared educational experiences; shared training experiences; and shared operational 
experiences. On the other side of the same coin, the social network is manifested both 
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in the cyber and physical realm through a complex web of human interactions at the 
personal, group, state, and global level.  
In its relationship with this particular matter, the quantitative analysis has proven 
that being associated with the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based Quran recitation 
fellowship and the non-NU and Muhammadiyah-based campus Islamic da’wah 
fellowship as opposed to only being associated with the traditionalist, long-standing 
Islamist organizations (e.g., NU/Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) has a significant 
relationship and the positive causal effect on the individuals to believe in the 
establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia through 
violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror). It is also important to note that since individuals’ 
involvement in the social network is shaped by the personal relationship, shared 
educational experiences, shared training experiences, and shared operational 
experiences; the Indonesian government must pay a very serious attention to the 
Islamic educational system and institutions throughout the nation.  
The serious attention is not only given to the domestic supporting factors that 
make such social networks to exist, but also to the international forces (international 
state and non-state actors) that support these networks through fundings, teaching 
materials, technological supports, man-power, and other supporting infrastructures. In 
other words, the special attention needs to be made on the social network-based 
counterterrorism efforts (from the policy to the strategy and operational level) in order to 
prevent such social networks from existing, growing, and recruiting potential 
individuals/terrorists whether by the means of preventing their occurrence, of 
penetrating and disturbing the Salafi jihad social networks, and of decreasing the pool of 
potential terrorists.  
There are several creative social networks-based engagements that the 
government can do. These engagements can include promoting the banning of 
extremist imams from preaching, promoting the open and intellectual discussion of 
politico-religious related issues, and working with the fundamentalist Muslim groups to 
promote a pacifying message and repudiate terrorist violence. Just as European 
socialists acted as a bulwark against Soviet communism in the twentieth century, the 
peaceful fundamentalist Muslim groups’ help is essential to neutralize 
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extremist/jihadist/terrorist networks, for they attract the same clusters of alienated young 
men as the Salafi jihad but may provide them with a peaceful alternative to terror.274 
This is indeed an intelligence-heavy work that must be consistently supported by the 
means of law enforcement, diplomacy, and even military. 
 
c. Effectively curbing the influencing power of radical ideology. 
On top of that, the Indonesian government along with the traditionalist, long-
standing Islamist organizations (e.g., NU/Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) and the 
whole society at the personal, familial, group, and national level must exactly know the 
strategic minds behind the radical ideology that Indonesia is facing.275 This effort must 
also be boosted by a more strict security clearance process in order to assure that any 
government individuals involved in curbing the influencing power of radical ideology are 
indeed the ones who have serious personal and professional integrity in this kind of 
counter-ideology engagement.276 This is not only because the radical ideology is the 
most significant variable for the occurrence of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, but also 
such ideology is becoming more global in its nature.  
By referring to four main ideologues in the twentieth century who are discussed 
in chapter 2, whose works are influential for the occurrence of Islamist terrorism (e.g., 
Salafi jihadism), the Indonesian government is expected to fully grasp of how the 
ideologies of these global-level ideologues are implemented in the modern-day context 
of irregular warfare. The Indonesian government must be keen to acknowledge what 
                                                   
274 For more, see Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 182. 
 
275 The crucial dates in the evolution of the ideology of global jihad that also influences the pattern of 
Islamist terrorism in Indonesia: 1918 – 1924 (the end of Caliphate); 1945 – 1948 (the creation of Israel 
state); 1979 (Iranian Revolution, the Siege of Mecca, and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan); 1988 (Soviet 
Withdrawal from Afghanistan); and 1990 – 1991 (Fall of USSR and Gulf War I). See (Gorka and 
Sookhdeo 2012).  
 
276 According to Rear Admiral TNI Dr. Amarullah Oktavian, ST., MSc., DESD. (the Dean of Defence 
Management Faculty at the Indonesian Defence University) in a discussion with the author on September 
30, 2017, a stricter security cleareance process is instrumental in the nation’s effort in counter-ideology 
engagements. 
 
Correspondingly, according to Lieutenant General TNI (Ret) Agus Widjojo (the Governor of the National 
Resilience Institute of Republic of Indonesia) in a discussion with the author on October, 19, 2017, it is 
highly critical for Indonesian strategic leaders to be educated in the totally different way by transforming 
their “how-to-think” in dealing with contemporary strategic security challenges.   
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kind of radical ideology that this country is facing. Over generalizing the radical ideology 
of Indonesian Islamist terrorism as merely “violent extremism or religious right-wing” 
could be misleading and detrimental to the Indonesian ability to understand, cope, and 
defeat the Islamist terrorist threats this country is facing. Denying this fact simply out of 
a misguided tolerance/sensitivity to other Muslims will delay Indonesian ability to 
understand the true nature of this conflict and to delegitimize that threat: the radical 
ideology implemented through violent and non-violent jihad. Both of which have the 
same goal, which is the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist 
state of Indonesia. 
 
What to do about that? 
When it comes to laying out and examining about Islamist radical ideology, it may 
not be as complex as offering solutions to it. Theological, philosophical, intellectual, and 
psychological engagement must be fully employed at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical level of any counter-radicalization and deradicalization efforts by using all 
instruments of national power available: military; informational; diplomacy; law 
enforcement; intelligence; financial; and economic. Based on the lesson learned from 
the case of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyyah that was founded in 1978 and Muslim Brotherhood 
that was founded in 1928, at least we can conclude a two-point strategy that the 
Indonesian government may adopt.277  
First, radical groups must reach the conclusion that violent campaigns will not 
achieve their goals and will lead to the destruction of their groups and their influence. In 
this sense, radical groups must be answered with enough force and determination that 
they perceive a cease-fire (stop being engaged in the violent way) as the only way for 
them to survive. This means that radicals’ violence cannot go unanswered. Each 
unanswered act of violence makes them bolder. The mujahidin in Afghanistan felt that 
they could overcome a world superpower because they drove the Soviet Union out of 
the country. As al-Qaeda moved on to attack the United States interest overseas, the 
United States gave a weak response, which made al-Qaeda bolder. They actually firmly 
believed that they could win an all-out battle with the United States.  
                                                   
277 For more on this two-point strategy, see (Gabriel 2006), 165 – 167.  
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Based on this premise, if the Indonesian government along with the government 
of other countries continue to demonstrate their lethal force (military/intelligence/law 
enforcement) and their resolve, radicals will eventually be forced to recognize that 
violence will not achieve their goals. Instead, violence will only succeed in self-
annihilation and bring harm to the cause of Islam. In addition to that, the Muslim public 
will harden their hearts against radicals who continue to harm their society instead of 
improving it. Although it may not be possible to change the goal of (fundamental) 
Islamists, which is to claim the whole world for Islam, it is possible to cause them to 
change their current strategy of achieving it.278 That said, the Indonesian government 
must back Islamist radicals into a corner where jihad will not work and then give them a 
dignified third option: the peaceful involvement in the civilized society. 
Second, during the cease-fire (or at the hibernate stage where these radicals 
neither adopt violent ways nor peaceful democratic mechanisms), the Indonesian 
government should not allow extremist groups to regroup and gather strength to make a 
better attempt at mounting violent attacks in the future along their way to establish the 
Islamic (Shari’a) law and the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. Therefore, the 
Indonesian government must cripple their ability to do this by the means of preventing 
radical groups from using funds for violent purposes, and of educating young people 
about teachings in the Quran and hadith that support the spreading of Islam through 
peaceful engagements, instead of through jihad. This religious enlightenment campaign 
needs to be given an important place within a wider strategic informational campaign 
involving all media outlets available.  
Additionally, these Islamist moderate voices need to have a prominent place on 
the Internet in order to counteract the thousands of Islamist Web sites that are feeding 
jihad to Muslim young men.279 Perhaps the new writings of the historic leadership of al-
Gama’a al-Islamiyyah can provide the philosophical foundation that a committed Muslim 
can follow to demonstrate the sincerity of his/her faith and ideology without causing 
harm to those who believe differently. It is time for Muslim scholars and leaders to take 
                                                   
278 Ibid., 165 – 166.  
 
279 These moderate Islamists may come from the silent majority in the Islamic world: the secular/ordinary 
Islamist; liberal-Islamist; and orthodox or traditional-Islamist. 
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the lead in educating Muslim society in an interpretation of the Quran that looks 
forwards to the twenty-first century instead of dragging Muslim society backwards into 
the seventh century where preserving and advancing Islam through violent/lesser jihad 
is no longer needed; treating the religious preachers not as the judges; supporting the 
voices of Islamist moderation; leaving religious education to the family; and having more 
enlightened/emancipated Muslim women.280  
On another side of the same coin, the counterterrorism efforts must also 
acknowledge the imperfection of any human-made systems (e.g., Western civilization, 
colonialism, crusades, and democracy) that might alienate the Islamic world in the past. 
The successful appeal of any counter-radicalization efforts will also depend on the 
speaking respectfully towards the Muslims, Muhammad, and Muslim beliefs and to 
some extents by providing humanitarian aid to Muslims and showing many other 
humanized faces of Indonesian democracy and counterterrorism efforts. 
Having laid out the specific ideologies to be anticipated and how to engage in the 
counter-radicalization, at the practical level the Indonesian government along with the 
traditionalist, long-standing Islamist organizations (e.g., NU/Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah), and the whole society at the personal, familial, group, and national 
level must also consistently develop the Islamic educational teaching and da’wah 
system that accommodate the growth and dominance of pluralistic and inclusive Islam, 
which is based on the secular basic values of the nation, whilst at the same time 
discrediting any extremist ideologies to influx and to permeate through the society.  
Moreover, since the multivariate statistical analysis has also proven that the 
dynamic of Islamist struggle at the global level (among some other ideological-related 
factors) has the most significant relationship and causal effect on individuals to believe 
in the establishment of Islamic (Shari’a) law and Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia 
through violent jihad (e.g., the act of terror), the Indonesian government must do their 
best to build the resilience of its citizens against the appeal of Salafi and other extremist 
ideologies, including the allure of being involved in any kinds of foreign jihad at the 
                                                   
280 Ibid., 166 – 167, 169 – 173.   
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global level.281 Discrediting and preventing the extremist ideology to permeate through 
the Indonesian society is one thing, whilst discouraging Indonesians to be allured with 
such ideologies is another significant challenge. 
This policy recommendation is in line with the view of Hamed El-Said. According 
to El-Said, the engagement with the community and its key members is a powerful 
instrument in building a society that is resilient to violent extremist ideologies, aware of 
its dangers and risks, and capable of building and maintaining bonds and trustful 
relationships. In this sense, the government must stimulate programmes that promote 
community engagement and participation, debates, and discussion of all sorts of 
problems that becoming the concern of Islamist radical individuals. Through this way, 
the communities will be more resilient and empowered to find solutions for their 
problems, including the problems that are related to violent extremism.282 
 
d. Continuously Improving the quality and quantity of government incentive. 
The analysis in this Ph.D. thesis project has proven that the combination of the 
higher level of state repressive measure (according to the rule of law enacted by the 
Indonesian government) and the less government incentive contribute positively to the 
creation/occurrence of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. It is for this reason that the 
Indonesian government must sophisticatedly and specifically improve its “carrot” policy 
(e.g., the government incentive) to balance any repressive measures (e.g., death 
penalty or life imprisonment) that the government adopts as the consequence of 
complying with the rule of law in the Republic of Indonesia. In other words, the 
Indonesian counterterrorism policy, strategy, and operation must be formulated in such 
a way that keeping the balance between the under-reaction and the over-reaction to 
better address specific terrorist threats at the potential and actual stage. 
                                                   
281 According to the finding of Ph.D. thesis, being anti-Western is significant for causing individuals to 
become the Salafi jihadists in Indonesia. This particular finding is in line with what Marc Sageman said, 
where the global Salafi jihad feeds on anti-Western and anti-American hate speech. Such virulent 
discourse is a necessary condition for the jihad and provides a justification for it. For more, see 
(Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks 2004), 182. 
 
282 For more, see (El-Said n.d.).  
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At the end, by referring to the findings of this Ph.D. thesis project the Indonesian 
government can know that the kind of terrorist threat this nation is dealing with is the 
religious extremism that has both domestic and global orientation. This kind of 
extremism justifies its violent ideology and/or behaviour with religious-based arguments. 
Thus, the formulated Indonesian counterterrorism strategic policy must know of how 
best to address the terrorists’ motivating grievances, funding sources, support networks, 
leaders, operatives, and capabilities.283 It is by based on these aspects, the Indonesian 
government will know of how and of where to determine and to commit the nation’s 
resources in the counterterrorism efforts.  
Therefore, whilst the Indonesian government is integrating all elements of 
national power towards a comprehensive counterterrorism effort, it must be sure to 
pause and reflect on how well the nation understands its own intentions, capabilities, 
and biases about the Islamist terrorism and its wider fundamental, extremist, and violent 
movements. In this sense, by referring to the terminology of James J. F. Forest (2015), 
the Indonesian counterterrorism policy must not accommodate the room of prejudice, 
bloodthirsty, or bigotry. Policymakers, intelligence analysts, law enforcement/police 
officers, military personnel, diplomats, and other involved in counterterrorism must be 
committed to objectivity, self-discipline, integrity, and attention to nuances and details of 












                                                   
283 For more, see (Forest, An Introduction to the Study of Counterterrorism 2015). 
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6.3 Revisiting the Indonesian Counterterrorism Poli cy and Deradicalization 
Efforts (2002 – 2017 and Beyond). 
 
Based on the finding of this Ph.D. thesis project, we can clearly see the general 
pattern of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, and how it will likely to transform in the future. 
Correspondingly, this part revisits the pattern of Indonesian counterterrorism policy 
since 2002 until 2017, whilst at the same time trying to recommend the overall 
counterterrorism policy for the future.  
The counterterrorism policy in Indonesia for the last fifteen years (2002 – 2017) 
has been shaped by the two schools of thought. The first school of thought views the 
emerging Salafi jihad as a form of violent, fundamental-Islamist movements which are 
more driven by international conflicts that permeate through the Indonesian society by 
taking advantage of Indonesian politico-socio-economic weakness. The proponents of 
this camp argue that the Indonesian engagement in the global struggle against Salafi 
jihad movements is necessary as long as the United States and the Western world are 
still engaged in the “war” with Salafi jihad at the global and strategic level. In this case, 
the violent, fundamental-Islamist movements are considered equally significant in the 
way the United States dealt with the communism and the Soviet Union in the Cold-War 
era.  
The proponents of this camp do not seriously view terrorism that is justified by 
religious-based arguments as the latent problem but merely as the strategic effect of the 
“war” between the United States and the Western world versus violent, fundamental-
Islamist movements that eventually spill over to Indonesia. According to their point of 
view, counterterrorism measures are rather to be treated non-exclusively. In other 
words, they simply view that the national development would automatically in the long-
run eliminate the Salafi jihad movements in Indonesia so that having more specific 
national counterterrorism measures (e.g., counterterrorism law, counterterrorism policy, 
and counterterrorism strategy) are less important. 
On the other hand, the second school of thought argues that Salafi jihad 
movements in Indonesia have been an integral part of Indonesian social cleavages, and 
continuously appear since the Independence day in 1945, particularly due to the failure 
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to insert the implementation of Shari’a law for Muslim citizens in the constitution of 
Republic of Indonesia (UUD 1945) with the ultimate end-state to establish the 
Indonesian Salafi Islamist state (see in attachment #5 of the accompanying materials: 
the Jakarta Charter written in 1945). The camp of this school argues that violent Salafi 
Islamist movements in Indonesia are latent with or without the United States and 
Western world engagement in the “war” with the Salafi jihad. For the last fifteen years 
(2002 – 2017), the policy of this camp places a strong emphasis on the deradicalization 
efforts that are integrated into wider politico-socio-economic development policy. As 
opposed to the first camp, this camp argues that although the national development 
would automatically eliminate the Salafi jihad movements, having more specific national 
counterterrorism measures (e.g., specific counterterrorism law, specific counterterrorism 
policy, and specific counterterrorism strategy) are still an imperative. 
Subsequently, for the last fifteen years the Indonesian counterterrorism policy is 
categorized into three phases: 2002 – 2006 (from the sanctuary doctrine to the 
accommodation doctrine); 2006 – 2010 (from the accommodation doctrine to the 
suppression and preventive doctrine); and 2010 – 2017 (the improvement of 
suppression and preventive doctrine under BNPT).  
The first phase (2002 – 2006) is the period where the Indonesian government 
initially denied the existence of home-grown Salafi jihad movements (the sanctuary 
doctrine). This period was ended by the acknowledgment of Indonesian government 
that the Salafi jihad movements indeed existed in Indonesia, although the Indonesian 
government still preferred to silently deal and make concessions with the alleged 
terrorists (the accommodation doctrine). It is for this reason that in 2005 the Indonesian 
government acquited Abu Bakar Baasyir in the charge for his alleged involvement in the 
continuous terrorist attacks from 2002 until 2005. This period was marked by the 
establishment in 2002 of a special coordinating desk at the Indonesian Coordinating 
Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs that dealt with the terrorism eradication; 
the issuance of the terrorism crime eradication act in 2003 (UU 15/2003); the 
establishment of Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in 2004; 
and the publication of joint guide book on the eradication of terrorism in 2004 by the 
Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. This 
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coordinating ministry is responsible to oversee and supervise all national security 
ministries and agencies in Indonesia. 
The second phase (2006 – 2010) is the period where the Indonesian government 
began to fix classical problems in the national security community: the competition 
among national security apparatus following the separation of Indonesian National 
Military (TNI) and Indonesian National Police (Polri) in 1998 that caused the intelligence 
loopholes, where these loopholes were seriously problematic for the government 
counterterrorism efforts. Based on the comprehensive review of the government 
counterterrorism policy from 2002 - 2006, during the period of 2006 – 2010 the 
Indonesian government began to adopt the suppression doctrine which focused on 
crushing terrorist networks and halting the impending terrorist attacks. In 2006 the 
Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs issued a newly-
updated policy: the revision of strategic policy in the terrorism eradication along with the 
publication of integrated joint operations guide book. This period was marked by 
transforming in 2010 the 2002-established coordinating desk on the terrorism 
eradication into a single national agency that focuses on dealing with counterterrorism. 
Based on the international comparative study by the Indonesian government, the newly 
built agency is named the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) that is equipped 
with policy and operational arms. 
The third phase (2010 – 2017) is the period where the Indonesian government 
openly acknowledges the latent existence of Salafi jihad movements and acts more 
confidently by the support of general Indonesian people. This is a period that improves 
the implementation of both suppression and preventive doctrine. This period has been 
marked by the empowerment of BNPT as the leading multi-agencies government 
institution that deals with terrorism issues from the strategic level down to the tactical 
level, the issuance of preventive terrorism finance act in 2013 (UU 9/2013), the 
strengthening of Indonesian National Police anti terror detachment 88 (Densus 88) 
supported by the Indonesian National Military counterterrorism forces (the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force), and the more aggressive preventive measures (e.g., the domestic 
surveillance on alleged individuals, groups, and networks), more suppression (e.g., the 
direct action towards alleged individuals who fight back during the counterterrorism 
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operations and the fair court trial for alleged individuals who do not fight back during 
counterterrorism operations), and  the deradicalization efforts that uniquely 
accommodate the “remorseful” individuals.284  
Being more aware of the spreading of radical Salafi ideology in Indonesia and on 
the importance of international cooperation/global engagement by the Indonesian 
government also begins to mark this period. Up to the finishing stage of writing this 
Ph.D. thesis in the quarter one (Q-1) of 2018, the Indonesian government is in the 
process of issuing a new counterterrorism act to supersede the 2003 terrorism crime 
eradication act. During this period, the government has been doing its best to fix the 
legal and institutional counterterrorism capabilities (e.g., the establishment of National 
Counterterrorism Agency/BNPT in 2010 and a new preventive terrorism finance act in 
2013), to fix the interagency issues in government counterterrorism efforts (e.g., the 
establishment of whole-of-government-and-society approaches and joint operations 
mechanism inside BNPT from the international, down to the national, provincial, 
municipal, and village level), and to fix other operational aspects of government entities 
in counterterrorism efforts (e.g., the empowerment of counterterrorism capabilities in 
each governmental ministry and agency). The figure 6.1 and table 6.2 below visualize 
the engagement structure of BNPT and the SWOT analysis of Indonesian 
counterterrorism efforts since 2002 until 2017.  
                                                   
284 According to Major General TNI Benny Indra (the Assistant for Intelligence to the Commander of 
Indonesian National Military) in a discussion with the author on April 25, 2017, in the compliance to rule of 
law and based upon the executive order of the President of Republic of Indonesia, the Indonesian 
National Military is always ready to dedicate its assets and capabilities to sustain the strategic 
engagement of Indonesian government’s counterterrorism efforts.  
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The Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, 




The Ministry of 
Defence (military), the 
National Police, the 




The State Intelligence 
Agency (BIN), the 
Indonesian Ministry of 
Defence (military), the 
National Police, the 
Directorate General of 
Immigration, the 
Financial Transaction 
Analysis Centre, etc. 
Law Enforcement 
(Direct Action and 
Court Trial) 
 
The National Police, 
the Court system, the 
Directorate General of 
Immigration, the 
Directorate General of 
Custom, the Office of 





and elements of 
society including the 
academic community. 
All layers of society 
are encouraged to be 
involved. 
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Long-time experiences of Indonesian 
armed forces (the Indonesian National 
Military and Indonesian National Police) in 
the internal security including in dealing 
with Islamist Salafi rebellions and other 
separatist movements since 1945. 
 
The strong political will of Indonesian 
government to develop the institutional 
capacity and the revision of several 
counterterrorism strategic policies 
throughout 2002 - 2017. 
 
The state still has the huge potential from 
its instruments of national power (military, 
information, intelligence, diplomacy, 
economic, financial, and law enforcement) 





The law enforcement is still dominating 
counterterrorism efforts, so other 
instruments of national power have not 
been well developed. In this sense, the 
roles and capabilities of law enforcement 
and non-law enforcement instruments of 
national power need to be proportionally 
strengthened to make them better 
reinforcing to each other according to its 
own division of labor. 
 
The legal and strategic policy is relatively 
outdated and narrowly putting the 
emphasis on law enforcement. In this 
sense, the Indonesian National Police 
engagements (as the front liner of 
domestic law enforcement and of 
government domestic counterterrorism 
efforts) needs to be supported and 
strengthened by all other governmental 
and societal elements. 
 
The kinetic force (e.g., military and police) 
is rather limited in the reactive than in the 
preemptive and preventive measures. 
 
The intelligence loopholes at both the 
strategic and operational level. 
 
The Indonesian counterterrorism methods 
are more defensive as opposed to 
offensive.  
 
The weak reinforcement of Indonesian 
state secular ideology (e.g., Pancasila and 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) as the nation’s 
strategic culture after President Suharto’s 
era makes the Indonesian society 
becomes vulnerable against the radical 
ideology. 
 
P a g e  | 417 
 
 
Complicated bureaucratic issues tend to 
hinder the accelerated issuance of national 
security related bills. This is coupled by the 
condition where many legislatures do not 





The global audience has been more aware 
that violent movements justified by 
religious-based arguments are the 
common threat for the global civilized 
society.  
 
The violent Salafi jihad movement that 
Indonesia is facing is also considered a 
serious common global threat. 
 
The increased awareness of society in 
terms of the deadly effect of terrorism 
justified by religious-based arguments. 
 
The increased awareness among various 
stakeholders in the Indonesian society 
regarding the importance of 
counterterrorism efforts and of national 
resilience against violent Islamist 
movements. 
 
The strong public support that is coupled 
by dedicated international stakeholders. 
   
Threat 
 
Terrorism is still thriving although many of 
its cells have been exposed and crushed. 
The rebirth rate of terrorist cells is higher 
than the government’s ability to cope up. 
 
Terrorist networks have been transnational 
and present in many countries by taking 
advantage of globalization, media, and 
technological development. 
 
The terrorist funding with the cover of 
spreading religion keep infiltrating the 
Indonesian society. The influences of 
these Islamist transnational movements in 
Indonesia are significant.286 
 
The poverty and ungoverned territories in 
Indonesia’s remote islands. 
 
Terrorism can occur at anytime and 
anywhere, whilst terrorist networks have 
the in-depth root within the society backed 
by a systematic recruitment pattern. 
 
 
Source: Self-made.287  
 
                                                   
286 For more, see Abdurahman Wahid, ed, The Illusion of an Islamic State: How an Alliance of Moderates 
Launches a Successful Jihad Against Radicalization and Terrorism in the World’s Largest Muslim-Majority 
Country, kindle edition. (LibForAll Foundation Press, 2011), 59 – 221. In this book, the Indonesian 
Minister of Defense (2004 – 2009) Professor Juwono Sudarsono also warned the public regarding the 
infiltration of Islamist transnational movements that come to Indonesia and infiltrate the society. Their 
main characteristics are their intolerance, and often violent towards others including towards Indonesian 
modern Islamist people and society. 
 
287 Adapted. See (H. Pandjaitan 2011). 
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Looking forwards, the Indonesian counterterrorism policy needs an overhaul in 
terms of adjusting it with the current and likely future pattern of terrorist movements that 
this country is facing, as well as by improving the state capacities that are supported by 
the public support at the domestic and global level. Correspondingly, any efforts to issue 
a new piece of legislation related to terrorism and counterterrorism issues must also 
cover the essential elements of the strategic response to the global terrorist movement 
that this country is facing (e.g., global violent Islamist salafi movement). Whilst the table 
6.3 below lists the key elements to be considered for drafting the new counterterrorism 
bill, the figure 6.2 below visualizes the possible future trajectory of Indonesian 
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Table 6.3 The Essential Elements for Drafting the Indonesian Counterterrorism Bill/Act 
Essential Elements  Notes 
Terror as a violent/armed tactic that can be 
used by anyone/any actors (e.g., state 
and/or non-state actors). 
 
Terrorism can become a strategic 
phenomenon depending upon its (various) 
social contexts. 
The minimum and the 
widening/overarching definition of 
terrorism. 
The common denominator of terrorism is 
the use of violence towards civilians to 
send the message to achieve political 
goals. In other words, at the very least we 
can define terrorism as a criminal 
violent/armed tactic used to send 
messages and to achieve political goals 
via targeting civilians.   
 
This definition can be expanded by based 
on the 22 key elements found in at least 
109 definitions of terrorism, and by based 
on the specific social contexts of terrorism 
movement that Indonesia is facing. 
 
The overlapping of terrorism with other 
forms of political violence (e.g., crime, 
insurgency, guerrilla warfare, conventional 
warfare). 
We need to examine the phenomenon of 
terrorism movement that Indonesia is 
facing from a wider perspective (e.g., 
criminal, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and 
conventional warfare perspectives). 
 
The end-state, strategic objectives, 
reasons, targets of attack, ultimate 
audience, domain of attacks (land, sea, 
air, cyber), tactics, weapons, resource 
mobilization, organization, territorial 
control, war zones, and global energy of 
certain terrorism movement that Indonesia 
is facing.  
 
Is it the non-state terrorism, state 
terrorism/terror from above, or state-
sponsored terrorism? 
 
Who are the terrorist perpetrators that 




These parameters are useful to identify 
whether certain terrorism movement that 
Indonesia is facing (e.g., violent Islamist 
salafi movement) is a strategic challenge 
or merely a tactical and local one.  
 
Likewise, it is essential to identify whether 
certain terrorism movement that Indonesia 
is facing is a pure crime, pure insurgency, 
pure guerrilla warfare, or pure 
conventional warfare. Is there any 
overlapping of it from the perspective of 
Indonesian national interests? 
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The in-depth understanding that the non-
state terrorism that Indonesia is facing 
(e.g., violent Islamist salafi movement) is 
neither a pure crime (it is an extraordinary 
crime) nor a pure conventional warfare. 
 
We need to identify the overlapping 
domain of certain terrorism movement that 
Indonesia is facing (e.g., violent Islamist 
salafi movement). 
The strength and weakness of 2003 
terrorism crime eradication act (UU 
15/2003). Is there any improvements need 
to be made and in which aspects?  
There are two options if the improvement 
is needed. It is either to add the 
amendment (konsideran) to the existing 
2003 terrorism crime eradication act or to 
drafting and issuing a new 
counterterrorism act (UU Penanggulangan 
Terorisme). 
 
It is very essential that any changes in the 
legal aspect (e.g., new pieces of 
legislation) must cover not only a single 
terrorism movement (e.g., violent Islamist 
salafi movement) that Indonesia is 
currently facing, but also to cover other 
terrorism phenomena that Indonesia might 
be facing in near future (e.g., insurgency-
based non-state terrorism in Papua or 
other Indonesian provinces).  
 
Subsequently, any new pieces of 
legislation must also improve the strategic 
response capacity of the nation and the 
Indonesian government itself. The piece of 
legislation must ideally cover strategic 
multi-dimensional aspects involved in 
national counterterrorism efforts. Such 
aspects include military, intelligence, 
diplomacy, law enforcement, information, 
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Figure 6.2. A Proposed Framework for Indonesian Counterterrorism Policy 
(Beyond 2017) 
DEF
• VIP  protection(P)
• Public Security (P):
• Critical Infra & Key 
Assets protection (P);
• Cyber  security (P);




• Witness protection 
(P).
• Cut off recruitment , training, and 
logistical  Access (A);
• Stop terrorist traffic(A);
• Stop terrorist plan since the earliest 
stage (preventive) (A);
• Eliminate  the sanctuary(A);
• Outlaw terrorist organizations(P);
• Econ & financial freezing (A); 
• Political pressure(A);
• Information Warfare(A);
• Continuous censoring over terrorism 
and Islamic radicalism (A/non kinetic).
• Rehabilitation (A);
• Reintegration to society (A):
• Increase the welfare (A);
• Scholarship (A);
• Econ assistance(A);
• Create jobs (A).
1




• Reconstruct radical doctrine (A);
• Gov-sponsored surrogate Islamic 
boarding school(A).
Model of Counterterrorism Measures to be Developed
Prevention De-radicalization
Law Enforcement Int’l Cooperation
OFE
DEF OFE
• Hostage rescue (A);
• NBC ops (A);
• Infiltration to 
terrorist sanctuary 
(A/lethal force).






• Intel cooperation (A);
• Int’l cooperation to prevent 
conditions giving rise to 
radicalism & terrorism (A);
• Cooperation with int’l 
bodies (A);
• Lobbying at international 
level (A).
• Cut off  all access of 
terrorism since overseas 
(A);
• Pressuring terrorism 
sponsors that originate 
from overseas. (state/non 




• Attack sponsoring 
states (A/lethal force)
A: Active, P: Passive
 
Source: Self-made.288  
                                                   
288 Adapted. See (Collins 2001) and (H. Pandjaitan 2011). 
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On Deradicalization Efforts 
 
As this Ph.D. thesis has contributed to the creation of knowledge in the field 
particulary in terms of Islamist terrorism in the case of Republic of Indonesia, it is 
necessary if this last section is dedicated to discussing the Indonesian deradicalization 
efforts since 2002. As an individual becomes an extremist through processes, there will 
be also processes through which an extremist individual eventually decides to renounce 
violence, leaves a group or such a violent movement, or even rejects a radical 
worldview. However, according to Rabasa, et al. (2010), there is the reason to believe 
that deradicalization appears to have its own distinct features, some of which are quite 
different from the factors associated with the initial radicalization of extremist individuals. 
The policy analysis of this Ph.D. research project (part 5.3) corresponds with the 
findings by Rabasa, et.al (2010) on Indonesian deradicalization efforts from 2002 until 
2010.289 Unlike her Southeast Asian counterparts, Singapore and Malaysia, 
deradicalization efforts in Republic of Indonesia are not centrally driven, highly 
structured, and well-resourced. The Indonesian approach of deradicalization efforts 
operate at two levels: seeking to develop intelligence on terrorist network and to return 
detainees to society. The strategic objective of these two levels of engagement is not to 
change the mindset of the terrorists but rather to obtain intelligence on the terrorist 
network in order to disrupt it and prevent further terrorist attacks. Much of its success at 
this level comes from the apparatus’ employment of soft approach to terrorist 
detainees.290 Unlike Singapore and Malaysia, which employ religious establishment to 
persuade detainees of recanting their extremist views of Islam, in Indonesia the 
counterterrorism apparatus assisted by a team of psychologists, not mainstream clerics, 
play the leading role in disengagement efforts. 
 As previously mentioned on chapter 2 (part 2.2.5), the cultural interrogation 
method is developed accordingly by the counterterrorism apparatus, where the 
interrogator to be immersed in the culture of the detainee, understand his hopes and 
                                                   
289 For more specific discussion on Indonesian deradicalization efforts, see (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 106 – 
117. 
 
290 Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency Chief Ansyaad Mbai, interview with Angel Rabasa, 
Jakarta, March 2009; quoted in (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 107.  
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fears, and speak his language.291 Correspondingly, in the Indonesian approach to 
deradicalization, there is no formal “theological dialogue.” The most appropriate 
individuals to interact with terrorists are, paradoxically, those who are directly involved in 
the arrest and interrogation or ex-militants who can speak with the authority of 
experience in the extremist group. That is why, the Indonesian approach to 
deradicalization requires the police to treat the prisoners in a humane way and to 
develop bonds of trust. Such efforts of developing bonds of trust include the reuniting of 
inmates with their families, to reminding them of their earthly responsibilities as 
husbands and fathers, and the financial assistance given to their family by 
counterterrorism apparatus.292 Those involved in such program responded in various 
ways, ranging from the lowest level of cooperation, which is by accepting assistance, to 
the level of providing information and to cooperating privately in deradicalization of other 
militants. After these three levels have been reached, the expectation is to hit the 
highest level of cooperation, which is publicly recanting and becoming actively engaged 
in deradicalization and counter-radicalization activities.  
Fom the perspective of terrorism prevention, such program has been very 
successful in eliciting information that in turn enabling counterterrorism apparatus to 
disrupt the terrorist network in Indonesia. Since 2002, several extremist individuals have 
been cooperating privately with the counterterrorism apparatus to disengage other 
militants from the network, but their identities have not been revealed. This approach is 
not, however, always successful with all terrorist prisoners. Some show no remorse for 
their involvement in terrorism and tell the interrogators that one day they will switch 
places, and the terrorists will interrogate the interrogator (e.g., police), or that struggle 
will be continued by their children and grandchildren.  
 On top of that, another approach in Indonesian deradicalization efforts is by 
capitalizing the high-profile role of ex-militants. The Indonesian government seeks to 
turn the militants’ respect for seniority and hierarchy into a means of deradicalization. 
                                                   
291 Senior consulting psychologist Sarlito Sarwono, interview with Angel Rabasa, Jakarta, March 2009; 
quoted in quoted in (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 107. 
 
292 Inspector General Gories Mere, head of the National Police antinarcotics task force and former head 
of Detachment 88, interview with Angel Rabasa, Jakarta, March 2009; quoted in (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 
108. 
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The interrogators seek to gain the trust of JI insiders and then rely on the insiders to 
influence the rank and file. Looking retrospectively, the Indonesian approach to 
deradicalization is unique because, unlike the top-down approaches found in the Middle 
East, Singapore, and Malaysia, the Indonesian approach has been developed based on 
experience interacting with detainees and implemented by police interrogators with very 
little participation by religious authorities or other entities of the Indonesian government. 
This might seem unusual from a non-Indonesian perspective, but in fact it is consistent 
with the culture of Indonesian security agencies, which are often left to their own 
devices to raise funds from donors or their own business enteprises.  
 Despite the ad hoc nature of the Indonesian deradicalization efforts and the lack 
of incentives to induce cooperation, the program has achieved some degree of 
success.293 Corresponding to the finding of this Ph.D. research project, some critics of 
the Indonesian deradicalization efforts argue that the ex-militants have not truly 
deradicalized because they do not promote a truly moderate ideology. Although these 
ex-militants oppose the killing of civilians, they continue to espouse radical beliefs.294 All 
these weaknesses of Indonesian deradicalization efforts may substantially come from 
the lack of a coordinated effort by other government agencies. The government has not 
allocated funds for the program or to implement some form of post-release monitoring. 
This is clearly a reflection of political will since the fight against terrorism is linked to 
Islam and a very sensitive issue in Indonesia.295  
 
The Concluding Thought 
 
As the concluding thought for this Ph.D. thesis, based on the framework 
developed in the aforementioned model (figure 6.2) and the reflection of Indonesian 
deradicalization efforts, in the future the Indonesian government may need to be more 
outward looking/global-oriented, aggressive, and maximally utilizing the four pillars of its 
                                                   
293 For more on this, see (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 115. 
 
294 Kristen E. Schulze, “Indonesia’s Approach to Jihadist Deradicalization,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 8, 
July 2008, 9; quoted in (Rabasa, et al. 2010), 116. 
 
295 Indonesian government official, discussion with Angel Rabasa, Jakarta, March 2009; quoted in 
(Rabasa, et al. 2010), 116. 
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counterterrorism efforts: prevention; deradicalization; law enforcement; and international 
cooperation that includes the global engagement in the widest sense. In this sense, the 
Indonesian government needs a more clear-cut differentiation between what it means 
by active and passive measures of counterterrorism efforts that theoretically and 
practically are dual natures: offensive and defensive. Consequently, it means that the 
Indonesian national security doctrine as a basis of Indonesian counterterrorism efforts, 
which historically is based on the free-and-active foreign policy and more inward-
looking, also need another adjustment along with the reorientation and refocusing of 
Indonesian grand strategy. All which merits our further research both by the academic 
and policy community, and we hope that this Ph.D. thesis could serve one of its 
purposes as an academic and policy reference for any further studies in the respective 
fields.  
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The Attachment #1:  
The Profiling of 16 Prisoners and of 6 Recently Rel eased Prisoners  
(The materials for the discovering pattern analysis  and the content analysis in the chapter 4.1.a and 4.1.b) 
 
 
Note: The radicals whose boxes are red-colored in this part are the ones deemed as the most important individuals/nodes 
in the social network analysis (the chapter 4.3) 
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On The Prisoners/Imprisoned Violent Jihadists (n=16 ) and Released Prisoners/Violent Jihadists (n=6).  
The Breakdown Mapping of Collected Data of the Prisoners/Imprisoned Violent Jihadists (n=16) 
Nº 
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Dia adalah Amir JI sejak 1999, 
kemudian kepala MMI pada 
Agustus 2002. Akhirnya 
ditangkap pada Oktober 2002. 
Dihukum 4 tahun pada Agustus 
2003 karena tuduhan makar 
(subversif). Setelah mendapat 
remisi akhirnya keluar pada 30 
April 2004, sebelum kemudian 
ditangkap lagi. Pada 3 Maret 
2005 kembali dihukum 30 bulan 
atas tuduhan terorisme. Setelah 
melakukan banding lepas lagi 
pada 14 Juni 2006. 
Terakhir ditangkap pada 9 
Agustus 2010 di Banjar, Jawa 
Barat. Dakwaan yang dikenakan 
adalah mendanai kamp pelatihan 
militer untuk JAT di Aceh.  
2 Juli 2014 menyatakan 












































Pendiri JAT pada 




























Ditangkap dan ditahan di 
Malaysia pada 31 Januari 2008. 
Kemudian diekstradisi ke 
Indonesia pada Maret 2008. 
Menyatakan pengakuan dan 














Dia juga alumni 
(1977 – 1981) dan 
pengajar (1984 – 




menimba ilmu di 
LIPIA, dan 
kemudian 
mengajar di Mahad 


















































Ditangkap 23 Juni 2010 di Klaten 
saat sedang merakit bom 
bersama Heri Sigu Samboja 
untuk meledakkan kedutaan 
Denmark di Jakarta. Pada tahun 
2005 pernah ditangkap karena 
memiliki informasi tentang Azhari 
dan Noordin Top, sekaligus 
memasok persenjataan untuk 
Top. Awalnya berencana 
membunuh Ulil Abshar Abdullah, 
yang adalah tokoh jaringan Islam 
liberal. Pada tahun 2006 divonis 
7 tahun dan dilepaskan pada 
Maret 2009.  Dia terlibat pada 
perekrutan dan operasionalisasi 
untuk kamp pelatihan JAT di 








SD, SMP, STM di 
Jakarta Timur.  
STIQ Al Manar, 
Utan Kayu (2000 – 
2001).  
 
Guru TPA di Masjid 
Nurul Hidayah, 
Cipayung (1997 – 
1999). Terlibat 
pelatihan militer di 
kamp Wairmurat, 
Buru yang didanai 
oleh KOMPAK. 
Bahkan memimpin 
pelatihan di Seram 
Barat (Juli 2004), 
dan menjalankan 
aktifitas KOMPAK 























































Ditangkap pada 10 Desember 
2010 di Kudus, Jawa Tengah 
karena memimpin kamp pelatihan 
militer di Aceh. Dia ini juga 
merupakan figure senior di JI dan 
mantan pimpinan Mantiqi III. 
Pertama kali ditangkap 8 Juli 
2003 dan dinyatakan tidak 
terbukti terlibat terorisme, namun 
tetap dihukum 7 tahun karena 
kepemilikan senjata dan bahan 
peledak lainnya. Kemudian 
dilepaskan pada 28 Agustus 
2007. Dilaporkan bahwa dia ini 
dikirim ke Aceh atas perintah 
ABB. Membantu perekrutan 













Semarang (1980 – 
1981) sebelum 




1985). Berada di 
perbatasan 
Pakistan dari 1985 
– 1989 termasuk 
sebagai instruktur. 
Kembali ke Jakarta 
untuk bergabung 
dengan JI (1995), 





jihad di Poso. 
Kepala Mantiqi III 
(1997 – 2001). 
Kepala Laskar 


















Abu Rusdan.  
Orang tua 
























Ditangkap pada 5 November 
2004 di Bogor, Jawa Barat 
karena perannya yang besar 
dalam perencanaan dan 
eksekusi peledakan bom di 
kedutaan Australia, termasuk 
dengan perekrutannya. Dia juga 
didakwa melakukan perekrutan 
untuk kamp militer di Aceh pada 



































SMA di Sukabumi 
dan merupakan 
teman sekelas dari 
Agus Ahmed. Dia 
dilatih di Mindanao 
(1997 -2000) dan 





satu pemilik dari 
badan usaha CV 
Sajira Media Karsa. 























bin Abu Isa 






Pada 11 November 2005 Densus 
88 melakukan penyerangan ke 
rumah ybs di daerah Protomulyo, 
Kendal. Polisi menemukan M16 
dan beberapa peluru senjata 
laras pendek. Dia juga diduga 
sebagai koordinator wilayah 
Semarang untuk jaringan 
Noordin. Ditangkap di bis pada 17 
Januari 2006 saat berada di 
Boyolali, Jawa Tengah dalam 
perjalanannya dari Sukoharjo. Dia 
juga bertugas sebagai perekrut 
untuk jaringan Noordin Top dan 
terlibat dalam perampokan pada 
tahun 2001 dan 2005. Dia adalah 
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Ditangkap 25 Januari 2011 di 
Abbottabad, Pakistan, beberapa 
saat sebelum tertangkapnya 
Osama Bin Laden.  
Memiliki peran besar dalam 
serangan bom di Bali. Hijrah ke 
Mindanao pada 2003, dan 
dilaporkan mengkomandani unit 
jihadis dari luar negeri yang 
bergabung dengan kamp Abu 
Sayyaf di Jolo. Dia kembali ke 
Indonesia pada Juni 2009, dan 





























pada tahun 1998 







 ASG, JI 













Kulon Progo.  
WNI Terlibat di dalam beberapa 
serangan bom di Indonesia 
termasuk Bom Bali I dan II, dan 
serangan bom kepada Duta 
Besar Filipina di Jakarta. Dia 
ditahan pada 13 Januari 2003 
bersama dengan Ali Imron dan 
dihukum seumur hidup. 
Hukuman 
seumur 






Sungkar dari 1990 
– 1994 melalui 
Jemaah Tabligh. 













Ngruki (1983 – 
1989) – 1989), dan 



























Ditangkap pada 22 Februari 
2010. Memfasilitasi masuknya 
para jihadis ke Aceh melalui 
pesantren Darul Mujahidin di 
Aceh Utara.  
Abdullah Sunata dan Maulana dia 
melalukan survey untuk kamp 
pelatihan di Payabakon, Aceh 
Utara pada Mei 2009.  








Dari SD hingga 
SMA dia sekolah 





Akhirnya dia lulus 
dari STPDN pada 
tahun 2006. 














































 Ditangkap di Tangerang Selatan 
pada 21 Maret 2015. Dia adalah 
pendiri dari al-Mustaqbal website. 
Didakwa dengan UU 15/2003 
(Pemberantasan Teror) dan UU 
8/2011 tentang ITE serta makar. 
Dialah yang meng-upload video 
























 Awalnya dia 
adalah anggota 























 Ditangkap pada 22 Februari 
2010. Dilatih di Mindanao. 
Terlibat dalam serangan bom di 
Kedubes Australia dan berprofesi 
sebagai Satpam di Plaza 
Senayan. Menyatakan 
pengakuan dan kesetiaannya 


















Jihad di bawah 
pimpinan Jafar 
Umar Thalib pada 
2001 (hanya 
selama 2 bulan). 
Keterlibatannya 
adalah mencarikan 
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12 Sutomo bin 
Sudartonai 





Ditangkap pada 3 November 
2012 di Kayamanya, Poso. 
Mendapatkan pelatihan perakitan 
bom dari kelompok Badri 
Hartono. Sebelumnya ditangkap 
setelah konflik dengan Polisi di 
Tanah Runtuh, Poso pada 
Januari 2007. 
 
Dihukum 5 tahun di LP. Palu, 
Sulawesi sebelum dilepaskan 
pada 2010. Dia adalah wakil 












Sejak SD – SMA 
bersekolah di di 
sekolah negeri. 





Pernah bekerja di 
radio RHK 
Semarang dan 






Pindah ke Poso 





oleh Abu Tholut. 
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Ditangkap kembali pada 14 
Agustus 2014 saat dideportasi 
dari Turki (ingin bergabung 
dengan ISIS).  
 
Pada 4 Agustus 2004 sudah 
pernah ditangkap atas tuduhan 
menyembunyikan Azhari dan 
Noordin Top di Surabaya. Dia 
sempat mendapatkan penyiksaan 
saat penangkapan tsb dan 













guru di pesantren 






















Ditangkap untuk keempat kalinya 
pada 6 April 2011 atas berbagai 
kasus kriminal, termasuk 
percobaan perampokan BRI  
pada Oktober 2010 di 
Lhoknibung, Pantai Bidadari, 
Aceh Timur dengan JUNAIDI. Dia 
juga didakwa terlibat perampokan 
toko milik etnis China di 
Bireuenon pada 1 November 
2010, serangan di penjara 
Lhokseumawe pada 11 
November 2010, perampokan 
pom bensi di Bireuen pada 20 
Desember 2010, toko emas di 
Bireuen pada 25 Desember 2010 
dan di Lhoksukon, Aceh Utara 
pada 24 Januari 2011.  
 
Didakwa dengan pasal 365 dan 
UU Darurat 1951 (bukan UU 
tindak pidana terorisme). 8 Mei 
2012 terlibat di dalam pelarian 42 
tahanan di LP. Meulaboh. Dia 
sudah berkali kali dipindahkan 
dari satu penjara ke penjara 











Juni 2009 untuk 
perampokan BRI, 
Kutablang, 
Bireuen pada 12 
Mei 2009 dan 
kemudian didakwa 




ganja, dan ditahan 
di LP. Tanjung 
Gusta, Medan 
bersama dengan 



























Ditangkap di Medan pada 11 
April 2010. Pada tanggal 14 April 
2010 dia dan Mustaqim 
menunjukkan kepada pihak Polri 
tempat disembunyikan banyak 
senapan di daerah Jantho, Aceh 
Besar. Sebelumnya pernah 
ditangkap di Surakarta karena 
asosiasi dia dengan Dr. Azhari 
Husin dan Noordin M. Top. Dia 
ikut membantu terhubungunya 
ring Banten dengan JI sebelum 
serangan bom di kedubes 
Australia. Dia dihukum selama 
3.5 tahun pada Mei 2005, dan 
akhirnya dibebaskan pada Maret 
2007. Dia dekat dengan Urwah 
yang tewas tertembak dengan 











Mukmin, Ngruki (92 
– 95) 
Darusyahada, 95-
98; Mahad Aly 
(Universitas an-























































Abu Irhab Bima, pada 5 
Februari 1982 
WNI Ditangkap di Boyolali pada 7 Mei 
2011 karena menjual pistol FN ke 
Syarip. Dia dihukum selama 8 
tahun sejak Februari 2012, dan 
dipindahkan ke LP. Pasir Putih di 
Nusakambangan pada 22 Januari 
2013. Dia menyatakan pengakuan 
dan kesetiaannya kepada ISIS 





senjata air soft, dan 
dekat dengan Sofyan 
Tsauri 
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The Breakdown Mapping of Collected Data of the Recently Released Prisoners/Violent Jihadists (n=6) 
 



















 Ditangkap pada 19 September 
2010 dalam kaitannya dengan 
perampokan bank CIMB di Medan 
pada Agustus 2010. 
 



















   















Ditangkap di Subang, Jawa Barat 
pada 7 Agustus 2010 karena 
menyembunyikan Abdullah Sunata, 
kepemilikan illegal senjata dan 
amunisi, serta perencanaan untuk 
mengebom sebuah mobil. 
Dia terkait dengan Fahrul Rozi 
Tanjung yang dihukum selama 5.5 
tahun pada 21 Juni 2011. 
Dilepaskan pada 21 Januari 2014. 
Produk sekolah 




2 bulan setelah 
kejadian Tsunami. 
Dia adalah anak didik 
dari Abu Wildan yang 
merupakan 
tokoh/pimpinan dari 
DI/MMI/JAT. Dia juga 
dekat dengan Aman 
Abdurrahman dan 
Yuli Harsono yang 
sudah menyatakan 
































Syam; Sam Cipondoh, 
Tangerang, 





Dihukum selama 16 tahun pada 
tahun 2003. Dilepaskan pada 
Agustus 2011. Dia ditangkap pada 
19 November 2002 karena terlibat 
di dalam perampokan toko berlian 
yang mana hasil perampokan tsb 
digunakan untuk mendanai 
pengeboman di Bali. Dia juga 
menyiapkan serangkaian komponen 
untuk melakukan serangan bom di 
Bali, sekaligus berperan sebagai 
pengawal pribadi Imam Samudera. 
Dia tewas di Ramadi, Iraq saat 
sedang bertempur dengan ISIS 
pada pertengahan 2014. 
Produk sekolah 
negeri di Tangerang. 
Dia pernah ikut 
pendidikan  
Kuliyatul Mu’alimin 
Islamiyah (KMI) di 
pesantren al-Mukmin 
dari 1992-1997. 
Dia pindah ke Darus, 
Syahada, Boyolali 
(1995 – 1996), 
kemudian ke Daar il-
Ilmi (setingkat 
madrasah aliyah). 
Dia lulus tahun 2000 
dan kemudian 

































pada 11 Maret 
1974. 
WNI Tersangka dalam serangan bom 
hotel Marriot di Jakarta pada 5 
Agustus 2003. Ditahan pada 29 
Oktober 2003 di Cirebon, Jawa 
Barat. Dihukum selama 10 tahun 
sejak September 2004. Ditahan di 
LP. Cipinang dan dipindahkan ke 





Aliyah di Tapanuli 
Selatan (1989 – 
1990). Pernah 
belajar di pesantren 
Al-Mukmin, Ngruki 
(1990 – 1994), 
menjadi guru di 
pesantren Lukman 
al-Hakim, Johor. Dia 
ikut pelatihan militer 
di Mindanao dari 












































WNI Ditahan pada 27 April 2003 karena 
keterlibatannya sebagai pihak 
perantara untuk urusan dana yang 
digunakan selama operasi 
pengeboman Bali I dan II. Dia juga 
bertanggung jawab untuk 
perekrutan 2 orang lainnya yang 
terlibat serangan Bom Marriott pada 
tahun 2003, dimana salah satunya 
adalah Asmar Latin Sani. Dia 
dihukum selama 7 tahun pada Mei 




















































Ditangkap di Jakarta pada Juli 2005 
karena keterkaitannya dengan 
Abdullah Sunata, dkk. Dia 
menggantikan Lutfi alias Ubeid 
sebagai pengawal Noordin M. Top. 
Dia dihukum selama 8 tahun dan 
saat ini sudah bebas (sejak 
Agustus 2009). 




Dia bekerja sebagai 
pedagang HP dan 
pernah terlibah 
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The Most Mentioned and Important Words by 22 Indivi duals 
 
1. The establishment of Salafi Islamist State of Indo nesia 
 Their goal. This is the integral part of their belief and obligation as the devout Muslim. 
 
2. The implementation of Islamic shari’a  law in Indonesia 
Their goal. This is the integral part of their belief and obligation as the devout Muslim.  
 
3. Violent Jihad. (violent action) 
As a necessary way. For them this is something justified by the Quran and Hadits. 
 
4. Da’wah  
As a necessary way. They believe that this is something mandated by the Quran and Hadits. For them, with or without 
violent acts, da’wah is still very important element in the Islamic struggles. 
 
5. Al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah  
Their goal (nationally, regionally, and globally). This is the integral part of their belief and obligation as the devout 
Muslim. 
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6. Takfir  
They believe that others with different view and belief system are deemed as kafir (in the wrong way and not being 
grateful to Allah). Muslim people with different view are also deemed as takfir. Thus, they are also the valid targets to 
be attacked and fought on.  
 
7. Togut/Taghut  
Anything/anyone being worshipped or anything/anyone that rules but non-shari’a conforming laws. This meaning goes 
beyond, where Togut or taghut is also interpreted as any hindrances (in the government or outside the government) to 
their goal. Togut or taghut must be fought on. For them, fighting the togut or taghut is justified by the Quran and 
Hadits. 
 
Correspondingly, they are also against the Islamic imams that ignore “the Yellow Book.”1 This is indeed the old (Salafi) 
Islamic boarding school (pesantren) that uses “the Yellow Book” as a main reference of studying Islam. Therefore, 
these 22 individuals only recognize/endorse the works of Imam Ahmad Bin Hanbal according to the interpretation of 
Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab. 
 
                                                          
1 In the Islamic education, “the Yellow Book” refers to the traditional books that consist of Islamic teaching materials (diraasah al-
Islamiyyah) that are taught in the Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). “The Yellow Book” covers a wide spectrum of Islamic 
teaching materials: fiqh; aqidah; akhlaq/tasawuf; Arab grammar (‘ilmu nahwu and ‘ilmu sharf); Hadith; tafsir; ‘ulumul Quran; as well 
as social affairs and humanities (mu’amalah).”The Yellow Book” is an Arabic-language book that is without vowel (harakah) or 
commonly known in Indonesian language as “the Arab Gundul.” 
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8. The Enemy of Islam (the Western world, Jewish Peop le, Judaism, and Christianity) 
These enemies of Islam are actively conspiring to destroy Islam at the various lines. These enemies are the retarding 
force for both the advancement of Islamic civilization and the establishment of a just society at the global level. For 
them, this belief is also justified by their selective and extreme interpretation of Quran and Hadits. 
 
9. Pancasila 
Pancasila is not acknowledged within their bounded rationality as the legitimate state ideology. Anything related to the 
state system is man-made and not worthy to be complied on. They believe that this “secular” ideology must be 
replaced with the Islamic ideology (reflected by Quran and Hadits) as the ideological foundation and ultimate source of 
law in Indonesia. 
 
10. UUD 1945 
UUD 1945 is not recognized as the legitimate constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Like Pancasila, anything related to 
the state system is man-made and not worthy to be complied on. They believe that this secular-based foundational 
constitution must be replaced with the Islamic shari’a law as the only legal foundation in Indonesia. 
 
11. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which is the national motto whose meaning is “the unity in diversity” is also not recognized 
within their bounded rationality. Anything related to the state system is man-made and not worthy to be complied on. 
They believe that this “secular-based” national motto must be replaced with the uniformity under the Islamic ideology 
and the application of shari’a law in the Salafi Islamist state of Indonesia. 
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12. NKRI 
NKRI is the Indonesian acronym for “the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia.” This is the state formation according 
to the UUD 1945. NKRI is also not recognized by them. They believe that this state formation must be replaced with 





The Attachment #2:  
The Profiling of Opinions from 15 Key State/Securit y Officials and Experts in the Field  
(The first and second stage’s materials for the dis course analysis in the chapter 4.1.c) 
 
The Stage #1: Interviewing/filling out the quetionn aires 
(The Stage #1 is where 15 Policy-Makers/Experts’s Opinions are expressed in the Questionnaires) 
 
The Stage #2: The Breakdown Analysis on the Opinion s (n=15) 
(The Stage #2 is where the opinions from 15 key state/security officials and experts in the field are analyzed and 
elaborated according to the independent and dependent variables examined in this Ph.D. thesis) 
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The Description of 15 Respondents (Key State/Securi ty Officials and Experts in the Field) 
 Name 
 
Position  Institution  Atribut e  
1 SYD  
 
CT practitioner 


























3 MHW  
 
Career Diplomat Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry 






















7 AD  
 








8 HR  
 
Religious Leader  Physicist, M.Div  



















11 BK  
 
 

















13 AC  The Key Member 
of Indonesian 
Counterterroism 
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The Attachment #3: The Quantitative Data of 40 Form er Prisoners 
(The first, second and third stage’s materials for the quantitative analysis in the 
chapter 4.2). 
 
The Stage #1: Filling out the questionnaires 
(The stage #1 is where the 40 respondents filled out the questionnaire) 
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The Stage #2: Putting the answers in the excel form at 
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The Stage #3: Putting the answers in the excel form at 
(The stage #3 is where their responses are transformed into specific STATA data set 
files)  
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This following picture is the categorization of each variable’s attributes into the binary 
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The following picture indicates that the data set is already available at the STATA 
 
The Attachment #4: The Social Network Analysis Papers  
(The materials for the social network analysis in the chapter 4.3) 
 
FINAL PROJECT- Disrupting Bali bombing’s Networks 
Wiphusana Klaimanee, Mariusz Nogaj 
DA 4600 – Dark Networks      11 June 2008 
 
Background 
The terrorist organization created by Mohammed Top Noordin in Indonesia has 
posed a serious threat to the Indonesian state. Although, the counterterrorist efforts 
made by police and military have brought significant results, it is too early to say that the 
Noordin’s organization was defeated. Some of the key figures are still at large.1 
From the point of view of social network analysis, the Noordin’s network poses 
an excellent object to examine it. This network is not too big (79 individuals) with 
relatively well identified ties connecting particular members of the network.2 
In this project we have decided to analyze the Noordin’s network in order to find 
a feasible strategy to disrupt it. Just for the training purposes we have assumed that all 
79 individuals are both alive and free. Having this assumption in mind we have adopted 
the strategy to use for our analysis only the key relationships between the members of 
the network. Once the key relationships had been selected, we have analyzed them by 
a use of the social analysis software (UCINET, NetDraw, and Pajek), to identify the key 
figures within the network, who we regard are the targets to aim at. The process of 
selecting the key figures demanded using of different types of metrics. It allowed us to 
find the most prominent actors in the network depending on the metric we have used. 
The final step was to analyze obtained results and point out the terrorists of the highest 
importance within analyzed network. 
Key relationships 
According to the assignment we were supposed to do, we have decided to use 
for the purpose of this exercise the following matrices: 
• Matrix called Bali bombings, which we have created for the assignment 
3. This is 2-mode matrix containing data about individuals involved in two 
Bali bombings. 
• 1-mode matrix called Friend, containing data about the friendship ties 
within the Noordin’s network. 
                                                          
1
 International Crisis Group, “Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s networks”, Asia Report N 114, 5 May 2006. 
2
 Ibid,. 
• 2-mode matrix called School, containing data about the ties between the 
members of Noordin’s network and certain schools they graduated from. 
• 2-mode matrix called Train, containing data about the members of 
Noordin’s network participating in terrorist training. 
The underlying concept which is behind our choice of the relationships is based 
on the assumptions as follows: 
- the climax of the terrorist activity is a terrorist act (e.g. bombing); 
- people in order to be capable to conduct a terrorist operation must be well-
trained; 
- organized training for the terrorists demands involvement of many people, so 
only a well-developed terrorist organization is able to train its members in 
organized manner; 
- terrorist organization (at least the hard core of it) must be established by people 
who share not only common ideology, but also have personal ties with each 
other. The friendship is recognized as one of the strongest relationships joining 
people; 
- friendship usually demands a relatively long time to be established, so it is often 
that people who share this relation know each other from the school times. Our 
argument is that school environment is likely to create strong friendship. As we 
learned from the article about Noordin, many of the members of his terrorist 
network met for the first time in school. 
So, basing on the assumptions made, we have decided to aggregate and 
subsequently analyze the aggregated network consisting of 4 matrices (Bali bombing, 
Friend, Train, School). 
1. The first step we had to do, was to transform all 2-mode matrices into 1-mode 
ones. This created new matrices called respectively Bali bombings-Aff, School-
Aff, and Train-Aff. 
2. The next step was to stack all 4 matrices. This created a new matrix called 
Joined. 
3. The next step was to aggregate these 4 stacked matrices into a single-valued 
matrix. This created the matrix called Joined-wda. 
4. Then we dichotomized the joined network and obtained the final matrix called 
Joined-wdaGTO. 
5. The matrix called Joined-wdaGTO was the matrix we started to examine by use 
of the metrics introduced in the class. 
PART I Description of the originally coded matrices  
In this part of this work we are presenting the originally coded matrices 
(relationships). We have decided to show the size of nodes within networks as a 
function of its betweenness centrality. The reason for that is highlight the most central 
actors and make the picture easier to read. 
The first relationship we have originally coded was the relation showing the 
involvement of particular members of the Noordin’s network in two Bali bombings. We 
were basing on the data obtained from the article about the Noordin’s network. We have 
created a 2-mode matrix where the actors were in the rows, and columns represented 
the Bali bombings I, II. We coded the involvement in particular bombing by assigning “1” 
to the actor, and “0” in case certain actor was not involved. We have picked up these 
two terrorist operations because of their geographical proximity to each other. It could 
suggest that some of the people involved in the first Bali bombing might participate in 
the second Bali bombing. Moreover, these two operations were the most deadly terrorist 
operations conducted by the Noordin’s terrorist network. 
1. Sociograms of the relationships used. 
 
Figure 1:  Sociogram showing the relationship of Bali bombing coded as a 2-mode 
matrix. 
 
Figure 2: Sociogram showing the relationship of Bali bombing coded as a 1-mode 
matrix with the size of nodes reflecting the betweenness centrality. 
The second relationship we used was friendship. 
 
Figure 3: Sociogram showing the friendship ties with size of nodes depending on the 
betweenness centrality. 
The third relationship we used was training. 
 
Figure 4: Sociogram showing the training ties with size of nodes depending on the 
betweenness centrality. 
The fourth relationship we have used was school ties 
 
Figure 5: Sociogram showing the school ties with size of nodes depending on the 
betweenness centrality. 
2. The aggregated network (Joined-wda). 
 
Figure 6: Sociogram showing the ties in the aggregated network (Joined-wda) with size 
of nodes depending on the betweenness centrality. 
PART II Analysis  of the aggregated dichotomized network ( Joined-wdaGTO) 
The first metric we decided to use in order to analyze the network was centrality. 
We decided to compute all kinds of centrality, and basing on the analysis of the results 
to identify the key figures in analyzed network. 
1. Analysis of different types of centrality in UCI NET (multiple measures of 
centrality). 
 
Figure 7: Multiple measures of centrality in UCINET. 
The results we obtained are depicted in the table below. We decided to take into 
consideration the top 5 actors who scored highest in term of different types of centrality. 
Metric s of centrality  
Betwenness  Degree Closeness  Eigenvector  
1. Zulkarnaen 1. Zulkarnaen 1. Zulkarnaen 1. Zulkarnaen 
2. Ahmad Rofiq 2. Jabir 2. Ahmad Rofiq 2. Jabir 
3. Abdullah 
Sunata 
3. Azhari Husin 3. Jabir 3. Ahmad Rofiq 
4. Azhari Husin 4. Abdul Rauf 4. Azhari Husin 
Ubeid 
4. Tohir 




5. Suranto 5. Suranto 
Table 1: The top 5 actors in terms of different types of centrality. 
In order to identify the key actors in terms of centrality we decided to give the 
actor who scored highest in terms of particular centrality 5 points, then 4 points for the 
second highest score, ………, and 1 point for the 5th highest score. The results are in 
the table below. 
Actor 
Metrics of centrality  
Betweenness  Degree  Closeness  Eigenvector  Total  
1. Zulkarnaen  5 5 5 5 20 
2. Jabir 0 4 3 4 11 
3. Ahmad Rofiq 4 1 4 0 9 
4. Azhari Husin 2 3 2 0 7 
5. Abdul Rauf 0 2 0 3 5 
6. Abdullah 
Sunata 
3 0 0 0 3 
7. Ubeid 0 1 2 0 3 
8. Noordin 1 1 0 0 2 
9. Suranto 0 0 1 1 2 
10. Tohir 0 0 0 2 2 
11. Mohammed 
Rais 
0 0 0 2 2 
Table 2: The rearranged results of centrality. 
The analysis of different types of centrality allowed us to identify 11 individuals 
who scored highest. Among them, the first five actors seem to be the central figures in 
analyzed network. These are Zulkarnaen, Jabir, Ahmad Rofiq, Azhari Husin, and 
Abdul Rauf . 
In order to check our findings we also used Pajek to get the picture of the 
network in terms of degree centrality. 
 
Figure 8: Degree centrality drawn in Pajek in y-direction. 
The results obtained from Pajek fit to these ones obtained from UCINET. 
2. The cut-points 
The second metric we decided to use in order to identify the key figures in 
analyzed network was cut-points or cut-vertices. We assumed that identification of cut-
vertices within network will enable us to make further selection of the key persons. We 
recognized the importance of people who are cut-vertices, because there are important 
actors as far as the communication within network is organized. Once the cut-vertex is 
removed one or more parts of certain network can become separated from the rest of 
network.3   
                                                          
3
 Nooy de Wouter et al, “Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek,” Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2005. 
 
Figure 9: Sociogram showing the cut-vertices (in blue) in the aggregated network 
(Joined-wdaGTO) with size of nodes depending on the betweenness 
centrality. 
In terms of cut-vertices combined with the betweenness centrality, 3 actors seem 
to score high. These are Ahmad Rofiq, Abdullah Sunata, and Iwan Dharmawan . 
3. Brokerage metric 
The third metric we decided to use was set of brokerage functions. We decided 
to analyze the overall network and use as a partition the sub-network of Bali I, II 
bombings. In order to transform this 2-mode network into a format of partition we 
decided to build a new 2-mode matrix, where the numbers attached to actors had 
meanings as follow: 
0-actor not involved in any Bali bombing 
1-actor involved in Bali I bombing 
2-actor involved in Bali II bombing 
3-actor involved in both bombings 
 
Figure 10: One-column matrix of Bali bombings used as a partition for computing 
brokerage function. 
Computing the brokerage function for Bali bombing network. 
 
Figure 11: Output log with the brokerage computations 
The next step was to visualize different types of brokerage functions. The 
pictures were drawn with the size of nodes depending on the certain brokerage function. 
Coordinator role depicted in NetDraw. 
 
Figure 12: Coordinator role. 
The most prominent actors as far as coordinator role is concerned are Ahmad 
Rofiq, Son Hadi, Ubeid, and Suramto . 
Consultant role. 
 
Figure 13: Consultant role. 
The most prominent actors as far as consultant role is concerned are 
Zulkarnaen, Noordin, and Jabir . 
Liaison role. 
 
Figure 14: Liaison role. 
The most prominent actors as far as liaison role is concerned are Azhari Husin,  
Zulkarnaen, and Jabir . 
Representative role. 
 
Figure 15: Representative role. 
The most prominent actors as far as representative role is concerned are 
Zulkarnaen, Abdul Rauf, and Jabir . 
The overall analysis of the different brokerage functions allowed us to identify 
Zulkarnaen and Jabir  as the key figures. Both terrorists appear 3 times in top 3 
positions in different brokerage roles. 
PART III Analysis and recommendations  
The analysis of the aggregated network provided us with the information about 
the key figures in this network. As it was stated earlier we have decided to aggregate 4 
relations, because we saw the structure of terrorist organization as a set of overlapping 
relations. In order to identify the key persons in this combined network we used the 
different types of centrality, as well as cut-vertices and different brokerage metrics. It 
allowed us to identify the key persons in this network, what can be used to disrupt 
analyzed network. We also used the drawings to better understand the complexity of 
analyzed network. The visualization of the network helped to identify the underlying 
structure of the analyzed network. 
In terms of centrality we identified 5 individuals as key players: Zulkarnaen, 
Jabir, Ahmad Rofiq, Azhari Husin, and Abdul Rauf . 
In terms of cut-vertices we identified 3 individuals as key players: Ahmad Rofiq, 
Abdullah Sunata, and Iwan Dharmawan. 
In terms of brokerage functions we identified 2 individuals as key players: 
Zulkarnaen and Jabir. 
The final combined analysis showed us that the key figure in analyzed network is 
Zulkarnaen , closely followed by Jabir . Zulkarnaen  appeared to be the most important 
figure in terms of centrality and brokerage functions. He was relatively less important as 
the cut-vertix, but it can be explained by the fact that he is located deep inside the 
structure of the network; hence he has many ties and serves rather as a consultant than 
the liaison. This assumption was proved by the analysis of brokerage functions, where 
Zulkarnaen  scored highest as the consultant. As far as Jabir  is concerned, he scored 
usually less than Zulkarnaen , but he was always between the top 3-4 individuals in 
terms of almost every metric. 
So, our recommendation for disrupting this network is to target Zulkarnaen  and 
Jabir  respectively. However, as it was stated at the beginning just for the training 
purposes we assumed that all terrorists were alive and free. As we know from the article 
about Noordin’s network, Jabir  was killed by Indonesian police in 2006,4 so taking it into 
consideration, we recommend that elimination of Zulkarnaen  will be critical for 
disrupting analyzed network. 
                                                          
4
 International Crisis Group, “Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s networks”, Asia Report N 114, 5 May 2006. 
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TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: NOORDIN’S NETWORKS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Indonesian police are closing in on Noordin 
Mohammed Top, South East Asia’s most wanted terrorist. 
In a dramatic pre-dawn raid on 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, 
Central Java, they shot and killed two members of his inner 
circle and arrested two others. If and when they capture 
Noordin, they will have put the person most determined to 
attack Western targets out of commission. But the problem 
of Noordin’s support structure will still have to be tackled.  
For four years Noordin has tapped into jihadist networks 
to build a following of diehard loyalists, and those same 
networks may be available to others. Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI), the region’s largest jihadist organisation, continues to 
provide the hard core of that following: the two killed in 
the Wonosobo raid were longstanding JI members, as was 
at least one of those arrested. But beginning in 2004, 
Noordin began reaching out to young men from other 
organisations and some with no previous organisational 
affiliation. 
Many JI members reportedly see the group he has cobbled 
together – he grandly calls it al-Qaeda for the Malay 
Archipelago – as a deviant splinter that has done great 
harm to the organisation they joined in the mid-1990s. 
Noordin, however, reportedly sees himself as leading JI’s 
military wing, even though he answers to no one. He 
justifies his actions by citing jihadist doctrine that under 
emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the 
enemy – a group of two or three or even a single individual 
can take on the enemy without instructions from an imam. 
This report examines the way in which Noordin has relied 
on personal contacts to put his group together. It is based 
on interrogation depositions, court documents, and 
Indonesian press reports, with information crosschecked 
through extensive interviews with knowledgeable sources, 
both official and unofficial. 
For the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta in August 2003, 
he used a small circle of Sumatra-based JI members who 
had either been associated with a JI school in Malaysia, 
Lukman al-Hakiem, or with its prototype, the al-Mukmin 
Islamic boarding school in Ngruki, near Solo, Central Java.  
For the Australian embassy bombing in September 2004, 
he relied on three networks: the East Java division of JI; 
alumni of JI schools in Central Java; and a West Java-
based faction of an old insurgency, Darul Islam, whose 
members supplied the key operatives. While individuals 
from that Ring Banten faction had worked with JI before, 
military operations had never before been outsourced in 
this way. It was one indication that Noordin was working 
on his own. 
After the embassy bombing, Noordin was short of funds, 
weapons and experienced fighters. He turned to two men 
who had access to all these, neither of whom was JI. One 
was from a different Darul Islam faction with long 
experience in the Philippines; the other had been head of 
the Ambon office of the Islamic charity KOMPAK and 
could mobilise veterans of Indonesian communal conflicts. 
Intense negotiations followed with couriers used to relay 
messages between the bosses. It turned out that neither 
the Darul Islam nor the KOMPAK leader was interested 
in joining forces but both were arrested in mid-2005 and 
began to lose control over their followers, some of whom 
went over to Noordin. 
For the second Bali bombing in October 2005, Noordin 
relied on his inner circle, including the two who were killed 
on 29 April, to find and train new members. Recruitment 
appeared to be rather ad hoc, despite written materials 
attributed to Noordin suggesting a tightly organised cell 
structure designed to undertake military operations. 
Noordin has shown remarkable determination and capacity 
to plan operations even as he loses his closest colleagues 
to police dragnets and remains the target of Indonesia’s 
biggest ever manhunt. It is not clear who among potential 
successors could do as well.  
But his behaviour following Bali II suggests he is running 
short of money and experienced cadres. The loss on 29 
April of the men who served as both couriers and recruiters 
has to be a significant blow. The Wonosobo raid was a 
triumph for the police, and Noordin’s arrest will be an even 
greater one. But the networks he drew on will survive as a 
potential source of recruits for future operations. 




Asia Report N°114 5 May 2006 
TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: NOORDIN’S NETWORKS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Noordin Mohammed Top remains the most wanted man 
in Indonesia.1 Despite four years of dogged police pursuit 
and a raid on 29 April 2006 that netted some of his closest 
associates, he has managed not only to evade capture but 
also to recruit new operatives for spectacular, once-a-year 
suicide bombings: the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003; 
the Australian embassy in 2004; and three restaurants in 
Bali in 2005. The 38-year-old Malaysian national by all 
accounts is not a particularly impressive figure. For a 
salafi Muslim, his religious knowledge is limited, and he 
does not speak Arabic. He is not a skilled orator. He has 
a knack for surrounding himself with devoted followers 
who possess skills that he does not, however, and his 
ability to elude police for so long has enhanced his stature. 
He can also claim to head the one organisation that 
actively continues to wage jihad against the U.S. and its 
allies on Indonesian soil.  
That organisation is not Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – at least, 
not the JI most members would recognise. Noordin and 
members of his inner circle are JI members. Until 2001 
he directed the Luqmanul Hakiem school in Malaysia, 
headquarters of Mantiqi I, the JI division that covered 
Malaysia and Singapore. But he increasingly appears to 
have charted his own path, in a gradual process that began 
with the 2003 Marriott bombing. By the time of the 
embassy bombing, he seemed to be operating on his own 
without reference to the JI central command, although he 
reportedly still considered himself a member.  
 
 
1 For related reporting on Indonesia see Crisis Group Asia Report 
N°103, Weakening Indonesian Mujahidin Networks: Lessons 
from Maluku and Poso, 13 October 2005; Asia Report N°92, 
Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian 
Embassy Bombing, 22 February 2005; Asia Report N°74, 
Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 3 February 
2004; Asia Report N°63, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: 
Damaged but Still Dangerous, 26 August 2003; Asia Report 
N°43, Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah 
Terrorist Network Operates, 11 December 2002; and Asia 
Briefing N°20, Al-Qaeda in South East Asia: The Case of the 
"Ngruki Network" in Indonesia, 8 August 2002 (as corrected 10 
January 2003). 
He reportedly justifies his actions on the grounds that 
under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded 
by the enemy – a small group or even a single individual 
can take on the enemy without instructions from its imam. 
In this way, he may see himself as leading the “real” JI, as 
opposed to the do-nothings who object to the bombings.  
However he justifies it, he is running his own show. His 
followers began calling themselves thoifah muqotilah, 
Arabic for “fighting force”, in 2005. It was a new use for 
an old term JI had used to refer to a decentralised special 
forces unit it planned to set up after the first Bali attack. 
Noordin seems to have appropriated the term without 
connection to that initiative.  
By about April 2005, according to Indonesian police, 
Noordin was claiming to head the working group for the 
Malay archipelago of Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad, the formal 
name of al-Qaeda.2 The extent of his actual communication 
with al-Qaeda is not clear but he certainly seems to have 
been infatuated with it, aping not only its name but also its 
materials and tactics. As of mid-2004, he had taken on the 
nom de guerre of “Aiman”, almost certainly after the 
al-Qaeda No.2 Aiman Zawaheri. A whole section of a 
website, www.anshar.net, developed under Noordin’s 
guidance between July and September 2005, was devoted 
to articles translated into Indonesian from Sawt al-Jihad, 
the al-Qaeda online magazine. Noordin’s appearance on 
a videotape found in November 2005, complete with 
balaclava covering his face, seemed to be an effort to 
replicate the videos made by Zarqawi, the prominent 
insurgent in Iraq. 
Noordin’s ties to Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, the Bali 
bomber, remain strong. Noordin reportedly idolises the 
East Java-born preacher, who was his mentor in Mantiqi I 
and is also a hafez – one who has memorised the Koran. 
Mukhlas, while on death row in Bali, continued to give 
his protégé materials for religious discussion groups, 
thanks to the lax controls on communications within 
Indonesian prisons. If Noordin is not convincing as a 
religious scholar, Mukhlas is, and through a variety of 
media, printed and electronic, his teachings can be – 
 
 
2 “Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad dibentuk 6 bulan sebelum Bom Bali 
II”, Suara Merdeka, 3 February 2006. 
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and almost certainly were – used for recruitment and 
indoctrination.3  
Since Bali II, Noordin has suffered setbacks. In November 
2005, he lost a key members of his team, the master bomb-
maker Azhari Husin, during a police siege in East Java; 
eight followers were arrested in Semarang, not far from 
the site of the April raid. But his group survived and even 
grew because of the networks he was able to tap into for 
shelter, logistical assistance, and recruits. 
These networks have changed over time, reflecting 
Noordin’s increasing distance from JI. For the Marriott 
bombing, all major operatives were Sumatra-based JI 
members. For the Australian embassy bombing, Noordin 
turned to the JI network in East Java, JI schools in Central 
Java and a Darul Islam group in West Java that had 
worked with JI in the past but was a separate entity with 
its own chain of command. The actual bombing was 
carried out by the latter in a kind of outsourcing operation 
that was at odds with standard JI practice.  
For protection after the embassy attack, Noordin 
increasingly relied on networks that included but went 
far beyond JI, taking in non-JI veterans of the two big 
communal conflicts in Indonesia, Ambon (Maluku) and 
Poso. He also used those veterans’ networks to reach out 
to two non-JI figures, KOMPAK leader Abdullah Sunata 
and Darul Islam leader Akram alias Shamsuddin alias 
Taufikurrahman. They refused to join him, and by mid-
2005, both were under arrest.4  
The Bali II bombings of 1 October 2005 suggest that once 
Sunata and Akram were behind bars, their control over 
their followers loosened, allowing Noordin to bring some 
of them on board. By early 2006 he was trying to turn his 
ad hoc band into a more structured armed force that 




3 Mukhlas was moved from Bali to a maximum security prison 
in Central Java in October 2005 after Bali II, and controls may 
be tighter now. 
4 Abdullah Sunata was arrested for weapons possession and 
failing to disclose information about Noordin’s whereabouts, 
Akram for involvement in a 2000 bombing in Yogyakarta. 
II. THE MARRIOTT BOMBING 
NETWORKS 
The 2003 Marriott Bombing provides the first case study 
of how Noordin used personal networks. Plans for that 
operation developed almost by accident, but as they did, 
Noordin relied heavily on people he knew and trusted – 
almost all JI members and many associated with the 
Luqmanul Hakim school in Johor, Malaysia. 
A. THE LUQMANUL HAKIEM SCHOOL 
Luqmanul Hakiem opened in 1992 on JI founder 
Abdullah Sungkar’s instruction, with Mukhlas as its 
director. It was directly modelled on the al-Mukmin 
pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Ngruki, Central 
Java that Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir had founded 
twenty years earlier. It adopted the Ngruki curriculum 
wholesale and had the same aim of developing new cadres 
to wage jihad; moreover, many of its teachers were Ngruki 
alumni.5 After JI’s establishment in 1993, the school 
became the nerve centre of Mantiqi I, most of whose 
leading members were associated with it in some way. 
All the best known JI bombers– Hambali, Mukhlas, 
Amrozi, Ali Imron, Zulkarnaen, Faturrahman al-Ghozi, 
Dulmatin, Imam Samudra, Azhari and Noordin himself – 
either taught, lectured or studied there. It taught young 
women as well as young men, and Hambali was not 
the only senior JI member who found a wife there. At 
its height it had about 350 students.  
Noordin began to attend lectures there around 1995, when 
he was studying for a master’s degree at the nearby 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia; he did not join JI until early 
1998.6 When it was clear that Luqmanul Hakiem needed 
a Malaysian national as director to stay open, Noordin took 
the job, although Mukhlas remained the dominant figure.  
In late 2001, a crackdown on JI in Malaysia began, 
and Luqmanul Hakiem ceased operations by early 2002. 
Noordin left for Riau, Indonesia early in the year, and 
in mid-2002 he and his Indonesian brother-in-law, a 
Luqmanul Hakiem graduate named Mohamed Rais, 
moved to Bukittinggi, West Sumatra with their families 
and opened a repair shop for automobile shock absorbers.7 
 
 
5 Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, March 2006. 
6 Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006. 
7 Rais and Noordin would have known each other at Luqmanul 
Hakiem for at least six years. Rais was an Indonesian national 
whose family lived in Malaysia, in the village where JI founder 
Abdullah Sungkar and his entourage settled in 1985. He joined 
JI in 1995 when he turned fifteen and was sent to Ngruki to 
complete his education. After graduating in 1995, he returned to 
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They hired Ismail, another Luqmanul Hakiem graduate, 
and in November 2002, a month after the first Bali bombing, 
Azhari Husin joined them at Noordin’s invitation.  
B. THE LEFTOVER EXPLOSIVES 
The accidental trigger for the Marriott bombing came in 
December 2002. As police stepped up their hunt for JI 
members in the aftermath of Bali, Toni Togar, a JI member 
based in Medan, North Sumatra, got nervous, because his 
house stored all the explosives left over from JI’s December 
2000 Christmas Eve bombings. He contacted Noordin to 
tell him he was going to throw them out. The question is 
why he chose Noordin, rather than his immediate superior 
in the JI organisation, the head of the wakalah, who 
apparently was reachable.  
The answer may give a clue to Noordin’s subsequent 
activities. The team that carried out the Christmas Eve 
bombings was led by Hambali and included Imam Samudra 
and many of the 2002 Bali bombers. From the beginning 
these men were operating outside the JI administrative 
structure, not even part of its special forces unit, laskar khos, 
that reported directly to Zulkarnaen, the person on the 
central command responsible for military affairs. Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir was aware of Hambali’s activities, but 
most wakalah members were not, and people like Toni 
Togar were often selected to take part without the 
knowledge of their division leaders.8 Hambali had thus 
set a precedent for a secret team pursuing jihad on its 
own. This was probably in part because he controlled 
separate funding, including from al-Qaeda.9 
Toni Togar and Azhari had both been members of 
Hambali’s team, and while it is not clear how Noordin 
got involved, it was logical for Togar to convey his plans 
to dispose of the explosives to someone within this circle. 
Noordin, however, saw good materials being wasted and 
 
 
Malaysia to teach at Luqmanul Hakiem and joined the 
subdivision (wakalah) of JI’s Mantiqi I in Johor. He remained 
there until February 2002 when his other Malaysian brother-
in-law was arrested as a member of a JI affiliate, Kumpulan 
Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), which consisted of Malaysian 
nationals, many of whom were members of the Malaysian 
opposition political party, PAS. JI reportedly did not want to seem 
as if it were poaching from PAS, so it encouraged those interested 
in JI to form their own organisation. Crisis Group interviews, 
Jakarta, March 2006. 
8 For reference to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s involvement in 
discussions of plans for the Christmas Eve bombings, see 
statement of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, 30 April 2002 in case 
dossier of Abdul Aziz bin Sihabudin, No. Pol. BP/364/XII/2002 
/SERSE/, Kepolisian Republik Indonesia Daerah Riau Kota 
Barelang.  
9 Ken Conboy, The Second Front (Jakarta, 2005), p. 112. 
forbade the disposal, saying the explosives could still be 
used, and he would arrange to take them.10 Before he 
could do so, however, Toni Togar showed up at the shop 
in Bukittinggi and told Noordin and Rais that he had 
already moved the materials to the house of a JI member 
in Dumai, Riau. 
C. THE NGRUKI LINKS 
In January 2003, Rais, Noordin and Azhari moved to 
Bengkulu, where a group of JI members lived, including 
Asmar Latin Sani, who became the Marriott suicide 
bomber. Noordin and Azhari planned the bombing there as 
a way of putting the explosives to good use. JI members 
in Bengkulu, Lampung, and Riau were involved in some 
planning and logistical support but were not told the target.  
Interestingly, Noordin began to plan for a spectacular 
attack with some of the Bengkulu members just as others 
from their wakalah were taking part in a program to refresh 
their military skills, as a response to the exposure and 
arrests that followed the Bali bombings.11 For most of 
the top JI leadership, this was a time for training and 
consolidation – not new attacks. But Hambali had set 
the precedent of going off on his own, and Noordin 
followed it. 
The next stages of the operation involved small teams 
with ties to one another beyond the JI affiliation. Getting 
the explosives from Dumai to Bengkulu via Pekanbaru, 
Riau, in February 2003 and securing additional materials 
such as detonators involved Noordin, Azhari, Rais, Toni 
Togar, and a new team member, Masrizal bin Ali Umar 
 
 
10 Indictment of Mohamed Rais in South Jakarta District 
Court, No.PDM-51/JKTSL/01/2004. 
11 The training was part of a central command decision to try to 
coordinate training activities with military operations. Mustofa 
was responsible for training, Zulkarnaen for military affairs, and 
they did not get along. Individuals kept weapons caches and did 
not share them with JI as a whole for training. Hambali snatched 
fiah (cell) members without informing the relevant wakalah 
heads and used them for operations which bore no relevance to 
their training. In an effort to move beyond egos, reduce confusion, 
and base training on a coherent military strategy, the acting amir, 
Abu Rusdan, approved a single central command coordinating 
post to oversee training and military functions, with a direct 
administrative line through the mantiqis to the wakalahs. Trained 
military units at wakalah level were to be known as thoifah 
muqotilah, the original use of the term. Crisis Group interviews, 
Jakarta, March-April 2006. Only Mantiqi II actually got a training 
program based on the new structure underway in early 2003 
but it was discovered by police in June 2003 and many of the 
participants were arrested. See expert witness testimony of 
Lobby Loqman SH, 12/12/2003 Badan Reserse Kriminal Polri, 
Direktorat VI Anti-Teror in case dossier of Solihin alias Rofi. 
(Loqman refers to the units as thofiah mukhatalah.) 
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alias Tohir, another Ngruki alumnus and Luqmanul 
Hakiem teacher. He was a close friend of Rais and would 
have been trusted completely by the others. 
After the explosives reached Bengkulu safely as 
unaccompanied baggage on an ordinary intercity bus, 
they were stored at the house of Sardona Siliwangi, 
another Ngruki student and JI member. At the time the 
Marriott plot was being hatched, Sardona, who lived in 
Bengkulu, was working with Asmar Latin Sani to set up 
a new Ngruki-like pesantren there, and it was he who 
opened a bank account in March 2003 to facilitate financial 
transactions for Noordin. That said, he does not seem to 
have been an enthusiastic team member; it was more that 
once asked to help, he could not refuse.12 Noordin only 
formally asked him to join in early April, and while he 
initially agreed, he only lasted a few weeks before he 
decided the demands on his time were too onerous and 
backed out. Noordin apparently had not shared significant 
details with him except how to communicate via codes 
and passwords.13  
The police were never far behind: Rais was arrested in late 
April 2003, Sardona in May. The difficulties of mounting 
an operation had to be severely compounded by knowledge 
that the police would obtain more information from those 
in custody but it did not deter Noordin any more than his 
plans for the Australian embassy attack were affected by 
the arrests of close associates just before. 
In late April, another JI member from Riau was drawn in: 
Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhoni Hendrawan alias Gembrot 
alias Idris. He had been involved in the 2000 Christmas 
Eve bombings in Pekanbaru and was a natural choice 
to help, albeit in a relatively minor role: transporting 
the explosives yet again. 
In May, two tried and trusted team members returned. 
Toni Togar, whose reluctance to keep the explosives set 
the whole plot in motion, robbed a bank in Medan on 6 
May to raise funds for the project. Ismail, the Luqmanul 
Hakiem alumnus who had worked with Rais and Noordin 
in the shock absorber repair shop in Bukittinggi, got an 
email from Noordin asking him to pick up some packages 
from a man in Dumai. Ismail did so, and the packages 
turned out to be cash in Australian dollars, sent by Hambali 
via a courier.14 Ismail then got a series of instructions from 
 
 
12 Interrogation deposition of Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona 
Bin Azwar, 28 August 2003. 
13 Ibid. 
14 A book that appears based in part on transcripts of Hambali’s 
interrogation says Hambali arranged for $25,000 to be sent: 
$15,000 for operational expenses, $10,000 for Bali bomber 
families. Conboy, op. cit., p. 229. Hambali’s younger brother, 
Gungun, who was arrested in Karachi in September 2003, 
testified Hambali had secured a promise of $50,000 from an 
Noordin on how to bring the cash from Dumai to 
Lampung.15  
Table 1 summarises the school ties of the operatives: 
Table 1: Education of Marriott Bombers (names in 
bold are those most commonly used) 
Noordin Moh. Top Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998-2002 
Azhari Husin Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998-2002 
Indrawarman alias Toni Togar Ngruki, 1987-1990 
Mohammed Rais Ngruki ,1991-1995;  
Luqmanul Hakiem, 1996-1999, 
2001-2002 
Asmar Latin Sani Ngruki, 1991-1995 
Ismail alias Mohamed Ikhwan Luqmanul Hakiem, 1991-1998 
Sardona Siliwangi  Ngruki, 1993-1997;  
Universitas an-Nur, 2000-2002 
Masrizal bin Ali Umar  
alias Tohir 
Ngruki, 1990-1994;  
Luqmanul Hakiem, 1998, 2000 
Mohamed Ihsan alias  
Jhoni Hendrawan alias Idris  
Ngruki, 1989-1993 
D. THE FINAL TEAM 
On 4 June 2003, in Lampung, the final team was put 
together: Noordin, Azhari, Ismail, Asmar Latin Sani, 
and Tohir. Noordin assigned the tasks. He explained that 
he was in charge, with Azhari as field commander and 
Ismail his assistant. Asmar and Tohir would rent the 
house, buy the vehicles and get the explosives to Jakarta. 
Asmar had agreed to be the martyr. 
When they got to Jakarta, they split into two teams to 
survey four possible targets. Azhari and Ismail examined 
the Marriott and a Citibank branch; Noordin and Tohir 
looked at the Jakarta International School and the 
Australian International School. Eventually they decided 
on the hotel because of the American brand name and the 




Arab in Pakistan, which was sent via couriers to Thailand and 
on to Malaysia where some was to support families of arrested 
KMM members. The money that reached Indonesia may have 
been from the same source. See interrogation deposition of Gun 
Gun Rusman Gunawan alias Abdul Hadi, 20 January 2004 in 
case dossier of Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan alias Abdul Hadi, 
No. Pol BP/04/III/2004 Den Sus 88 Anti Teror. 
15 Interrogation deposition of Ismail alias Muhamad Ikhwan 
alias Agus alias Iwan, 28 January 2004 in case dossier of Gun 
Gun Rusman Gunawan, op.cit. 
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Noordin used only JI members – in fact, a subset of JI 
members who were Sumatra-based alumni of either 
Ngruki, Luqmanul Hakiem or both. The question is whether 
the Marriott bombing was JI-endorsed. That members of 
the central command were apprised is clear: on 7 June, 
according to Ismail’s testimony, Noordin met the secretary 
of the central command, Abu Dujanah (an Indonesian 
national who had taught at Luqmanul Hakiem), and 
Qotadah alias Basyir, a senior member of Mantiqi II who 
had been involved in the post-Bali military refresher 
course. (He appears to have been the only JI person 
involved in that program who went over to Noordin.) 
That evening, Noordin, Azhari and the two visitors talked 
in a hotel, then Ismail escorted them back to Jakarta. In 
late August, after the bombing, Noordin and Azhari met 
them again in Bandung and talked late into the evening. 
Noordin and Abu Dujanah remain at large, Qotadah’s 
whereabouts are unknown and Azhari is dead, so the 
substance of their conversation remains unknown. Either 
Noordin asked Abu Dujanah, as secretary of the central 
command, to get the command’s endorsement for the 
operation, or he simply approached Abu Dujanah, as part 
of the Luqmanul Hakiem circle, believing he would be 
sympathetic to the go-it-alone approach and might be in a 
position to assist. His argument would almost certainly 
have been the one he had tried with Sardona earlier, “Our 
enemies will destroy us if we don’t destroy them first”.16  
As noted, this argument was unacceptable to many JI 
members, who believed the Bali bombing had been a 
disastrous misstep. But Abu Dujanah, according to one 
source, gave highest priority to protecting fellow JI 
members and whatever he thought of the Marriott 




16 Interrogation deposition of Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona 
bin Azwar, 28 August 2003. 
17 Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, March 2006. There has been 
much press speculation about whether Abu Dujanah has assumed 
the role of JI amir. Crisis Group sources say he has not. But he 
is one member of the central command who since 2003 has 
remained in a position to take decisions and, when necessary, 
communicate with others. Zulkarnaen was out of contact; Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir, Abu Rusdan, Ahmad Roichan and Mustofa were 
under arrest; Ustadz Arif was weak. A source suggested Abu 
Dujanah, if left to his own devices, would probably not use JI 
resources for Noordin-style bombings but there is no evidence 
that he tried to stop his colleague.  
III. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY 
BOMBING 
For the embassy attack, Noordin put his team together 
using three networks: JI’s East Java division; the informal 
alumni association of JI schools in and around Solo, 
Central Java; and an offshoot of the old Darul Islam 
organisation based in Banten and West Java provinces.  
Once identified, one or two men from each of these 
networks went through their personal networks to mobilise 
others, relying as often on family, business, neighbourhood, 
professional, or school ties as on organisational affiliation, 
though it is sometimes difficult to make the distinction. 
Affiliation with JI or DI often leads to intermarriage and 
joint business operations among members. But these ties 
above and beyond the organisational structure mean the 
networks can be activated and loyalties invoked whether 
or not the organisation is functioning or an action is 
endorsed by a particular leader. 
For this mission, the most interesting question is how the 
East/Central Java and West Java networks merged, and 
here, it seems, Ambon experience may have been key. It 
came down to Noordin asking a young follower in Solo 
in April 2004 where he could find additional operatives 
with a proven commitment to jihad, and the young man 
replying, in effect, “I know someone in Bandung who 
might be able to help…” That person was Iwan Dharmawan 
alias Rois, who took charge of the logistics and finding the 
suicide bomber for the 9 September 2004 operation. Before 
examining how Noordin established contact with Rois, it 
is worth looking at how the three networks functioned. 
A. THE EAST JAVA NETWORK 
By late 2003, in the aftermath of the Marriott bombing 
and the intensified police activity, Noordin and Azhari 
needed sanctuary. Through October, they hid in the 
Bandung area, but by November had made their way back 
to Solo, where they made contact with Usman bin Sef 
alias Fahim, the head of the JI wakalah for East Java. Fahim 
was wanted by the police for a range of JI-related activities 
and was hiding in the Solo area. But as a respected Islamic 
teacher (ustadz); as head of Darussalam Foundation, the JI 
front in Surabaya, East Java’s capital; and as the wakalah 
leader, he could issue instructions to JI members in 
Surabaya and expect to be obeyed. 
In November, Fahim summoned a man named Son Hadi 
from Surabaya to Solo. A 1991 Ngruki graduate, Son Hadi 
had worked alongside Fahim in the Darussalam Foundation 
since 1997. Fahim told him that hiding Noordin and Azhari 
was a good deed and instructed him to find a place for 
them in Surabaya.  
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Son Hadi returned home and contacted three friends, 
who knew each other through religious study but 
who were also likely fellow members of JI.18 On 18 
November, he rented a minivan with money collected 
as infaq (contributions) from the Muslim community 
in Surabaya.19 He and a friend drove to Mojoagung, a 
town about an hour and half from Surabaya, to meet 
Fahim, Noordin and Azhari. All drove to a pre-arranged 
spot in the city, where the other two friends, one named 
Ismail, were waiting with motorcycles. They took 
Noordin and Azhari to Ismail’s house, and everything 
was fine for about a month. 
Then Ismail’s father decided to visit, and Ismail said the 
men would have to move. Son Hadi contacted another 
friend, Achmad Hasan, who lived in Blitar, also in East 
Java. Hasan had been inducted into JI by Fahim in 1996 
but he also had a commercial connection to Son Hadi: 
their wives ran a business making and selling Muslim 
headscarves (jilbab).20 
In January 2004, another operative entered the picture. 
Heri Sigu Samboja alias Ilyasa was a 22-year-old Ngruki 
graduate and religious teacher at the Darul Fitroh pesantren 
in Sukaharjo, outside Solo. His father, Khumaidi, was an 
Afghan veteran and friend of Fahim’s.21 Fahim apparently 
contacted Khumaidi about sending his son to study with 
Azhari in Blitar. According to Heri’s statement to police, 
his father came to the pesantren where he was teaching 
and offered to send him to study computers and learn how 
to make viruses that would wreck American data systems. 
Heri was not particularly interested; he preferred, he said, 
to go for jihad to Poso or Mindanao. His father said it was 
 
 
18 The three were Ustadz Anton alias Pak Lik, Ismail, and 
Jauhari. Anton was a fellow participant in a religious study 
circle at the al-Ikhsan mosque in Surabaya, where Son Hadi 
was a regular preacher (khatib) and which also appears to have 
been a centre of JI activities. Son Hadi told the police Ismail, 
who agreed to put the men up, was also a frequent participant 
in his study sessions, meaning he was also likely active in the 
JI wakalah. Jauhari was part of the same circle, but his exact 
relationship with Son Hadi is not clear.  
19 Interrogation deposition of Son Hadi in case dossier of 
Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 
January 2005. 
20 JI women appear to be important in supporting the activities 
of the organisation through making and selling Muslim clothing. 
The wife of Agus Dwikarna (a member of Laskar Jundullah, 
not JI) was also active in this business, selling in the southern 
Philippines as well as Indonesia. One factory outside Solo 
reportedly had difficulties when the woman who ran it, the wife 
of a Ngruki teacher, was accused by her employees of paying 
sweatshop wages.  
21 Fahim was in the 1987 intake of Afghanistan trainees but he 
made a visit to Mindanao in November 1987; it is not clear 
when Khumaidi was in Afghanistan but they may have been 
there at the same time. 
very difficult because surveillance was tight and asked 
him to go instead to Solo to see about the computer study. 
Heri left the following day, went to a designated meeting 
place at the house of a religious teacher where he met 
another young man. The teacher then took the two of 
them to see Fahim.22 
“Do you know why you’ve come here?”, Fahim asked. 
“To study computers”, Heri replied. 
“Well, actually to study electronics”, Fahim said. “Are 
you prepared to do this?” 23  
They said they were. It must have been clear to both 
young men that they would be engaged in clandestine 
activity but they may not have known, nor did Heri’s 
father necessarily know, what lay in store. 
Heri went back to his pesantren and asked leave from 
the director, telling him, as Fahim had instructed, that 
he was going to Poso to teach. A few days later, his 
father picked him up and sent him to Blitar, giving a 
number to call when they arrived. The number turned out 
to be Hasan’s, who took them from the bus terminal to 
his house. They were introduced to Noordin and Azhari, 
both using false names, and told that they were there 
to study bomb-making. 
Heri and his fellow student embarked on a month-long, 
seven-hours-a-day course with Azhari in Hasan’s home. 
A few weeks after they arrived, Fahim called Hasan and 
instructed him to go to the main mosque in Kediri, a city 
about two hours away. Fahim was waiting there with two 
other men – Adung, an old associate of Hambali’s from 
Malaysia who replaced him as head of Mantiqi I and 
became a member of the JI central command, and 
Qotadah, the man who, with Abu Dujanah, met Noordin 
before and after the Marriott bombing.  
They all drove back to Blitar, and it turned out that the 
visitors had come bearing gifts: 25 kilograms of potassium 
chlorate and ten kilos of sulphur for bomb making, as 
well as a pistol and ammunition. Not long afterwards, 
another visitor delivered about 30 kilograms of TNT. 
Sometime in early February 2004, Heri and his fellow 
bomb-making apprentice were deemed to have completed 
their studies and were sent home. Adung and Qotadah 
 
 
22 The teacher was Ustadz Hasbi. The second young man 
was Ilyas alias Tukiadi. 
23 Interrogation deposition of Heri Sigu Samboja alias Nery 
Anshori alias Mohamad al Ansori alias Mohammad Nuruddin 
alias Ilyasa als Akhi Shogir alias Jamaluddin alias Azmi als 
Ma’ruf alias Abdul Fatah, 12 November 2004, in case dossier of 
Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 
January 2005.  
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accompanied Heri to Solo. At least at this stage, Noordin 
seemed still to have the backing of the members of the 
central command most associated with Mantiqi I.  
Heri informed his father the next day that he had joined 
for jihad with Noordin and Dr Azhari. Under the 
circumstances, this was unlikely to have come as a 
surprise. He returned to teaching at the Darul Fitroh 
pesantren but stayed in touch with Adung. 
Shortly thereafter, Hasan called Son Hadi to tell him that 
Noordin and Azhari would have to leave his house and 
take their lethal materials with them. At that point, Son 
Hadi called an old friend, Chandra alias Farouk, who lived 
in Pasuruan, East Java, and asked if he could put up two 
guests. Chandra and Son Hadi had known each other since 
1996 when both were studying in Bangil, East Java, and 
had subsequently become partners in a business to collect 
and sell used cloth for industrial purposes – another 
example of JI business ties.24 
After Noordin and Azhari moved to Pasuruan, Son Hadi 
got a call summoning him to Solo to meet with Adung. 
He was told to bring the respected teacher Abu Fida, 
another member of JI’s East Java wakalah and the son of 
the director of the mosque where many JI activities took 
place. The meeting was apparently tense. Son Hadi 
reported that he had moved the two fugitives. This was 
the first Adung knew of this, and he demanded to know 
who Chandra was. He told Son Hadi that henceforth, 
he, Adung, and not Fahim, Son Hadi’s superior in the JI 
structure, was responsible for safeguarding the men, and 
Abu Fida, not Son Hadi, would be the local man in charge. 
He ordered Son Hadi to give Chandra’s telephone number 
to Abu Fida and then sent him back to Surabaya. 
Abu Fida took over responsibility for the two men and 
in April 2004 ordered Hasan to go to Chandra’s house in 
Pasuruan, pick up Azhari and take him back to Hasan’s 
house in Blitar. Heri, the young religious teacher, moved 
in with him. Noordin, who seems to have stayed in the 
Surabaya area, visited him there twice in May and June. 
In May, Noordin asked Hasan’s help in meeting Munfiatun, 
a young woman who had expressed interest in marrying a 
mujahid – a warrior for Islam. She would be his second 
 
 
24 Son Hadi told police Chandra was known as an NII (Darul 
Islam) activist when they were in Bangil, so he may not have 
been a JI member. Interrogation deposition of Son Hadi bin 
Muhadjir, 15 December 2004 in case dossier of Achmad Hasan 
alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. 
Another connection to Bangil comes up below: Joni Achmad 
Fauzan, a man who helped hide Noordin in early 2005 and joined 
him, went to school in Bangil around the same time as Chandra 
and Son Hadi, and was a Ngruki alumnus, so may have known 
Son Hadi there.  
wife; he was still married to Mohamed Rais’s sister from 
Riau. Noordin had heard about Munfiatun through Hasan, 
since she was a friend and former roommate of Hasan’s 
wife when they were university students in Malang.25 
Adung performed the wedding ceremony, with Hasan and 
Abu Fida in attendance. Abu Fida then gave Hasan a long 
detonating cord to take back to Azhari in Blitar. 
By mid-June, Azhari had another bomb-making student, 
Gempur Budi Angkoro alias Jabir, a Ngruki graduate and 
cousin of the legendary Faturrahman al-Ghozi, the JI 
operative and Hambali associate killed in the Philippines 
in 2003. Jabir was one of the two killed in the April 2006 
raid in Wonosobo. He stayed with Azhari until 5 July 
2004 and later became an important member of Noordin’s 
inner circle, reportedly helping recruit the Bali II suicide 
bombers.  
The next day, Adung and Fahim were arrested in Solo. 
When Hasan heard, he immediately took Azhari, Heri, 
and all the bomb-making materials back to Pasuruan, 
where Chandra found them another place to stay. Jabir 
and Noordin joined them a few days later, and they all 
stayed there until they left together for Jakarta on 22 July. 
B. THE JI SCHOOL NETWORK IN CENTRAL 
JAVA 
The second network that came into play was the web of JI 
schools across Indonesia, with three of the most important 
in the Solo area: al-Mukmin in Ngruki; Darusysyahada in 
Boyolali; and Mahad Aly, otherwise known as Universitas 
an-Nur, in Solo itself. Many involved in the embassy 
bombing were alumni of these three schools. 
Table 2: Education of Embassy Bombers 
Son Hadi Ngruki 1988-1991 
Syaifuddin Umar  
alias Abu Fida 
Lecturer, Universitas an-Nur 2000-
2002 
Gempur Budi Angkoro 
alias Jabir 
Ngruki 1993-1996; Darusysyahada 
1996-1998, taught 99-04 
Suramto alias Muhammad 
Faiz alias Deni 
Ngruki 1992-1995; al-Husein 
(Indramayu, also JI school) 1995-
1997; an-Nur 2000-2003 
Bagus Budi Pranoto  
alias Urwah 
al-Muttaqien (Jepara, also JI school)  
1990-1996; an-Nur 2000-2003 
Lutfi Haidaroh alias Ubeid Ngruki 1992-1995; Darusysyahada 
1995-1998; an-Nur 2000-2003 
 
 
25 Interrogation deposition of Achmad Hasan alias Agung 
Cahyono alias Purnomo, 9 December 2004, in case dossier 
of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 
10 January 2005. Munfiatun had been a student at Brawijaya 
University in Malang. 
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Heri alias Umar  
(Ubeid’s brother) 
an-Nur  
Heri Sigu Samboja  
alias al-Anshori 
Ngruki 2002-2003  
 
Urwah, Ubeid, and Deni in the above table were all 
classmates at an-Nur, and Abu Fida had been their teacher. 
In March 2004, according to Urwah, he and Ubeid were 
summoned from Solo to Surabaya by Abu Fida on the 
pretext of helping develop a concept for the construction 
of a new pesantren. They left immediately and at the 
designated meeting place, a house owned by Abu Fida, 
they found their old classmate Deni.26 (Deni was a 
preacher for the Darussalam Foundation in Surabaya 
from 1997 to 2000, meaning he would have been part of 
the JI wakalah under Fahim. He was also known as Abu 
Dujanah’s courier.27) Abu Fida introduced Urwah and 
Ubeid to Noordin. 
Sometime in April 2004, Urwah and Ubeid moved to the 
house in Surabaya and over the next three months engaged 
in long discussions with Noordin about the need to make 
war on kafirs (infidels, understood by many salafi Muslims 
as meaning all non-Muslims) in general, the U.S. and its 
allies in Indonesia in particular.28 There was no need to go 
to Iraq or Afghanistan; the jihad could be waged at home.29 
Noordin stressed that for the jihad to succeed, groups had 
to work together, and one person he wanted to draw in was 
Abdullah Sunata of KOMPAK, who probably knew more 
experienced veterans of the Ambon and Poso conflicts than 
anyone else in Indonesia.30  
It was at this point that Noordin’s ties to the JI institutional 
structure began to weaken. Once he began actively 
 
 
26 Interrogation deposition of Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah, 
21 September 2004, in case dossier of Irun Hidayat, Polri Daerah 
Metro Jakarta dan Sekitarnya, Direktorate Reserse Kriminal 
Umum, 2005. 
27 Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006. 
28Interrogation deposition of Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah. 
op. cit. 
29 Interrogation deposition of Purnama Putra alias Usman alias 
Usamah alias Ipung alias Risqy alias Uus alias Tikus, 14 July 
2005, p. 19, in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia alias Arham alias 
Arnold, Badan Reserse Kriminal Polri, Detasemen Khusus 88 
Anti-Terror. It may not be a coincidence that around this time a 
pamphlet was circulating in jihadist groups that was a translation 
from Arabic into Indonesian of an article that first appeared in 
the al-Qaeda on-line magazine Sawt al-Jihad. Entitled “You 
Don’t Need to Go to Iraq for Jihad”, it was written in 2003 by a 
Saudi jihadist, Muhammad bin Ahmad as-Salim. 
30 Interrogation deposition of Purnama Putra, op. cit., p. 19. 
Noordin did not meet Sunata until after the embassy bombing 
but Sunata appears to have authorised his followers to secure 
materials for the bomb, including the detonating cord Abu Fida 
provided after Noordin’s wedding. Ibid, p. 20. 
recruiting his own people, he further alienated the 
leadership of the JI mainstream.31 
As Noordin, Urwah and Ubeid discussed the need to find 
committed mujahidin, Urwah mentioned Iwan alias Rois 
from Bandung, a Darul Islam fighter whom he had known 
at least since 2002, when Rois came to Universitas an-Nur 
about enrolling his brother.32 Noordin apparently had met 
Rois earlier, in Ambon or Mindanao.33 He ordered Urwah 
to reestablish contact and explore how far he would be 
willing to take part in a jihad. Urwah called Rois in early 
May, and they arranged to meet in Solo.  
Two days later, at the mosque on the an-Nur campus, 
Urwah drew him out on his attitudes toward the U.S and 
its allies and their interests in Indonesia. He concluded 
Rois had both sufficient religious knowledge and the 
proper spirit for jihad that would make him a good 
member of the team.  
Urwah returned to Surabaya and reported the conversation 
to Noordin, who made no comment but a week later told 
Urwah to meet Rois again and to deliver a letter. At the 
same mosque in Solo, Urwah handed over the letter; Rois 
read it, and sent back a response via Urwah. 
We do not know the contents of the letter, but it appears 
to have led Rois, within weeks at the end of May, to set 
up a new military training camp in Gunung Peti, Cisolok, 
Pelabuhan Ratu, West Java, specifically designed to select 
suicide bombers. Most participants had undergone earlier 
training that Rois conducted in 2003, among them Heri 
Golun, who later detonated the bomb in front of the 
Australian embassy. Two weeks into the new training, 
Ubeid’s younger brother, Heri alias Umar, and other men 
from outside West Java arrived. Deni was already there, 
having been sent by Urwah shortly after his meeting with 
Rois in Solo.34 Deni and Umar – who was arrested in 
 
 
31 The JI administrative manual, known as PUPJI, authorises 
working with other organisations but not to the point of ignoring 
the JI hierarchy. 
32 All Urwah says is that he first met Iwan alias Rois in Solo in 
2002, when the latter came to his dormitory at Universitas an-
Nur and left his card, with the name and telephone of the Sajira 
courier company. Ubaid and Rois were in Mindanao doing 
training at the same time but in different camps and may not 
have met. 
33 A source said Ambon but could not remember when Noordin 
was there. Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, April 2006. Urwah’s 
testimony suggests Mindanao. 
34 Deni says Urwah told him he was needed as a religious 
instructor for a month but did not give any details, only that 
Rois would explain when he got to Bandung. See deposition of 
Surampto alias Muhammad Faiz alias Deni alias Ahmad in case 
dossier of Achmad Hasan als Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, 
Jakarta, 10 January 2005. The men who joined the training in 
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early 2006 for withholding information about Noordin’s 
whereabouts – provided the religious instruction, and 
Rois and his wife’s uncle, Saptono, led the military drills. 
The training focused on fa’i (robbing non-Muslims to raise 
funds for jihad), and included simulated robbing of a 
house. Deni said he did not know who organized or paid 
for the training, although Rois testified in late 2004 that 
the funds came from his uncle, himself, and the income 
from unlicensed gold mining in the area.35 
During the training, Ubeid and Urwah visited to see how 
it was going. Urwah gave Rois a mini-revolver with four 
2.2 caliber bullets as a gift from Noordin. 
C. THE NETWORK THUS FAR 
Noordin had thus far drawn on Fahim and his East Java 
network, where one link, from Fahim to Son Hadi, brought 
in at least five and probably six people involved in hiding 
the two fugitives: Anton, Ismail, Jauhari, Chandra, Hasan 
and Deni. All except for Chandra would have known both 
Fahim and Son Hadi through the JI’s East Java wakalah 
and the Darussalam Foundation in Surabaya, although 
there were other bonds, such as that between the wives of 
Son Hadi and Hasan. Chandra was a friend and business 
partner of Son Hadi’s, but it is not clear whether he moved 
in the same jihadist circles. 
The recruitment of bomb-makers appears to have been a 
much more personal process. Fahim appears to have used 
his Afghan connections to get to Heri Sigu Samboja’s 
father and then the son. Jabir had a blue-blood jihadist 
lineage, but he also seems to have been recruited 
individually. 
The friendship among three graduates of Universitas 
an-Nur, Urwah, Ubaid, and Deni and their loyalty to 
their former instructor, Abu Fida, were instrumental 
to setting up the most critical part of the operation, 
recruitment of the field operatives from West Java. This 
link depended on one critical tie, from Urwah and Ubaid 
to Rois, and we still do not know exactly where it was 
forged. But the personal links among the West Java 
operatives are the most interesting. 
D. FAMILY AND BUSINESS IN WEST JAVA 
When Urwah contacted Iwan alias Rois, he probably had 
no idea that he was tapping into a whole clan of Darul 
Islam members. Two families proved particularly 
important for the embassy bombing. One was that of 
 
 
addition to Ubeid’s brother were Dirman, Ade Bahru, Abu 
Roiroh, and Deny Nugraha. 
35 Ibid. 
Rois’s wife, Wiwit. Her father, Awal Purnomo, was born 
in Cianjur, the eldest of nine children. Two of his brothers, 
Kang Jaja alias Aqdam and Saptono, became involved in 
Darul Islam in the 1980s. Awal himself was inducted as a 
member only in 1993, at the age of 39. Kang Jaja was the 
most committed of the three brothers, and it was he who 
began military training of DI members in West Java with 
the help of some Afghan veterans.36  
In 1998, Kang Jaja founded the CV Sajira courier 
company as a three-man partnership between himself, 
his brother Awal, and a third Darul Islam fighter, Heri 
Hafidin, with the idea that the company would both live 
up to the ideals of Darul Islam and provide wherewithal 
for its struggle.37 He personally financed training for his 
cadres in Mindanao and in late 1999 sent a group of nine, 
including his nephew, Rois, and his brother, Saptono.  
Another in that batch was Rosihin Noor, who became one 
of the most militant of the group and the shooting instructor 
in Kang Jaja’s military training sessions. Rosihin married 
into the second big family involved in the Kuningan bomb. 
The patriarch, Engkos Kosasih alias Pak Kamal, was a 
former Darul Islam fighter and commander for the Banten 
area in the early 1960s before Darul Islam surrendered to 
the Indonesian government. He had seven children, four 
of whom died. The three who survived all became 
involved in Kang Jaja’s group. His son, Agus Ahmad, 
was inducted into Darul Islam in 1993 by one of his 
father’s protégés and became an employee of CV Sajira 
in 1999. His daughter, Iis, married Rosihin, also a Sajira 
employee. The youngest son, Iwan Sujai, also joined DI 
and the Sajira company. 
In addition to the players linked to the company, there 
were the three candidate suicide bombers, childhood 
friends from the same village in Cigarung, Sukabumi, 
whose fathers were Darul Islam members.  
Irun Hidayat was also a central figure. Inducted into Darul 
Islam by Kang Jaja in 1987 at fifteen, he was in the same 
class at Serang Islamic High School as Imam Samudra and 
Heri Hafidin, one of the three owners of CV Sajira. He 
became a close friend of Rois, and the two went to Ambon 
in January 2002. Irun became a martial arts instructor in 
the military training sessions run by Kang Jaja and Rois. 
Since 1999, Irun also had been the local head of the 
religious council of the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union 
(Perserikatan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia, PPIM). He was 
to call on a fellow unionist to put up the bombers the 
night before they struck the embassy. 
 
 
36 For a discussion of Kang Jaja’s involvement in Darul Islam, 
see Crisis Group Report, Recycling Militants in Indonesia, op. 
cit., pp. 27-30. 
37 Kang Jaja had a 34 per cent share, Awal and Hafidin 33 per 
cent each. 
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E. MOBILISING THE NETWORK 
As noted, when Rois was approached by Noordin through 
Urwah, he almost immediately set in motion a new 
training camp to select suicide bombers as a way of 
striking at what he called American and Jewish interests. 
On 22 June, Urwah accompanied Rois and his uncle, 
Saptono, to Surabaya where Rois met with Noordin. 
Noordin asked about the readiness of the suicide bombers, 
and Rois said three candidates had been selected. Noordin 
said they would have to be “ripened” through additional 
religious instruction, and designated a teacher, Baharudin 
Soleh, for the job Soleh, who used the alias Abdul Hadi, 
may have been used to “ripen” the suicide bombers in 
Bali II as well. He was killed in the April 2006 police 
raid. He and Jabir – the other man killed in that raid – 
were classmates at Ngruki in 1993-1994.  
On 25 June, Abdul Hadi accompanied Rois back to 
Bandung. An immediate objective was to find a pesantren 
where the three would-be martyrs could get additional 
religious instruction under trusted teachers. In a plan 
apparently orchestrated by Noordin, the pesantren would 
have to take in not only Abdul Hadi and Ubeid’s younger 
brother as unpaid teachers, but also the three candidate 
martyrs – Apuy alias Epul, Didi alias Rijal, and Heri Golun 
– as students. Rois asked Irun Hidayat if he knew a likely 
one. Irun suggested Miftahul Huda in Cikampek, the 
pesantren director agreed, and instruction began on 3 
July.38 
Whatever the plans had been, they were disrupted by the 
arrests of Fahim, Adung and others three days later. On 15 
July Urwah came to Bandung and told Rois that Noordin 
and Azhari’s wherabouts were now known and they 
needed his help to find a new place. Rois went to Surabaya 
the next day to consult with Noordin, and the new priority 
came to be finding a place for the Malaysians and their 
followers in the Jakarta area. On 22 July, Noordin, Azhari 
and entourage, including Hasan from East Java and Heri 
Sigu Samboja, the young bomb-making apprentice, arrived 
in the capital, with all the explosive materials. 
Rois got Agus Ahmad to put up the group at his house 
in Cianjur for a few nights. While they were there, word 
came through that Urwah and Ubeid had been arrested 
in Solo on 26 July. Noordin ordered his group to move 
again, putting Rois in charge of the escape. Rois drove 
Noordin and Azhari to the main mosque in Banten and 
left them there while he went to see a fellow member of 
 
 
38 Deposition of Iwan Dharmawan Muthoalias Rois alias Fajar 
alias Abdul Fatah alias Dharma alias Yadi alias Muhammad 
Taufik alias Rdho alias Hendi in case dossier of Hasan als 
Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005. 
the Ring Banten group, Pujata, who had been arrested and 
detained briefly in November 2002 for helping dispose 
of leftover explosives from the Bali bombs. Pujata was 
understandably reluctant to get involved again when asked 
to help find a place for the fugitives, so Rois went to see 
another member of the Banten group, Fathurrochman alias 
Rochman. He had been detained with Pujata in the same 
case but agreed to help. As it happened, Rosihin Noor 
was at Rochman’s house when Rois came by, and Rois 
told him to see that the explosives were moved and that 
the group at Pesantren Miftahul Huda left immediately. 
Rochman found a house in the Anyer area of Banten, and 
from then on, Noordin and Azhari moved constantly, 
rarely staying more than four nights in the same place. 
On 5 August, at Noordin’s instructions, Rois set off to 
retrieve Heri Golun, who had been selected as the suicide 
bomber, and buy the Daihatsu vehicle that was used in the 
bombing. He enlisted the help of Irun Hidayat in both 
tasks. From then until 17 August, frantic activity – moving 
the principals, purchasing additional materials for the 
bombs and raising funds – alternated with lulls, when the 
operatives went to Internet cafes to pass the time. 
On 17 August, Noordin asked Rois to check on Heri 
Golun’s state of mind. When Heri said he was ready, he 
moved into the house where Noordin and Azhari were 
and slept in their room at night, so they could give him 
additional religious counselling. 
On 23 August, Rois started to teach Heri Golun how to 
drive, and on 9 September, the new driver blew himself 
up in front of the Australian embassy. 
F. THE CONNECTION TO CONFLICT AREAS 
As noted above, how Urwah and Ubeid, the JI operatives 
in Solo, knew Iwan alias Rois and that he likely would be 
able to produce the suicide bombers Noordin sought is an 
unanswered question. There were already well-established 
links between JI and the Banten group before Rois came 
into the picture: 
 Kang Jaja and others in the group had been active 
in Darul Islam before a faction split off and formed 
Jemaah Islamiyah, so many leaders would have 
known each other; 
 Imam Samudra was reportedly a member of both 
the Banten group and JI, and maintained ties with 
his old classmate Heri Hafidin, a leading ustadz in 
the Banten group and part owner of CV Sajira; 
 several Banten members were Ngruki alumni, 
including Abdul Rauf and Andri Octavia, two of 
those arrested in connection with a robbery to raise 
funds for the Bali bombing; and 
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 Iqbal, the Bali suicide bomber, was a Banten, not 
JI member, and left a will saying he hoped his 
martyrdom would help inspire others to restore the 
glory of the Indonesian Islamic State as founded 
by Kartosoewirjo. 
But why did Urwah single out Rois by name when 
Noordin asked him about committed mujahidin? Rois’s 
military record provides some initial answers. 
In mid-1999, Rois became head of the Pandeglang, Banten 
battalion for Region IX of Darul Islam. From sometime 
in 1999 to February 2000, he trained in Mindanao as one 
of nine Darul Islam members from the Banten area funded 
by Kang Jaja. From August to September 2001, in 
preparation for going to “either Ambon or Poso” (his 
phrase, suggesting they were of equal importance for 
jihad), he and Kang Jaja initiated a training course for 
twelve members of the Banten group, to which they 
invited a JI-Malaysian as an instructor. The police broke 
up the course and arrested most of the participants but 
detained them only briefly. He held another training 
course, late 2001 to early 2002, in the hills of Ujung 
Kulon, West Java. In late January-early February, he 
went to Ambon for two weeks with Irun Hidayat to visit 
Banten members who had been inserted into Laskar 
Jihad forces there. From June 2002 until February 2003, 
he was in Poso. 
Eight months in a conflict setting would have been ample 
time for Rois to demonstrate his leadership capacity, 
training skills and commitment to jihad. His name would 
have been known in JI circles. Equally, JI’s reputation 
in Poso as having the cadres most steeped in religious 
knowledge would likely have impressed Rois; it may 
have been the desire to deepen his religious knowledge 
that led him to want to enrol his brother in Universitas 
an-Nur. But the meeting must have made a mutual 
impression, because it was Rois, the individual fighter, 
rather than Ring Banten, his organisation, that Urwah 
suggested for the job. 
IV. NOORDIN REACHES OUT TO 
KOMPAK AND DARUL ISLAM 
There is little indication that Noordin’s band of diehard 
followers had any particular structure at this stage. All 
those closest to him – Ubeid, Jabir, Abdul Hadi and Azhari 
– were JI members, and he continued to draw heavily on 
JI networks. But it was clear that resources were dwindling. 
As noted, since as early as April 2004, Noordin had been 
trying to get KOMPAK leader Abdullah Sunata and DI 
leader Akram to join him for good reasons:  
 both were known as strong, charismatic leaders 
and salafi Muslims; 
 neither was JI but they had significant numbers of 
militarily-trained followers, almost all veterans of 
Ambon, Poso, or both;  
 they had routes to the Philippines and training 
camps in Mindanao that were independent of JI 
and were actively engaged in finding new recruits; 
 they had access to weapons and supplies, from the 
conflict areas and Mindanao; and 
 at least Sunata seemed to have access to funds. 
It was clear that if Noordin could draw in either or both, 
but particularly Sunata, his forces would be considerably 
strengthened. The problem was that neither had shown any 
interest in al-Qaeda-style bombing operations. (Sunata’s 
supply of materials to Noordin seems to have been due 
to pride in being able to meet the request and showing 
his superiority as much as anything else.)  
Sunata’s focus remained the conflict areas. He went to 
Ambon in 1999, ran the KOMPAK office there at the 
height of the conflict in 2000-2001, then moved back and 
forth between Poso and Ambon, recruiting and training 
new groups of young men to fight in both places. In April 
2004, as Noordin was looking for men and material, 
Sunata was watching Ambon erupt in violence and trying 
to figure out how to exploit it.39 He reportedly believed 
the jihads in Ambon and Poso were unfinished, that the 
kafirs there were permanent enemies who if not attacked 
 
 
39 He arranged to have weapons sent from Umar Patek in the 
Philippines to a trusted colleague in Ambon and for a military 
training course, mostly for KOMPAK members, in the hills of 
West Ceram a few months later, apparently in expectation of 
ongoing repercussions from the April violence. See interrogation 
of Abdullah Sunata alias Arman alias Andri, 12 July 2005, p. 8 
in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit. For background to the 
April violence in Ambon, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°32, 
Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon, 17 May 2004. 
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first, would threaten Muslim lives.40 By 2004, after five 
years of fighting, he may have seen the job of training 
men for the conflict areas as permanent, and if the conflicts 
were waning, it was his interest to stir them up. Because 
of his Ambon role, he had good relations with virtually 
every jihadist group in Indonesia and seems to have 
relished the degree to which all sought his help but there 
was no reason to believe he had any interest in joining 
Noordin’s very different kind of war. 
Akram is more of an enigma. An Afghan veteran from 
the same class as Mukhlas (1985), his real name is 
Muhammad Taufiqurrahman. From Temanggung, Central 
Java, he was known by fellow Afghan alumni as 
Shamsuddin. He lived in Sabah for a few years before 
going to Mindanao in 1987 to set up training for Darul 
Islam, five years before JI did so – although Fahim, later 
to become the JI East Java leader, accompanied him 
on the visit. His elder brother, Abdul Malik, a tobacco 
entrepreneur, was also deeply involved in sending DI 
recruits to the Philippines, and both married Filipinas 
(Akram’s wife is an ethnic Tausug). When JI split from 
Darul Islam in 1993, Akram stayed neutral and eventually 
allied himself with another DI leader, Aceng Kurnia.  
Both Akram’s men and his Sabah and Mindanao 
connections would have attracted Noordin’s interest – 
Tawao, the seedy Sabah port and an Akram stronghold, 
was a standard transit stop on a route from Indonesia 
to the Philippines. But like Sunata, Akram had never 
exhibited any interest in attacking Westerners. If Sunata 
was more interested in local jihads, Akram, given his 
background, was almost certainly focused on acquiring 
the military capacity to build an Islamic state in Indonesia. 
A. THE GO-BETWEENS 
Each of the three men, Noordin, Sunata and Akram, used 
subordinates to liaise with the others. Ubeid did this for 
Noordin until his arrest in late July 2004, about six weeks 
before the embassy bombing. It is not clear who, if anyone, 
took his place during the critical period immediately before 
and after the bombing. 
In early October 2004, however, Noordin took on a 29-
year-old Ambon veteran, Ali Zein for the job. From his 
perspective, it was the perfect choice. Ali Zein was a JI 
member based in Solo with contacts to KOMPAK from 
his Ambon days. He often visited the Islamic Centre in 
Solo that was the nerve centre for KOMPAK activities in 
the conflict areas. He was a friend of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s 
son, Abdul Rohim, and had impeccable family credentials: 
he was the younger brother of Fathurrahman al-Ghozi, 
 
 
40 Crisis Group interview, March 2006. 
and his cousin, Jabir, was already in Noordin’s group. 
When they met for the first time in Pekalongan, Central 
Java in October 2004, the first task Noordin gave him was 
to lobby Abdullah Sunata for a revolver.41 
Abdullah Sunata’s go-between with JI was Purnama Putra 
alias Usman, 23, a Solo native who joined KOMPAK and 
went to Ambon in 2000. Usman was so small and 
unwarrior-like that one of his many nicknames was Tikus 
(Mouse), but he knew everyone. He joined KOMPAK 
at the age of eighteen on the invitation of another friend, 
Hari Kuncoro, who later married the sister of the JI Bali 
bomber, Dulmatin. Usman helped produce the KOMPAK 
magazine al-Bayan and some of its many video CDs. 
Akram’s go-between with Abdullah Sunata was a 32-year 
old Bandung native, Enceng Kurnia alias Arham alias 
Arnold. He was an original member of the Abu Bakar 
Battalion and AMIN, the young, disaffected militants who 
in 1999 broke away from the West Java-Jakarta command 
of DI out of frustration with their elders’ reluctance to 
wage a jihad in Ambon.42 Akram arranged training for 
Arham in Mindanao. After ten weeks there in 1999, 
Arham returned to Indonesia and went almost immediately 
to Ambon.  
The go-betweens – Ali Zein, Usman, and Arham – all 
knew Sunata from Ambon, while Ali Zein and Usman 
knew each other slightly from the Islamic Centre in Solo 
and had several friends in common, especially because the 
JI-KOMPAK bond was long established.43 Arham met 
Usman through Abdullah Sunata in 2003. Arham and Ali 
Zein never met but Noordin knew of Arham through many 
other KOMPAK and JI contacts. Although Darul Islam, 
KOMPAK, mainstream JI, and Noordin had different 
goals, they intersected and overlapped through the personal 
networks of their members. 
B. THE PHILIPPINES CONNECTION 
The ties of the above organisations to the Bali bombers, 
Dulmatin and Umar Patek, are an example of the 
intersection. Several months after the 2002 Bali blasts, 
the two fugitive JI members came to Jakarta and asked 
Abdullah Sunata as the former KOMPAK-Ambon head, 
if he could help contact Ambon veterans known as the 
 
 
41 Interrogation deposition of Ahmad Rofiq Ridho alias Ali 
Zein alias Allen alias Abu Husna alias Fuad Baraja, 13 July 
2005 in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit. 
42 See Crisis Group Report, Recycling Militants in Indonesia, 
op. cit., for discussion of AMIN. 
43 For a description of how that link emerged, see Crisis Group 
Report, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, op. cit. The director of the 
KOMPAK office in Solo and the Islamic Centre that housed 
it was Aris Munandar, a JI member. 
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STAIN group.44 Most of that group belonged to Darul 
Islam but Dulmatin and Patek knew they were also 
Mindanao alumni, and they wanted to get to the Philippines. 
The normal JI route to Mindanao through North Sulawesi 
was apparently too dangerous immediately after Bali I; 
Nasir Abas, head of JI’s Mantiqi III, who normally 
arranged travel for JI recruits through eastern Malaysia to 
Zamboanga, was hiding in Poso. Dulmatin and Umar 
Patek hoped to use the only route left, the DI-controlled 
channel through East Kalimantan into Tawao in Sabah, 
Malaysia and across to Mindanao. Sunata agreed to help 
and found a place for his unexpected visitors to rent.45  
Ahmed Said Maulana of the STAIN group was a frequent 
visitor to his house, so Sunata called him, only to find 
that he was one of the few members without Mindanao 
experience.46 Then Umar Patek remembered another 
STAIN member, Arham, Akram’s go-between, whom 
he probably met in Mindanao in 1999.47 Abdullah Sunata 
knew Arham well from Ambon and that he and his wife 
lived in Lampung. After a few calls to learn the address, a 
Sunata adjutant and Umar Patek left for Lampung to 
see if Arham could help get him to the Philippines and 
simultaneously open a new training site for Indonesians. 
Arham agreed, and by the end of March 2003, had 
succeeded in getting Dulmatin and Umar Patek and their 
families to the Philippines. 
The consequences were significant: 
 Abdullah Sunata realised that through Arham’s 
contacts, he could send KOMPAK recruits to train 
with Dulmatin and Umar Patek, both Afghan 
alumni with extensive experience. The fact that 
they had been involved in bombing operations of 
the kind Sunata rejected did not matter; they were 
still expert trainers. He began, therefore, to send 
small groups of three or four, and he himself went 
 
 
44 STAIN is an acronym for State Islamic Institute (Sekolah 
Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri). The STAIN group rented a 
house near this institute in Batu Merah, Ambon, at the height 
of the conflict. Most eventually returned to Java. 
45 Interrogation deposition of Abdullah Sunata, 12 July 2005, 
in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit. At the time, Sunata 
says, they were using funds from the sale of Dulmatin’s 
relative’s car. 
46 Ibid. Crisis Group wrongly stated in the report Recycling 
Militants in Indonesia, op. cit., that Maulana accompanied 
Dulmatin and Umar Patek to Mindanao. He was asked but 
did not go at the time. He went to Mindanao later in 2003 
with Sunata. 
47 Sunata asserts that Umar Patek and Arham knew each other 
in Mindanao in 1999; Arham says he saw Patek for the first 
time when he showed up at his house in March 2003 and that 
Patek asked his help not in getting out of Indonesia but in 
opening a new training facility in Mindanao. 
in July 2003 for a month at Umar Patek’s invitation, 
with a KOMPAK associate, Muhammed Faiz. 
 Dulmatin and Umar Patek set themselves up 
completely outside the JI network in the Philippines. 
They settled in Pawas, outside Cotabato, where DI 
trained, not in Jabal Quba, where the JI training 
camp was, and they had almost nothing to do with 
Wakalah Hudaibiyah, the JI administrative 
subdivision in Mindanao. They did join with at 
least two others linked to Mantiqi I, Marwan, a 
Malaysian, and Darwin, who had fled to Mindanao 
two years earlier.48 They were later joined by Hari 
Kuncoro, Dulmatin’s brother-in-law. 
 Because Noordin was also part of Mantiqi I, he 
saw Umar Patek and Dulmatin as natural allies.  
The result was that the presence of the two fugitives 
in the Philippines strengthened the triangular relationship 
between KOMPAK, Akram’s faction of Darul Islam, and 
Noordin, although the first two had serious differences with 
the third. It also probably strengthened Noordin’s desire to 
get Akram and Sunata on board. 
C. THE MALUKU CONNECTION 
The final piece that strengthened bonds among the actors 
leading up to Bali II was the Maluku connection. As a 
prelude to looking at how all these bonds were activated 
across organisational lines, we can examine three activities: 
the first military training course run by KOMPAK on Buru 
island, Maluku in 1999; the KOMPAK office in Ambon 
in 2000-2001; and a 2004 training course in West Ceram. 
These help explain how lasting personal networks are 
formed but also suggest that once one network member is 
tapped for an operation, it may become easier to get others.  
1. Training in Waimurat, Buru, October 1999 
Buru is known primarily as the island that served as the 
penal colony for suspected members of the Indonesian 
Communist Party during the first half of Soeharto’s tenure. 
But in October 1999, Aris Munandar of KOMPAK’s 
Solo office organised and financed a military training 
course near Waimurat for some 30 people, including 
many recruits from Java. At least four JI leaders were 
instructors: Zulkarnaen, JI’s chief of military operations; 
Umar Wayan alias Abdul Ghoni and Ali Imron, both to 
play important roles in the first Bali bombing; and Muchtar 
 
 
48 Marwan alias Zulkifli bin Hir is the elder brother of Dani alias 
Taufik, arrested in connection with the Atrium Mall bombing 
in Jakarta of September 2001. He is said to be a KMM founder. 
Asep alias Darwin is an Indonesian JI member. 
Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks 




alias Ilyas. All were Afghan veterans. KOMPAK, JI, and 
Darul Islam sent young men for training. 
The Darul Islam group included a West Java man, Hilman, 
reportedly close to Akram; and two men known as Umar 
and Ali. The KOMPAK trainees included Abdullah Sunata; 
Asep Jaja alias Dahlan, sentenced to life imprisonment for 
the May 2005 attack on paramilitary police in Ceram; 
Salman alias Apud, arrested in Malaysia in September 
2003 returning from training in Mindanao; Mohamed 
Saifuddin alais Faiz, who later helped produce the Sunata-
Noordin meeting and was arrested in December 2004 in 
Mindanao; Hari Kuncoro; Dani Chandra, arrested in mid-
2005 for helping hide Noordin; and several others. 
2. The KOMPAK office, Ambon 2000-2001 
All these and many more maintained contact with each 
other throughout the Ambon fighting, with the KOMPAK 
office in the area known as Waihong serving as the nerve 
centre. Sunata became head of the office in 2000 and was 
responsible for distributing food and funds to mujahidin 
and displaced Muslims; in 2004 Asep Jaja, a Buru trainee 
and high school classmate of Sunata’s, took on the same 
role informally.49  
In his role as chief quartermaster for the mujahidin at the 
height of the conflict, Sunata came to know virtually 
everyone in JI and DI and many of the local recruited 
Muslims as well. There were three centres in Ambon at 
the time: 
 The KOMPAK office in Waihong. Sunata 
frequently returned to Java, bringing new recruits 
back each time.  
 The JI house in Air Kuning. A Bali bomber, Utomo 
Pamungkas alias Mubarok, was based there. Ali 
Zein, later Noordin’s go-between, arrived in May 
2001. He first met Sunata during a second tour 
in 2002 and Asep Jaja during a 2003 stint.  
 The Darul Islam house near the STAIN complex in 
Kebon Cengkeh, Batu Merah. The DI contingents 
in Ambon included people sent by a DI elder, Gaos 
Taufik; men from the more militant Abu Bakar 
Battalion (AMIN); and those loyal to Ajengan 
Masduki. It may have been here that Akram, who 
fell in the last category, developed a stronger 
following. One who arrived in June 2000 for his 
first “tour of duty” was Enceng Kurnia alias Arham, 
later Akram’s courier.  
 
 
49 Sometime in 2003, after the Bali I bombings, the KOMPAK 
offices in Ambon, East Kalimantan (Samarinda) and South 
Sulawesi closed, leaving only the offices in Jakarta and Solo 
still functioning. 
The ethic of mutual assistance forged among these groups 
in Ambon later had direct practical results. In 2004, when 
Sunata (KOMPAK) in Jakarta wanted to get a weapon to 
Asep (KOMPAK) in Ambon, after violence erupted there 
in April, he contacted Umar Patek (JI) in the Philippines, 
and got Ali Zein (JI) to collect it from Menado, North 
Sulawesi.50 
3. Training in West Ceram, July 2004 
Perhaps because he was so bound to Ambon, Sunata 
believed the jihad there was not finished. After violence 
broke out there again in April 2004, he resolved to prepare 
more mujahidin to continue it. He organised and financed 
a training course in the hills outside Olas, West Ceram 
– a site used before for KOMPAK-JI training. Many 
instructors were familiar, including at least two alumni of 
the 1999 Buru training, Asep Jaja and Moh Faiz. Two 
of the go-betweens, Usman the Mouse from KOMPAK 
and Arham from Darul Islam, were present. Sunata also 
brought three people from an organisation he had worked 
with in Poso, and a Darul Islam man, Harun, whom he 
knew from Ambon and Poso (and who had worked with 
Ring Banten in West Java). A few locals and “leftover 
mujahidin” – men who came to Ambon to fight but 
stayed on – rounded out the training team. Sunata sent 
about twenty recruits.  
Three features of this training are worth noting: they used 
posters of then Indonesian presidential candidate Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and his running mate Jusuf Kalla 
as target practice; their funding, whatever its source, was 
inadequate to cover the planned two weeks; and many of 
the instructors took part in the attack on the police post in 
the same village in May 2005. But for this report, the most 
important aspect of the training is how it emerged out of 
bonds created more than five years before when the first 
Buru camp was set up. 
D. NOORDIN’S EFFORTS TO BUILD 
ALLIANCES 
All the strands came together in Noordin Mohammed 
Top’s efforts to get Sunata and Akram on board.  
In April 2004, Usman the Mouse went to Surabaya in 
connection with a small trading business he had with 
Asep Jaja’s in-laws.51 He called Abu Fida – the instructor 
at Universitas an-Nur, East Java JI member, and mentor 
 
 
50 Interrogation deposition of Ahmad Rofiq Ridho alias Ali 
Zein in case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op.cit. 
51 Asep Jaja married a woman from al-Islam pesantren in 
Lamongan, the school associated with the three brothers involved 
in the Bali bombs, Mukhlas, Ali Imron, and Amrozi. 
Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks 




of several of Noordin’s young Central Java followers – 
for a place to stay. Abu Fida put him up but the next day 
invited him to meet a guest – Noordin – who asked him to 
be his bridge to Sunata and to tell Sunata that he needed 
TNT, a detonating cord and Rp 500,000 to find possible 
suicide bombers. Usman relayed the request to Sunata by 
email. 
A few weeks later Usman went back to Surabaya and 
told Noordin that he and Sunata were willing to look for 
the material. Noordin, however, also wanted aluminium 
powder and more weaponry from the Philippines, 
including M-16s and rocket-propelled grenade launchers 
(RPGs). Usman again relayed this to Sunata by email. 
In the meantime, he surveyed his KOMPAK friends for 
explosives and eventually secured ten kg of TNT left over 
from Ambon from his former high school classmate, Hari 
Kuncoro, Dulmatin’s brother-in-law. Usman stored this at 
the room he was renting in Solo, and Ubeid, Noordin’s 
then-adjutant, picked it up at the KOMPAK-Solo office. 
In June, Hari Kuncoro secured the detonating cord and 
gave it to Iqbal Huseini, a Sunata man, for Usman. Just 
before Usman left for the military training in West Ceram, 
he gave the cord to Ubeid in Surabaya, at a mosque near 
Airlangga University. The police arrested Ubeid and 
several others in late July 2004, and Noordin was minus 
a chief assistant. 
Plans for the Kuningan bombing went ahead nonetheless, 
and afterwards the immediate need was for place to hide. 
In early October Ali Zein was called by a friend in Solo, 
Iwan, asking him to look for a place to rent in Pekalongan, 
a town on the north coast of central Java famed for batik.  
The choice of Pekalongan would have been linked directly 
or indirectly to Said Sungkar, a key figure for anyone 
involved in jihadist activities in the area. Contrary to many 
assertions, he was not and reportedly had never been a JI 
member, despite family ties to its founder, Abdullah 
Sungkar. He reportedly had been a major contributor to 
activities in Maluku. Ali Zein used Sungkar’s contacts 
to collect donations in Pekalongan for the Ambon jihad, 
including from two men who were instrumental in hiding 
Noordin in late 2004, Imam Bukhori and Ustadz 
Fathurrahman, both members of the Pekalongan branch 
of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). 
The connection to FPI, more known for attacks on brothels, 
casinos, karaoke bars and the like – than for terrorism, is 
probably less significant than that the men were part of a 
hardline pengajian (religious study circle) in Pekalongan 
that Noordin could rely on. It also included Abdul Aziz, 
a high school computer teacher later found to be the 
webmaster of a site set up for Noordin and his followers, 
www.anshar.net.52  
Upon the request to find a place in Pekalongan, Ali Zein 
called Imam Bukhori, asking if a friend could stay at his 
house. Bukhori agreed, and Ali Zein relayed the message. 
Three days later, Ali Zein was called to a meeting at 
Buhhori’s house and found his cousin, Jabir, Iwan, and 
two other men, Zuber and Aiman – better known as Azhari 
and Noordin.  
A week later Ali Zein told Usman the Mouse at the 
KOMPAK-Solo office he had replaced Ubeid as 
Noordin’s assistant. He asked Usman to lobby Sunata to 
get an automatic pistol for Noordin, who had only an old 
revolver. Coincidentally, when Usman contacted Sunata, 
the go-between from Darul Islam, Arham, had just 
returned from Ambon with a Baretta. Shortly thereafter 
Arham went to Solo and gave a small carton in a plastic 
bag to Usman. Usman gave it to Ali Zein, who gave it to 
Noordin. The contents were the Baretta and 35 bullets. 
Ali Zein and Usman met to try to arrange a meeting 
between Noordin and Abdullah Sunata in Pekalongan, 
at the home of another FPI member  
1. Approaching Sunata and Akram 
At the beginning of Ramadan, mid-October 2004, Usman, 
Sunata, Ali Zein and Noordin gathered in Pekalongan.53 
Sunata and Noordin went off in a room together. According 
to Sunata, they discussed their similar perceptions about 
jihad as a pillar of the faith, and Noordin explained his 
plans for further bombings, asking Sunata to work with 
him.54 Sunata said he had to discuss it with others. The 
next day, Usman and Sunata returned to Solo. 
Not long afterward, Noordin, Ali Zein, Usman, and Faiz, 
the veteran from KOMPAK of the 1999 Buru training, 
met in Pekalongan to discuss a program of cooperation. 
Noordin told Faiz to lobby Akram, Arham’s boss, and 
Usman to lobby Sunata. He gave Usman a slip of paper 
with an email address and password, told him to memorise 
them, then to open the email once he was in a different 
city. He then took the slip of paper back.  
 
 
52 One question is whether the group described as a pengajian 
was in fact an organisational cell, since JI members under 
questioning occasionally have used the idea of a religious study 
group to divert attention from more formal structural ties. But in 
this case it may well have been more of an ad hoc group, because 
it is hard to imagine any organisation that could embrace Said 
Sungkar, FPI and militant JI members at the same time. 
53 The material in this section is taken from interrogations of 
Usman, Ali Zein and Abdullah Sunata included in the case 
dossier of Enceng Kurnia. op. cit. 
54 Sunata testimony in ibid. 
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In the next few days, Faiz apparently met Akram in 
Yogyakarta. When he and Usman then went back to 
Pekalongan, he told Noordin that Akram did not want to 
be involved; his priority was getting his own organisation 
in order. Noordin had suggested that all three organisations 
– his, DI, and KOMPAK – conduct a bomb-making 
training, but Akram said no one from DI could take part. 
Usman delivered a message from Sunata that he was 
ready to send people but needed to know when and for 
how long. The next day, Faiz and Usman returned to 
Solo. The training never took place. 
2. Moving to Semarang and Solo 
Noordin by this time was getting nervous about staying in 
Pekalongan and ordered Ali Zein to look for a new place 
in Semarang, Central Java. Ali Zein telephoned a friend 
from the KOMPAK-Solo office, who said Noordin could 
use his parents’ house in nearby Ungaran. Then Ali Zein, 
Noordin, Azhari and Jabir drove to Semarang, together 
with Iwan. Noordin and Azhari split up a few days later 
because Noordin was convinced there were spies around.  
At this stage, Usman called Ustadz Zaenal at Pesantren 
Isykarima in Tawangmangu, Solo, which had been 
founded in 2000, apparently as a Ngruki satellite. Zaenal 
said the group could use a room at the school reserved for 
patients affected by djinn (evil spirits), so Ali Zein, Faiz, 
Noordin and Usman moved in. They told Zaenal that they 
would take care of all food; Noordin was continuing to 
supply expenses.  
For the first two days, Faiz and Usman stayed with 
Noordin so Ali Zein could run an errand. When he 
returned, the first two returned to Solo, where they were 
editing a video CD of the training in West Ceram that 
they hoped to use for fund-raising. They returned after 
another two days when Ali Zein had to run another errand 
for Noordin. The end of Ramadan was approaching, so 
Usman, Faiz, and Noordin mostly sat in their rooms 
reading the Koran. When Ali Zein returned, Usman and 
Faiz asked Noordin’s permission to continue editing the 
video. 
At this point, Abdullah Sunata told Usman and Faiz – 
both KOMPAK people who should have been reporting 
to him – to break off contact with Noordin, so they 
turned off their mobile phones and never returned to 
the pesantren. About a week after Ramadan ended (16 
November), Usman and Faiz left for Jakarta to give the 
finished video to Sunata. Shortly later, Faiz left for the 
Philippines, with the aid of the Darul Islam go-between, 
Arham, but was arrested on arrival in Zamboanga in 
December 2004.  
In early January 2005, Usman the Mouse, back in Solo, 
was asked by Ali Zein to meet Noordin again, this time in 
nearby Kartosuro where he was holed up in a furniture 
factory, worried too many people were around. Ali Zein 
needed Usman’s help to find him a new place to stay and 
suggested Usman ask a KOMPAK friend, Joko Harun. 
Throughout Usman’s meetings with Ali Zein and Noordin, 
he had either borrowed Joko’s motorcycle or asked for a 
lift, so Ali Zein had come to know Joko in the process.55 
Joko agreed, and Noordin moved to Joko’s house in Solo.  
That evening, Usman met Noordin in Joko’s house, and 
Noordin asked him to look for people who could carry 
out fa’i (robbing of non-Muslims in the interests of jihad) 
– an indication that Noordin was running low on funds. 
Usman told him the “Poso kids” were usually up for that 
sort of thing but he had to get permission from Sunata to 
contact them.  
The Poso reference is important. Until then, Noordin’s 
post-Marriott network had been centred exclusively in 
Java. JI unquestionably still had people in Poso but those 
around Noordin in early 2005 who had contacts there 
were from KOMPAK, like Usman. The seeds of the idea 
to bring in the KOMPAK-linked Poso mujahidin rather 
than just Java-based Poso veterans may have originated 
then. 
3. Sunata refuses 
At the same meeting in Joko’s house, Usman mentioned 
to Noordin that Sunata was in town. The next day, through 
messages passed by Usman, Noordin and Sunata met 
again, and Sunata refused Noordin’s original request to 
join forces. That night, according to Usman, Sunata got 
angry at him for continuing communications with Noordin, 
in violation of his earlier instructions.56 
The next day, after Joko went to work, Usman met 
Noordin again. Noordin began by talking about why he 
contacted Sunata, the need to manage operations, allocate 
money and train personnel. Usman told him that Sunata 
had ordered him to break off contact from the time that 
he, Faiz and Noordin were last together, but that he and 
Faiz had not known how to tell him – and he asked 
permission to leave 
 
 
55 Usman and Joko knew each other from the KOMPAK-Solo 
office; both were friends with Hari Kuncoro, and Joko spent 
four months with the latter in Ambon in 2002. 
56 Interrogation of Purnama Putra, op. cit. 
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V. THE LEAD-UP TO BALI II  
From this point, the documentary record of Noordin’s 
movements begins to peter out. We will not have a full 
account until the men arrested after the second Bali 
bombs testify (several are on trial). 
We know Noordin stayed a week in Joko Harun’s house 
in Solo in January 2005. Azhari appears to have been in 
Solo then, in the Laweyan area. Sometime in February, 
Noordin made his way to Pacet, Mojokerto, East Java,57 
where another Ngruki alumnus, Joni Ahmad Fauzan, a 
classmate of Ali Zein’s, put him up.  
While there, Noordin ordered Joko, Joni and Ali Zein 
to survey possible bomb or kidnap targets in East Java, 
including: the Christian University of Malang; Americans 
at an electrical plant, PLTU Paiton near Banyuwangi; 
a synagogue in Surabaya; the owner of a mushroom 
processing company suspected of being Chinese or Korean 
(he was a Chinese Christian from Menado); consulates in 
Surabaya; and the Novotel hotel in Surabaya, whose 
manager was suspected of being Australian.58 
Because of the need to keep moving and stay one step 
ahead of the police, Noordin was not able to go beyond 
the initial surveillance and he seems to have moved back 
to Indramayu, in West Java, where he and Azhari rejoined 
forces. They appear to have been in West Java for several 
months before returning to Central Java.  
It may have been during their stay in West Java that 
recruitment of the Bali II suicide bombers began, through 
the efforts of Jabir, the al-Ghozi cousin who was 
instrumental from the beginning in helping Noordin evade 
arrest. Just as Ubeid helped bring in Rois of the Banten 
group for the embassy bombing, Jabir seems to have been 
responsible for recruiting the man who blew himself up 
at Café Nyoman in Jimbaran, Bali on 1 October 2005. 
Jabir, as noted, had graduated from and taught at the 
Darusysyahada pesantren in Boyolali, outside Solo, a JI 
school. One of his students in 1999-2000 was Salik 
Firdaus, from Cikijing, Majalengka, West Java. Salik 
was in teacher training, a program that in schools like 
Darusyahadah is often a direct line to JI induction, but he 
did not finish.59 Police believe Jabir recruited him, and 
 
 
57 Testimony of Joko Triharmanto alias Harun alias Jek in 
case dossier of Enceng Kurnia, op. cit. 
58 Indictment of Ahmad Rafiq Ridho alias Ali Zein alias Allen 
alias Jamal alias Saiful, No.Reg Perk: PDM2618/JKTSL/12/ 
2005, 15 December 2005. 
59 The program is known as Kuliyatul Mu’alimin al-Islamiyah 
(KMI), and is usually followed by a year of practice teaching 
at a like-minded institution. See “Salik Firdaus Jebolan Ponpes 
Salik then brought in the other two suicide bombers.60 
Salik has the classic JI recruit educational pedigree: he not 
only attended Darusysyahada, but also taught at another JI 
school, al-Mutaqien in Indramayu – where one of those 
arrested in the 29 April raid was also a teacher.61 
Another Darul Islam man who appears to have come into 
the network before May 2005 is Agus Puryanto alias 
Arman. Born in Ngawi, he studied at STAIN in Solo. 
He was an avid supporter of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, 
reportedly taking part in demonstrations in support of 
the detained JI leader in Solo and Jakarta.62 In June, he 
rented a house on the outskirts of the city, in Kartosura, 
Sukoharjo, that he shared with another person, almost 
certainly Azhari, then suddenly left in August before the 
lease had run out. Arman blew himself up when he and 
Azhari were surrounded by police in Malang, East Java in 
November 2005. 
In May, Cholily, a university student from Malang, 
reportedly met Noordin and Azhari for the first time, 
apparently in Solo. Police said he had been a JI member 
since 1999.63 A press report suggests Cholily was 
recruited by Ahmad Basyir, a Surabaya-based KOMPAK 
member arrested in March 2006, but this is not verified.64 
Police, however, said Cholily became Azhari’s apprentice 
after attending a course in Solo with Noordin, Arman – 
the DI man above – and Basyir.65 This may have been the 
 
 
Darusysyahadah di Boyolali”, Antara, 1 November 2005; “Pamit 
ke Batam, Terus Menghilang”, Suara Merdeka, 11 November 
2005. 
60 “Keluarga Akui Foto Salik”, Pikiran Rakyat, 11 November 
2005. 
61 Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, February 2006. The man 
arrested is Solahudin, who comes from a JI family: his brothers, 
Farihin alias Ibnu, Abdul Jabar, and Mohamed Islam have all 
served time in prison for jihadist activity. Abdul Jabar was 
involved in the 2000 bombing in Jakarta of the Philippines 
ambassador’s residence and is serving a twenty-year sentence. 
Solahudin himself is suspected of involvement in the bombings 
of the Atrium shopping mall and several churches in Jakarta 
in 2001. 
62 “Arman alias Agus Puryanto Pernah ajak Teman Kuliah 
Jihad ke Ambon”, detik.com, 21 November 2005. 
63 “Cholily Terus Diperiksa”, Kompas, 23 November 2005. If 
the report of his JI involvement is true, he would be one of the 
few who joined JI from a Nahdatul Ulama background. He was 
a student at Universitas Negeri Malang, formerly the teacher 
training institute IKIP Malang, one of Indonesia’s top tertiary 
schools. 
64 ABC newsonline, 7 March 2006. For police claims that 
Basyir was a KOMPAK member, see Eddy Chua, “Fugitive 
Noordin gives Indon cops the slip again”, The Star (Malaysia), 
13 March 2006.  
65 “Berkas Kasus Bom Bali II Dilimpahkan ke Kejaksaan”, 
tempo.interaktif.com, 24 February 2006. 
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bomb-making tutorial Noordin had been trying to arrange 
when he asked Akram and Sunata to take part. 
In June or July 2005, Noordin and Azhari returned to 
Pekalongan. Abdul Aziz, the computer teacher there, told 
police he was called by Abdul Hadi, the man responsible 
for “ripening” the Australian embassy bomber, asking 
him to look for a house for Noordin to rent sometime in 
July. Noordin told Abdul Aziz to use the house to develop 
the website, but to work with Misno, who became a Bali 
II bomber.  
From July to September, Abdul Aziz worked to develop 
the site on his computer in the al-Irsyad high school, 
Pekalongan. Noordin apparently supervised content, 
which included a long section of “advice” to fellow 
mujahidin from Mukhlas, clearly written after he was 
imprisoned. Abdul Aziz met Misno frequently over the 
two months and reported that the young would-be martyr 
told him not to say anything about the site to Said Sungkar, 
suggesting, indeed, that for all his logistic aid, he was not 
in the inner circle.66 
Sometime in September, Noordin, Azhari and the selected 
suicide bombers apparently returned to Semarang, a few 
hours’ drive from Pekalongan, where they could find 
refuge and more recruits. At the height of JI’s existence, 
the Central Java wakalah based in Semarang was far and 
away the best organised, and despite periodic police sweeps, 
most notably in July 2003, a solid base still existed. It 
included Subur Sugiarto, who became Noordin’s courier 
in the role Ubeid and Ali Zein had played earlier.67 He 
also appears to have brought Semarang-based friends into 
the network, most of them apparently new recruits, not 
ex-members of the old wakalah.68 Subur and three of these 
robbed a mobile phone store in Pekalongan in September 
to get fourteen telephones for the group’s use.  
As plans for Bali II advanced, Noordin conducted training 
on the second floor of the “Selera” restaurant in Semarang 
for the three suicide bombers and Anif Solchanudin.69 
Anif was originally to have been a fourth “bridegroom” – 
the code word for suicide bomber – but he was an Ambon 




66 “Azis carikan Noordin rumah kontrakan”, Bali Pos, 6 
December 2005. 
67 “Diduga Terkait Dr Azahari”, Sinar Harapan.  
68 These included Dwi Wdiyarto alias Wiwid, 30; Anif 
Solchanudin alias Pendek (“Shorty”), 24; Ardi Wibowo alias 
Dedi, 30; Aditya Tri Yoga, 29; Wawan Suprihatin, 35; Hari Seti 
Rahmadi; Sri Puji Mulyono; Joko Suroso; and Reno alias Tedi. 
All but the latter were arrested after Bali II; Aditya Tri Yoga 
was later released. 
69 “Police nab four suspected terrorists in Central Java”, 
Jakarta Post, 10 January 2003 
On 1 October, Salik Firdaus, Misro, and Aip Hidayat 
strolled into three cafes in Bali and blew themselves up, 
killing another twenty in the process. From a base in East 
Java, Azhari seems to have supervised construction of the 
bombing backpacks, while Noordin stayed in Semarang.  
Over the next few weeks, Subur led a short military 
training course for five members of the group on the 
slopes of Mount Unggaran, just south of Semarang; all 
of the participants paid their own way.70 
On 9 November, police arrested Cholily in Semarang as 
he was bringing an Azhari-made bomb from Malang for 
Noordin via Tedi, a member of the Semarang group who 
is still at large. From Cholily police learned of Azhari’s 
hideout in Batu, Malang, and immediately surrounded it. 
During the ensuing gunbattle, Azhari was killed; Arman 
blew himself up.  
Noordin eluded capture in Semarang. He has since been 
traced to Solo; Rengasdengklok and Krawang, West Java; 
Surabaya; and Wonosobo, Central Java. 
 
 
70 Teroris Ditempa di Gunung Unggaran”, Bali Post, 8 December 
2005. 
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Noordin clearly aspires to head a tightly organised military 
machine with cells across South East Asia, designed to 
mount terror attacks on the U.S. and its allies, kafirs, anti-
Islamic governments including Indonesia, and other 
enemies of Islam. He is a long way from that now. That 
said: 
 He can draw on a JI base in Surabaya, Solo, and 
Semarang. In each he has been able to find reliable 
couriers who can reach out to other networks for 
assistance.  
 The JI school network remains important, 
particularly for his inner circle, which is probably 
still linked to the old Mantiqi I; it included Jabir 
and Abdul Hadi, the two killed in the April 2006 
raid. A critical question is whether it also includes 
Abu Dujanah and Zulkarnaen or whether JI has 
fragmented further. 
 Whatever his ambitions, Noordin’s “organisation” 
still seems largely ad hoc but this could be 
changing. Paradoxically, his constant movement 
may enhance his ability to set up cells, even as it 
militates against direct supervision of operations. 
 He may be reaching out to other organisations more 
with Sunata and Akram in jail. There is some 
indication he is attracting their followers. For access 
to experienced mujahidin, weapons and funds, 
contacts in those networks are vital. 
 He will be searching for new couriers to the 
Philippines in particular, and for this he may look 
to Akram’s older brother, Malik. 
 The role of the older JI leaders from Mantiqi II will 
be critical in restraining younger, more militant 
members from joining Noordin. 
 Since Noordin operates on the principle that going 
it alone with a small group is a necessary response 
to the political situation, he may be encouraging 
like-minded groups to do the same, which may 
have ramifications for Poso, in particular. 
 More than ever, controls are needed on what goes 
in and out of Indonesian prisons so Mukhlas, Imam 
Samudra and others cannot give Noordin’s group 
materials, encouragement or radical legitimacy. 
There are numerous indications the capacity of Noordin’s 
group remains limited. Anif Solchanudin, the “fourth” 
suicide bomber, was kept from martyrdom because as an 
Ambon veteran, he was needed to train recruits. If Noordin 
could rely on JI veterans from Ambon, Poso, and Mindanao 
– totalling in the hundreds – he should not have to be so 
concerned about one not overly experienced trainer. 
There appears to be no one in Noordin’s circle with 
the in-depth religious knowledge that traditionally 
distinguished JI from KOMPAK and DI, and there is no 
hint in any of the materials that have come out of any 
attention to daawa (religious outreach). That may explain 
the reliance on Mukhlas’s writings and sermons but also 
suggests limited capacity to attract JI ustadz.  
For the Mount Unggaran training in October 2005, 
Noordin’s courier, Subur, could marshal only eight 
participants, who had to pay for themselves. By contrast, 
KOMPAK’s Abdullah Sunata got twenty to West Ceram 
in 2004, and he financed them all. Reliance on fa’i – 
armed robbery – suggests not enough funds are coming 
from outside or through infaq (member contributions) 
to sustain activities. 
The efforts to survey possible targets in East Java in early 
2005 suggest extraordinary determination to move forward 
with attacks even while under deep cover and the subject 
of one of the largest manhunts in Indonesian history. That 
he had to abort all plans because of the need to keep 
moving, however, indicates there was not sufficient 
strength in East Java to go forward without him. 
All this notwithstanding, the troubling thing is that there 
seems to be no shortage of new recruits, and recruiters like 
Subur Sugiarto or Jabir appear to have had little difficulty 
tapping into their personal networks to find new people as 
needed. We do not yet have a clear idea of the recruitment 
arguments, except that Abdul Aziz, the computer teacher, 
said he joined not because he approved of bombing but 
because he shared Noordin’s hatred of the U.S. and its 
allies. 
It also remains true that while very few KOMPAK- or JI-
trained bomb-makers seem to have joined Noordin, it only 
takes one or two to teach others. Jabir, who apprenticed 
himself to Azhari in 2004, is now dead but the Semarang 
fugitive, Reno alias Tedi, appears in a Noordin-sponsored 
video teaching bomb-making step by step.  
A final note: strengthening networks in Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and perhaps Thailand are going to be more 
important for Noordin, as a Malaysian, than they would 
be for an Indonesian; that he has reiterated the old Mantiqi 
I goal of an archipelagic South East Asian operation should 
not be a surprise. If he can ever again think beyond his own 
survival, this may mean more efforts to communicate with 
Malaysian JI members in the Philippines, reach out to the 
DI members in Sabah, and reactivate old links in Thailand. 
Noordin’s ambitions are too big to stay focused on 
Indonesia but the Indonesian police are likely to get to 
him first.  
Jakarta/Brussels, 5 May 2006 
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Abdul Ghoni  
 See Umar Wayan  
Abdul Hadi  
 See Baharudin Soleh 
Abdul Malik  
 Darul Islam (DI) member; tobacco entrepreneur from Wonosobo; involved in sending DI recruits to the 
Philippines; older brother of Akram; married to a Filipina. 
Abdul Rauf alias Sam 
 Member of Darul Islam (DI) faction called Ring Banten group arrested after the 2002 Bali bombing in connection 
with robbing of a gold store, the proceeds of which went toward the bombing. Serving sixteen-year sentence in 
Bali. Grandson of DI member, Ngruki alumnus. 
Abdul Rohim 
 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s son; active in producing video CDs of conflict; frequent traveler to Pakistan and Afghanistan 
in 2000-2001. 
Abdullah Sunata alias Nata alias Arman alias Andri 
 Head of KOMPAK office in Ambon 2000-2001, sentented to seven years in prison in April 2006 for withholding 
information about Noordin’s whereabouts and illegal possession of weapons. Noordin tried to get him to join 
forces in 2004 but he refused.  
Abdullah Sungkar 
 Founder of Jemaah Islamiyah, co-founder of al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki, outside Solo, Central Java. Born 
1937 to well-known family of batik traders of Yemeni descent; inducted into Darul Islam in 1976, detained briefly 
in 1977, then again with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 1978; fled to Malaysia with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 1985, died 
in Bogor in 1999.  
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir  
 Succeeded Abdullah Sungkar as amir of Jemaah Islamiyah, 1999; head of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, 2000. 
Born 1938 in Jombang, East Java, attended Gontor pesantren, active in al-Irsyad; co-founder with Sungkar of 
Pesantren al-Mukmin, better known as Pondok Ngruki. Inducted into Darul Islam 1976, arrested 1978, released 
1982, fled to Malaysia 1985, returned to Indonesia 1999. Arrested October 2002, sentenced to four years on 
rebellion and immigration charges September 2003; rebellion charges thrown out on appeal, sentence reduced 
by Supreme Court to one year six months, March 2004; on eve of release, charged with terrorism April 2004, 
sentenced to 30 months, due for release June 2006. 
Abu Dujanah 
 Real name Ainul Bahri; native of Cianjur, Indonesia; secretary of Mantiqi II, secretary of central command; taught 
at Luqmanul Hakiem; helped protect Azhari and Noordin Mohammed Top after August 2003 Marriott bombing; 
Afghan veteran. 
Abu Fida 
 Instructor at Mahad Aly in Solo, also known as Universitas an-Nur; member of Jemaah Islamiyah’s East Java 
wakalah; mentor of several of Noordin’s young Central Java followers. Arrested August 2004 for harbouring 
terrorists, later released. Real name Syaifuddin Umar.  
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Aceng Kurnia  
 Native of Garut; head of Kartosoewirjo’s private guard, arrested June 1962; headed effort to revive Darul Islam in 
1969. Installed as commander I for West Java division of DI, 1975. Mentor of Akram.  
Achmad Hasan alias Agung Cahyono alias Purnomo  
 Born 1971, lived in Blitar, East Java; BA in economics; inducted into Jemaah Islamiyah by Fahim in 1996; 
arrested 2004, sentenced to death 2005 for role in Australian embassy bombing. 
Adung 
 Real name: Sunarto bin Kartodihardjo; member of Jemaah Islamiyah central command, formerly driver of 
Sungkar in Malaysia, then succeeded Mukhlas as head of Mantiqi I. Ngruki graduate, detained 1979-1981 in 
connection with Komando Jihad. Arrested Solo 2004 for withholding information about Noordin, sentenced to 
seven years. 
Agus Ahmad  
 First major figure arrested in connection with September 2004 Australian embassy bombing. Born 1973, Cianjur, 
West Java. Recruited by Iwan alias Rois. Sentenced to four years, July 2005. 
Ahmad Rofiq Ridho alias Ali Zein alias Allen alias Abu Husna alias Fuad Baraja 
 Courier for Noordin, 2004. Ngruki alumnus, brother of Fathurrahman al-Ghozi, cousin of Jabir; veteran of Ambon; 
Jemaah Islamiyah member. Arrested July 2005, sentenced to seven years, April 2006. 
Ahmad Sayid Maulana 
 Member of AMIN. Leader of Darul Islam in Maluku. Arrested in Sabah, Malaysia in September 2003; detained 
under Internal Security Act.  
Ajengan Masduki 
 Darul Islam leader whose break with Abdullah Sungkar led latter to form Jemaah Islamiyah in 1993. Died Cianjur, 
West Java November 2003.  
Akram alias Shamsuddin alias Muhammad Taufiqurrahman 
 Darul Islam leader whom Noordin approached in 2004. Born Temanggung, Central Java; Afghan veteran; lived in 
Sabah before going to Mindanao in 1987 to set up Mindanao training for DI members. Loyal to DI leader Aceng 
Kurnia. Younger brother of Abdul Malik. Arrested June 2005 for involvement in mosque bombing in Yogyakarta 
in 2000; sentenced to three yers, January 2006. 
Ali Ghufron (sometimes written Aly Ghufron) alias Mukhlas  
 First director of Luqmanul Hakiem pesantren, Malaysia; Jemaah Islamiyah leader; Afghan veteran; Bali bomber; 
prolific writer of jihadist literature; brother of Ali Imron and Amrozi; sentenced to death October 2003, currently 
detained Nusakambangan prison, Central Java. 
Ali Zein 
 See Ahmad Rofiq Ridho 
Anif Solchanudin 
 Recruited as fourth suicide bomber for Bali Bomb II (along with Salik Firdaus, Misro, and Aip Hidayat). Ambon 
veteran. Arrested November 2005, accused of sheltering Noordin. 
Apuy 
 Alias of Syaiful Bahri; Ring Banten member from Cigarung, Sukabumi, involved in 2004 Australian embassy 
bombing. Initially selected as possible suicide bomber. Arrested November 2004 in Bogor, sentenced to ten years 
in prison, September 2005. 
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 See Enceng Kurnia 
Aris Munandar 
 Head of KOMPAK-Solo office that provided major funding for jihadist activities in Ambon and Poso. In October 
1999, organised and financed a military training course near Waimurat, Buru.  
Asep Jaja alias Dahlan 
 KOMPAK fighter, high school classmate of Abdullah Sunata; trained in Waimurat, Buru 1999, West Ceram, July 
2004; sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in a May 2005 attack on paramilitary police in West Ceram, 
Maluku; married to woman from al-Islam pesantren in Lamongan.  
Asmar Latin Sani 
 The suicide bomber for the 2003 Marriott bombing, Jakarta; Ngruki graduate 1995. 
Azhari Husin alias Zubair alias Zuber 
 Malaysian national; Jemaah Islamiyah member; master bomb technician. Killed in police stakeout in Batu, Malang, 
East Java, November 2005. Involved in Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Batam as well as Bali I and II, Marriott, 
and Australian embassy bombings. Mechanical engineering student, Adelaide University, Australia; 1979-1984, 
studied at University of Technology, Malaysia (UTM); PhD, Reading University, UK, 1990 in property valuation; 
professor at UTM, 1991. Lived in Jakarta 1996; board of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Lukmanul Hakiem pesantren, Johor; 
instructor in Mindanao, 1999; explosives training, Afghanistan, 2000. 
Bagus Budi Pranoto  
 See Urwah 
Baharudin Soleh alias Abdul Hadi 
 Close associate of Noordin killed in 29 April 2006 raid in Wonosobo, Central Java. Selected by Noordin to “ripen” 
the young men selected as possible suicide bombers for the Australian embassy bombing (Apuy alias Epul, Didi 
alias Rijal, and Heri Golun), through giving them additional religious instruction. May have done same for Bali II. 
Married to sister of Ali Zein. 
Basyir  
 See Qotadah 
Bukhori  
 See Imam Bukhori 
Chandra alias Farouk 
 Sheltered Noordin for twelve days prior to embassy bombing, still at large. Studied in Bangil, business partner with 
Son Hadi. From Pasuruan, East Java, may have been recruited as possible suicide bomber. Not clear whether Jemaah 
Islamiyah or Darul Islam. 
Cholily 
 Courier for Noordin, whose arrest in Semarang on 9 November 2005 led to the police stakeout of Azhari’s hideout 
in Batu, Malang, the same day.  
Dani Chandra alias Yusuf 
 KOMPAK member, arrested in June 2005 in Wonogiri for helping hide Noordin; trained in Waimurat, Buru 1999; 
two time veteran of Ambon, also went to North Maluku and Morotai during conflict. D-3 degree from Bogor 
Agricultural University. 
Deni  
 See Suramto 
Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks 





 Real name Joko Pitono. Born in Pemalang, Central Java; Afghan veteran; Jemaah Islamiyah member, taught at 
Luqmanul Hakiem pesantren in Johor, Malaysia; one of most-wanted Bali bombers; in Philippines since 2003, 
target of Philippines Armed Forces bombing raids, November 2004 and January 2005. 
Engkos Kosasih alias Kamal 
 Former Darul Islam fighter, commander for the Banten area in the early 1960s. Three of his children became 
involved in Ring Banten, including Agus Ahmad.  
Enceng Kurnia alias Arham alias Arnold 
 Bandung native; Darul Islam member; Akram’s go-between with Abdullah Sunata. Trained in Mindanao 1999, 
went to Ambon in early 2000. Involved in KOMPAK-led military training in West Ceram, July 2004. 
Fahim  
 See Usman bin Sef 
Faiz  
 See Mohamed Saifuddin 
Fathurrahman al-Ghozi 
 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member; born Madiun, son of Darul Islam member Zainuri; brother of Ali Zein, cousin of 
Jabir; Pondok Ngruki graduate; Afghan veteran, class of 1990; instructor in JI’s Camp Hudaibiyah, Mindanao from 
1995; involved in several JI bombings including attack on Philippines ambassador to Jakarta 2000, Rizal Day 
bombing in Manila 30 December 2000; arrested Jan 2002 in Manila; escaped July 2003 from Camp Crame, Manila. 
Shot and killed in October 2003.  
Fathurrochman alias Rochman 
 Member of Ring Banten, detained with Pujata in the same case. But unlike Pujata, he agreed to help Iwan find a 
house in the Anyer area of Banten for the fugitives (Noordin and Azhari). 
Gembrot  
 See Mohamed Ihsan 
Gempur Budi Angkoro  
 See Jabir 
Hambali 
 Former head of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Mantiqi I; former GPI member from Cianjur; arrested in Thailand, August 
2003, implicated in virtually every major bombing undertaken by Jemaah Islamiyah. In U.S. custody at 
undisclosed location since 2003. 
Hari Kuncoro 
 Dulmatin’s brother-in-law; KOMPAK and JI member; Ambon veteran; now believed to be in Philippines.  
Harun alias Syaiful alias Fathurrobi 
 Explosives instructor for Cimanggis group, March 2004; worked with Ring Banten, helped recruit youths who 
took part in September 2004 bombing. Born Cilacap, Central Java. Took part in July 2004 training in West 
Ceram; helped hide perpetrators of May 2005 attack on police in West Ceram. Previous experience in Ambon and 
Poso as mujahid. Sentenced to nine years by Maluku District Court, February 2006. 
Hence Malewa  
 Born Poso 1979; member of Mujahidin Kayamanya, Poso; took part in July 2004 training in West Ceram; arrested 
Yogyakarta on suspicion of involvement in murder of Palu prosecutor Fery Silalahi; sentenced to twenty months 
for weapons possession in April 2006. 
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 Suicide bomber in September 2004 Australian embassy bombing; member of Ring Banten. 
Heri Sigu Samboja alias Ilyasa alias Nery Anshori alias Mohamad al Ansori alias Mohammad Nuruddin alias 
Akhi Shogir alias Jamaluddin alias Azmi alias Ma’ruf alias Abduf Fatah  
 Born Solo 1982; studied bomb-making with Azhari, helped assemble embassy bomb, sentenced to seven years, 
September 2005. Father was Darul Islam Afghan veteran. 
Idris  
 See Mohamed Ihsan 
Imam Bukhori 
 Member of (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) in Pekalongan; friend of Said Sungkar. Jabir, Noordin and Azhari in 2004. 
Arrested November 2005. 
Imam Samudra 
 Bali bomber, member of both Jemaah Islamiyah and Ring Banten. Sentenced to death 2003. 
Iqbal alias Arnasan alias Lacong 
 Suicide bomber in the 2002 Bali bombings, member of the Banten group, not Jemaah Islamiyah, and left a will 
saying he hoped his martyrdom would help inspire others to restore the glory of the Indonesian Islamic State as 
founded by Kartosoewirjo. 
Iqbal Huseini alias Ramly alias Rambo 
 KOMPAK member, loyal to Abdullah Sunata, involved in getting the detonating cord used in embassy bombing. 
Sentenced to four years in prison, April 2006. 
Irun Hidayat 
 Ring Banten member; high school classmate of Imam Samudra, friend of Iwan alias Rois, went to Ambon briefly; 
martial arts instructor in military training sessions run by Kang Jaja and Rois, teaching martial arts. Since 1999, 
local head of the religious council of the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union (Perserikatan Pekerja Muslim 
Indonesia,PPIM). Sentenced to three years, July 2005. 
Ismail (Muhamad Ikhwan)  
 Luqmanul Hakiem alumnus, worked with Noordin and Azhari in Marriott bombing 2003. Sentenced to twelve 
years, October 2004.  
Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois  
 Ring Banten member, field commander of September 2004 embassy bombing; nephew by marriage of Kang Jaja; 
graduate of state high school, Sukabumi. Trained in Camp Jabal Quba in Mindanao 1999-2000. Ambon and Poso 
veteran. Set up a military training camp at Noordin’s request in Gunung Peti, Cisolok, Pelabuhan Ratu, West Java, 
specifically designed to select suicide bombers. Arrested November 2004 in Bogor. Sentenced to death, July 2005. 
Jabir (real name: Gempur Budi Angkoro)  
 Killed in police raid 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, Central Java. JI member from Madiun, cousin of Fathur Rahman 
al-Ghozi, attended Ngruki 1993-1996, graduated from and taught at Darusysyahada pesantren. He was instrumental 
from the beginning in helping Noordin evade arrest. May have been responsible for recruitment of Salik Firdaus, 
suicide bomber in Bali II.  
Jhoni Hendrawan  
 See Mohamed Ihsan 
Joko Triharmanto alias Harun (Joko Harun) 
 Helped hide Noordin in early 2005. Ambon and Poso veteran. Probably KOMPAK member. Sentenced to six 
years in prison, January 2006. 
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Joni Achmad Fauzan 
 From Mojokerto, helped hide Noordin in early 2005 at a Muhammadiyah orphanage there; classmate of Ali Zein’s 
at Ngruki; undertook survey of possible targets in East Java with Ali Zein and Joko Harun at Noordin’s instruction 
in early 2005. Sentenced to six years in prison, April 2006. 
Lutfi Haidaroh  
 See Ubeid 
Marwan (real name: Zulkifli bin Hir)  
 Brother-in-law of Dani alias Taufik (arrested in connection with the 2001 Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta). In 
Mindanao with Dulmatin and Umar Patek. Malaysian national, said to be one of the founders of the KMM. 
Misno 
 Suicide bomber in Café Manega, Jimbaran, Bali 1 October 2005. Son of sharecroppers in Cilacap, elementary 
school education. 23-years old when killed.  
Mohammad al Ansori  
 See Heri Sigu Samboja 
Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhoni Indrawan alias Gembrot alias Idris 
 Jemaah Islamiyah member from Riau; Ngruki member, involved in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in 
Pekanbaru, minor roles in Bali 2002, Marriott bombings. Sentenced to ten years in prison, July 2004. 
Mohamed Rais 
 Noordin’s brother in law, a Luqmanul Hakiem graduate; Indonesian national Malaysian resident. Inducted into 
Jemaah Islamiyah in 1995; Ngruki graduate; Luqmanul Hakiem instructor; member of Johor wakalah of JI’s Mantiqi 
I. Moved to Bukittinggi, West Sumatra early 2002 with Noordin. Helped in early stages of Marriott bombing; 
arrested in late April 2003, sentenced to seven yrs May 2004. 
Mohamed Saifuddin alias Faiz 
 KOMPAK member, Ambon veteran, took part in 1999 Waimurat, Buru training, July 2004 training in West Ceram, 
helped bring about Sunata-Noordin meeting. Left for the Philippines late 2004, arrested on arrival in Zamboanga 
in December 2004. Currently detained in Philippines. 
Mukhlas  
 See Ali Ghufron 
Muchtar alias Ilyas 
 Afghan veteran, a Jemaah Islamiyah leader. Instructor at 1999 military training in Waimurat, Buru. 
Mukhlas  
 See Ali Ghufron 
Muhamad Ikhwan  
 See Ismail 
Munfiatun 
 Second wife (2004) of Noordin, friend and former roomate of Achmad Hasan’s wife as students at Brawijaya 
University in Malang. Sentenced to three years, 2005, detained in Malang. 
Mus’ab Sahidi 
 Friend of Ali Zein who helped him to find a hiding place for Noordin.  
Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks 




Muzayin Abdul Wahab (also spelled Muzain, Mujayin)  
 Elder brother of Aris Munandar, ustadz and imam of mosque in Cipayung, East Jakarta, mentor of Abdullah 
Sunata. 
Nasir Abas 
 Former head of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Mantiqi III.  
Noordin Mohammed Top 
 Malaysian Jemaah Islamiyah member, former director of Luqmanul Hakiem pesantren Johor; graduate of Universiti 
Teknologi Malaysia. Chief strategist in 2003 Marriott bombing, 2004 embassy bombing and October 2005 Bali 
bombings. No Afghan experience but trained in Mindanao, went to Ambon. 
Purnama Putra alias Usman alias Usamah alias Ipung alias Uus alias Tikus 
 Born Sukorharjo 1981; Abdullah Sunata’s go-between with Jemaah Islamiyah, met Noordin twelve times, helped 
arrange Noordin-Sunata meeting. KOMPAK member; went to Ambon in 2000; helped produce the KOMPAK 
magazine al-Bayan and some of KOMPAK’s many video CDs as well. Sentenced to seven years, April 2006. 
Qotadah alias Basyir 
 A senior member of Mantiqi II involved in the post-Bali refresher training, also the man who with Abu Dujanah 
met Noordin before and after the Marriott bombing. 
Rois 
 See Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois 
Rosihin Noor 
 One of the most militant members of Ring Banten, shooting instructor in Kang Jaja’s military training sessions.  
Said Sungkar 
 A relative of Jemaah Islamiyah’s founder, Abdullah Sungkar, but never a member; based in Pekalongan.  
Salik Firdaus 
 Suicide bomber in Café Nyoman, Jimbaran, Bali 1 October 2005. Born 1981, Cikijing, Majalengka, West Java. 
Went to Darusyahadah, taught at al-Mutaqien pesantren Cirebon.  
Salman alias Apud 
 KOMPAK trainee, arrested in Malaysia in September 2003 returning from training in Mindanao. 
Saptono 
 Uncle of Iwan Dharmawan’s wife, instructor in military training camp set up by Rois in Gunung Peti, Cisolok, 
Pelabuhan Ratu, West Java.  
Sardona Siliwangi alias Dona bin Azwar 
 Jemaah Islamiyah member, Ngruki graduate from Bengkulu; house there was used to store the explosives for 
Marriott bombing. Opened a bank account in March 2003 to facilitate financial transactions for Noordin. Arrested 
in May 2003, sentenced to ten years, February 2004, reduced to eight on appeal. 
Son Hadi 
 Born 1977, Pasuruan, east Java; Ngruki graduate, worked alongside Fahim in the Darussalam Foundation – and 
thus presumably as a member of the Jemaah Islamiyah wakalah – since 1997. Sentenced to four years, May 2005. 
Subur Sugiarto 
 Arrested January 2006, suspected of having made video of Bali II suicide bombers’ last testaments. Became 
Noordin’s courier and Semarang coordinator in 2005, after arrest of Ali Zein. Robbed a mobile phone store in 
Pekalongan in September 2005 and made off with fourteen telephones for group’s use. After bombing, led a short 
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military trainning course on the slopes of Mount Ungaran, just south of Semarang. Reportedly Jemaah Islamiyah 
since 1999. 
Sunata  
 See Abdullah Sunata 
Suramto alias Mohammad Faiz alias Deni alias Ahmad 
 Born Sukoharjo 1979. Courier for Abu Dujanah, graduate of Ngruki, Pesantren al-Husein, Indramayu (also 
a Jemaah Islamiyah school); and Universitas an-Nur. Worked as a preacher for the Darussalam Foundation 
in Surabaya 1997-2000.  
Syaifuddin Umar  
 See Abu Fida 
Taufikurrahman  
 See Akram 
Tohir (Real name: Masrizal bin Ali Umar) 
 Attended Ngruki 1990-1994, inducted into Jemaah Islamiyah upon graduation, went to Luqmanul Hakiem as 
teacher 1998, sent for military training to Mindanao, returned to Luqmanul Hakiem in 2000. Sentenced to ten years 
in September 2004 for role in Marriott bombing. 
Toni Togar alias Indrawarman 
 Jemaah Islamiyah member based in Medan, North Sumatra, involved in Christmas Eve 2000 bombings. His 
nervousness about storing leftover explosives from that operation led Noordin to plot the Marriott bombing. 
Ngruki graduate, 1987-1990. Sentenced to twelve years, May 2004. 
Ubeid (real name: Lutfi Hudaeroh) 
 Courier for Noordin; arrested in July 2004; Ngruki, Darusyahadah, and An-Nur graduate. Born 1979, Ngawi, East 
Java. Jemaah Islamiyah member, Mindanao veteran. Fluent in Arabic. Sentenced three and a half years, May 2005. 
Umar alias Heri 
 Younger brother of Ubeid, above. Helped with military training of embassy bombing suspects. Jemaah Islamiyah 
member, arrested January 2006. 
Umar Patek 
 Bali bomber, Jemaah Islamiyah member, working with Dulmatin in Mindanao; married to a Balik Islam Filipina. 
Umar Wayan alias Abdul Ghoni 
 Jemaah Islamiyah, Afghan veteran, an instructor for military training course near Waimurat, Buru, Maluku 1999; 
involved in the first Bali bombing, sentenced to life imprisonment, 2004. 
Urwah (real name: Bagus Budi Pranoto) 
 Helped bring Iwan alias Rois on board for Noordin-led embassy bombing operation, 2004. Attended al-Mutaqien 
pesantren, Jepara, Mahad Aly (Universitas an-Nur, Solo). Sentenced to three and a half years, May 2005. 
Usman (the Mouse) 
 See Purnama Putra 
Usman bin Sef alias Fahim 
 Head of Jemaah Islamiyah’s East Java wakalah, helped protect Noordin after Marriott, got him additional 
explosives. 
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Zulkarnaen (real name: Aris Sumarsono)  
 Head of Jemaah Islamiyah’s military operations, member of central command; in hiding since 2002 Bali bombs. 
Afghan veteran, served as instructor at military training course near Waimurat, Buru. Ngruki student 1975-1980, 
originally from Sragen, Central Java. 
Zulkifli bin Hir  
 See Marwan 
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The Attachment #6: The Elaborate Information on the Most Influential Modern 
Radical Leaders 
1. The Founders1 
 Hasan al-Banna Abul ala Mawdudi Sayyid Qutb 
Birth -  Death 1906 - 1949 1903 - 1979 1906 - 1965 
Nationality Egyptian Indian Egyptian 




the Quran by age 10. 
Religious education 
focused on Islamic 
languages: Arabic 
and Farsi. His native 
language is Urdu. 
Religious education at 
Al-Azhar; memorized 
Quran by age 10. 
Name of Group Founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, 
the first modern 
Muslim radical group, 
1928 
Founder of Jema’at e-
Islami, 1941 
Member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, 1950 
Key Publication Al Aqaa’id (The 
Principles), Our 
Message 




Let Us Be Muslims 
Milestone Along the 
Road (1964, written 
from prison) and 
many others. 
Crime Assassinations of 
enemies of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, 







leaders of Pakistan in 




government, author of 
Milestone Along the 
Road 




Old age Execution by Egyptian 
government, 1965 
Age of Death 43 76 59 
Status of Group 
Today 
Still working to 
establish Islamic 
government and law 
but have abandoned 
violence and use 
preaching and politics 
instead. 
Supported the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, 
Osama bin Laden and 
Al-Qaeda. Killed 
journalist Daniel Pearl 
Still working to 
establish Islamic 
government and law 
but have abandoned 
violence and use 
preaching and politics 
instead. 
Source: Gabriel (2006, 18) 
                                                          
1 These men were scholars of Islam, and through great organization skills and deeply inspirational writing, 
they spread a return to Islamic fundamentalism starting in the late 1920s. Their call for jihad was clear but 
sophisticated. Many conservative Muslim Web sites make their writings available in Arabic, English, and 
other languages. 
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2. The Evangelists2 
 
 Dr. Salah Sariah Shokri Mustafa Abdul Salam Faraj 
Birth/death 1933 - 1975 1942 - 1978 1954 - 1982 
Nationality Palestinian Egyptian Egyptian 





Name of Group Started Egyptian 






and Flight), 1971 
Helped to start 
Egyptian Al-Jihad 
(branch of Al-Gama’a 
al-Islamiyyah), 1979 
Key Publication The Message of 
Faith, 1973 
Al Kalafa (The 
Leader); transcript of 
legal defense, 1978 
The Abandoned Duty, 
1981 
Unique Message Detailed argument 
that Muslims in 
general have fallen 
into apostasy 
Separation from 
infidel Muslim society; 
intolerant of anyone 
not involved in al-
Takfir wal-Hijra 
Detailed argument 
that jihad is the only 
effective way to 
establish Islamic 
government and law 
Crime Invaded military 
training school in 
Cairo, 1974 
Kidnapped and killed 
moderate Muslim 
preacher, 1977 
Helped to plan 
assassination of 
Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat, 1981 
Type of Death Executed by Egyptian 
government 
Handed by Egyptian 
government 
Executed by Egyptian 
government 
Age of Death 41 36 28 
Status of Group 
Today 
Banned in Egypt, 
legal in England. 
Arabic Web site in 
2005 called for 
“physical battle 
against the infidel 
rulers in the Islamic 
world.” British branch 
claims to reject 
violence. 
Active in most Arab 
nations. Al-Qaeda 
leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri and Iraqi 
terrorist leader al-
Zarqawi are thought 





Qaeda under the 
leadership of Ayman 
al-Zawahiri. 
Source: Gabriel (2006, 28) 
 
 
                                                          
2 These men took the writings of the founders to heart and gave their lives to put them into practice during 
the 1970s and 1980s. The life cycle of these writers was to become committed to radical Islam, found 
their own radical group, write a manifesto of their position, carry out an attack against the government, get 
captured, go on trial, and be executed. These writings are rarely available in English or analyzed in depth, 
but they are fueling the next generation of radicals (so-called the evangelists). 
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3. The Prisoners3 
 
 Abod Zoummar Karam Zohdy Assim Abdul 
Maghed 
Birth 1946 1952 Unknown 
Nationality Egyptian Egyptian Egyptian 
Education Military Agricultural engineer Civil engineer 






Key Publication Author of the Strategy 
of Al-Jihad; coauthor 
of the Constitution of 
Al-Jihad, 1986 
Coauthor of the 
Constitution of Al-
Jihad, 1986 
Coauthor of the 
Constitution of Al-
Jihad, 1986 
Original Message Overturn immoral 
ruler; fig those who 
oppose Shari’a Law; 
establish caliphate 
Overturn immoral 
ruler; fig those who 
oppose Shari’a Law; 
establish caliphate 
Overturn immoral 
ruler; fig those who 



















1981 – 2011 (30 
years). He was 
released right after 
the Egyptian 
revolution. 
1981 – 2003 (22 
years). He was 51 
years old when he 
was released. 
1981 – 2003 (22 
years) 
Current Philosophy Ran for president of 
Egypt on a 50-point 
program; still 
committed to original 
goals 
Leading Al-Gama’a 
al-Islamiyyah to reject 
violence in favor of 
nonviolent 
persuasion; still 
committed to original 
goals 
Leading Al-Gama’a 
al-Islamiyyah to reject 
violence in favor of 
nonviolent 
persuasion; still 
committed to original 
goals 






                                                          
3 This group is different from the evangelists because they were not executed for their attacks against 
government. Instead, they were kept in prison, where they wrote two manuscripts in the 1980s defending 
their jihad against Egyptian authority.  
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4. The Aristocrats4 
 
 Osama bin Laden Ayman al-Zawahiri 
Birth 1957, the 17th of 52 brothers and 
sisters borne by multiple wives 
1951 
Birth Place Saudi Arabia Egypt 
Family Background His father came from Yemen to 
Saudi Arabia around 1930 as a 
laborer. From that beginning, the 
bin Laden family built the largest 
construction company in the 
kingdom and was awarded 
contracts to renovate the three 
holiest mosques in the Islamic 
world. 
Zawahiri’s family was 
distinguished both on his father’s 
and mother’s side. His grandfather 
was the imam of Al-Azhar Mosque 
in Cairo, and his father was a 
professor of pharmacology. His 
maternal grandfather was 
president of Cairo University and 
ambassador for the Egyptian 
government. 
Education Public administration degree from 
King Abdul-Aziz University in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 1981 
MD degree from Cairo University, 
cum laude 
Name of Group Founded Al-Qaeda in 1988 to 
channel fighters and funds to jihad 
in Afghanistan 
Second in command of Al-Qaeda; 
leader of Egyptian Al-Jihad, which 
began to merge with Al-Qaeda in 
1998 
Imprisonment None Arrested and imprisoned in 1981 
after assassination of Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat. Released 
in 1984. He was hardened and 
radicalized by torture and poor 
conditions in prison. 
Key Publication Fatwa Against Jews and 
Crusaders, 1998 
Letter to America, 2000  
(These documents were 
authorized by bin Laden but not 
necessarily written by him entirely) 
Knights Under the Banner of the 
Prophet (his memoirs, 2001)  
Healing the Chest of the Believer 
(1986) 
The Prohibiting Word 
Unique Message Attack the far enemy instead of 
the near enemy 
Use of suicide bombers as a 
primary method of attack 
Jihad Activity Started at the age of 22 in 
Afghanistan; total of 26 years to 
date. 
Started at the age of 16 in Egypt, 
total of 38 years to date. 
Personal Life Three of four wives; at least fifteen 
children 
One wife; daughters and a son 
Source: Gabriel (2006, 42) 
 
                                                          
4 In the late 1980s, two new leaders became prominent in radical Islam. Unlike their predecessors, they 
were men of privilege and means. After successfully pushing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan, they 
turned their sites toward a new target and masterminded the attacks of 9/11.  
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The Attachment #7: The Four Major Caliphates of Islamic History 
A.H. 11 – 40  
(A.D. 632 – 661) 
The Four Rightly Guided Caliphs 
 
1. Abu Bakr 
2. Umar ibn Al-Khattib 
3. Uthman bin-Affan 
4. Ali ibn Abu Talib 
a. Ali and the governor of Syria, 
Muawiyya had different arguments 
about punishing a rebel group called 
the Kharijites who killed the third 
caliph. 
b. Islam torn into two parts (the Sunni 
led by Muawiyya and the Shiite led by 
Ali). 
c. They fought many battles, but in the 
end, Ali was killed and Muawiyya took 




A.H. 41 – 132 




a. Muawiyya passed the throne to his son 
Yazid. 
b. Yazid defeated a rebel group led by Al-
Hussein ibn Ali, who was prophet 
Muhammad’s grandson (from Fatima, 
prophet Muhammad’s daughter). 
c. Yazid beheaded Al-Hussein ibn Ali. 
d. The merciless tactics of the Umayyad 
family created powerful opposition against 
them all, ending with the last caliph, who 
was assassinated in southern Egypt by 
the Abbasids, a rebel group loyal to 
prophet Muhammad’s family. The dynasty 
lasted ninety years. 
 
90 years 
A.H. 132 – 656 
(A.D. 750 – 1258) 
Abbasid State 
(defeated by Mongols in A.H. 656/A.D. 1258) 
 
a. The house of prophet Muhammad, known 
as the Abbasid State, made the complete 
destruction of the Muawiyya line their top 
priority after the Abbasid State took over 
the empire. 
b. Under the fifth caliph of Abbasid State, 
Harun al-Rashid, the Abbasid established 
the House of Wisdom (Bayt al-Hikma) in 
Baghdad in present-day Iraq, and during 
his rule Baghdad began to flourish as a 
508 years 
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center of knowledge, culture and trade. 
The House of Wisdom also collected the 
works produced by Judeo-Christian-
Greek cultures. Al-Rashid ruled from 786 
to 809, during the peak of the Islamic 
Golden Age. His time was marked by 
scientific, cultural, and religious 
prosperity. Islamic art and music also 
flourished significantly during his reign.  
c. During the Abbasids, the Islamic empire 
experienced many internal divisions that 
developed into independent states, such 
as the Fatimites and Mamluks in Egypt 
and the Jobians in Egypt, Syria, and 
northern Iraq. 
d. While the internal struggle produced 
divisions, the external pressure of the 
Crusades produced powerful feelings of 
unity. 
e. The weakened Abbasid State finally 
succumbed to an invasion by the Mongols 
and dissolved in A.D. 1258. As the 
Muslims lived for the first time under 
foreign authority, the call to return to the 
roots of Islam continued.  
f. Ten years after the Mongols took over, 
Ibn Taymiyyah was born (A.H. 661/A.D. 
1268). Later in his life after working as a 
teacher, scholar, imam, preacher, and 
writer he became outspoken on two 
topics (the Sufism theology and Mongols 
accepting of Islam). Consequently, it 
caused him at odds with everyone (the 
Sufi Muslims, the Sunni Muslims, and the 
Mongol rulers). One of his fundamental 
arguments is if a government refuses any 
part of Islamic law, then that government 
has chosen to follow man instead of 
Allah. Therefore, whether that 
government claims to be Muslim or not, it 
must be fought. For a radical Muslim, Ibn 
Taymiyyah is a role model because he 
did not do things to make people or 
leaders happy. Within the bounded 
rationality of a radical Muslim, Ibn 
Taymiyyah was not politically correct. He 
merely stood upon the Quran and the life 
of prophet Muhammad alone.  
 
(A.D. 1301 – 1924) Ottoman Empire 
(dismantled by Kamil Attaturk in 1924) 
623 years 
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a. The Ottoman Empire was established 
during the life of Ibn Taymiyyah. 
b. This empire destroyed the Eastern 
Roman Empire and took control of its 
capital, Constantinople (which is modern-
day Istanbul) and converting one of the 
world’s largest Christian cathedrals (Aya 
Sophia) into a mosque. 
c. Employed thirty-six caliphs.  
d. As the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 
1924, from the mind of some segments of 
Islamic world it was caused by the 
Western attack of weakening Ottoman 
Empire with intellectual weapons, 
preaching freedom, democracy, and 
human rights.  
e. This environment produced the Great 
Awakening of Islam, led by the Founders, 
Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in 
Egypt and Abul ala Mawdudi in India. The 
intellectual works of these founders are 
then developed by the next generations of 
Islamist radical leaders with global 
influence in the second half of 20th 
century and in the early 21st century. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Gabriel (2006) 
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